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The dilemma of the democratic State in Africa

SIMÃO NHAMBI

This edition comes out at a time when in the latest general election held on 15 October, Mozambique made history by electing the first president who has not been directly involved in the war of liberation. After Samora Machel, Joaquim Chissano and Armando Guebuza, Filipe Jacinto Nyusi will become the country's fourth president. The election of Filipe Nyusi opens a way for him to lead the historic ruling party, Frelimo.

While one can look at the election of the new president of Mozambique as a simple democratic process, it should be noted that the dynamic of the democratic state imposes the need of leadership to be more innovative and outreaching and to develop economic and social policies to meet the demands of the masses. The greatest challenge that any leadership, in Africa, face (Mozambique is not an exception) is the ability to maintain peace and political stability as well as the ability to develop and implement social and economic policies that are inclusive and responsive to the short, medium and long term needs of the country.

This dynamic includes, among others, the ability to develop a bilateral partnership that will help the country raise its productivity and build its democratic institutions. In their article entitled *Look East or Look Least? The Zimbabwean Experience of Chinese Economic Investment in Selected Texts and Examples*, in this issue, Theresia Mdlongwa, James Hlongwana & Thamsanqa Moyo, try to capture the relevance of this approach. The paper looks at how the leadership of Zimbabwe has assumed a new position on public policy amid the economic crises in Zimbabwe since 1999. The country's choice of allies, especially China, as the principal 'development' partner is examined here. The implication of labour relations and practices between the Chinese investors in Zimbabwe and their interference in domestic politics and policies, define Zimbabwe's preference for China as the country's economy battles the imposed economic sanctions by the West.

In a well-rooted system of democratic institutions, the failure to orchestrate economic and social development and unethical practices by the elected officials can be costly to incumbent presidents. The article demonstrates how acts of corruption, and or, systematic violation of the law are confronted by the watchdogs of the country: the opposition parties, civil society and the mass media to remove the legitimacy once earned by votes. Impeachment as an accountability measure in a presidential system? Nigeria's Fourth Republic is the main topic of the second article in this edition from Omololu Fagbadebo and Suzanne Francis. As the topic suggests, the authors bring to the readers' consciousness the idea of impeachment of elected officials, especially the president. 'One of the mechanisms to mitigate abuse of power is the legislative authority to remove erring executives through the impeachment process' This argument is woven into the web of other arguments constructed in the paper about legitimacy, elites and power relations between the people and the political actors.



Undoubtedly, the question of power relations between the elite and the people, among others, is linked with the issue of inequality and inequity. According to Bob Muchabaiwa, children in the African continent are the most affected by this social menace. Therefore, *'Dimensions, Dynamics and Pathways of Addressing Inequality and Inequity Amongst Children in Africa'*, is the third article in this edition. Muchabaiwa raises some policy questions and evidence to demonstrate how children are highly affected by inadequate public policies, especially when they fail to guarantee reasonable childhood development and security. The author raises awareness of the fact that inequality among children is multi-dimensional and he suggests policy options for African states.

Sithembiso Myeni provides a valuable contribution to the policy debate of anchoring the concepts of representation and participation. The author of the article entitled *Representation without Participation: Dilemmas of Quotas for Women in Post-apartheid South Africa* is concerned about how the democratic system in South Africa has brought about the policies of representation and yet falls short on nurturing participation. Although women gained access to different political layers such as national legislatures and municipal councils through the quota system, their representation in the decision-making process has yet to be secured.

Finally, it is a common understanding that the process of state-building in Africa encompasses many elements. The quest for the sovereignty of the African State has been challenged by the undeniable link of the African State with slavery and colonisation. The accounts of those remarkable moments tend to be exogenous and misrepresented. Olufemi Badru and Adetutu Omotoso, in the last article presented in this edition, debate the idea of *A Holistic Philosophy of Emancipation and the Post-colonial African State*. The authors are mainly concerned with the application of evolving approaches to mitigate what they refer to as the 'intellectually impoverished scholastic discussion' on the African State.

Perhaps the old question could be asked: Who is positioned to give an accurate account of the evolving relationship between the state and democratic forces in Africa? The papers presented in this issue offer interesting perspectives on various dimensions of this publication. We hope you will enjoy reading them and also hope that the policy recommendations presented by the authors will make useful contributions to policymakers and other political actors.

Look East or Look Least? The Zimbabwean Experience of Chinese Economic Investment in Selected Texts and Examples

THAMSANQA MOYO, THERESIA MDLONGWA & JAMES HLONGWANA

Abstract

Imaginative writers capture the vicissitudes, vagaries, failures and successes of the society in which they are produced faster than historians do. A great deal of fictional works have been produced that analyse the causes, manifestations and effects of the Zimbabwean crisis on their politics. One side effect of the crisis that some artists have grappled with is the 'Look East Policy' promulgated by Robert Mugabe in 2005. This was a policy shift necessitated by the break down in relations between Zimbabwe and most of the Western countries because of deficits in governance, human rights democracy and the inauguration of the politics of coercion. Due to the fact that the policy was foisted on Zimbabwe by circumstances that leadership did not foresee, it was replete with abuses of labour laws, extraction of mineral resources, and the flooding of cheap goods to the detriment of local industries and its people. In this research paper, we argue that though there could have been positive spinoffs to the policy, writers who have so far analysed this policy see it as skewed in the sense that China seems to be benefiting more than Zimbabwe is. We argue that friendship with China is a form of latter day colonialism and was motivated less by national interests than by the fact that Zimbabwe found herself in a cul de sac. To the extent that Zimbabwe was forced to look in one direction for political and economic succour, she was forced to look least among the community of nations that used to respect her. This is why there is talk in the country about engaging the West again. The research limits itself to the analysis of fictional works, which are still few, that narrativise the reality of Chinese investment in Zimbabwe. We use No Violet Bulawayo's We Need new Names, Gappah's An Elegy for Easterly, Eppel's White Man Crawling and his poem 'Ghostly Galleon'. We conclude that modern-day foreign policy is never to look south, east, west or north, but realise that there are no permanent friends anywhere, only interests. We argue that looking to China as the only giant international friend for Zimbabwe has economically diminished the country's options and this has become an albatross around its neck. There is a need to revisit the so-called policy so that it is in the national interest.

KEYWORDS: Policy, Zhing-zhong, fine-weather friend, Look Least, Asian giant; sanctions

Sumário

Escritores imaginativos captam as vicissitudes, caprichos, fracassos e sucessos da sociedade onde eles são produzidos mais rápido do que os historiadores o têm feito. Uma grande quantidade de obras de ficção que foram produzidas faz análises das causas, acções e efeitos da crise do



Zimbabwe em suas políticas. Um efeito colateral da crise que alguns autores têm se confrontado com ele é “Look East Policy,” promulgado por Robert Mugabe em 2005. Esta foi uma mudança de política necessária em virtude da quebra nas relações entre o Zimbabwe e a maioria dos países ocidentais por causa de problemas de governação, democracia e direitos humanos, e a introdução da política de coerção. Contudo, a liderança não previa as consequências que esta política teria no que diz respeito aos benefícios reais do país. Como resultado disso, as leis laborais não são respeitadas, o regulamento de extracção mineira é violado e a entrada contínua de produtos baratos de proveniência chinesa afectam a competitividade das indústrias locais e o povo recente directamente o impacto. O argumento que se levanta neste artigo é de que a amizade com a China é uma forma de colonialismo nos últimos dias e foi motivada menos por interesses nacionais e, mas mais pelo facto de que o Zimbabwe se viu num beco sem saída. Na medida em que o Zimbabwe foi forçado a olhar para uma direcção em busca de socorro político e económico; ele foi forçado a olhar menos para a comunidade das nações que costumavam respeitá-lo. É por isso que se fala no país sobre o reatamento das relações com Ocidente. Este estudo se limita em análise de obras de ficção, que ainda são poucas, narrando a realidade do investimento chinês no Zimbabwe. Assim, usamos Bulawayo Não Violeta, precisamos de novos nomes, “Gappah’s An Elegy for Easterly, Eppel’s White man Crawling” e o seu poema “Ghostly Galleon”. Concluimos que a política externa dos dias modernos é de não olhar para o Sul, Oriente, Ocidente ou Norte, mas para todos os lados vendo que não há amigos permanentes, mas interesses permanentes. Argumentamos que olhar para a China como o único amigo gigante internacional para o Zimbabwe tem diminuído opções económicas do país e este tornou-se um albatroz em volta do pescoço. Há necessidade de rever essa política de modo a se enquadrar nos interesses nacionais.

Palavras-chave: política, Zhing-zhong, amigo de todos tempos, Olhar o Oriente, gigante Asiático; sanções.

Introduction

The Context of the Revived Sino-Zimbabwe Relations

Zimbabwe’s political, economic, social and ideological imbroglions have provided artists with raw material with which to narrate the nation’s story. The period from 1999 has seen accelerated literary production that contest, rehearse, question and legitimise policy decisions that leaders of Zimbabwe have orchestrated. This is important in this context because Zimbabwe has witnessed an unprecedented economic, social and political turmoil occasioned by hit-and-miss political decisions that brought about what has come to be known as the Zimbabwean Crisis. This crisis saw the country’s relations with the West take a nosedive over human rights, governance and a host of democratic deficits. The result was a desperate search for alternative markets, lines of credit and

friendship in what President Robert Mugabe described in 2005 as the new Look East Policy (*The African*, 2005). In announcing the decision to look for new friends, President Mugabe said:

“We have turned east where the sun rises, and given our backs on the West where it sets (Maroodza, 2011:2).

Despite the linguistic sleight-of-hand, this signalled the reconstruction of an asymmetrical friendship with the rising economic Asian giant, China. Because of this friendship’s implications on the lives of the people, on natural resources, on local markets, and on the Chinese labour practices, Zimbabwean writers have naturally concluded that the Chinese are ‘fine-weather’ friends to Zimbabwe.

It is important to analyse the President’s reasoning for turning east as captured in his 2005 statement quoted above. The policy statement (if it can be called that), is thin on content and thick on demagoguery and obscure metaphors. President Mugabe and his ZANU-PF’s sun seemed to have set when they began insulting the West, violently seizing farms, abusing human rights, winning questionable elections, and running the economy aground (Alexander, 2003). China’s sun as an economic giant may be rising phenomenally, but that does not mean that Zimbabwe can bask in the vicarious glory of another country seen as a newfound friend. Indeed, China’s fortunes are in direct contrast to that of Zimbabwe. The tendency to view international dealings, aid and investment opportunities in terms of binaries is akin to a lover who, spurned by a long-time boyfriend, rushes to the next man’s arms, not because she has feelings for him but to spite the previous lover into believing he has lost out big time. Thus, Zimbabwe turned to China because there appeared to be no possibility of a sunrise in the political careers of her leaders whose knee-jerk decisions at home were based on the politics of survival. China seemed to offer that window of opportunity economically and also as a discursive way of seeming to be in control of statecraft (Martin and Johnson, 1981). The sanctions that had been imposed by the West as punishment for abuses and unconstitutionality left President Mugabe and his cohorts with no option but to find alternative lines of credit to breathe life into an otherwise comatose economy (Hammar, 2003). There was a real possibility of regime change in Zimbabwe at this time.

Before looking at the foundations of the SINO-Zimbabwe relations, it is important to state that a policy is of necessity not a product of one individual declaring at a rally or funeral that the nation has decided to take a particular course. A policy involves a deliberate, conscious, consensual and cooperative effort by the country’s decision-makers. National issues are too serious to be left to the whims of one individual to declare preferences. Zimbabwe’s foreign policy, like those of any other country, outlines its relations with other states. Such a policy is grounded on the country’s domestic policy realities. These imperatives issue arguably from the need to protect the country’s all-encompassing sovereignty and territorial integrity and, essentially, to protect its image and prestige in the community of nations. Foreign policy objectives should not be based



on the leaders' whims and king-size egos, but on improving the lives of the general populace of Zimbabwe. To seriously improve the lives of the people, according to Benoist (1999, p24-35), "a government (can only) be strong when it is legitimate" and driven by values of justice and reason. It is therefore arguable if the so-called Look East Policy was in fact such or an attempt by the country's leaders to futilely spite the West for deigning to call Zimbabwe to account. It became easy to seek a friend who did not ask for democratic systems, ignored serious violations, and was driven by profit imperatives. The stance that China has taken towards the governance and politics of the countries in which it has invested has made it an ideal ally for Zimbabwe. China's closeness with Zimbabwe and other African states can be seen in the light of China's own murky human rights record (Taylor, 2004). China does not want its human rights record questioned just as Robert Mugabe hides behind the controversial principles of sovereignty and non-interference in order to ride roughshod over its citizens.

One may argue that in the main, the Look East Policy is reductive and unnecessarily prescriptive and shows how Zimbabwe is still caught up in the bipolar world of Cold War politics instead of pragmatism. It can also be seen as an attempt to resuscitate the revolutionary discourse of the war era, dredging up a nationalist state that justifies the government's heavy-handedness on its opponents. Obert Gutu in *The New African* (2010) argues that in today's world, one should be wary of:

Continuing to look east without also looking west, north and south. At any rate, if you continue going east, you will inevitably come to the west because the East and the West are now two sides of the same coin.

If the Zimbabwean nationalist discourse is averse to colonialism or neo-colonialism in all its forms, and if their resort to nativism is to find purchase, then mortgaging the nation to China needs some revision. Sadomba, (2011:225) sees the Look East Policy as a strategy by Mugabe to frame himself as a victim, thus ensuring that this block would support him in the UN and other international organisations. This essentially torpedoes the notion that this policy shift was volitional. Saungwene, in the *Newsday* of 23 June 2014, scathingly placed the whole issue into sharp relief when he stated that:

The issue is the Chinese were never our friends and will never be, we are the ones who tried to befriend them but they don't see much economic benefits for investing in good relations with Zimbabwe.

The increasing questioning of Chinese partnership has, of late, been strident. *The Daily News* of 24 June 2014 carried the headline: "Chinese VP snubs Zimbabwe Again" while the *Zimbabwe Independent* of 20 June 2014 screamed "Zimbabwe must not sign away Mineral Wealth." *The Southern Eye Newspaper* of 23 June 2014 reported that "Minister (Mpfu) kicks out Chinese" in the Victoria Falls airport upgrading.

Nevertheless the 'policy' has had its own intended and unintended consequences for the Zimbabwean leadership, though so far few writers are charitable enough to admit as much. Most writers are fatigued by the discourse of patriotism that invariably sings eulogies for the ruling oligarchy while the majority sings dirges for their imperilled lives. However, the 'policy' saw Zimbabwe establishing relations with Asia and because of that, it managed to escape international isolation. In 2008, China and Russia vetoed a United Nations resolution by the UN Security Council, which intended to impose stiffer sanctions on Zimbabwe following allegations that the 2008 elections were marred by state-sponsored violence. This could have resulted in a tightened travel ban and asset freeze on Zimbabwean officials (Chingono, 2010).

Zimbabwe buys manufactured products such as machinery, electrical items, engine and motor spares, plastics and many other commodities from China. Curiously, the trade relations are not different from the classical pattern of trade between the third world and developed world (Stiftung, 2004). The Zimbabwean market is being flooded with quantities of textiles, clothing and shoes from China sold at retail prices well below the prices of local commodities (Bloch 2004). While China is an important economic partner, its activities should be closely monitored and controlled.

Measures should be put in place to ensure that the cheap Chinese goods do not find their way easily into the local market. As the local industries are closing shop due to viability problems partly because of cheap commodities from Asia, Zimbabwe risks turning into a nation of merchants (Marongwe, 2004). Economically, the expectation is that China will replace Western donors and fill in the shoes left by the West in terms of resources that are no longer forthcoming. Such optimism possibly neglects the fact that unlike Western cooperation, the Chinese approach does not come shrouded in moral principles and universal values, but is rooted on clearly defined Chinese fundamental economic values that safeguard their survival as a people. Some workers at ZIMASCO, Kwekwe branch, lashed out at the Chinese culture of investing less in the host country while safeguarding financial accumulation for repatriation to China. One employee, a certain B. Moyo, had this to say;

I wonder what kind of a country we will be in 5 to 10 years to come. These Chinese people are not permanent investors and history tells. They do not like financial reserves in a country of destination and if any are available, they are quick to export the money to China. In simple terms they are economic looters (*The Weekly Gazette*, 25 October 2013).

What pains the nation is that the core-periphery trade relations that led to underdevelopment in Africa during the colonial period are the ones that Zimbabwe has forged with the Chinese.

Against this introductory background, the research analyses the textual representations of Chinese investment presence in Zimbabwe. Though not many stories foreground this theme, we use No Violet Bulawayo (2013)'s *We Need New Names*, Petina Gappah's (2009) short story *Mpandawana Dancing Champion* and John Eppel's (2011) poem 'Ghostly Galleon' in 'Together' and 'West of East' in *White Man Crawling* (2007). We argue that most of the writers who have written about Chinese presence are critical of their activities because they 'zhingzhong', 'fongkong'



and engage in some practices that do not add value to the nation. This is why the title of No Violet Bulawayo's book is *We Need New Names*; new ways of conducting foreign policy, new identities in the conduct of politics and economics.

'Zhing-Zhonging' the Nation in No Violet Bulawayo's 'Country-Game' and Gappah's 'Mpandawana Dancing Champion'

The story by No Violet Bulawayo uses the technique of child narration to foreground the absurdities and the barren policies of the ruling elite who represent the national father figures. Child narration is a technique that uses the voice of innocence that captures, though it cannot change, the realities of the adult world in Zimbabwe. It renders poignant a nation being plundered and pillaged by China that, more or less, is becoming a colonising force in the country. The story brings to light the fact that the Chinese have flooded the construction industry in the country. Maroodza (2011:6) points out as much when she observes that:

at present approximately 30 Chinese companies are established in Zimbabwe with a marked presence in the construction sector.

This is what the child narrator captures when she notes that "Chinese men are all over the place in orange uniforms, yellow helmets – the way they are running around you would think they are a field corn" (p42). What, however, comes across as ironic is that the Chinese men in the story are "in orange and yellow helmets" while the black men "are working in regular clothes – torn T-shirts, vests, shorts, trousers cut at the knees, overalls, flip-flops, tennis shoes" p42. The dual presentation of those with protective clothing and those without, raises serious questions about the work ethos of the Chinese. The construction industry is a dangerous one and requires protective clothing for the workers. That the Chinese themselves have protective clothing and not others shows that they are flouting the labour laws of the country with impunity. This calls into question the claim that the Chinese are all-weather friends. Friendship is characterised by mutuality and win-win arrangements. The child narrator is questioning the role of the government in regulating the ways in which the Chinese companies should adhere to the labour practices of Zimbabwe. Is the government so desperate and powerless that the Chinese have, like previous colonialists, imported their labour practices in the country? This symbolises the fact that the Chinese are aware of the desperation of the Zimbabwean government's failure to provide employment to its citizens and are therefore out to fish in their troubled economic waters. More tellingly, this lack of concern for Zimbabweans' welfare can be analogised to their lack of concern for Zimbabwe in general. In the brutal political violence that shook Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2009, China never raised its voice in the name of ordinary Zimbabweans. Younde (2007:10) quotes Zhakata (2005) as saying that:

China publicly endorsed Operation Murambatsvina, a policy that bulldozed the homes of hundreds of thousands of people living in high-density suburbs.

This show of support amidst loud condemnation shows China's sagacity in pretending to be Zimbabwe's all-weather friend and therefore gaining concessions in Zimbabwe's mineral wealth. That the operation was targeting the urban poor who had voted for the opposition supports the view that in its economic dealings with Zimbabwe, China is not concerned about global issues like democracy and human rights. This disproves the theory that the Look East policy was adopted in the interests of general Zimbabweans.

The children have this in mind when they shout to the Chinese that:

"...Leave our country and build wherever they (sic) come from – that they are not even our friends" (p47).

The above criticism of the Look East Policy is juxtaposed to the statement by the Chinese man in Shanghai, when he meaningfully says to the children, "now you want made in China, you work, nothing free" p47). This becomes a metaphor of the relationship that characterises the Sino-Zimbabwe friendship. The Chinese are not concerned with sentimental appeals to historical friendship, but the profit imperative. The Chinese "economy is particularly in need of – raw materials to support its own growth and development of its own industries and infrastructure"(Maroodza, 2011:7). The Minister of Finance and Economic Development returned recently from China with his begging bowl empty. Characteristically, the children seem to capture this meanness of the Chinese when they say: "Let's just go, they are not giving us anything" p.47). This becomes metonymic of China's hesitancy in providing Zimbabwe with open lines of credit because they view the nation as a high risk.

China's pragmatism and solipsism is captured when Godknows says: "China is a red devil looking for people to eat so it can grow fat and strong" p47. Bastard frames it as a 'beast'. The appellations that these children give bespeak of Chinese meanness, that in foreign affairs, there are no permanent friends but permanent exploitation to assuage domestic interests. The child narrators are pointing to glaring anomalies in relations with China, which the leaders are incapable of because they are caught in a time warp. Colonial Britain was mean, exploitative and racist in the extreme. But, while the British colonised Zimbabwe, they also made it their home and therefore tried, in their racist colonial ways, to grow the economy. They developed infrastructure in many provinces, built hospitals, roads, schools, industry and created employment. On the other hand, the Chinese, like Paradise children in Budapest, seem on a mission to greedily wolf down everything within their reach. Thus, No Violet Bulawayo (2013:20) mockingly comments that:

The eastern countries like the former colonisers are on a mission to steal from the third world countries, stealing not just a tiny piece but also a whole country.

The image of a 'beast' used by Godknows is therefore apt. A beast survives by eating other animals and is very uncouth in the conduct of its business. Thus, while China is developing into one of the



world's leading economies, Zimbabwe is careering uncontrollably in the opposite direction. The story also points to the forced eviction of Zimbabwean blacks to pave way for Chinese mining of diamonds. Soldiers forcibly remove the indigenes so that the Chinese can have uncontested mining rights. This explains why *The Zimbabwe Independent* cautioned against mortgaging the nation to the Chinese because China, being wary and foxy, does not want to extend unsecured credit to Zimbabwe. The government's solution has been to surreptitiously sign away the country's mineral resources to the Asian giant (*The Zimbabwe Independent*, 20 June 2014).

Bulawayo cunningly and strategically uses the technique of juxtaposition in her analysis of the Chinese presence in Zimbabwe. Having presented the Chinese as mean at the workplace, and through the child narrators stigmatised them as ogres, she goes on to present the Paradise community as being recipients of food donations (adults) and toys (children) by representatives of Western NGOs. It is the food that the government of Zimbabwe is unable to provide for its citizens despite the incredible capacity for invective directed at the West. Bulawayo seems to be suggesting that though the west is patronising, at least they are philanthropic. China is not shown as philanthropic but taking advantage of the situation to exploit both human and natural resources. In fact, they point out that there is nothing for free. Rhetorically, the writer is making a case against pigeonholing foreign policy direction to only one direction.

The Chinese-constructed infrastructure has also shown amazing lack of durability. The National Sports stadium had to be renovated after dangerous cracks appeared that could have endangered fans. The Msavezi Bridge near Chachacha, built by the Chinese, was in 2013 washed away by floods that resulted in the ZUPCO bus being swept away with passengers aboard. The stretch of the road in Mandamabwe turn-off in the direction of Gweru shows shoddy workmanship. The road is so bumpy that it cannot pass for a tarmac road and is given to potholing in the shortest possible time. Certain bridges and roads constructed way back by the British colonialists still stand as beacons of efficient and enduring workmanship. Maybe the problem really lies with the Zimbabwean administration who gives these Chinese carte blanche and fail in the important duty of monitoring and evaluating in the futile belief that a friend cannot give one the wrong end of the stick. Eppel (2007:51) talks about the Chinese's insatiable appetite for 'sex and money'. This finds expression in the story 'Country-Game' where a Chinese foreman emerges from a big tent with two Zimbabwean women. That he is busy buckling his belt signifies that he was having sex with both of them. In patriarchal societies, the phallus is a symbol of control and domination, of piercing holes in Mother Zimbabwe since it is framed as female. The Chinese are therefore having a good time exploiting both the natural and human resources of Zimbabwe.

On Independence Day, April 2014, Robert Mugabe accused the Chinese of flooding the country with cheap labour (Newsday, 23 June 2014). The President was bemoaning the fact that in most cases, the Chinese brought their own personnel from China. The irony is that investment is supposed to create employment for the locals and if labour is brought from elsewhere, then it ceases to have any logic. China is a populous country where the pressure is eased if some of its citizens are offloaded to other countries. Zimbabwe becomes a dumping site of elements

deemed excess in their own country. In instances where the labour force is local, the pay is low, the working hours long. No Violet Bulawayo (2013) is at pains to paint this sordidness when she creates a black labour force that is so wretched that the children wonder why they do not behave like other dignified adults at their workplace. The children have also been sent to pass a message to Moshe who was working for the Chinese but is said to have left for South Africa. The writer here seems to be insinuating that those who have the means simply escape to foreign lands rather than be used by the Chinese. Recently in the Zimbabwean newspapers, the Chinese made headlines for abusing the Zimbabweans by beating them up as punishment. Whites adopted this practice during colonial Rhodesia. Gappah's 'Mpandawana Dancing Champion' reflects the extent to which Zimbabwe has become a dumping site for Chinese products that do not add value to the nation. For Mdhara Vitalis, Chinese products are a fraud.

Mdhara Vitalis says: "I made furniture from oak, teak, mahogany, and cedar ash chaiyo – not these zhing-zhong products from China. They may look nice and flashy but they will crack in a minute" (p115). In a way, the narrator is saying that the Zimbabwean economy has become zhing-zhong through association with China. One cannot but fail to detect the implicit comparison with the period before the Look East Policy. Mdhara Vitalis puts this into sharp relief when he points out that the chairs that he used to make are used by the President. But this again raises the issue of why the leaders themselves do not use the brittle Chinese products but expect the ordinary person to be happy with them. Darling captures her disdain for such Chinese products when she says of them:

Last time they gave us a black plastic bag full of things – watches, jewellery, flip-flops, batteries – but like those shoes mother bought me once, the items were cheap kaka and lasted us only a few days (No Violet Bulawayo, 2013:46).

This should not be misconstrued to mean that China manufactures only fake products because they do business with other Western countries, which Robert Mugabe described as where the sun sets, but that Zimbabwe as a market destination is deemed equivalent to those types of products. Thus, the bane of Zimbabwe today is that she has been forced to look East and therefore look least because, with money in short supply and the economy not functioning well, the ordinary person is forced to buy products that do not last, forcing him/her to buy the same thing within a short space of time. Bobo wryly and cynically concludes that:

The country (is) becoming Zhim-Zhim-Zimbabwe because the ruling party has sold the country to the Chinese (Gappah, 2009:115).

The statement shows the element of disappointment over Chinese investment in Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe is considered a pariah state by most Western countries who accuse it of maintaining its grip on the populace through force. For this reason, most of these governments



have embargoed it from receiving arms until democracy has been achieved. China's appetite for raw materials makes her sidestep issues to do with violence and human rights. It is on this basis that China's relationship with Zimbabwe is also based on military cooperation where China supplies the country with arms. Often these arms are used to suppress dissent and to cow the citizens into submission. John Eppel's (2011:51) poem 'Ghostly Galleon' captures this military cooperation despite Zimbabwe's avowed propensity for violence. The persona talks about the An Yue Jiang looking to supply arms to Zimbabwe. The persona says:

There is a ghostly galleon
That plies the southern seas;
It carries death for working folk:
Canons and RPGS.

Proper friendship dictates that one gives counsel to the friend in terms of behaviour and nation-building. If China could sell Zimbabwe arms even though she has no external provocation, whatever Zimbabwe uses the arms for is not their business. This encourages dictatorship, gross violation of rights, megalomania and a culture of silence. The significance of the poem is in that during the period of biting economic crisis when food was scarce, inflation rampant and the politics characterised by adversarialism and violence, China decided to sell arms to Zimbabwe seemingly to be used against her own people. The Chinese ship tried to dock in Durban to disgorge its lethal contents. The workers refused to offload it, suspecting sinister intent. The persona therefore indicts China for being complicit in the subversion of the popular will in Zimbabwe.

Conclusion

In light of this, the government's Look East Policy is problematic. Though it possibly has its own positive spin-offs for the country, the reality on the ground, from the ordinary person's perspective, suggests otherwise. This is to be expected given the fact that it was a hastily conjured up, reactive and fundamentally desperate move in response to the acrimony with Western countries over rule of law, democracy and violence. It is even arguable that, at the time it was announced (2003), it could have been called a policy, rather an order to the West to mind their own business. Zimbabwean writers chosen for this research saw this as precursor for disaster. Not only does China seek to exploit Zimbabwe's resources for her own industries, that country tends to flood the local industry with cheap, substandard goods that do not add value to the nation. In the construction industry, not only is the personnel often imported from China, but the local workers are abused and the labour laws flagrantly flouted. The workmanship is poor in the construction of infrastructure like roads, stadia and bridges. This is why the word zhing-zhong has become a word for abuse and derogation. In a globalised world where there are common norms and standards that nations need to adhere to such as democracy, freedom, human rights, probity and rule of law, China's investment policies have not been helpful in that regard. Besides, China's sale of arms to Zimbabwe has helped prop

up tyrannical tendencies in the country because she does not care what happens in Zimbabwe as long as they (Chinese) harvest profits. This has given rise to the perception that Zimbabwe has been mortgaged to China as the new colonialists. Zimbabwe is the one that engages in megaphone declarations of putative friendship with China while the latter is pragmatic and profit-driven. Dredging up the ideological past counts for nothing in a world driven by national and economic interests and not sentimental Cold War politics. Thus, to the extent that the Look East Policy confines Zimbabwe to look in one direction, and that Zimbabwe has remained in the doldrums since her fallout with the West, the Look East Policy, as shown by the selected artists, is indeed a look least policy in the eyes of the general Zimbabweans. Chinese economic investment has failed to bail Zimbabwe out of the economic doldrums as shown by company closures, the liquidity crunch, the high rate of unemployment and the continued haemorrhaging of the economy.

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Impeachment as an Accountability Measure in a Presidential System? Views From Nigeria's Fourth Republic

OMOLOLU FAGBADEBO AND SUZANNE FRANCIS

Abstract

Extant provisions of Nigeria's presidential constitution seek to promote a culture of accountability through a system of checks and balances. Since Nigeria's return to civil rule in May 1999, promotion of good governance through accountability government continues to be a challenge. All indications point to a worsening governance crisis in the midst of abundant resources. Besides, Nigeria's socio-economic performance and visible poor service delivery depict a deepening governance crisis occasioned by mismanagement of public resources. The data collected by means of documents and literature indicates that the presidential system has checks and balances as measures to prevent the abuse of power. Impeachment is the major institutionally recognised legislative mechanism to hold the executive accountable. The puzzle since the inception of Nigeria's Fourth Republic is the failure of the legislature to appropriate this statutory authority to police the execution of public policies in a manner that will conform to the constitutional requirements. While there are requisite constitutional provisions that mandate the legislature to ascertain its power over the executive, indicating Nigeria's commitment to the promotion of good governance, the legislature has failed to appropriate these instruments to stimulate a responsible government that is open to promoting good governance. Using the theories of structural functionalism and elites, this paper argues that this legislative failure to appropriate the instrument of impeachment to instil the culture of responsible executive in policy process engenders the prevailing governance crisis in Nigeria. The paper concludes that a political system where systemic corruption prevails will reduce impeachment to a mere instrument of political vendetta.

Key words: impeachment, governance, corruption, accountability, oversight

Sumário

Disposições existentes na constituição presidencialista da Nigéria procuram promover uma cultura de responsabilidade através de um sistema que permite escrutinar o executivo. Desde o retorno da Nigéria para um governo civil em Maio de 1999, a promoção de boa governação através de prestação de contas continua a ser um desafio.

Todas indicações apontam para uma crise de governação piora no meio de recursos abundantes. Para além da fraca prestação de serviços públicos, o desempenho sócio-económico e visivelmente pobre, representam uma crise de governação ocasionada com má

gestão dos recursos públicos. Dados documentais indicam que o sistema presidencialista tem freios e contrapesos como medidas para prevenir o abuso de poder. Impeachment é o principal mecanismo legislativo institucionalmente reconhecido para responsabilizar o executivo.

O grande desafio que se enfrenta, desde o início da Quarta República da Nigéria, é a incapacidade do legislador em adotar medidas estatutárias para policiar a execução de políticas públicas de uma maneira que estará em conformidade com a constituição. Embora existam disposições constitucionais necessárias que conferem à legislatura com o poder de escrutinar o executivo, não tem havido medidas adequadas, tomadas para promover a cultura de boa governação. Usando as teorias do funcionalismo estrutural e elites, este artigo argumenta que essa falha legislativa apropria-se do instrumento de impeachment para incutir a cultura do executivo responsável no processo político gera a crise de governação na Nigéria. O documento conclui que um sistema político onde a corrupção sistêmica prevalece irá reduzir impeachment a um mero instrumento de vingança política.

Palavras-chave: *impeachment*, governação, corrupção, prestação de contas, supervisão

Introduction

Nigeria returned to civil rule in May 1999 after a long period of military dictatorship¹. Following the acrimonious relationship that characterised the operation of the Westminster parliamentary system in the First Republic, Nigeria adopted presidentialism as the governing system in the Second Republic, 1979-1983 (The Political Bureau 1987). Nevertheless, the practice of this new system also attracted military intervention consequent upon breakdown of law and order after the 1983 general elections (Ayeni and Soremekun 1988; Joseph 1991). The military took over the reins of government on December 31, 1983 until May 29, 1999. Since 1999, attempts to institutionalise a culture of accountability in government in a system of checks and balances continue to be a challenge. All indications point to a worsening governance crisis in the midst of abundant resources (Fagbadebo 2007 and 2009). Constitutional design for most presidential systems usually provides mechanisms for checks and balances. Executive power controlling policy process is often sandwiched by legislative scrutinising measures in order to safeguard the interests of the public (Turley 1999; Bloch 2006). With the principle of shared power as well as an independent base of authority, the presidential system is a design to avert the danger of concentrating power in one individual or institution.

¹ Nigeria gained independence on October 1, 1960. A little over five years, precisely on January 15, 1966, the military took over power in a series of coup d'états. Though this military interregnum ended in 1979, another spate of military coup took place from 1983 and kept the military in power until May 28, 1999.



Notionally, the legislative institution in Nigeria occupies a prominent position as an agent of accountability. In other words, drafters of the constitution constructed the statutory responsibilities of this political branch of government as a way of guaranteeing transparency and accountability². This branch of the government, as in other presidential systems (Huneus et al, 2006; Hochstetler, 2011), is a principal actor in controlling the powers of the executive branch to achieve the desired objectives of the state. Section 13 of the constitution states:

It shall be the duty and responsibility of all organs of government, and of all authorities and persons, exercising legislative, executive or judicial powers, to conform to, observe and apply the provisions of this Chapter of this Constitution (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended)).

Section 16 (1) a-d specifically mandates the Nigerian state to:

- (a) Harness the resources of the nation and promote national prosperity and an efficient, a dynamic and self-reliant economy;
- (b) Control the national economy in such manner as to secure the maximum welfare, freedom and happiness of every citizen on the basis of social justice and equality of status and opportunity;
- (c) Without prejudice to its right to operate or participate in areas of the economy, other than the major sectors of the economy manage and operate the major sectors of the economy;
- (d) Without prejudice to the right of any person to participate in areas of the economy within the major sector of the economy, protect the right of every citizen to engage in any economic activities outside the major sectors of the economy (Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended)).

Thus, the expectation of the Nigerian constitution is that the branches of government are responsible for the promotion and attainment of these objectives for the promotion of public goods.

To what extent has the legislative branch in Nigeria harnessed the requisite constitutional instruments to promote the culture of accountability in government as envisaged by the constitution? With presidential system and its safeguard against abuse of power, why does Nigeria's governance crisis seems to be endemic and intractable? This paper seeks to address these questions in six

2 Section 4 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 vests the legislative powers of the federal and state governments in the legislature. Beside this, legislative power is the first in the order of listing of the Powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in the Constitution. Sections 80-89 and 120-129, empower the legislatures at the federal and states, respectively, to authorise and monitor the disbursement of all funds for government expenditures.

sections. Aside from this introduction, the second section addresses the methodology while section three discusses the place of impeachment in the presidential system. Section four discusses the characteristics of the Nigerian political elites, while section five discusses the legislature and the burden of accountability in Nigeria. Section six discusses impeachment in Nigeria's political system where some of the cases of impeachment in the Second and Fourth Republics are analysed. In section seven, we present and discuss the data on a number of infractions committed by some governors.

Methodology

The paper adopts the qualitative method, which enables 'an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world' (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011, p. 3). In other words, data evolves from natural settings, with a view to making sense of or interpreting phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. This method is useful in delineating some of the essential qualities of complex social phenomena like governance crisis and the interplay of power in institutional structures of government. Institutional issues like power, authority, conflict, 'involve intricate webs of causes, effects, processes, and dynamics: they are about qualities' (Dougherty, 2002, p. 894).

The paper relies on data from extant literature and empirical evidence of corruption by government officials in Nigeria's presidential system. Data presented is generated mostly from newspaper reports on the various degrees of corruption cases³. These reports are reliable because they are either confessional statements of the affected officials as well as records of judicial proceedings resulting from investigations.

Impeachment in a Presidential System

Inquiry into the role of impeachment requires an analysis of the horizon and design of a presidential system. Presidentialism is an unusual form of democracy and a derivative of the monarchical system (Ahrens 2001; Scheuerman 2005). In a presidential system, the head of state has a pre-established tenure that the legislature cannot discharge by a parliamentary vote (Sartori 1994; Linz 1994; Perez-Linan 2007; 2014; Samuels and Shugart 2010). Most of the modern presidential constitutions

3 Newspaper reports in Nigeria constitute a reliable means of generating data on the pandemic corruption in the political system. The Freedom of Information Law has strengthened the Nigerian media to obtain official information and data from government offices and departments. Nigerian media are whistle blowers in exposing corruption practices in government. Nigerian newspapers report cases of corrupt practices daily while commentators as well as the citizens voice their condemnation and resentments. Unfortunately, the reportage of such unethical practices has not reduced the scourge because of official cover-up of such cases, especially at the judiciary (Fagbadebo, 2007). The rage of public outcry against such acts cannot be sustained once there is a judicial pronouncement or inaction by the legislature. The anti-corruption agencies are underfunded to prosecute landmark cases of graft against government officials; consequently, such cases linger in the judiciary. This becomes problematic when the cases affect prominent political office holders or impinge on their core interests. This has strengthened the arms of the media. For details, see Daniel 2014; Anaba 2014; Chiedozie 2013.



epitomise the notion of separation of powers and the doctrine of checks and balances (Hochstetler 2011). In essence, a shared power is a design to overcome the danger of concentration of power in an individual associated with absolute monarchy. One of the main concerns of a presidential system is how to curb the abuse of these separated powers and punish elected officials involved in misconduct (Kada 2002). One of the mechanisms to mitigate the abuse of power is the legislative authority to remove an erring executive through the impeachment process.

Kim (2008), in his study of some Latin American countries, has discovered that impeachment cases are common in the presidential systems with divided government, fragmented political parties and power imbalance between the legislature and the executive. To him, public discontent about government over poor economic performance and scandals of misconduct by the leaders often propels lawmakers to press impeachment charges. In other words, legislature responds to the demands and preferences of the public, who are usually encouraged by the existing political environment, and this often motivates impeachment cases.

Naoko Kada (2002, p. 2) recognises the importance of impeachment as an 'accountability mechanism' in the face of the burgeoning corruption pandemic. She notes the possibilities of abuse of the impeachment provisions, especially by the opposition groups in the legislature. This, she argues, depends 'largely on the degree and nature of information control during investigation' (Kada, 2002, p.1). Her study does not account for the prevalence of brazen disregard for the rule of law in the face of overwhelming evidence of financial impropriety as found among top political office holders in Nigeria. Why is it difficult for the Nigerian legislature to appropriate the constitutional provisions to arrest the worsening accountability problem?

Political Elites in Nigeria's Presidential System

Scholars have argued that the behaviour of political elites is crucial to democratic stability, especially in transitional political systems (Lopez-Pintor 1987; Malloy 1987). In other words, elite choices determine the nature of democratic transitions and breakdowns. The decision of the actors to exercise their power to stimulate good governance and stability is a function of choice. Political elites, especially those in the legislature, mostly discover this impulse to act in the course of their oversight function. As in the case of some Latin American countries, public protests against the government often compel the legislature to exercise its power of discipline (Kada 2002 and 2003; Hochstetler 2011).

In Nigeria, scholars and writers are of the views that the defining nature of the characteristics of the political elites is abuse of power. Henry Kifordu (2011) says Nigeria's political actors depend largely on state resources for survival. He contends that they exploit and manipulate state institutions for the realisation of their personal ambitions, while vested interests continually encumber accountability (Kifordu, 2010). Richard Sklar and his colleagues aver that 'Nigeria's political titans vie for power and control over the vast spoils of office' and 'sit atop vast, pyramid-structured patronage networks based on regular 'cash and carry' kickback relationships' while

over 70 percent of the people wallow in poverty (Sklar et al, 2006, p. 105). Wale Adebani and Ebenezer Obadare (2011) see Nigeria as a polity where political actors consecrate corruption while they engage in competitive thievery of public funds. The next section presents the evidence to support this assertion in the contemporary dispensation.

The Nigerian elites are more interested in the pursuit of their desired objectives in abeyance to constitutional rules. Richard Sklar, et al (2006, p.100) remarks: 'The great game of politics in Nigeria is perilously rough and at times lawless'. This describes the character of the Nigerian political elites. Powerful 'godfathers' who sit atop vast patronage networks at the local, state, and federal levels dominate the country's political landscape. Political outcomes are primarily a function of titanic struggles among these magnates, who bargain among themselves – and at the expense of the impoverished greater public – within a political context of multiple ethno religious divisions (Sklar, et al, 2006, p. 101).

Because of the prevailing survival instinct (Kew, 2005), political elites seek all avenues to exert control on state power.

Legislature and the Burden of Accountability in Nigeria's Presidential System

The legislative branch as the representative body of the people plays a vital role in governance because it performs important functions that are necessary to sustain democracy in complex and diverse societies (Huneus et al. 2006; Alabi 2009). Why then is it that an accountability problem pervades the political system? Accountability means 'obligation to answer for the performance of duties' (Mulgan, 2011, p 1). This goes beyond mere information but includes the capacity to impose sanctions for failure or abuse of responsibilities as a measure of remedy with a view to rectifying the governance failure through deterrence (Mulgan, 2011).

Guillermo O'Donnell (2008) identifies two types of accountability: horizontal and vertical. Vertical accountability represents the exercise of the voting power of the citizens to change leaders through the electoral process. Jacobson (1989) has argued that a prevailing culture of free and competitive election is sufficient motivation for political leaders to govern responsibly. Nevertheless, when the outcomes of an election have no bearing with the performance of political elites while in office, then the executive and legislative elites might choose to act irresponsibly (Jacobson, 1989)⁴.

4 In developed democracies, election remains a veritable tool to hold political leaders accountable. Leaders in such countries realise the importance of people's power through voting and as such pursue policies capable of placing them in the good records of the public. Unlike developing countries where peoples' votes rarely count, vertical accountability in consolidated democracies provides opposition political party the opportunity to serve as an alternative government in case the ruling party fails the accountability test.



Horizontal accountability,⁵ on the other hand, occurs in between elections through institutional measures and mechanisms (Mulgan 2011; O'Donnell, 2008). The state institution such as the legislature as well as other bodies and agencies charged with the responsibility of conducting oversight activities on government administrations, exercise horizontal accountability. Such institutions have the requisite powers and authority 'to take actions that span from routine oversight to criminal sanctions or impeachment in relation to actions or omissions by other institutions of the state that may be qualified as unlawful' (O'Donnell, 2008).

In a presidential system, the legislature has the requisite constitutional authority to hold the executive arm accountable (Adamolekun 2010). Indeed, the concept of separation of power and doctrine of checks and balances are structural designs to ensure the promotion of transparency and accountability in government. With the exercise of oversight power in a system of separated but shared power, the legislature seeks to scrutinise government policies with a view to ensuring effective service delivery.

Central to accountability are the measures for correction to avert adverse consequences. This, accountability mechanisms such as parliamentary oversight and media investigations require the capacity to impose sanctions by the relevant agencies without breaching extant rules. The Nigerian presidential constitution recognises the legislature as the principal institution responsible for enforcing accountability of the executive branch.

One of the constitutional instruments designed to promote the culture of accountability is the legislative power to control and discipline the leadership of the executive branch. In Nigeria, the constitution recognises the importance of the legislature in policy process. Sections 80-89 and 120-129⁶, empower the federal and state legislatures, respectively, to control public funds. Section 120 (1&2) specifies that all the resources of the state should be pooled together as a Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF). Section 120 (3&4) stipulates that withdrawal from the CRF requires the authorisation of the legislature. Such authorisation is tied to specific projects as reflected in the appropriation law. Section 124 empowers the legislature to fix the remuneration of all political officeholders, including the governor and his deputy. As a measure to ensure legislative control of the finances of the state, section 125 stipulates the annual audit of the accounts of the state by the Auditor-General, who is directly responsible to the legislature.

Of particular interest to this paper is the power assigned to the legislature to have oversight over the activities of the executive with a view to ensuring accountability. Section 128 of the constitution states:

5 Adamolekun (2010) identifies diagonal and the society-drawn horizontal accountability. The diagonal accountability, according to him, connotes the involvement of the citizens directly in enforcing horizontal accountability.

6 These sections provide the same items for legislative actions. This paper will refer to sections 120-129 that deals with the legislative powers of the state legislature to control public expenditures.

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, a House of Assembly shall have power by resolution published in its journal or in the Office Gazette of the Government of the State to direct or cause to be directed an inquiry or investigation into – (a) any matter or thing with respect to which it has power to make laws; and (b) the conduct of affairs of any person, authority, ministry or government department charged, or intended to be charged, with the duty of or responsibility for – (i) Executing or administering laws enacted by that House of Assembly, and (ii) Disbursing or administering moneys appropriated or to be appropriated by such House. (2) The powers conferred on a House of Assembly under the provisions of this section are exercisable only for the purpose of enabling the House to – (a) Make laws with respect to any matter within its legislative competence and correct any defects in existing laws; and (b) Expose corruption, inefficiency of waste in the execution or administration of laws within its legislative competence and in the disbursement or administration of funds appropriated by it (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended)).

Inherent in this provision is the authority of the legislature to exert its control over the executive in terms of sanctions and discipline to induce accountability. Impeachment is one such accountability measure.

Impeachment in Nigeria’s Presidential System

Section 188 of the 1999⁷ constitution of Nigeria set out the procedure for the removal of a governor/deputy governor of a state⁸. Impeachment denotes indictment of misconduct. Henry Campbell Black defines it in the United States as:

A criminal proceeding against a public officer, before a quasi political court, instituted by a written accusation called ‘articles of impeachment’; for example, a written accusation by the House of Representatives of the United States to the Senate of the United States against an officer (Black 1968, p886).

7 In the 1979 constitution, the first presidential constitution, this provision is contained in section 132, for the removal of the president/vice-president and section 170 for the removal of a governor/deputy-governor. The difference between the provisions is that in the 1979 constitution, the process begins and ends with the legislature, while the 1999 provisions involve the Chief Judge to set up the panel to investigate the allegation of gross misconduct.

8 A similar procedure for the removal of the president/vice-president is in section 143. In the entire provision for removal of a governor/deputy-governor, president/deputy-president, there is no use of the word ‘impeachment’. The word appears in six places in the constitution. In sections 84 (5) and 124 (5), impeachment is mentioned in respect of disqualification for pension by the president/vice-president and governor/deputy-governor, respectively. Sections 146 (1) & 3(a) and 191 (1) & 3(a), identify impeachment as one of the factors that can disqualify the president/vice-president and governor/deputy-governor, respectively, from continuing in office. The provisions relating to the removal of these officers from office do not contain the word impeachment.



This definition differs from the impression in the Nigerian constitution. In this paper, I use impeachment to denote the removal of a governor/deputy-governor and president/vice-president through a legislative process.

Article II section 4 of the US constitution stipulates the offences that could warrant impeachment to include treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanours (The Constitution of the United States). Section 188(2b) of the Nigerian constitution defines the offence that could warrant the removal of a governor/deputy-governor to be 'gross misconduct in the performance of the functions of his office' (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended). Section 188(11) defines gross misconduct to mean 'a grave violation or breach of the provisions of this Constitution or a misconduct of such nature as amounts, in the opinion in the House of Assembly, to gross misconduct' (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended).

This definition has been subjected to a series of abuse and misuse by the Nigerian state legislatures (Nwabueze 1985; Lawan 2010). Nwabueze (1985) averred that this definition represents a misconception of the original meaning of gross misconduct. The Supreme Court has described it as 'nebulous, fluid and subject to potentially gross abuse and is also potentially dangerous at this point of our national or political life' (*Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors*).⁹ The Supreme Court admitted that though section 188(11) 'is generic and vague in its wording [but] cannot be extended beyond its onerously generic and vague nature to include misconduct, which are not gross' (*Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors*)¹⁰. The Court thereafter defined gross conduct as grave violation of the constitution such as corruption, breach of the provisions, abuse of fiscal provisions as well as interference with the statutory functions of the legislature.

Similarly, section 188(10), which ousts judicial intervention in the impeachment procedure, has also been misconceived by the judiciary to mean blanket restraint of judicial review of impeachment cases. The Supreme Court also averred that the interpretation of the clause of the provision negates the intentment of the drafters of the constitution¹¹. The apex court submits that the judiciary cannot interfere with the decision of the legislature but can judicially consider the extent of compliance to the stipulated rule and procedure for impeachment (*Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors*).¹²

Essentially, the import of impeachment in the Nigerian constitution is to serve as an instrument of accountability. Ben Nwabueze (1985) sees impeachment as an instrument of check against gross official misconduct. Drawing from the viewpoint of the American presidential system, Nwabueze argues that the provision is not a means of controlling the tenure of the officials concerned but to ensure ethical conduct in the exercise of power¹³. Awotokun (1998) sees the provisions as the

9 *Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors* (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt I), p183.

10 *Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors* (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt I), p135.

11 *Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors*, (2007) 1 S. C. (pt I), p 75

12 *Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors*, (2007) 1 S. C(pt I))

13 Impeachment is like the use of a vote of no confidence in the parliamentary system. While a vote of no confidence signifies the fall of the government, impeachment only affects the tenure of the officeholder without affecting the government. Perez-Linan (2007) discusses this point in detail, arguing that impeachment is an instrument of correction to discontinue with a particular administration while it encourages continuity in government.

needed mechanisms to enhance accountability, probity, and responsible executive with a view to averting arbitrariness in the exercise of power. In other words, impeachment is the antidote to corruption associated with absolute power. Akinsanya (2002) argues that impeachment provision in the constitution is the most effective weapon to combat the excess abuse and misuse of state power by the executive branch. To them, impeachment power of the legislature is essential to ensure effective control of the executive.

Could this be the intention of the drafters of the constitution? The Nigerian Supreme Court answered this in affirmative:

The exercise [impeachment] is much more than the party the Governor or Deputy Governor belongs to and the party a member belongs to. It is an exercise for the good of the state and members must remove their political hats or togas...Let the debate and the subsequent findings of the House be donated by the report of the Panel and not by sentiment (*Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors*).¹⁴

The court stressed that impeachment 'is meant to guarantee good governance and development and to prevent abuse of power' (*Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors*).¹⁵ In other words, the impeachment provision is not meant to exhibit sectional or political sentiments, but is meant as an instrument to ensure the promotion of the public good. Why was it difficult for the political elites to appropriate these statutory provisions as intended by the constitution?

Impeachment in Nigeria's Second Republic

During the Second Republic, there was a series of attempts by the legislature to exercise the impeachment power in section 170 of the Constitution (Nwabueze 1985; Awotokun 1998; Akinsanya and Idang 2002). The most celebrated was the impeachment of Balarabe Musa, the governor of the defunct Kaduna State. His impeachment was a function of the divided government that characterised the Kaduna state where the national Party of Nigeria (NPN) secured majority seats in the legislature, while the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) produced the governor (Awotokun 1989; Akinsanya 2002; Nwabueze 1985).

14 (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt I), p62.

15 (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt I), p183.



The seemingly ideological difference between the NPN and PRP¹⁶, coupled with the rigid position of the governor, accentuated an acute and hostile relationship between the executive and the legislature. Rather than adopt a negotiated path of compromise and accommodation of the opposition, the governor's intransigent and hostile disposition was reflected in his maiden address where he outlined the policy direction of his government¹⁷ (Awotokun, 1998). This radical posture infuriated the NPN members, who were in the majority in the legislature. The lawmakers were of the view that the governor should have consulted with the House on such a sweeping policy statement. Despite this criticism, the governor insisted that he would not reach a compromise with the NPN majority legislators. The deadlock eventually paved the way for breaches of constitutional provisions in the exercise of the governor's power with an uncompromising legislature.

It is evident that the attitude of the legislature is more politics than policy. The lawmakers seized the majoritarian opportunity to vent their political anger consequent upon the defeat of NPN in the gubernatorial election. The outcome of this action, according to Nwabueze (1985), is its bandwagon effect as other legislatures embarked upon the impeachment of their deputy governors while others threatened their governors with the impeachment axe. Unfortunately, the judiciary adopted a self-restraining posture in adjudicating cases of flagrant abuse of the procedure (Nwabueze 1985).

Impeachment in the Fourth Republic

Consequent upon the successful impeachment of Balarabe Musa without any reprieve from the judiciary, the tide of impeachment grew in the early period of the Fourth Republic. The legislatures in Anambra, Bayelsa Ekiti, Oyo, and Plateau impeached their governors. Similarly, legislatures in Abia, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Ekiti, Gombe, Jigawa, Katsina, Kebbi, Lagos, Osun¹⁸, and Taraba,

16 The NPN and PRP were offshoots of two major political parties controlling the Northern Nigeria in the First Republic – Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) and the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU). Mallam Aminu Kano, the leader of NEPU, was also the founder and leader of PRP. NEPU prides itself on being the party who represents the interests of the peasantry in the North as opposed to its conception of NPC as the mouthpiece of the oligarchy and the bourgeoisie class. This radical ideological disposition unsettled the political situation in the North, especially in Kano, as the NEPU became the rallying political platform for the Talakawas (the poor peasants who constitute the majority) (Dudley 1968; Sklar 1963). This same orientation remained the platform upon which PRP emerged as a political party in the Second Republic. Its electoral fortune was restricted to the Kano and Kaduna States.

17 The governor condemned the existing social order with a resolution that his government would initiate the building of a new foundation of new social order. As a demonstration of this policy thrust, the governor ordered the suspension, processing, and issuance of certificates of occupancy on government lands. To him, the land allocation system was an instrument of semi-feudal oppression and exploitation in the society. For the details on this, see Musa 1981.

18 The Governor of the State had earlier escaped removal through impeachment because the House could not muster sufficient votes to direct the investigation of the allegations of gross misconduct contained in the notice.

removed the Deputy Governors of their respective states¹⁹. In all these cases, there was a series of breaches of constitutional provisions relating to the procedure required by law.

Unlike the cases of Balarabe Musa during the Second Republic, judicial review of the legislative actions brought relief to three of the four impeached governors. Judicial pronouncements nullified the impeachment of Governors Rashidi Ladoja, Joshua Dariye and Peter Obi of Oyo, Plate and Anambra States, respectively.²⁰ In recent times, the legislatures have been guided by this judicial precedent though it has not reduced the rate at which state legislatures exercise the power either to harass or settle political scores.

The position of this paper is that in all the impeachment cases that took place in the Fourth Republic, none have been used for the promotion of accountability (Fagbadebo 2010). The 18lawmakers who participated in the impeachment of Governor Ladoja in 2006 acted the script of their godfather, Late Alhaji Lamidi Adedibu (Omobowale and Olutayo, 2007). Similarly, the six members of the Plateau State House of Assembly who impeached the governor, Chief Joshua Dariye, acted upon the goading of the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) (Lawan 2010). Prior to this time, there had been cases of money laundering against the governor, who had earlier jumped bail in London (Global Witness, 2010). In Bayelsa State, Governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, like Dariye, absconded from London in 2005, having been arrested on allegations of money laundering by the London Metropolitan Police (*Global Witness*, 2010). Nevertheless, the majority of the legislators did not see any reason for his impeachment until the EFCC conscripted 15 of the 24-member House to commence the impeachment process.

In 2014, the legislators in Adamawa State impeached the governor, Murtala Nyako, on 26 counts of financial misconduct (Yusuf, 2014). Prior to this time, the EFCC had frozen the accounts of the state government upon suspicion of fraudulent transfer of state funds to personal accounts of government officials (Alachenu *et al*, 2014). With proven cases of financial malpractices established against the governor, one could argue that the legislators were prompted by their desire to salvage the state from the shackles of misgovernment. Nevertheless, it is evident that the legislators' actions were prompted by the impulse to avenge the defection of the governor from the People Democratic Party (PDP) to the opposition party, the All progressive Congress (APC) (*ThisDay*, 18 July, 2014). In October 2013, the Adamawa State House of Assembly passed a vote

19 The Deputy Governor of Abia State, Eyinaya Abaribe, survived the first impeachment attempt but eventually resigned when the legislature commenced the second attempt. Similarly, the two Deputy Governors in Lagos States, Bucknor Akerele and Pedro, also tendered their resignation letters when the legislature commenced the impeachment process against them. Tukur Jikamshi of Katsina State, Abdullahi Argungu of Kebbi State, John Okpa of Cross River State, Garba Gadi of Gombe state and Shehu Kwatalo of Jigawa State, lost their positions through impeachment when they fell out with their governors.

20 *Inakoju & 17Ors v Adeleke & 3 Ors*[2007] 8 NWLR; *Hon. Michael Dapialong and others v. Chief (Dr) Joshua Chibi Dariye and another*, [2007] 8 NWLR; *Hon. Mike Balonwu & five others v. Mr. Peter Obi & another* (2007) 5 NWLR (Pt.1028) 488 C.A.



of confidence on the leadership of the governor, Murtala Nyako (Sani, 2014)²¹. The lawmakers had praised the governor for his purposeful leadership in the administration of the government of the state as well as forging an effective working relationship with the legislature. Curiously, the offences that warranted impeachment had been committed prior to the time the legislators passed a vote of confidence in the governor. If the governor had not defected from the PDP to the APC, would the legislators have contemplated impeaching him? From all indications, it is evident that the impeachment of the governor was primarily prompted as an instrument of political vendetta rather than a promotion of accountability.

The Chief Whip of the Adamawa State House of Assembly, Mr Jerry Kumdisi, provided insights into the politics associated with the impeachment of the governor (Ndiribe, 2014). According to him, the impeachment of the governor was a punishment for his arrogance. He disclosed further that the major factor that prompted the move was a series of political differences between the governor and some members of the legislature. Is impeachment an instrument of punishment for arrogance or political vendetta? With the exception of Peter Obi, whose impeachment was orchestrated by the divided-government, the other three impeached governors had cases of allegations of mismanagement of state resources (Lawan, 2010). Though judicial review of their cases was not based on the veracity of the allegations, it is evident from later developments that they were actually culpable of gross misconduct. As shown in data presentation, these former governors are currently involved in judicial litigation over the allegations of financial impropriety while in office. Aside from this, there are other governors who are also involved in litigation over financial impropriety while in office but are not 'harassed' or threatened by their legislatures.

Data Presentation and Discussion

Extant constitutional provisions provide avenues to monitor the disbursement of government funds. The legislature has constitutional powers to police the administration of appropriated funds. With adequate constitutional provisions, there should not be cases of misapplication or embezzlement of public funds at any level of government in Nigeria. Nevertheless, empirical evidence, as presented below, shows a prevailing culture of impunity among the heads of the executives of the states vis-à-vis failure of their respective legislatures to exercise their oversight power. The table that follows shows records of evidence of governor impunity in selected states in Nigeria.

21 The concept of a vote of confidence is alien to the presidential system. It is an instrument commonly used to confirm the survival of a government in the parliamentary system. A vote of 'no confidence' is an indication of the collapse of the government. However, its usage is a common phenomenon in the Nigerian presidential system, apparently politically, as an instrument of public relations, when lawmakers have struck a deal with the governor, usually to do with welfare packages. It is a token of their loyalty to the governor and a pledge of their continuous support.

Table 1: Records of Allegations of Impropriety against Selected Governors between 1999 and 2011

Name of Governor	State	Allegations	Legislative/Judicial Action
Jolly Nyame	Taraba 1999-2007	Money laundering and acceptance of bribe to the tune of N1.36billion	No legislative action. Charged in court by the EFCC but no conviction
James Ibori	Delta 1999-2007	Stole £50m while in office. Embezzled £157million. Laundered £1.4million	No legislative action. Convicted by a London Court
Lucky Igbinedion	Edo 1999-2007	Stole N4.4 billion	No legislative action. He was charged in court by EFCC and found guilty
Joshua Dariye	Plateau 1999-2007	N1.6 billion of the state's ecological fund while in office	No legislative action. EFCC induced his impeachment but was invalidated by the judiciary. He later confessed to the offence but said that he had used part of the money to fund the 2003 presidential election
Attahiru Bafarawa	Sokoto 1999-2007	Facing a 47-count charge relating to allegations of embezzlement of state funds	No legislative action. EFCC pressed charges against him
Orji Uzor Kalu	Abia 1999-2007	Criminal diversion of public funds totalling over N5 billion	No legislative action. Was charged in court by the EFCC
Chimaroke Nnamani	Enugu 1999-2003	Laundered N4.5 billion	No legislative action. EFCC pressed charges against him
Danjuma Goje	Gombe 2003-2011	Diversion of N52 billion state funds for private use. Stole N5 billion from the state coffers through supply of food to the Gombe State Government House	No legislative action. EFCC pressed charges against him
Diepreye Alamieyeseigha	Bayelsa 1999-2005	Money laundering to the tune of over US \$20million; arrested in London but absconded to Nigeria	Impeached by a faction of the legislature induced by the EFCC. Arrested and charged in court. He was found guilty but was later pardoned by the Federal Government

Sources: Compiled by the author from different newspaper reports.

The above data is a reflection of the general pattern of actions and modus operandi of most government officials in Nigeria. While in office, in spite of the constitutional provisions for checks, the culture of impunity characterises the administration of governance. Most of these governors, despite the overwhelming evidence of graft while in government, are serving in various capacities in the National Assembly. Joshua Dariye, Chimaroke Nnamani, Attahiru Bafarawa, Danjuma Goje,



are serving senators in the Nigerian Senate. In fact, Bafarawa was, at a time, contemplating running for the Nigerian presidency.

While these indicted former governors remain prominent actors in the country's political process, the anti-corruption agencies find it difficult to proceed with their prosecution for lack of funds. For instance, the EFCC had to make provision for N284.6 million in the 2014 budget for the prosecution of the former governors indicted of corruption since 2003 (Daniel 2014)! This is an indication of the prevalence of the culture of impunity while the legislature remains docile.

The provisions of the constitution on the power of the state legislature to discipline erring governors are clear. While the legislature recognises impeachment as an oversight function to instil fiscal discipline and promote good governance in the country's presidential system, (Tambuwal, 2013) its conduct and reactions to cases of corrupt practices left much to be desired. A writer sums it up this way:

A situation where legislators are sitting contractors does not only worsen the situation but result(s) in conflict of interest between public interest and private concern. Where ministries, parastatals and other organizations that are supposed to be under the 'supervision' of the legislature end up sponsoring, paying for the over sea (sic) trips and other emoluments of the legislature, oversight functions automatically take the passenger's seat if not outrightly thrown out of the fast-moving vehicle of national development (Kadir, ND).

Unfortunately, none of the state legislatures of these governors took any action while the governors were in office, with the exception of Alamiyeseigha. Thus, accountability is not a direct consequence of collusion between the executive and the legislature.

The political elites blame this failure on the absence of credible leadership in the political system (Ajayi, 2013). Former president Olusegun Obasanjo said that the country is reeling under the curse of leadership (Ajayi, 2013). A former defence minister, Theophilus Danjuma, denounced the infamous role of the country's political leadership, who were fond of 'scheming and screaming for due and undue advantages' while the people 'are chained down in dehumanising and grinding poverty'(cf. Akhaine & Bello, 2013). The legislature lamented the failure of governance as the Senate President, David Mark, spotted 'frustrations occasioned by maladministration' as the lot of the people of the country (cf. Aborisade, 2013). To him, the rising tide of insecurity and serial political instability, especially within the political parties, depicted the unbridled appetite of the leadership for power without service.

We need to look inwards and begin to search our minds. The ball certainly is in our court as leaders to do what we should do to reverse the trend. We must shelve the attitude of seeking power at all cost(s). We do not need to get desperate about getting to the top. At any level, we must be ready to contribute our quotas (cf. Aborisade, 2013).

These submissions manifest in the spate of failure that characterises the provision of basic amenities in the country. Most Nigerian roads are in deplorable condition while many communities are under the siege of criminals. Transparency and accountability are no longer the norms guiding public policy. Every sector of the society has its own device of circumventing the rules of probity. In short, the spoil politics and its attendant effects are the defining characters of every sector in the Nigerian society where access to political power is the avenue to appropriate state resources for personal prosperity (Dal Bo and Powell 2009). The outcome of this is the acute struggle to control state power by the political elite. While private properties of the political elites expand, the people's quality of life dwindles.

Conclusion

The urge of the people to abandon their legitimate place of assignment where 'they could only make a pittance' and accept 'the cozy, cushy embrace of a corrupt, deceitful, and unscrupulous... administration' (Obasanjo, 1998)²² persists. Indeed, Obasanjo's description of Nigeria as a country where 'anything goes' is more real under civilian administration since May 29, 1999 characterised by spoils. In Nigeria, 'corruption and fraud became habits that trickled down to every level of society' (Obasanjo, 1998). President Goodluck Jonathan recently admitted that the Nigerian people have accepted corruption as the norm with a retrogressive system through which the society rewards corrupt people, rather than punishes them (Ujah, 2013).

When you talk about corruption, the private sector is involved; the public sector is involved; even the individuals, including other societies, and I wouldn't want to mention names so that I will not be attacked. But I know that if collectively all of us don't reward corruption, people would not be attracted to corrupt practices, but when we all reward corruption, then of course, we will be tempted to go in that direction (cf. Ujah, 2013).

In other words, the Nigerian environment, according to the president, tempts government officials to take what belongs to the public. This is an admission of failure by a leader who swore to uphold the provisions of the constitution of the country.

All the above submissions by political elites are indications of the failure of presidentialism as a governing system meant for the promotion and protection of the interests of the public in Nigeria. This is not necessarily because of the nature of the system, but the endemic culture of corruption that pervades the political landscape of the country. Thus, it is obvious that with systemic corruption, governing measures to induce good governance would be an exercise in futility. And impeachment will remain an instrument of political harassment and vendetta.

22 Olusegun Obasanjo, a one-time military head of state and lately the democratically elected president for eight years, used these words to deride the nature of political actors under the military regime of general Ibrahim Babangida, ironically, one of the prominent elites in the ruling People Democratic Party (PDP). These words are still relevant to describe the nature of the scramble of elites to occupy government positions in the country even under the administration of Obasanjo.



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Dimensions, Dynamics and Pathways of Addressing Inequality and Inequity among Children in Africa

BOB MUCHABAIWA

Abstract

Inequality and inequity are devastating to all of us. These two pertinent issues, however, negatively impact on children more than adults. They are a cancer that must be halted from many fronts by both state and non-state actors. Public policy in Africa can no longer afford to pay little attention to inequality among children. All children – regardless of circumstances at birth and other extraneous factors such as place of residence, available income, religion and political context – should have equal chance and access to opportunities to develop and progressively realise their rights.

Inequality and inequity among children have their own dynamics, slightly different from those experienced by other segments of the population. If African governments are to effectively fulfill their role of ensuring the development of all children, they need to be mindful of the dimensions, manifestations and measurements of inequality and inequity among children. The aim of this paper is to proffer policy options, conveniently labelled 'pathways', on how to tackle inequality among children in Africa. The paper advocates for a broad-based and child rights based approach, which goes beyond the narrower focus on income and delivery of social services to children. The discussion is based on extensive review of literature on inequality and children's rights as well as interviews with key informants in selected African countries. The policy options are by no means exhaustive. Their effective application will, however, be significantly influenced by the context.

Key words: inequality, children's rights, fiscal policy, social inequities

Sumário

As desigualdades sócio-económicas são devastadoras para todos nós. Estas questões pertinentes, no entanto, têm um impacto negativo sobre as crianças mais do que os adultos. Elas são um cancro que deve ser travado em muitas frentes por ambos os actores estatais e não estatais. A política pública em África não pode continuar a não prestar atenção para as desigualdades entre as crianças. Todas as crianças, independentemente das circunstâncias de origens naturais e outros factores externos, tais como local de residência, renda disponível, religião e contexto político, devem ter igualdade de oportunidade e acesso a oportunidades para desenvolver e realizar progressivamente os seus direitos.

Desigualdade e iniquidade entre as crianças têm a sua própria dinâmica, ligeiramente diferentes daquelas experimentadas por outros segmentos da população. Se os governos africanos são para cumprir eficazmente o seu papel de garantir o desenvolvimento de todas



as crianças, eles precisam de estar atentos às dimensões, manifestações e medidas de desigualdade e iniquidade entre as crianças. O objectivo deste artigo é propor opções políticas, convenientemente sobre como lidar com a desigualdade entre crianças na África. O defensor de papel para uma abordagem baseia-se amplamente nos direitos da criança, que vai além do foco mais estreito sobre a renda e prestação de serviços sociais para as crianças. A discussão é baseada em extensa revisão da literatura sobre a desigualdade e os direitos da criança, bem como entrevistas com informantes-chave em países africanos seleccionados. As opções políticas são de modo algum exaustivas. A sua aplicação eficaz, no entanto, pode ser significativamente influenciada pelo contexto.

Palavras-chave: desigualdade, direitos das crianças, política fiscal, desigualdades sociais

Introduction

In the last decade or so, many African countries have experienced good economic growth. According to the World Bank, in 2013, seven out of the ten fastest growing economies in the world were in Africa. Unfortunately, the benefits of Africa's economic growth have been concentrated in the hands of a few. This is what a number of classical and contemporary economists, including David Ricardo, feared: that economic growth would benefit the owners of capital the most whilst the working class and the poor majority languish. When it comes to income, most children are dependent on their parents or guardians. It is unacceptable that an estimated 60.8% of the poor people in Africa, mostly children and young people, still live on less than US\$2 a day and hold only 36.5% of total income (AfDB 2012). Yet, the ultimate objectives of development, should be expansion of economic, social and political freedoms and human development opportunities of all people, including children (Sen 1999). Ortiz and Cummins (2011:20) have estimated that, if the current economic development and consumption patterns do not significantly change, it will take more than 800 years for the bottom billion in the world to achieve ten percent of global income.

Inequalities are not a new phenomena. They have been observed throughout the evolution of the state and the development of the human race. What is worrying, however, is that although inequality has in recent years become a topical issue, not much has been done to bring the discussion closer to children. Yet, the African population is significantly youthful. The works of Latin American researchers (Barros *et al*, 2009) working with the World Bank, which resulted in the development of the Human Opportunities Index to measure inequality among children, though focused on Latin American, provides inspiration to this study and hopefully to African governments. The Human Opportunity Index is a composite indicator that measures two elements: (i) the level of coverage of basic opportunities necessary for human development, such as primary education, water and sanitation, and electricity; and (ii) the degree to which the distribution of those opportunities is conditional on circumstances exogenous to children, such as gender, income, or household characteristics (Barros *et al*, 2009).

This seminal work by Barros and other Latin American researchers, working with the World Bank, is undoubtedly valuable. It therefore constitutes a solid base for the discussion that will follow. It will, however, be extended to include variations in enjoyment of fundamental freedoms and rights by all children – including civil and political freedoms; democratisation of the public sphere that children live in to ensure human security; and a scrutiny of the systemic and structural issues that perpetuate the privileging and disadvantaging of specific segments of society and subsequently constrain household income and opportunities for children to develop.

The focus on children is deliberate. Firstly, inequality is twice as high among children than in adults (Save the Children, 2012). Children suffer more from living in unequal societies than adults. The effects of inequality are more pervasive during the early years of life. Second, opportunities for children to develop fully, especially early on in life, are dependent on factors extraneous to them, including but not limited to, circumstances at birth, availability of basic services, demographics of households and places of residence. It is the responsibility of adults to make a case for this focus on children. Third, children lack the voice, power and resources to negotiate issues of life. This makes them vulnerable and dependent on parents, guardians and public officials for their survival and development. Fourth, childhood inequalities and inequities have far-reaching effects on the physical, cognitive and emotional development of children. Some of the negative effects are permanent. At the same time, certain opportunities for development are such that once lost they are difficult to recover in the future. Malnutrition of children under the age of five, for example, may irreparably affect the cognitive and physical development of children. In Ethiopia, children who get stunted early in life, are nearly one whole grade behind non-stunted children at the age of 12 (Woodhead, Dornan & Murray, 2013:28).

This paper aims to achieve two related goals. Firstly, it seeks to highlight that inequality among children is multi-dimensional. Second, it aims to tease out possible policy options at the disposal of African governments, presented as pathways, to address this pervasive challenge. African leaders have the responsibility to ensure the progressive realisation of children's rights. The 'Post-2015' agenda is a lifetime opportunity for African leaders to work in partnership with the international community to improve life chances for all children and to reverse trends in inequities among children.

The paper is divided into three sections. The first section sets the context for discussion by providing a conceptual framework of inequality as it relates to children. The second section is a discursive analysis of the various dimensions of inequality among children in Africa. The third section presents the possible pathways on how inequality among children in Africa could be addressed by national governments, and where necessary, with support from the international community.

Inequality and Children's Rights

The four fundamental child rights principles articulated in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) constitute the frame of analysis and policy positioning that will follow. The four principles are: non-discrimination; best interest of the child; right to survival and development, as well as the child's right to form and express his/her own views. Inequality among children should thus,



I argue, be discussed in terms of the extent to which individual children have the opportunities and capabilities to enjoy fundamental freedoms and rights outlined in the CRC and national laws.

The following questions will help us to delve into the subject, albeit from a simplistic viewpoint: 1) Are all children within a particular country receiving the same treatment from adults in both private and public spheres?; 2) Are government policies and actions reflecting the best interests of all the different groups of children?; 3) Do all children in a given African country have equal opportunities for survival and development?; and 4) Do all children in a given African country have equal chances of forming and expressing their views about issues of concern? The simple answer seems to be 'no' for all the questions. That points to inequality and inequities among children. The 'no' answers, however, beg the why and how questions. In answering the later questions, it becomes abundantly clear that discussions on inequality among children cannot be insulated from the deep-seated and structural factors shaping the political economies of Africa.

How then is inequality among children defined? Save the Children (2012:07) defines inequality as "variation in living standards across a given population". To Amartya Sen (1999:15), inequality among children refers to differences in the enjoyment of "substantive freedoms". The CRC outlines the freedoms and rights that should be enjoyed by children. These include right to life, health, education, protection from abuse, participation and to parental responsibilities and state assistance. Woodhead, Dornan, and Murray, (2013:06), have argued that inequality is a measurement of "differences in both household circumstances and child outcomes" which reflect "political-economic-cultural forces that structure societies, and children's lives, in terms of distribution of resources and opportunities in ways that align to greater or lesser degree with ethnicity, caste, religion, urban/rural location, gender, generation, etc.". From the above definitions, inequality among children could be defined as disparities in access to and availability of opportunities, voice, power and social status of children for them to survive, develop, participate in issues that affect them, and to be treated the same way in society. Inequity, on the other hand, refers to unfair and unjust treatment of children on the basis of their social, economic and political status as well as other circumstances that result in them not enjoying specific rights and freedoms they should.

These disparities are perpetuated by those in power via the policies and institutions they put in place as well as the socialisation processes (Naidoo & Wills 2008). Unequal societies exhibit disparities in levels of access by children to essential services such as water, shelter, clothing, sanitation, healthcare and education. This could be linked to lack of enjoyment of the rights to survival and development. Inequality is reinforced by and also leads to social exclusion, chronic poverty and powerlessness among children. It is dehumanising and a reflection of social and economic injustices. Inequality is also divisive, socially corrosive, a breeding ground for conflict and a general cause of unhappiness among children and adults alike (Warwick-Booth, 2013). It also affects children's self-esteem, identities, and performance, thereby undermining human development.

Inequalities become apparent in the schools that children go to, the neighborhoods they live in, the type of playgrounds they spend most of their time in, the length of their life, the power they have

to influence family and community affairs, and in consumption patterns. Children living in high-income families, for example, tend to experience better education, health and more opportunities for their development compared to those in poor households (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009; Save the Children, 2012; Ortiz and Cummins, 2011). At the same time, children from poor families are less likely to be registered at birth and nearly three times as likely to be underweight than those from rich families. In Tanzania, only 4% of children from poor families – surviving on less than \$1.25 a day – are registered at birth compared to 56% from rich families. Children from poor families are also twice as likely to die before they reach the age of five (Unicef 2014).

Ortiz and Cummins (2011:34); Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) and Piketty (2014) established a positive correlation between inequality levels and the rate of crime and other social problems in society. They concluded that people in relatively equal societies engage in less criminal behaviour, have better social mobility, are more trusting and experience less violence than those in unequal societies. Wilkinson and Pickett (2009), for example, argued that levels of social cohesion, child participation in social activities and the size of social networks of children are closely related to levels of inequalities in society. They also noted that citizens living in unequal societies rarely trust their governments. Warwick-Booth (2013) also observed that social challenges such as child prostitution and children living on and off the streets are usually associated with poor and crowded communities, which usually reflect inequalities. It is the same children that suffer the most from the effects of pollution and environmental degradation. When inequality becomes more pronounced, it perpetuates stigma and discrimination of certain groups of children. Unfortunately, stigmatisation among children can be worse than among adults. At least adults know how to sometimes 'cover up' their inner feelings about other groups of people. Children tend to be carefree when they talk or relate.

Inequalities among societies in general usually manifest themselves in social and economic stratification; discriminatory policies and behaviors; social exclusion; lack of voice; and differences in access to human development opportunities. Countries that experience high levels of inequality have less chances of eradicating child poverty with the same level of growth as their equal counterparts. Every percentage increase, in health sector spending for example, will yield more and better results in more equal societies (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009).

Dimensions of Inequality among Children in Africa

Inequality among children in Africa is a growing challenge, and may soon reach crisis point if not reversed. Let us briefly unpack the different dimensions of inequality among children. For the purposes of easy understanding, I have decided to categorise inequality and inequity among children into four dimensions, namely: 1) geographic, 2) economic, 3) sociological and 4) historical/inter-generational. A child may experience all or some of these dimensions.




Geographic Dimension

A child's place of residence, to a considerable extent, reflects the income, protection and other opportunities for survival, development and to enjoyment of fundamental freedoms and rights outlined in the CRC and national laws. In this paper, place of residence refers to the physical location as well as the type of house that children live in. Residence-based disparities are usually influenced by the level of infrastructure, climatic and environmental conditions, economic circumstances of parents and guardians, historical as well as the political and security situation in a country. Disparities often exist in access to safe water, hospitals, schools and other essential services for children living in rural Africa compared to urban areas. Children in rural parts of Africa tend to walk much longer distances to access essential services like schools and clinics. In the process, these children, especially girls, are exposed to violence and other forms of abuse (Unicef, 2014). According to Save the Children (2012), stunting is six times higher in rural than in urban areas.

A striking element of this geographic element is skewed access to information and communication technology. Several parts of Africa, for example, do not have cellphone, television and Internet coverage. Yet the Internet and television, for example, have become key instruments of learning. By 2013, except South Africa, all sub-Saharan countries had Internet penetration below 25%. This means that 75% of the population, most likely from rural and peri-urban areas, which generally lack electricity, are deprived of what is apparently an essential service.

Table 1: Internet Penetration Levels in Selected African Countries




Source: Author's compilation based on World Bank data (2013): <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/>

Extreme inequalities are also observable within the same urban or rural area. Most urban areas in Africa reflect three distinct settlements, namely slum and highly crowded areas with poor houses; medium-density and modestly housed settlements; and, rich and low-density suburbs. These settlements mirror the quality of services and opportunities available to children. A child living in a slum area like Alexandra Park in Johannesburg and Kibera in Nairobi is exposed to the risk of poor sanitation, crime, poor housing and an unsafe environment compared to a child in Sandton and Karen respectively. At the same time, a child residing in Nigeria or Somalia, prone to terrorist attacks, does not have the same level of peace as a child living in Botswana.

Recent studies in Kenya by the National Bureau of Statistics and Society for International Development (SID) also confirmed that children in different regions of the same country may have completely different lifestyles and opportunities for their survival and development. For example, children in Nairobi County (capital city of Kenya) have 15.4 times more access to secondary education than those living in Turkana County, which is approximately 700km from Nairobi. The Loima Constituency in Turkana has the lowest proportion of individuals with secondary education in Kenya estimated at 0.8 percent. This is 79 times less than the proportion in Embakasi West Constituency in Nairobi County which is estimated at 63 percent (Njonjo 2013).

Table 2: Geographic Disparities in Child Rights Outcomes



Source: Author's compilation based on UNICEF (2014) data: *The State of the World's Children in Numbers*.



From the above bar graph, a woman living in a rural area in Zambia, for instance, has a 31% chance of having a skilled birth attendant while her urban counterpart has nearly 83% chance. In general, a mother living in rural Africa has 1.7 times less chance of having a skilled attendant at birth than one in an urban area (Unicef 2014). Although rural poverty is still high in Africa, after it only declined from 64.9% to 61.6% between 1998 and 2008, urban poverty is also increasing. It is estimated that the urban population in Africa will be 52% in 2025, up from 37% in 2014 (AfDB, 2014). Policy responses should thus refrain from only using the rural-urban praxis. Dynamics within both rural and urban areas should also be investigated. The place of residence is squarely extraneous to the child, influenced by, for example, economic circumstances of parents or guardians; settlement patterns arising from wars of conquest and dispossession and colonisation; and migration due to a changing climate.


Economic Dimension

The economic dimension of inequality refers to skewed access to available income and wealth by children, which would help them to access basic services required for survival and development. It is crucial, however, to note that the economic dimension influences the others to a greater extent. The essence of this dimension is not to advocate that children should have income of their own but that they should have access to available income, which is basically an enabler to access specific services and for the enjoyment of certain freedoms and rights. It is common knowledge that children, by law, are not required to engage in economic activities to have income of their own. They depend on resources availed to them by their parents, guardians and governments.

The economic dimension of inequality among children is therefore broken down into three elements. The first element is differences in availability of and access to household income to purchase services and products such as food, clothing, uniforms and school books, even if some services are provided by the government for free. The second element is access to financial and non-financial wealth or assets of parents and guardians. These may include cattle, land, businesses and financial investments. The last element is access to public resources provided by government. Public income could be availed to children through cash transfer programmes, for example. A key question then is the need to interrogate the extent to which governments invest in children when their parents or guardians are poor.

The table below shows the Gini income coefficient of selected African countries, most of which have been experiencing high income growth. The Gini coefficient is a commonly used measure that varies between '0' reflecting complete equality and '1' or '100' indicating complete inequality. From the table opposite, most of the countries in the medium income bracket (South Africa, Namibia and Zambia) exhibit high levels of inequality.

Table 3: Income Inequality in Selected African Countries



Source: Author's compilation based on UNDP statistics, 2013.

While some children have access to all the income they need, mostly from their parents and guardians, some rarely have enough to buy basics such as food or books. Save the Children (2012), estimates that a child in the richest 10% of households has up to 35 times the effective available income of a child in the poorest 10% of households. The organisation has further observed that “the gap between the richest and poorest children has grown by 35% since the 1990s” (2012:34). One third of Kenyans, for example, survive on 1 440 Kenya shillings (about US\$18) or less per month while only 12 percent spend 7 200 Kenya Shillings and above (Njonjo 2013:18). This translates into less available income to children to improve access to opportunities and enhance their capabilities to progressively realise their rights. In Africa, the top 10% people earn 22 times more than those in the bottom 10%. This disparity is reflected in the lives of children. Poor families spend nearly 80% of available resources on food. This means that children in these families barely have income for other things like sports, leisure and health checkups.

High levels of income inequality also mean that when economic downturn or disaster strikes, those at the bottom of the income scale, the most vulnerable, are disproportionately hurt (Njonjo, 2013). During this period, poorest households also suffer the most because government spending in Africa tends to be cyclical. This means that governments usually cut expenditures, including basic social services, when faced with a fiscal crisis. In view of this, Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) have concluded that inequality and inequities demand a greater role of government. The inverse is true for more equal societies.



It is unfortunate that poor families tend to have more children yet they have less income and wealth available to support them. For many poor families, having many children is seen as a livelihood-strategy. This contributes to the transmission of intergenerational child poverty. Furthermore, the pyramid structure of populations in Africa implies huge dependency ratios. Many children look to parents or guardians who may actually not be gainfully employed. Furthermore, poorest children are three times more likely to be married before the age of 18 than their rich counterparts (Save the Children, 2012). Table 4 below shows the relationship between income inequality and outcomes for children in selected African countries. A general trend is that more children from rich families are registered than those from the poorest. In Cote de l'voire, for instance, while 90% of children from the richest 20% have birth certificates, only 44% of children from poorest families are registered. Similarly, the percentage of births with a skilled attendant are far higher in the richest 20% families than in the poorest 20%.

Table 4: Disparities in Child Rights Outcomes Based on Economic Status in Selected African Countries

Country	Birth Registration % (2005-2012)			Skilled Attendant at Birth % (2008-2012)			Primary School Net Attendance Ratio (2008-2012)		
	Poorest 20%	Richest 20%	Ratio of Richest to Poorest	Poorest 20%	Richest 20%	Ratio of Richest to Poorest	Poorest 20%	Richest 20%	Ratio of Richest to Poorest
Cote de l'voire	44	90	2.0	35	91	2.6	57y	80y	1.4y
Mozambique	42	60	1.4	32	90	2.8	67y	91y	1.4y
Namibia	-	-	-	60x	98x	1.6x	88x	97x	1.1x
Nigeria	12	76	6.2	11	90	8.2	34	94	2.8
Senegal	50	94	1.9	30	96	3.2	47	78	1.7
Sierra Leone	74	88	1.2	44	85	1.9	59	88	1.5
Swaziland	39	73	1.9	65	94	1.4	95	99	1.0
Uganda	27	44	1.6	43	88	2.0	73	87	1.2
Zambia	5	31	5.8	27x	91x	3.4x	73x	96x	1.3x
Zimbabwe	35	75	2.1	48	91	1.9	84	91	1.1

Source: UNICEF (2014), *The State of the World's Children in Numbers*.

In one of his letters to Malthus, renowned economist David Ricardo argued that economists should not only concentrate on the causes and drivers of economic growth but also on the "enquiry into the laws which determine the division of produce of industry amongst the classes"

(Ricardo 1820: 01). Ongoing discourses in Africa on shared and inclusive economic growth do not, however, seem to give due consideration to the economic dimension of inequality as it affects children. Many people, including academics and policy makers, assume that the benefits of inclusive economic growth will trickle down to children. History, unfortunately, tells us otherwise. The problem, in part, lies with the overemphasis on 'productive sectors' such as transport, communications, agriculture and tourism without paying equal attention to social sectors such as education and health. Yet, empirical evidence exists to show that social spending in health, education and social protection has demonstrable medium- and long-term economic benefits (ACPF, 2013; Save the Children, 2012; World Bank, 2010). In spite of the high-sounding rhetoric on inclusive growth, the overtly liberal and market-based economic development paradigm being pursued by many African countries, which apportions a lesser role to the state in economic development, is likely going to condemn many children to poverty and result in the widening of the gap between the rich and poor children.

Sociological Dimension

Using social systems theory, inequalities are also seen in how children are treated in society and in how they relate to each other and to adults. A key element of this dimension, also relevant to others discussed above, is the level of access by different groups of children to basic social services such as clean water, education, housing, water, sanitation, and primary healthcare. Access is influenced by a number of factors such as distance to be travelled, household demographics, access rules and procedures, culture and public access to relevant information about the services.

Max Weber is one of the early writers to have described inequality using a sociological lens. According to Weber, inequality is reflected in three dimensions of social stratification, namely class, status and party or political power (Livesey, 2010:03). Class is not just an issue of social stratification but also an expression of a whole set of norms, values, beliefs and interests. Children will reflect the basic class, race, and gender divisions in a given society (Wrigley & Dreby, 2005:01). Other sociological factors such as religion, caste, language and disability status also influence how a child is treated in society.


Social inequities are embedded in social, cultural and religious values and norms that are driven by family institutions, clans, religious organisations, political structures and media. Cultures and societal norms define who children are, how they should behave and what power relations should exist among them and also with adults (Livesey 2010). Social inequities expose children to the risk of discrimination, abuse and even systemic exclusion from mainstream life. They also tend to result in stigma and discrimination of some children. Discrimination levelled against specific groups of children affect the way they perceive themselves, lower their ambitions in life and reduce their confidence to engage in public life. The situation is considered to be worse for children with disabilities and with mental illnesses.

Social inequities are also reflected in the roles and relations between boys and girls. Most African cultures tend to accord more freedom, voice and opportunities to boys than girls. Unicef



(2014) established a close, though not perfectly linear, relationship between levels of gender inequality and maternal mortality. As shown in the diagram below, countries with higher gender inequalities, measured by the Gender Inequality Index (GII), also tend to have high maternal mortality. For the GII, a score of 0 means equality between males and females while a score of 1 implies the highest level of inequality. The average GII for sub-Saharan Africa is 0.570 while the average for Europe and Central Asia is 0.317. The maternal mortality ratio is 31 and 389 respectively (Unicef 2014).

Table 5: Gender-based Social Inequities in Selected African Countries



Source: Compiled from UNDP data, 2013.

There are also disparities in the way various groups of children exercise the right to form and express opinions. Opportunities available to exercise this right are influenced by culture and societal norms, economic circumstances, public access to information and place of residence. At the domestic level, children from rich families tend to have more freedom to claim their rights and to demand their parents' time. Children from poor families rarely have time with their parents or guardians as they spend most of their time searching for livelihoods.

Another element of the sociological dimension is the unequal access to protection and

development opportunities as a result of a child's race, ethnicity and religion. Tribalism and religion, for example, are issues that have continued to characterise contemporary life – and in many cases are a cause of instability and conflict in many African countries including, but not limited to, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Mali, Somalia and South Sudan. Perceptions that specific tribes or religions are economically and politically more powerful than others, usually leave some people feeling dissatisfied. This makes political consensus hard to achieve (Warwick Booth, 2013).

Racially, children from black families in Africa tend to have less income and opportunities than their white counterparts. Inequality in South Africa, for example, “is an enduring legacy of the apartheid system, which denied the non-whites the chance to accumulate capital in any form – land, finance, skills, education, or social networks” (Narayan & Mahajan, 2013:01). However, post-apartheid South Africa has seen the replacement of white with black elites, without dismantling the systemic issues that perpetuate inequality. With a Gini coefficient of nearly 70, South Africa is one of the most unequal societies in the world. Ethnicity and race-related inequities arise from many factors including global power relations, legacies of colonialism, wars of conquest and dispossession in Africa, geography and socialisation.

The last element of this sociological dimension is political. This occurs when children have different opportunities and capabilities to exercise their rights, including civil and political freedoms due to political and religious affiliation of their parents or guardians. In Zimbabwe, for example, between 2002 and 2008 especially, concerns were raised over skewed access to food aid and other social services in favour of supporters of the ruling ZANU PF party. Further allegations were also raised concerning selective application of the law on the basis of perceived political affiliation.

Historical and Intergenerational Dimension

A cross-cutting dimension of inequality among children is its inter-generational nature. This means inequality can be transmitted from one generation to the other. The education and income circumstances of one generation, for example, are likely to have an impact on children in the next generation (Durlauf, 1992; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). High-income families are able to invest in their children through a variety of means including bank savings, insurance and enabling them to access education in high quality schools. This increases opportunities for their children to live happy and dignified lives in the next generation. The inverse is also true for poor families, who for failing to invest in their children, will pass on child poverty to further generations. The level of education of the head of the household and size of family also determine the extent to which children and future generations will be accorded opportunities for their development (Narayan & Mahajan, 2013).

Although there are good chances that rich parents will transmit their wealth to their offspring, it is not always the case because of structural and other systemic issues affecting economies in Africa. For example, income and wealth mobility is usually difficult because of high inflationary environments, uncertainties in financial markets, unpredictable state regulation and climate



change. Non-financial assets such as cattle, lands, etc. are particularly affected by changing weather patterns and demographics. It is therefore likely that a child who is born to a wealthy family may actually not be able to transmit the same level of wealth to his/her children.

From the above discussion, a few conclusions can be made. First, inequality among children is systemic and multidimensional. It is sometimes driven and perpetuated by those in power through the political structures, media and cultures in place at a given time. Secondly, children tend to reproduce and suffer the most from inequalities. Inequality among children is largely a result of factors extraneous to them. Public policy action should thus seek to ensure that a child's circumstances at birth should not limit opportunities available for survival and development.

Pathways to Addressing Inequality Among Children

Addressing inequality seems to be getting high up the development agenda of the African Union and its member states. The Common Africa Position (CAP) on the Post 2015 agenda adopted on 31 January 2014, recognised rising trends in inequalities. It therefore acknowledged that “investment in children, youth and women always generates substantial development multipliers” that contribute to a reduction in inequality (African Union 2013:02). The CAP rightly concluded that without sufficient investments in children, the war against inequality will be difficult to win. The CAP does not, however, elaborate on dimensions of inequality among children nor does it focus its policy proposals on children. It only provides generic policy prescriptions such as “sustained inclusive economic growth”, “decent and productive employment”, “sustainable social protection programmes”, “eradicating poverty”, “health for all” and “making services adequately and geographically available in both rural and urban areas” (African Union, 2013:03-6). The African Development Bank's Human Capital Development Strategy outlines the role of social safety nets and other risk management policy instruments in tackling inequality. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the Africa Progress Panel have also cautioned that if not addressed, inequality will negate efforts to develop the continent.

A brief discussion of possible pathways to reduce inequality among children within countries will follow.

Mitigate risk, shocks and vulnerability through child-sensitive social protection (CSSP)

Child sensitive social protection (CSSP) is a key tool that could be used to address inequality. There are four main instruments of child sensitive social protection, namely: social assistance, social insurance, social services and social equity measures. Social protection schemes can target children directly or indirectly through households. Child-sensitive social protection helps children move out of chronic poverty while at the same time expanding opportunities for child protection and development (Triegaardt 2006; UNICEF 2014; World Bank 2010). Increasing income available to children and opportunities for development significantly reduce the chances of children dropping out of school or not accessing other basic rights, like food, health care, etc.

Classic examples of CSSP programmes in Africa include South Africa's Child Support Grant, Malawi's School Feeding Programme; Ethiopia's Productivity Safety Net Programme (PSNP); Uganda's Expanded Social Protection Programme, including the Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment (SAGE) project; Zimbabwe's Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM); Kenya's Hunger Safety Net Programme, Ghana's National Health Insurance schemes and Rwanda's Umurenge Programme. The Child Support Grant in South Africa has helped reduce inequalities among children and also reduced the gap between rich and poor children by nearly 47%, while the Umurenge Programme in Rwanda helped reduce extreme child poverty from 40.6% to 9.0% (Soucat & Ncube, 2014). Many of the social protection schemes target the poorest and most vulnerable children and households. The aim is to improve access to education, food and primary healthcare by children. In East and southern Africa, a sizeable number of these social protection programmes seek to address the risks and vulnerabilities associated with HIV and AIDS and recurrent droughts.

Although it has been empirically proven that child-sensitive social protection can break the vicious cycle of poverty, and cushion households from various shocks and vulnerabilities, a few challenges continue to arise (Triegaardt, 2006; World Bank, 2010; Soucat & Ncube, 2014). The first challenge raised by some African governments is sustainability of CSSP programmes. This is particularly the case considering that many governments fail to adequately mobilise domestic resources to invest in children due to factors internal and external to them. For example, in 2010, African governments lost nearly US\$859 billion dollars to tax evasion and avoidance, corruption and other cross-border illegal financial outflows (GFI, 2013). Many of the CSSP schemes in Africa thus depend on aid and sometimes borrowed money. Inadequate resources seem to have forced a number of countries to move away from universalism to targeted social protection schemes. This is done through means testing, income tests, claw-back taxes and other behavioural tests. However, a few African countries seem to be moving in the right direction in so far as domestic resource mobilisation is concerned. These include Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Rwanda, South Africa and Senegal (Soucat & Ncube, 2014).

The second challenge is that some policymakers are yet to appreciate the connection between CSSP and economic development. A number of governments still need to be convinced about the economic benefits of investments in CSSP. Some even argue that if social protection schemes are to be funded from domestic revenue then economic growth should be a priority. This line of thinking has somehow led to social protection schemes sliding down the ladder of the spending priorities of many governments.

Third, in a number of countries, concerns have been raised regarding corruption, limited coverage of social protection programmes, poor targeting, late disbursement of funds and inefficiencies in social protection expenditures. Problems of ineffective and inefficient spending are in part exacerbated by weak public finance and expenditure tracking systems (Triegaardt, 2006). In Egypt, for example, where 30% of social protection spending goes to food subsidies, concerns have been raised on whether these subsidies are in fact benefitting poorest families the



most. Some of the subsidies are badly targeted and somehow benefiting the rich more than the poor (Soucat & Ncube, 2014). Furthermore, social protection programmes are generally easy to politicise. Reports of nepotism, political patronage and selectivity in the identification of social protection schemes are common features in many African countries.

Fourth, the effectiveness of some social protection schemes is affected by lack of awareness of benefits as well as access procedures and requirements. Skewed access to information is often a cause of social exclusion. In addition, issues of political and religious affiliations of parents also emerge.

Lastly, contributory social insurance often overlooks the unemployed and child-headed households. In Ghana for example, although the National Health Insurance has been expanded on a voluntary basis to include the informal sector, it still leaves a lot of child-headed households outside the system. It can be concluded therefore, that to be effective, CSSP should be developed within open, inclusive and accountable governance frameworks.

Enhance Child Survival and Development Opportunities through More and Better Public Spending in Key Child Rights Sectors Based on a Lifecycle Approach

Disparities in children's life chances to survive and develop fully can be reduced through adequate, equitable and effective public spending with the aim of ensuring universal access to essential social services by all children. It is important that public spending on social services is prioritised during the early years of life. At the same time, it should be transacted within open, participatory and accountable governance. Existing evidence suggests that enhancing opportunities for all children early on in life is likely to have a greater impact on child outcomes (Ricardo Paes de Barros, et al, 2009). Effective public spending has a strong redistributive effect that can significantly reduce inequality.

The demographic situation of Africa itself demands a deliberate focused on investment in children and youth. In most countries children and young people below the age of 25 constitute 45-60% of national populations. The youthful and growing African population means that there is a huge demand for education and primary healthcare that target children. Education systems, for example, have to be expanded to ensure that there are enough quality schools, educated teachers and adequate teaching materials. Demand side financing models¹ in the education sector, for example, such as scholarships for girls, provision of books and educational materials, have however, proven to be effective in a number of African countries (Save the Children, 2014). In line with Education for All objectives, most African governments currently provide free primary education. Concerns have, however, been raised regarding adequacy of resources and subsequently the quality of education provided (ACPF 2013). Primary healthcare services for children under the age

1 These are ways of financing that are designed to respond to requests, needs and particular circumstances of identified children.

of five are also paid for by government in many countries. Ensuring universal access to health will also imply reduction or elimination of user fees. In 2010, Sierra Leone for example, introduced a Free Health Care Initiative for children under five as well as for pregnant women. In 2013, Kenya also introduced free maternal health services for all pregnant mothers (ACPF, 2013).

A universalist approach – under which an entire population is eligible for social benefits as a basic right – to public spending on essential social services to children usually leads to social inclusion, decreased disparities in material well-being, a sense of belonging, voice, autonomy and improved power relations in society. However, while universalism in public spending may be desirable, lack of sufficient resources and sometimes pressure from interest groups, tend to force governments into ‘targeted’ interventions. Unfortunately, too much targeting sometimes creates societies of ‘givers’ and ‘beneficiaries’, thereby perpetuating stigma and discrimination of certain groups of children.

In order to make this ‘public-spending-on-social-services’ pathway effective, African governments have to address the following challenges. First, they have to increase domestic revenue, especially from tax, by eliminating unnecessary tax incentives, improving efficiency in tax collection and combating tax evasion and avoidance. As noted by Save the Children (2014b:04) “while aid can have a dramatic impact in the short term and should be maintained, it cannot replace the long-term political commitment to and resourcing of public services” from domestic resources, especially through taxation. The average tax to GDP ratio for most African governments is 17% compared to 34% for OECD countries. As mentioned earlier, Africa also continues to suffer from illicit financial flows. According to Global Financial Integrity, from 1980 to 2009, Africa lost between US\$1.2 and US\$1.3 trillion in tax evasion, tax avoidance, mispricing, corruption, money laundering and other illicit flows. Out of this figure, West and Central Africa account for 37 percent, North 31 percent and southern Africa 27 percent (Kar et al, 2013). Lack of international cooperation on tax contributes to this.

Second, governments should ensure effective and equitable budget allocations to sectors that directly contribute to the implementation of children’s rights. No children should be left behind in enjoying their rights.

Lastly, deliberate efforts should be made to ensure that allocated resources are effectively and efficiently spent, within open, inclusive and accountable public finance systems. As we discussed in the above section, efficiency and effectiveness in public spending is still an issue in a number of countries, and should be addressed. The World Health Organization has estimated that 20-40% of health sector resources are wasted in one way or the other (WHO, 2010). In Kenya, for example, reports of overlapping beneficiaries have been reported in its various social development initiatives, which include Free Primary Education (FPE), Secondary Schools Bursary Fund (SEBF), Constituency Development Fund (CDF), Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF) and the Rural Electrification Fund (REF) (Njonjo, 2013).



Democratisation of the Public Sphere and Combating Discrimination in order to Expand Opportunities for the Enjoyment of Fundamental Freedoms and Rights by all Children through Supportive Laws, Policies and Effective Oversight Mechanisms

A crucial aspect of the battle against social inequities – which is a cause and consequence of discrimination and social exclusion – is to expand opportunities for all children to exercise their civil and political freedoms. Religious, ethnic, gender and even political fundamentalisms and differences, which are commonplace in many African countries, significantly limit the exercise of freedoms and rights by all children. To undo these practices, with the aim of tackling social inequities, governments may require policy and legislative reforms. These reforms will need to be reinforced by the establishment and/or strengthening of human rights and accountability institutions. For example, impartial police forces, ombudspersons, human rights commissions and an independent judiciary are key accountability institutions that help governments to handle cases of social inequities. It is unfortunate that in a number of African countries, there is selective application of the law as well as biased relationships between ruling parties and independent human rights and oversight institutions. This ultimately compromises their effectiveness.

Some countries in Africa have established specialised oversight bodies to monitor and report on inequality and social inequities. An example is the 'Equal Opportunities Commission' in Uganda. The Commission was established by the Act of Parliament in 2007 in line with the National Constitution in order to eliminate discrimination and inequalities against any individual or group of persons on the ground of sex, age, race, color, ethnic origin, tribe, birth, creed or religion, health status, social or economic standing, political opinion or disability. The effectiveness and impact of this Commission is beyond the scope of this paper.

It can therefore be argued, that the role of the state in addressing inequality is unquestionable. Strong and capable oversight institutions are required to address the systemic and structural drivers of inequality among children. Laws and institutions must not only be in place, but be used effectively by the population. A free and independent media is important. International human rights mechanisms such as the African Commission on Human and People's Rights, NEPAD Peer Review, Universal Periodic Review, State party reporting to the CRC Committee and to the Committee of Experts on the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, are also key.

Several African countries have also put in place sector-focused institutions such as gender, disability and children's commissions to address any perceived social inequities. It is, however, yet to be seen whether such institutions will effectively hold governments and powerful private actors to account for the levels of inequality the politics of patronage and power dynamics engender. Many of the child rights institutions, including these oversight bodies, are usually under-resourced and patronised by ruling parties for them to effectively perform their duties. Furthermore, for the most part, children are usually not prioritised by some of the oversight institutions in favour of 'politically sensitive' issues such as disability, race and women.

Another way of responding to social inequities is through expanding opportunities for children's participation in development and public spending processes. This requires that governments

establish and adequately resource participation structures at sub-national and national levels. Public participation should also be provided for in national policies and laws. In order to participate effectively, the public should have access to timely, relevant and user-friendly information. It is the responsibility of governments to create a supportive environment for citizens' (including children's) participation in decision-making. This includes enactment of laws and policies that uphold freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly. In a number of countries, civil society organisations operate in restrictive environments that limit their opportunities for effective participation in policy and budgetary processes.

Enhance Household Income and Ensuring Public Investments in 'Pro-poor' Development Initiatives

Inequalities among children can also be addressed through livelihood, employment creation and public works programmes targeting households. Labour market-based strategies such as minimum wages, decent employment, insurances and worker benefits are therefore an important component of this pathway. Low formal employment levels, alongside widespread informality of economies, however, make labour market instruments an inadequate, though necessary, pathway of improving the amount of household income available to children in Africa. Other pro-poor policy alternatives are required. These include public works programmes, small-scale agriculture support, low-cost housing, micro-finance support, rural electrification and other livelihood initiatives. Examples of public works and livelihoods programmes include the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) in South Africa, Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia, Slum Upgrading Programme in Kenya as well as the Food for Work programme in Zimbabwe. South Africa's EPWP was introduced in 2004 with the purpose of creating jobs for the unemployed, utilising labour-intensive methods rather than capital-based technologies. Investments in small-scale and subsistence agriculture are particularly important in Africa considering that nearly two thirds of the African population depend on agriculture and fishing for survival. Some of the pro-poor interventions are reinforced by affirmative action that seeks to prioritise specific segments of the population such as girls and women, indigenous groups, youth and people with disabilities in issues such as educational scholarships, business finance, internships and youth development funds.

Another way through which income inequality at household level can be reduced is through progressive taxation. This is done by ensuring that those who earn more money are taxed at a higher rate than those earning less. In line with this principle of progressive taxation, many African governments usually revise their tax-free brackets upwards every year for them to be in tandem with inflationary trends and changing salary levels. They also charge very low tax or zero rate specific goods and services consumed by the poor while at the same time charge high tax on luxury goods, usually consumed by the rich. This will leave the lowest paid employees with some disposable income to spend on children. Suffice to say, in conclusion, that direct taxes such as pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) or income tax tend to be more redistributive than indirect taxes such as VAT.



In order to maximise tax revenue and ensure progressivity of taxation, where necessary, African governments should reform their tax policies, particularly property and wealth taxes such as capital gains taxes in order to increase tax revenue in an equitable manner. This also entails evaluating the distributional effects of specific taxes such as Value Added Tax. The ultimate objective should be to avoid a situation whereby the tax burden is not disproportionately placed on the poor though.

Conclusion

The paper discussed the different dimensions of inequality among children. The multi-dimensional nature will help us to appreciate the vital roles of the state in expanding opportunities and capabilities of all children to progressively enjoy their rights. It also discussed several pathways to tackle inequality among children. These include child-sensitive social protection (CSSP); making basic social services available to all children through more and better public spending in key child rights sectors based on a lifecycle approach; expanding enjoyment of fundamental freedoms and combatting discrimination through supportive policies and effective oversight mechanisms; and enhancing household income through labour market instruments as well as strategic investments in pro-poor development initiatives.

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Representation without Participation: Dilemmas of Quotas for Women in Post-apartheid South Africa

SITHEMBISO MYENI

Abstract

This article provides a sketch of ways in which 'formal' institutions of democratic representation work in practice for women in South Africa (SA). In doing so, the state of women's participation and representation in the political process in SA is explored. Available data substantiates that women's organisations and women's wings of political parties have influenced the Government of SA and political parties to introduce quotas for women. Although quotas have increased the descriptive representation of women in political arenas, their representation in the decision-making process has not yet been ensured. Women face several social, cultural and political challenges that hinder their participation, and are still neglected by their male counterparts. Election of women councillors does not resolve a series of dilemmas concerning how to institutionalise democratic representation within a racially diverse, spatially divided and rapidly changing political landscape in SA.

Key words: women, participation, representation, government, quota

Sumário

Este artigo fornece um esboço de como as instituições "formais" de representação democrática funcionam na prática, em prol dos interesses das mulheres na África do Sul. Desta forma, a participação e representação das mulheres no processo político na África do Sul é explorado. Os dados disponíveis comprovam que as organizações de mulheres e alas femininas dos partidos políticos têm influenciado o Governo da África do Sul e partidos políticos a introduzirem cotas para as mulheres. Embora as cotas aumentaram a representação descritiva das mulheres na arena política, ainda não foi assegurada a sua representação no processo de tomada de decisão. As mulheres enfrentam vários desafios sociais, culturais e políticos que impedem a sua participação, e ainda são negligenciadas por seus colegas do sexo masculino. Eleição de vereadoras não resolve a série de dilemas a respeito de como institucionalizar a representação democrática dentro de uma paisagem política racial diversa, especialmente dividida e em rápida transformação na África do Sul.

Palavra-chave: mulheres, participação, representação, governo e cota

Introduction

It has been recognised that participation and representation of women in politics, national legislatures and municipal councils have grown steadily in South Africa (SA), and this has become a subject of debate in political and academic circles. Political scientists and analysts have investigated many factors contributing to variations in women's representation, perhaps the most influential being the link between statutory gender quota laws and greater numbers of women in power. Others assert that sustainability of the economic and social empowerment of women depends on the extent of their integration in the political decision-making process (Panday, 2008). Studies have found that the influence of quotas outweighs the effects of economic development and other socio-economic indicators (Ballington, 1998; Panday, 2008). Therefore, political participation of women is an indicator through which the extent of enjoyment of political rights by women is measured.

It has been realised in SA that without active participation and incorporation of women's perspectives at all levels, the goals of equality, development and peace cannot be achieved. This article examines different dimensions of the question of quotas for women in the political process in SA, and considers whether these really do ensure their representation in political decision-making, in an attempt to expose the underbelly of post-apartheid SA. It considers the interplay between territorial and partisan interests in power inequalities as well as institutional mechanisms of continuity and change in protection of the patriarchal order.

Importance of Women's Participation and Representation in Politics

Many theorists have placed importance on participation and representation of women in politics. John Stuart Mill pointed out that participation of both the majority and minority has to be ensured for a government to be competent and efficient. In a seminal article, Reynolds (1999) observed that Mill included women in his definition of the disenfranchised 'minority' of that time. Four claims are made in this article for the importance of participation and representation of women in politics:

- *Justice*: Absence of members of historically disadvantaged groups such as women from political institutions is increasingly regarded as evidence of injustice. This can be associated with what Stevens (2007) calls the 'agency' argument – since women constitute half of any country's population, that alone reserves them the right to constitute half of the decision-making bodies.
- *Efficiency*: Women bring resources into politics, namely values, experiences, and the unique expertise that differentiates them from men. A political system that does not utilise both genders' experiences and resources is incompetent and failing in legitimacy.
- *Diversity*: Genders have separate political aspirations or interests that need to be directly represented by these genders themselves. Women's active participation and vigorous contribution in decision-making is essential to ensure that they promote and defend their specific needs and interests, promoting gender-sensitive governance and enhancing access



to and control over local resources for both (Stevens, 2007).

- *Changing the political system*: Inclusion of women in politics improves the quality of democratic deliberation; public policy can be improved by having a more diverse set of representatives who can influence the political agenda.

Sapiro (1981, p 712) summarises these arguments by saying that in the case of women, descriptive representation was 'a necessary condition, but it is not sufficient'. Her argument for necessity rests on the grounds that (1) Having women rather than men in office makes government demonstrably more responsive to women's interests; (2) Participation in government is intrinsically valuable; and (3) Increased representation of women will change the perception that politics is a male domain. Therefore, the extent of women's representation in government has considerable political consequences. The validity and trustworthiness of democracy will be in question if women, constituting half of the population, remain absent from the different institutions of a society (Panday, 2008).

History of Women's Politics in SA

During the British colonial period, and later the apartheid regime from the 1940s to the 1990s, rural local government remained exclusively male (Cameron, 1988; Mamdani, 1996). For example, under indirect rule, the lowest tier of State administration in rural areas was under the authority of traditional authorities governing by the 'customary law' of particular 'tribes', and women were legal 'minors' (Welsh, 1971; Cassim, 1981; Hassim, 1990). These structures were imposed in order to perpetrate the apartheid system.

Women were not allowed to cast a vote until the 1930s, when white women were granted universal adult suffrage. A law was passed in 1923 (Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923) to institute local government in the form of municipal and township councils with legislative powers. This law attracted into local politics power elites, distancing women from representative structures of local government until the critical junctures of the 1990s (Bond, 2000; Nesvåg, 2000).

Since the 1990s, quotas for women in Parliament have increased remarkably, reaching their present level of 43% of a total of 400 seats. Since gaining political power in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC)-led government has sought to bring women into national politics through electoral politics. Central to SA's 1996 Constitution was the adoption of the Bill of Rights, with extensive gender-equality provision and a positive obligation on the State to ensure women's participation and representation in decision-making. This was the first time in history that the rights of women in SA were included in the Constitution across racial lines.

One may argue that the political presence of women in the Government of National Unity (GNU) (1994-1999) contributed to numerous policies to support the incorporation of women in local government structures. In 1998, the White Paper on Local Government and the Municipal Structures Act (MSA) were promulgated, both advocating quotas for women in local government. Since then, there have been numerous controversies regarding the implementation of the quota

system and ways of filling these seats, partly because this was left to individual political parties to decide through their political party agencies, influenced by territorial and partisan interests.

Similarly, quotas for women were demanded in the structures of traditional authorities by progressive forces – women’s organisations and political parties. In 2003, the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (TLGFA) was passed in Parliament to secure the quota for women in the traditional authority structures (traditional councils), which have to link with the local government structure in SA. However, the partial and uneven character of reforms and the politics they generated added additional layers of complexity and tension to the participation and representation of women (Myeni, 2012). Even though only one political party, the ANC, has voluntarily adopted a 50/50 quota system for its proportional representation (PR) lists, other political parties (see Table 1) do make a contribution to the transformation of women’s representation and distribution of women in key sites of decision- making.

Present State of Women’s Participation in SA

Women’s participation in politics in SA is at national, provincial and local government level, as well as in the institution of traditional leadership. The focus in this article is limited to the national and local levels of government. At national level women can play a role as law- and policy-makers, while at local government level, women play a role only in development-related implementation and bylaw-making processes. Few women (see Table 1) who dominated politics in SA from 1994 to 2014 ensured significant advances in government for women.

Women in National Parliament

Prior to 1994, SA was insensitive to gender justice in the political arena, since the old political elite used a racist franchise to compose the South African Parliament. Thus, Parliament did not become an institution where the voices of women were heard, and where they could influence the course of government. Clearly the social composition of the apartheid Parliament was male-dominated. However, the late Helen Suzman represented the United Party (later the Progressive Party and Progressive Federal Party) for 36 years, 13 of these as sole opposition member in the apartheid Parliament (Hassim, 2006). Other than this, women were narrowly defined in terms of common exclusion from the processes and forums of public decision-making. In addition, the space was not progressive enough for both economic and social life because of the racist franchise that was at play.

Table 1 provides comparative data on the last five successive national government elections in SA. Women continually increased their representation in Parliament from 1994 to 2009, with it decreasing a little in 2014. After the first democratic election in 1994, women constituted a record 27.7% of Members of Parliament, placing SA seventh highest in the world on this indicator (Britton, 2002, p 33; Hassim, 2006). After the June 1999 general elections, women members increased to 30%, and after April 2004, constituted a record 32.75% of all parliamentarians elected. This increased further to 43% in 2009 (Commission of Gender Equality, 2010, p 60). However, after May 2014, women parliamentarians decreased to 39%.



The increase in women parliamentarians is through the Proportional representation (PR) system, which has a positive correlation with the percentage of women elected in Parliament (Matland, 1998; Goetz, 1998). Some argue that an advantage of party lists with PR is that it assists women, in that even if voters were reluctant to vote for women, voting for the party benefitted the women that were running (Goetz, 1998). Women achieved a significant breakthrough in representation in SA from 1994 onwards, largely attributable to the ANC's adoption of a quota system ensuring that at least 30% of candidates (in the 1994-2004 elections) on their lists were women. This quota was increased to 50% in the April 2009 and May 2014 general elections. This was not only an achievement for the ANC, but for SA at large, widely signalling the extent to which the new democracy had been inclusive and enhancing its image both locally and internationally.

How do women win candidate selection within a political party? There are two main categories into which women who are nominated fall: (1) Those with a close relationship with the women's movement, but who come through party tickets, and (2) Those who accrued political strength from years of association with the party organisation. In reality, political parties do not want to take any risk by nominating 'ordinary' women candidates, and that in itself perpetuates women's marginal presence in Parliament.

As Table 1 shows, reaching a 'critical mass' of elected women members did not take long in SA. Increases in women's representation averaged 3% between the 1994, 1999 and 2004 elections. In the beginning, having a quota was considered the sole avenue for women's entry into the legislature – and this has changed only slightly since the emergence of political parties led by women (Democratic Alliance (DA), Independent Democrats and National Freedom Front (NFP)). Nonetheless, there was a decrease in women parliamentarians after May 2014, largely because these women-led parties have failed to adopt a quota system, and have not shown strength in convincing women to stand out for political competitive elective posts from municipalities to the National Assembly.

Table 1 also shows that some of the 'older' parties did not have elected women members in Parliament. For instance, the breakaway Congress of the People registered 15 women in Parliament in 2009, and Economic Freedom Fighters registered nine in Parliament in 2014 doing better than both the Freedom Front and Pan Africanist Congress. Party delegates to Parliament from within the DA are elected on the basis of the universal adult suffrage. Evidence from parties not using the quota system suggests that to ensure women are equitably represented at national level, it is not enough to merely place women on lists – they must also be placed in electable positions.

Morna et al. (2009) illustrate that SA is the one country in the region that now gives the Southern African Development Community (SADC) the confidence that, with the right political will, the 50/50 objective can be achieved – at least in political decision-making. Morna et al. (2009) further argue that SA now has the highest representation of women in Parliament and Cabinet in the SADC region, and among the highest in local government. This success could partly be attributed to massive gender advocacy efforts by civil society. However, the decrease in women parliamentarians after May 2014 is a threat to this confidence, and followed a decrease of women in local government elections in 2011.

Table 1: Women's Representation in Parliament, 1994-2014

Party	1994			1999			2004			2009			2014		
	No. of Seats	No. of Women	% Women	No. of Seats	No. of Women	% Women	No. of Seats	No. of Women	% Women	No. of Seats	No. of Women	% Women	No. of Seats	No. of Women	% Women
ANC	252	90	35.7	266	95	35.7	279	104	37	264	130	49.2	249	116	47
Democratic Party/ Democratic Alliance	7	1	14	38	6	15.7	50	13	26	67	20	29.9	89	26	29
Inkatha Freedom Party	43	10	23	33	9	27.2	28	5	18.5	18	4	22.2	10	1	10
National Party/ New National Party	82	9	10	28	4	14.2	7	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-
United Democratic Movement				14	1	7	9	4	44.4	4	0	0	4	0	0
Independent Democrats							7	3	43	4	1	25	-	-	-
African Christian Democratic Party	2	0	0	6	2	33	6	2	33.3	3	1	33.3	3	1	33.3
Freedom Front				3	0	0	4	0	0	4	0	0	4	0	0
United Christian Democratic Party				3	1	33	3	0	0	2	1	50	0	0	0
Pan Africanist Congress	5	1	20	3	0	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
Congress of People										30	15	50	3	0	0
Economic Freedom Fighters	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	9	36
Other				5	2	40	4	0	0	3	0	0	12	2	16.7
Total	400	111	27.7	400	120	30	400	131	32.75	400	172	43	400	156	40.5

Note: Figures for these results include the participation and representation of women from political parties that do not use the quota system in the closed PR lists.

Source: Hassim (2006, p 174); Commission for Gender Equality (2010); Independent Electoral Commission Election Reports (1999, 2004, 2009); www.elections.org.za



In the South African parliamentary system, decisions are made at two crucial sites: The Cabinet and portfolio committees (Hassim, 2006), which are crucial for women to exercise their leverage. Table 2 provides comparative data on participation of women in Cabinets for the last five successive national government elections in SA. It shows that over the years there was an increase in participation of women as ministers, meaning upward mobility of women within the hierarchy, and a relationship between the quota mechanism and upward mobility of women in SA's Parliament.

Table 2: Women's Representative in Decision-making, 1994-2014

Election Year	Total no. of Government Departments/Ministries	No. of Women Ministers	No of Women Deputy Ministers	% of Cabinet Seats Occupied by Women
1994	27	4	8/14	15
1999	29	8	8/13	28
2004	28	12	8/13	43
2009	34	13	9	41
2014	35	15	15	42

Women in Local Government

Seekings (2000) stated that local government in the apartheid city was characterised by a complex process of functional inclusion, spatial separation and political exclusion, influenced by the view that blacks were 'temporary sojourners' in white cities. The local government system was male-biased and legislated the separation of African men and women, also attempting to structure African life in such a manner that only basic needs would have to be provided for by the State and white employers. The impact of the South African patriarchal society was compounded by the intersection of the historical realities of race, class and gender, as well as disability.

With the promulgation of the LGTA of 1993, government tried to incorporate women into local government bodies. In 1995, changes were brought into the official discourse on the LGTA, and it was amended to secure the minimum representation of women in local government. The amended Act defined women as an 'interest group' along with apartheid old guards such as farmers, landowners and traditional authorities (Pycroft, 1996; Hendricks & Ntsebeza, 1999). The Act gave women not more than 10% representation in an ex officio capacity in local government, based on the decision of the Member of Executive Council responsible for local government in the Provincial Government. Women were to undergo candidate selection in their respective political parties, which in part protected the patriarchal order.

The GNU tried to put more policies in place to support the incorporation of women in local government structures, and from the late 1990s, discussion of quotas dominated official discourses (1998 White Paper on Local Government; 1998 MSA; 2000 Municipal Systems Act), and contributed to the second reorganisation of local government. The 1998 White Paper on Local Government, drawing from the experience of the 1995/1996 local government elections,

acknowledged that women were under-represented, and proposed that political parties introduce a gender quota, encouraging them to ensure that in the next three municipal elections, at least half of the candidates on the party list were women.

The 1998, MSA also called for equal representation of women and other marginalised groups, but did not explicitly demand equal presence on wards and proportional lists. As a result, fewer women featured as ward candidates, and even fewer were elected (Tables 3 and 4). These discourses provided for the division of local councils into wards, which started more clearly after the December 2000 local government elections. This introduced the second reorganisation of local government into a two-tier system.

Tables 3 and 4 provide comparative data on the last three local government elections. As Table 3 shows, political parties that contested local government elections nationally increased from 79 in December 2000 to 97 in March 2006, and to 121 in May 2011. Both the ward-based and PR system provided a political environment that allowed a wide range of opinions to be expressed by political parties, as long as they worked within constitutional parameters.

Table 3 shows the total number of independent candidates contesting local government elections from 2000 to 2011. Selee (2004, p 20) concludes that even though independent candidates have mixed success, the electoral system allows citizens to develop new forms of political action. There is thus an emerging bloc of candidates external to political parties, forming an alliance around local power-broking structures, which again serve largely to exclude women. This means there are different sources for the 'supply of women' to the mainstream politics. Despite those women's movements, some emerge from civil society organisations who are not only driven by the political influence but by social influence, and a greater space is allowed by the electoral law that operates at the local government, which allows for independent candidates to emerge.

Table 4 provides a comparative analysis of women's representation in the last three local government elections, with a gradual increase in women's participation and descriptive representation in local government over the course of two municipal elections, but with a shameful decline in women's participation and representation in the May 2011 local elections.

Comparing Tables 3 and 4, there are three possible explanations for the increase in women contesting and winning seats in the post-apartheid local government: Increase in political parties contesting local government elections; increases in contested wards; and extension of democratic institutions, all contributing to the increase in political parties contesting local elections. Before leaving office in April 1994, the strategic decision of the National Party Government to have strong constitutional principles for decentralising power to sub-national politics and the intersection of democratising political reforms created supporters of decentralisation where women and quotas were also considered (Oomen, 2005; Hassim, 2006).

There are also possible explanations for the decline seen in the May 2011 local elections. Firstly, these results clearly demonstrate the impact of voluntary party quotas in a PR system in which parties determine where women are on the lists. Secondly, the political action of the ANC



Women's League (ANCWL) from the early 1990s that advocated for the candidate quota for improved political representation of women in politics, had an impact on structural changes in favour of women in local politics (Meintjes, 1998a; Hassim, 2006). These shifted the responsibility of women's under-representation away from women and re-authored it to political elites in the territory to devise new strategies and principles.

Hassim (2006) argues that in recognition of the most immediate problem being in the traditional electoral processes, the candidate quota was seen as a means of fast-tracking women's political representation. This was to influence reforms in candidate selection methods. However, these gender-specific claims contributed to a decline, and a bitter experience for women, considering that it was only the ANC that used a gender quota. In the election of 2011, the proportion of women councillors in the ANC dropped to 44% from 46% in 2006 (Morna et al, 2011).

Some scholars suggest that forms of electoral system are not necessarily the crucial point in the increase in women, but rather the number of candidates running for election and the number of representatives in a constituency (Lundell, 2004). The evidence presented in this article seems to confirm that an increase in the number of candidates running for election has been one of the contributing factors influencing the increase of women in political office in local politics in SA (Table 3). There is also a pattern emerging of women being locked into and dependent on internal party politics for political opportunities.

Table 3: Candidates for General Members of Local Government, 2000-2011

Year of Election	No. of Municipalities with Wards	No. of Political Parties	No. of Independent Candidates	Total No. of Wards Contested	Total No. of Candidates Contesting LG Elections	Total no. of Candidates Contesting per Gender		Total No. of PR Councillors	Total No. of Ward-based Councillors
						Female Candidates	Male Candidates		
2000	237	79	689	3 754	30 081	8 562	21 519	16 156	13 925
2006	237	97	663	3 895	45 189	15 718	29 471	21 498	23 691
2011	237	121	748	4277	53 596	19 731	33 865	23 278	29 570

Note: The number of general candidates contesting the first local government elections in 1995/1996 was not included since it was run using a different formula, which was agreed upon to secure participation of minorities.

Source: Independent Electoral Commission Elections Reports (2000, 2006); Morna et al (2009); www.elections.org.za

Table 4: Representation of Women in Municipal Councils, 2000-2011

Year of Election	Results per Gender		Results of Women per PR and Ward Councillors		% of Ward Seats Won by Women	% of PR Seats Won by Women	Overall % Won by Women
	Female	Male	PR	Wards			
2000	2 284	5 753	1 651	633	16.9	38.1	28
2006	3 314	5 036	1 889	1 425	37	42	40
2011	3 495	5 596	2 086	1 408	33	43	38

Note: The number of general candidates contesting the first local government elections in 1995/1996 was not included since it was run using a different formula, which was agreed upon to secure participation of minorities.

Source: Independent Electoral Commission Elections Reports (2000, 2006); Morna et al (2009); www.elections.org.za



Actors in Introduction of Quotas for Women

Since gaining political power in 1994, the ANC-led Government has considered the need for reform to improve women's political representation in politics in SA, and introduction of quotas for women dominated public discourse during the reform processes. Here, I examine the roles of the government, women's organisations and women in political parties in those reforms.

The Role of Government

From the 1994 Interim Constitution to the 1996 Final Constitution, the Government of SA laid down the fundamental values upon which the Republic is founded, including non-sexism and non-racialism. In 1996, the Constitutional Assembly provided a legitimising framework that did not exclude women from politics but enshrined their rights to form political parties, make political choices, and take part in party activities, according to the liberal discourse of the country's Constitution. In the Bill of Right, gender equality became a core principle and value for South African democracy, formally influencing both political parties and the Independent Electoral Commission¹ to ensure that women's political participation or political presence was not prejudiced in any way (Hassim, 2006, p 183). The equality clause of the Constitution includes a provision aimed at ensuring substantive rather than merely formal equality.

Since 1994, SA has taken measures to advance the status of women, and signed and ratified all relevant major international instruments, including the Beijing Platform for Action (PFA) in 1995, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in December 1996, and the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development in 1997, the latter aiming to achieve gender parity in all areas of decision-making by 2015.

In 2000, *South Africa's National Policy Framework on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment* was prepared by the Office on the Status of Women with input from women's movement activists, those working in non-governmental organisations, and scholars from different universities. This aimed to reverse the history of women's discrimination and marginalisation, both this framework and the Gender Policy Framework for Local Government aim to ensure that Gender Focal Points are appointed to all levels of Government and in respective departments. These frameworks ground themselves in the 1996 Constitution, gender theories and various international and regional instruments to which SA is a signatory. However, the fact that the 1996 Constitution does not provide for quotas to ensure adequate representation of women in elected public bodies, and that no legal quotas are established for national or provincial elections, make it difficult to have a penalty if the MSA is not adhered to. Accordingly, the discourse of descriptive representation of women was more influential in portraying women as a group – but not in enforcing empowerment at the level of individual citizens.

1 The Independent Electoral Commission is a permanent body that administers elections established under the Electoral Commission Act of 1996. The Electoral Act has an Electoral Code of Conduct that has to be respected by all registered parties and candidates, also requiring political parties to put into place mechanisms that would enable women to access their rights.

Also, despite these legislative frameworks, earlier actors such as traditional authorities were given tremendous powers over a relatively lengthy period of transition, and in the new system of local government (Beall, 2005, Oomen, 2005, and Ntsebeza, 2005). The last legal barrier for women to participate in all areas of national and local development was overcome when the TLGFA was passed in Parliament in 2003 to secure minimum representation of women in traditional authority structures (traditional councils), which have to link with the local government structure. However, introduction of the quota system in traditional leadership deepened women's dependence on male traditional leaders (Myeni, 2012).

All told, the Government of SA has set up a comprehensive network of mechanisms and institutions for the advancement of women. In the second half of the 1990s, the Commission for Gender Equality was established according to Section 187 of the South African Constitution, to ensure 'protection, development and attainment of gender equality' in order to balance the 1996 Constitution and the transition to democracy.

However, these new institutions of women's participation serve in a very contradictory environment, which can be described as 'representation without power'. In 2009, President Jacob Zuma announced the formation of a Ministry of Women, Youth, Children and Disability for co-ordination of programmes to address gender inequality. Critics argued that combining women and children in the same ministry was problematic (Morna et al, 2010), and that the ministry was not canvassed or debated and required clear conceptualisation to be effective. After the May 2014 general elections, President Zuma created a stand-alone Ministry of Women in the Office of the Presidency. Overall, SA is a case where women organised themselves and had some input in the negotiation process that culminated in the transition to democracy as well as the establishment of the Ministry of Women.

The Role of Women's Organisations

Women's voices in SA have also grown in strength due to a significant increase in women's organisations. The first such organisation, the Women's Enfranchisement League,² was established in 1902 in Durban and subsequently spread and grew (Walker, 1991), intensified by the failure of political elites in the National Convention (1908-1909) to grant women the right to vote.

As Walker (1991) observed, these scattered League(s) in different towns and cities held their inaugural conference in Durban in March 1911, which resulted in the formation of the Women's Enfranchisement Association of the Union (WEAU). The WEAU was initially committed to non-racialism on the issue of franchise for the purpose of women's liberation, but in their

2 The first organisation to espouse women's suffrage in South Africa was the Women's Christian Temperance Union, founded in 1889. This organisation was instrumental against the trade of alcoholic beverages. The organisation remained convinced that male legislators would always ignore their campaign if women had no vote (Walker, 1991).



Conference in 1924, changed in favour of an only-white vote. These women in former colonies and later provinces identified as their common interest the elimination of patriarchy (understood as the system of male domination), but here there was also an intersection of class, race and colonial forms of domination with oppression of women. A number of women's organisations were established with active support from urban elite groups (both male and female); however, their mobilisation was ineffective, in part because they did not reach into rural areas where most of the population lived, and because their objectives in furthering women's issues were not unified due to territorial segregation and the dominant racist discourse.

At the time of SA's Union and apartheid regimes from 1910 to the 1990s, there were a number of women's organisations in both urban and rural areas. In the early 1900s, political developments excluded women from political institutions. Women were not granted membership within the ANC, including voting rights, despite the fact that they were among its founding members; rather they were auxiliary members (Walker, 1991; Seekings, 2000). To make the place for women in the ANC leaders sponsored the Bantu Women's League, which restricted its activities to a narrow range associated with the 'upliftment and education' of girls (Hassim, 2006).

From the 1940s, many changes took place. In 1943, the ANCWL was formed and allowed women to become full members with the right to vote and participate at all levels (Walker, 1991; Seekings, 2000). Formation of the ANCWL opened a political space for women's representation in the ANC. As Walker (1991, p 90) argues: "... the ANC had finally come to incorporate women, one half of the people it claimed to represent, into its political frame of reference." However, national liberation took priority over the problem of gender inequality, because the ANCWL was created whereby "African women could be channelled into the national liberation movement on a footing that was, at least theoretically, equal to that of men" (Walker, 1991, p 115). Women were organised specifically as African women, a mark of the subsequent form that the women's movement would take in the national liberation movement (Hassim, 2006).

Formation of the ANCWL contributed to the creation of the Federation of South African Women (FSAW) in 1954, which in 1955 launched an independent militant campaign against the extension of passes to women to regulate their urban mobility. The FSAW was a non-racial women's movement operating within the Congress Alliance, the umbrella group formed by the ANC, white Congress of Democrats, South African Indian Congress and Coloured People's Organisation to oppose apartheid.

Women had begun to expand their activities to local struggles, and their mobilisation became stronger in urban areas. The first shift in opportunity came in the late 1970s and 1980s, when the political terrain of opposition to apartheid shifted to the local level, and women's participation in community organisations was encouraged to expand resistance at grassroots level. An unintended consequence of the 1980s institutional configuration was that it opened a new terrain of political struggle at local level, in turn providing a political opportunity for women to mobilise as a group separately from black people (Meintjes, 1998a; Hassim, 2006).

In these decentralised struggles about access to services and resource distribution, women developed a sense of agency that served as a building block in forming separate women's organisations challenging women's exclusion from the negotiation phase in the 1990s. Hassim (2006) argues that the local organising and politicisation of community issues drew many women with no previous history of collective action into political struggles and subsequently into women's associations. For a brief period from 1981 to 1984, women's organisations mushroomed, such as the United Women's Organisation in the Western Cape, Natal Organisation of Women and the Federation of Transvaal Women, until disbanded to give way to the relaunch of the ANCWL in August 1990. The shift in opportunity reconfigured the universe of political discourse to include not only universalistic demands for a democratic state, but also new, gendered concerns.

The political shifts of focus opened windows for women to take part in the democratisation process and activities in ways that had been totally impossible before the 1990s. Women's organisations began to establish links with each other across racial lines and geography, in order to focus on activities to raise the consciousness of women at grassroots level. This helped these organisations to raise gender issues in other forms, for the purpose of incorporating them into the democratisation processes. The Women's National Coalition (WNC), formed in April 1992, became an avenue through which women mobilised for action during the negotiation period. This coalition of women's organisations united to ensure that women's voices would be heard in shaping the new South Africa.

According to Goetz (1998, p 246) the WNC was nationally and indeed globally unprecedented in size and diversity, having approximately 90 women's organisations under its umbrella in 1994. The WNC was the largest and most representative women's organisation in the history of SA (Tripp, 1994), originally a brainchild of women in political parties who had been descriptively and substantively excluded from the negotiation processes. The WNC committed to building a society based on gender equality, democracy, and peace, and provides an interesting example. In order to address problems of subordination of and hostility to women, and the disregard that women experience from male colleagues, the WNC created an independent power base in the processes of transition.

The WNC's aim to challenge obstacles in the path of gender equality was to target traditional authorities, which formally constituted their authority in homeland politics through official discourses; therefore the WNC faced intensified conflict with traditional leaders over the equality clause, which seemed to challenge their claims to hereditary power (Walker, 1994). Traditional leaders at the Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP) demanded exclusion of customary law from the Bill of Rights. As Mokgoro (1997, p 1283) recounted, in the MPNP, traditional leaders lobbied for the place of customary law, while feminists lobbied against it. The WNC was trying to prevent continuation of apartheid's race-based mechanisms for organising political representation. Overall, once these women were organised and grouped together, they realised their individual potentials better and gained confidence in their ability to challenge social norms and other forms of discrimination, learning to negotiate new roles and opportunities.



The Role of Women in Political Parties

The success story of women in political parties in SA is impressive. The WNC, through the backing of the ANCWL, pursued dual politics: It appealed to the ANC from the independent base of the coalition, and appealed to the ANC's internal commitments to represent the demand for gender equality. The activities of women in their political parties created immense pressure on the negotiators to make changes in policies for the post-apartheid state regarding women's participation and representation. As a result, the constitutional negotiators replaced the old British system with the multi-member district system, which utilises party-list PR, found most likely to enhance women's representation (Ballington, 1998). Women activists and academics who participated in the WNC during the negotiation process contributed to the debate about the choice of an electoral system that would be beneficial to women's representation and introduction of a quota system (Britton, 2002 and Hassim, 2003).

Rejection of adoption of a quota system in 1993 appears to have been a response by ANC leaders to the failed quota proposal for party positions at the ANC's first conference held in Durban in 1991. Gender activists within the ANC continued to lobby for a quota until the December 2007 National Conference. Evidence suggests gradual changes: at the December 1997 and December 2007³ National Conferences, the decision about the quota for women moved from 33% to 50%, meaning a reform of the ANC's constitution, after progressive forces demanded increased representation of women in government structures. The ANC quota system substantially improved the representation and impact of women in Parliament, and its policy has been consistent in supporting the need for affirmative action and gender equality. Women opened the debate about women's representation in political institutions, mainly among members who had clearly supported the idea of a quota for women in the National Executive Committee of the ANC.

Major Factors Affecting Women's Involvement in Politics

The overall extent of women's participation in the political process is much lower than that of their male counterparts, despite determined efforts to create change. The following factors hinder the process of women's participation in the political process: structural deficiencies, patriarchy, culture and education.

Structural Deficiencies

In SA, women representatives are disadvantaged by political and structural constraints arising from the way in which quotas for seats for women are incorporated and implemented. As discussed

3 One has noticed through a historical trace of the nomination of women National Executive Committee (NEC) members, that changes took place from 1997 to 2007 within the ANC. For example, out of 60 NEC members, there were only 15 women, which increased to 19 in 2002 and improved dramatically to 40 women in 2007, plus two in the top six office bearers (see ANC Constitution as amended and adopted at 52nd National Conference, Polokwane, December 2007).

earlier, a 'mixed electoral system' was introduced in local government, with a combination of the constituency and PR that applied to urban areas being extended to all municipalities with wards, even in rural areas. This provided for centralisation of administrative power to political parties, in order to secure territorial power. Again the quotas for women were not used by political parties, except the ANC; however, even then the practice carries dynamics of gender exclusion. This was especially so when territorial interests and power to govern prevailed at the beginning of decentralisation reforms.

As shown earlier, women were further disadvantaged by resource constraints: even though there is an increase in the number of women in political office (as councillors elected through PR), women's influence in politics did not necessarily increase. Hierarchies of knowledge and power set developmental boundaries for public representatives in local politics. In essence, the main difference between the PR and ward councillors is that the latter are accorded fully-fledged powers to carry out development activities. This means that the legitimacy of women as PR councillors in the public sphere is reduced because they do not have any direct say on the official development activities or distribution of resources and benefits to constituents. This reflects the negative attitude of the lawmakers toward women.

As Beall (2005) and Goetz (2003) note, affirmative action for enhancing participation of women in local government elections in many countries has been taken as an extra measure, rather than considering women as credible and legitimate political actors. Robinson (1995, p 18) noted that women do not enjoy much influence in local politics because the combination of ward and PR was a result of a compromise forged during transition. The scenario around PR showed a constraint and unwillingness to devolve formal authority at local government level. The system serves to build in 'participatory exclusion' within the democratic process, challenging the sustainable political careers of women in local politics, and indicating major political structural deficiency and inequality.

Patriarchy

SA is a dualistic State, integrating statutory and customary law. At statutory level, the South African Constitution encompasses many rights, including those prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender. However, the traditional patriarchal⁴ society of SA, based on class, race and gender divisions, has not been dismantled, so while class mobility allows movement between rich and poor, the division of social space and differences in behavioural norms between men and women are rigidly maintained.

The family, constituting the basic unit of social organisation and control, sets norms for male and female roles, and the father (or, in his absence, the next male kin) is the head of the household. Both decision-making powers and economic control are vested in the hands of men,

4 Patriarchy can be defined as a system of social structures and practices in which men dominate, exploit and oppress women.



and the family operates through a clearly defined system of rights and obligations. In addition, the day-to-day life of most inhabitants of SA is governed by traditional courts that administer customary laws primarily based on male power, authority and domination over women.

This patriarchal tradition is embedded in historical legacies, where the code was first enacted in 1891 (Natal Code of Bantu Law, Law No. 19 of 1891) and reproduced under the Native Administration Act of 1927, which sanctioned tribal marriages and set up a separate court system of chiefs and commissioners (Walker, 1990 and Hughes, 1990). According to Section 27(2) of the Code of Bantu Law, a native female was deemed a perpetual minor in law, and had no independent powers. Provisions of this official discourse meant that African women in KwaZulu-Natal were under the guidance of their natural guardian for life, if not emancipated. Four major areas severely disadvantaged African women: Legal capacity, property ownership, marriage and ownership of men. These official discourses institutionalised and legitimatised the patriarchal ruling relations, which seemed difficult to dismantle due to the intersection of rights and custom in SA's liberal Constitution.

Culture

Cultural and traditional practices continue to infringe on the rights of women, and gendered power relations at all levels and in all spheres of life pose serious impediments to advancement of women. These cultural norms are perpetuated and sustained by the powerful institutions of the family, traditional authorities and religion, and have significant impacts on gendered-related issues.

Empowerment of women in terms of access to decision-making positions is considerably affected by the cultural stereotypes that exist in most societies. In SA, the major forms of stereotype include (1) That women's primary responsibility is to take care of the family and children, and it is only a secondary obligation to get involved in political and social institutions, (2) That the public domain is mainly for men, while the private household domain is for women, (3) That women lack experience, and thus are not capable of assuming leadership positions, and (4) That women's involvement in the public sphere should be an extension of their roles in the family.

Some of these gender stereotypes are rooted in social norms and practices, and SA is not an exception in this regard. In addition, ideas about participation of women are still associated with their marital status. However, at the same time, the new processes seem to have enormous power to erode some forms of patriarchies in favour of women in electoral politics.

Education

Through education, women can be knowledgeable, skilled, and self-confident in their participation in the ongoing development process. However, most South African women are still illiterate, lack information on the political process, and do not know how to mobilise for policies that respond to women's interests. Some have lost interest in voting due to unfulfilled promises and the rampant corruption embedded in neo-liberal policies. As a result, women lose interest in participating in political activities.

Most women remain engaged in the informal economy or the subsistence sector at low wages or none at all – members of the low-skilled or unskilled labour force. Even though there are political developments to improve the lives of women in the post-apartheid regime, the services that they offer remain invisible, unrecognised, and devalued. They are therefore somehow unprotected by laws and legislation. Their involvement in the informal economy means their incomes are inadequate and still seen by themselves and their families to be used by the family instead of spent as they themselves decide. In such a situation, women cannot afford the expenses required for political participation.

Representation without Participation

While political developments in SA through the ANC introduced quotas for women in order to ensure their participation in the political process, it remains an important question to determine whether these provisions have ensured representation of women in decision-making – or simply ensured attendance of some women in government institutions. The domination of men is still taken for granted in the public sphere and world of politics – men using their patronage networks to influence the decision-making process. It remains difficult for elected women to be seen as legitimate actors, especially in local government structures in SA.

However, we should not imagine that it is impossible for some women politicians to have a real impact on politics. For example, SA has seen the appointment of two female Deputy Presidents in Government (Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka and Baleka Mbete), although neither completed a full political term. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, also from the ANC, became the first female Head of the African Union Commission. There are also a few successful women in South African politics who lead political parties, and who have been successful in local government and been elected Mayor and Deputy Mayor in Metropolitan Municipalities, District Municipalities and Local Municipalities. However, their number is so small that they are viewed as exceptions.

In order to get a better idea of the extent of serious representation of women in political decision-making, this article draws on the experiences of both women and members in the political process as reported in other studies. Myeni (2012) in his thesis, suggested that more than 80% of women councillors interviewed in KwaZulu-Natal were dissatisfied – especially those who are PR councillors – at being prevented from exercising their rights and responsibilities as representatives. An even greater percentage expressed their exclusion from decision-making structures, whereas in an important structure such as Council, they are barred from expressing views not be in line with their political party's mandate. This reflects that the patriarchal society and its supporting structures offer little space for women to develop their authority and agency. To a large extent, political development through decentralisation reforms and processes tends to strengthen and reinvigorate existing traditional institutions and elites (Agarwal, 1997, Goetz, 2003, and Beall, 2005).

Furthermore, some members of society are not yet ready to accept women in key decision-making structures and processes. The extent of the above practices, the dilemma of women



in politics, and the role of official discourses over women participating in local politics are well captured in the testimony of one male councillor who was sympathetic to women in (local) politics: "If you are a married woman you seem to have an acceptable status to represent the community, but with males they are acceptable either married or not".⁵ This reflects experience in one administrative area in KwaZulu-Natal, where women suffer from an identity crisis and marital status is deeply rooted in 'a patchwork quilt of patriarchies'.⁶

Marital status is not something 'given' in an African community, but a process that goes through indigenous or customary law. The fact that there are legal processes taking place in both formal and informal institutions, transfer of property in the form of cattle and rituals that legitimate legal rulings, all represent fundamental material and moral constructions of gender integral to the local decentralised system.

The above testimony of the male councillor also says something about the convergence of formal and informal institutions: Women's marginalisation is reinforced by the paternalistic and discriminatory attitudes of male representatives, and their belief that women should not be involved in local politics, and that while men get into office on merit, women get in through institutionalised favours in the form of quotas and moral qualifications. It is clear that extending the scope for participation of women through quotas does not ensure their active participation in the decision-making process. For full participation in decision-making, it is necessary to overcome the rigid social, political and cultural barriers that women still face.

What Should be Done?

Genuine participation by women in decision-making remains limited, despite the introduction of quotas for them by political parties. The major causes of poor representation of women have been political, structural, educational and sociocultural as well as economic, restricting women's participation and representation while maintaining the dominance of territorial and partisan interests. Several improvements are required to ensure greater female representation in the process of politics in SA.

First, it is the responsibility of Government to initiate further reforms in the constitutional and legal provisions intended to ensure gender equality in every sphere. Legal measures need to be passed in order to implement enacted legislation such as the MSA of 1998 effectively. The new Ministry of Women must focus on issues of importance to women in every sector, and move away from being event-driven to focus on empowerment that would have an impact on women's lives.

Second, cultural norms and perceptions have stereotyped women's roles as limited to the family domain. It is essential to bring about changes by initiating appropriate educational, cultural

5 Interview with Councillor Dlamini, 18 June 2009.

6 According to Bozzoli (1983: p 149) a patchwork quilt of patriarchies is a system in which forms of patriarchy are sustained, modified or entrenched in a variety of ways, depending on the internal character of the system.

and informational policies. Discrimination against women should be made clearly unacceptable or be totally rejected, and educational curricula should be redesigned to highlight the significance of women's participation in development at all levels. The mass media should help policymakers and administrators to realise the importance of gender inequality and also work to encourage women to reorganise their roles and affirm themselves as equal partners of men in all sectors.

Third, since women's representation in the legislative and executive bodies greatly depends on their participation and representation in political parties, there is a need for the political parties in SA to take appropriate initiatives to expand party representation. Use of quotas for women should be adopted by all political parties. It might be easier to bring about such reforms in political parties since the largest political party, the ANC, uses the quota system to remain the governing party in SA. This practice is not unique to SA: Women quotas in political parties exist in countries such as Germany, Sweden, Norway and Denmark (Ballington, 1998). The commitment of political leaders at all levels to gender equality and to adopting and implementing existing and future reforms is critical in ensuring that the under-representation of women in the decision-making process is addressed.

Fourth, according to international best practices, political parties are encouraged to include motivated and qualified women in leadership positions, and sensitise party members to the importance of opening a supportive space for women among their members, leadership, and internal structures. During election campaign periods, political parties and civil society organisations should provide training and mentor women candidates by strengthening their campaigning skills, through training on fundraising, message development, working with the media, building voter contact and outreach programmes, writing campaign plans, and designing targeted methods of voter communication. Political parties should establish party funding mechanisms for money to be raised to support women candidates during their campaigning.

Fifth, political parties must adopt clear rules for the participation of women delegates at national party conferences, considering that in these national conferences, national organisational leaders are elected, resolutions and major party decisions are made and policies adopted that guide the direction of the party. Parties should consider establishing targets to ensure that a proportion of the delegates attending are women. Nonetheless, women's political structures such as the African National Congress Women's League (ANCWL) should continue to advocate for measures to promote women's electoral candidacies and lobby party leaders to ensure that women candidates are given high positions on the lists, and assigned to winnable seats. In addition, women's structures could seek funding for training interventions for women candidates, and conduct civic education and voter outreach. Political parties should also ensure that their manifesto and campaign messages are targeted to women voters, articulating the party positions on gender equality and women's empowerment.

Finally, government-initiated policy measures intended to empower women cannot go beyond rhetoric if adequate funding in the form of budget allocations is not provided. In order to be effective, political will must be translated into both policies and resources. At the same time, to



develop and strengthen women's capacity as political leaders, develop media relations, and help women generate resources, Government should work to ensure women's equal access to career patterns in SA.

Conclusion

Empirical analysis confirms that the opportunity for large numbers of women to participate and be political representatives in all spheres of government (national, provincial and local) only really began after 1994, through quotas. It was found that quotas became a new political technology of power, when both territorial and partisan interests dominated at the beginning of democratisation and political decentralisation. The gender quota as a strategy to ensure women's political participation and representation remain controversial in SA, as elsewhere. However, it is beyond doubt that where quotas have been implemented, the popular political culture has gradually become more accepting of women taking part in politics.

SA has been like other emerging democracies, where governments have shown commitment to their increased representation. This played a role in advancing women's political representation. Tripp (1994) argues that enhanced political representation of women largely depends on the government's political will, rather than on world economic standing and other economic factors. For example, despite being one of the poorest countries, Mozambique has made remarkable improvements in women's legislative representation compared to many advanced and industrialised countries. Greater women's representation in Uganda, Tanzania and several other African countries has been accounted for by initiation of party quotas and reserved seats (Tripp, 1994 and Tripp & Kang, 2008). Outside the African region, numerous women's movements have gained momentum through the process of democratisation. In Turkey, women's rights and the diversity of women's voices gained momentum through democratisation and economic transformation (De Brito, 2006). Moreover, since 1990, Bangladesh as an emerging democracy, overthrew autocratic rule and was able to set the stage for enhanced participation of women in the political process through the quota system.

Nevertheless, inequality of women in South African society remains common. Along with structural deficiencies, sociocultural obstacles and the dominance of territorial and partisan interests remain the major impediment to greater participation by women in the political process. Although the 1996 Constitution guarantees equal opportunities for women and men in every sphere, the women of SA are still fighting to enter the political process. The introduction of quotas for women by the ANC increased the number of women in Parliament as well as in local government, but has not yet ensured their genuine representation in the decision-making process.

Numerically, the proportion of seats held by women in Parliament and local government is still below the 50% recommended by the SADC and African Union, and this means that women are poorly represented in all spheres of decision-making. One may argue that the battle for women's active participation has just begun, and even the use of a gender quota should not be regarded as automatically enhancing women's access to decision-making power. The dominance of territorial

and partisan interests must not prevent women representatives from grasping the new opportunities offered to them. As they overcome obstacles like illiteracy and culture, women will create strong grounds for improving their lot in SA.

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A Holistic Philosophy of Emancipation and the Post-colonial African State*

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Abstract

This work philosophically responds to what one could call the domination by the social scientific scholarship, of the discourse of emancipation, in Africa. Using the research methods of critical analysis and reflective argumentation, the work makes two fundamental and justifiable claims. The first claim is that the concept of emancipation is significant in the human history of Africa, given its inglorious past experience of slavery, colonisation, and the existing neo-colonialism. Expectedly, given that emancipation is mainly reduced to a phenomenon of social scientific research, there is a rich and diverse scholarly discussion of emancipation as development from social sciences in Africa. However, the diverse richness of such scholarly discussion is still intellectually impoverished by the limited philosophical angle of the extant literature on emancipation in Africa and insufficient attention to some other central issues in the concept. Consequently, the second claim responds by calling for a well-worked-out, holistic philosophy of emancipation that exposes and addresses core issues in the contemporary plight of the African state, thereby attending to the problematic issue of reductionism and insufficiency of scholarly coverage in the traditional discussion of emancipation in Africa. Therefore, we attempt a discursive articulation of such a philosophy of holism as positive transformation, identifying the metaphysical, the moral, the logical, and the epistemic levels of analysis of emancipation in the post-colonial African state.

Key words: Africa, emancipation, holism, philosophy, post-colonialism, State

Sumário

Este trabalho, filosoficamente, responde ao que se poderia chamar a dominação pelo pensamento das ciências sociais, do discurso da emancipação, na África. Usando os métodos de análise crítica e reflexiva a argumentação de investigação, o trabalho faz duas afirmações fundamentais e justificáveis. A primeira alegação é que o conceito de emancipação é relevante na história humana na África, dada a sua experiência do passado inglório da escravatura, colonização e do neo-colonialismo existente. Sem dúvida, dado que a emancipação é, principalmente, reduzida a um fenômeno de pesquisa científica social, não há discussão acadêmica rica e diversificada de emancipação como o desenvolvimento das ciências sociais em África.

No entanto, a riqueza da diversidade de tal discussão acadêmica ainda é intelectualmente empobrecida. Na perspectiva filosófica, é limitada pela literatura existente sobre emancipação na África e atenção insuficiente para algumas outras questões centrais no conceito. Consequentemente, a segunda alegação responde propondo que haja um trabalho bem



elaborado, uma abordagem filosófica holística de emancipação que expõe e suscita questões fundamentais na situação contemporânea do Estado Africano, atendendo assim, a problemática da reducionismo e insuficiência de cobertura académica no tradicional debate de emancipação na África. Portanto, procura-se neste artigo uma articulação discursiva de tal filosofia do holismo como transformação positiva, identificando a metafísica, a moral, a lógica, e os níveis epistemológicos de análise da emancipação do Estado Africano pós-colonial.

Palavras-chave: África, emancipação, o holismo, filosofia, pós-colonialismo e Estado

Emancipation is a legitimate human interest – Nuyen (1998:27)

Introduction and Problem Statement

There have been consistent arguments that the concept and discourse of emancipation should be accorded more scholarly attention in Africa, as the quotation so rightly captures. There are at least two basic reasons that have made this call presently relevant more than ever before. On the one hand, the discourse of emancipation is significant to Africa, given the extant reality of the inability of African states to adequately shake off and rise above their inglorious past experience of slavery and colonisation. On the other hand, the discourse is also significant because of the contemporary neo-colonialism that is manifest in the political and economic relations between African states and developed states. To address the problems identified, scholars especially from the social-scientific disciplines of political science, economics, and sociology in Africa, have produced much scholarship, looking at, and proffering solutions to, what one could aptly call the crisis of emancipation, and their consensus seems to be that emancipation is development. The present exercise is also in line, though only in focus, with the traditional attempts to address the crisis of emancipation in Africa. However, the present work differs from the so-called traditional attempts in its disciplinary approach, since it offers a constructively philosophical attempt to address the problem, ultimately taking emancipation as positive transformation. The central argument that is advanced here is that the crisis of emancipation which besets the post-colonial African state, could be better understood and substantially addressed from the perspective of a holistic philosophy of emancipation as positive transformation, a philosophical attempt that examines the crisis of emancipation in Africa from the angles of epistemology, ethics, logic, and metaphysics. In other words, the basic goal of this work is to discursively articulate a holistic philosophy of emancipation as positive transformation for the post-colonial or contemporary African state.¹

The main body of the work is divided into five sections. After Section I, which introduces the discussion, Section II engages in some conceptual clarification; Section III critically examines some extant literature that focuses on some traditional theories of emancipation in Africa; Section IV attempts a systematic discussion of a holistic philosophy of emancipation for the contemporary Africa; and Section V summarises and concludes the discussion.

Preliminary Conceptual Mapping

We shall commence this discussion by focusing on the clarification of two basic concepts, which form the discursive basis of the work. The concepts are: emancipation and philosophy.

Emancipation:

According to Nuyen (1998:27), citing Jurgen Habermas, among the human interests is an interest in emancipation. For Nuyen, it is unlikely that many of Habermas' critics would disagree with this claim.² In this work, we cannot but agree with Nuyen (1998) on the position of Habermas that emancipation is a desirable. But, what constitutes this value?

Historically, emancipation as a word has been used variously. Originally, the Romans, in their legal language, spoke of emancipation as a 'release' from mancipium. The term stood for the total right of property exercised by the head of a household over persons and things. Thus, the slave, in being discharged from a mancipium became as free as the children of the household when they attained adulthood (see Grohs, 1976:65). Later, during the Enlightenment era, emancipation, otherwise called the liberation of man, came to be semantically equated with the power of reason of man to discover and understand the totality of reality. Therefore, a person who solely appeals to individual reason, rather than a metaphysical entity or an ecclesiastical authority, to sort out the totality of reality is mature, while a person who takes a different turn, is immature. A German Enlightenment philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1949 (1784):132), classically explains further that "such immaturity is self-caused if it is not caused by lack of intelligence, but by lack of determination and courage to use one's intelligence without being guided by another."

Two reasonable comments could be made about the theories of emancipation offered so far. Firstly, both of them are highly individualistic; They focus only on individuals, but not groups as well. Secondly, both understandings are strictly non-political in nature. But, emancipation could also be used with respect to group relations and, in this sense, legal sovereignty is meant. According to Grohs (1976:65):

For a long time 'emancipation' in Africa meant solely liberation from European rule. But when 17 African states became independent in 1960 and when from 1956 to 1966 32 countries finally attained national sovereignty, the continent, in part, emancipated itself from this type of colonial rule.

Obviously, Grohs (1976) is also using emancipation here in the political sense, given the mention of national sovereignty or freedom from colonial rule, apart from the legal sense embedded. But, as implied in the use of 'in part' by Grohs (1976) in the citation, this sovereignty is not complete. Salami (2009:131) supports this conclusion when he notes that the ending of colonial rule in most countries in Africa has not resulted in a complete control of their economic or political affairs, given that they are sovereign states only in name; Many of them remain under the economic and political control of their former rulers. If this position is accepted, it logically follows that the concept



of national sovereignty does not exhaust that of emancipation. In simple words, emancipation is more conceptually extensive than national sovereignty. We also explore the extension of the conception of emancipation in the study.

So far, one can see that emancipation as a word is normally and synonymously used with freedom, be it directly or indirectly. One could also say that the concept is usually applied and the meaning extended, when it is conjugated with another lexical element, that is, the preposition 'of'. Thus, we have phrases, such as 'emancipation of the intellect;' 'emancipation of women'; 'emancipation of blacks'; and so on. In these and such instances, emancipation means freedom from constraints relative to the lexical object it goes with. But, if emancipation simply translates into freedom as has been contended so far, and to be free is not to be bound, according to Timothy Endicott (2010:246), then emancipation in this sense is absolutist, and this makes it suspect and falsifiable. The logic is that almost everything that is open to human sense-experience is spatio-temporally bound in one way or another. Thus, if emancipation means boundlessness, and we could rarely come across such a thing in the world of the human person, then emancipation only resides in the world of human imagination, having no practical significance. In other words, if the absolutist account of emancipation, so to speak, is what we crave in getting the discussion about the concept properly started, then the discussion would never get off the starting blocks, the reason being that human experience does not offer any existential parallel to such an account. To this extent, we should turn to a non-absolutist account of emancipation in the present work. We should note, *ab initio*, that our account of emancipation also derives from the concept of freedom, given the seemingly general acceptance of the synonymy of the two words. But, we have to define how emancipation is to be construed in relation to freedom in this work, given that freedom itself is capable of diverse understandings. Having noted this, we shall now attempt to contextually construe emancipation as a conscientious nurturing of the capacities of the human subject, either as individuals or groups, to attain to a high level of positive transformation (hereafter emancipation as positive transformation). This conception of emancipation surely needs some analysis.

First, this conception is both limitative and extensive. It is limitative because it applies only to rational human beings or moral agents – non-human beings are excluded. It is extensive, at the same time, because it does not only apply to the human subject as individuals; it also applies to the human subject as groups. Thus, it could reconcile the Enlightenment atomistic understanding of emancipation by Kant (1784) with the political conception of emancipation by Grohs (1976). A person with independence of thought is positively transformed as a political unit that is sovereign.

Second, positivity of transformation is emphasised in our contextual conception of emancipation because there is nothing in human experience that could decidedly show that transformation is essentially positive; it could as well be negative, and thus be undesirable, at least, to a morally conscious human person. Specifically, positive transformation is emphasised here, as consisting with emancipation, rather than transformation *per se*. Moreover, the reference to human capacities in the conception of emancipation recognises that the human person is the primary object of

positive transformation, in the first instance, given that if this is recognised and acted upon, the human person reciprocally becomes the subject of positive transformation to his/her environment, in the final analysis.

Third, our contextual conception of emancipation is a composite of both negative and positive freedom. According to Blackburn (2005:141), narrow/negative freedom is thought of, as the absence of constraint, whereas positive freedom is a condition of liberation from social and cultural forces that are perceived as impeding full realisation; to become free is therefore a challenge that is only met by personal transformation. The contextual understanding of emancipation is negative freedom because it signals the fact that the capacity of the human agent should not be bridled, if s/he is to achieve any transformation at all, and this invariably sits well with absence of constraint. At the same time, the contextual conception is positive freedom because the conception is not concerned with just any transformation, but a high-level positive one. A person may not be constrained (negative freedom); yet, s/he may negatively transform, and thus fail to achieve his/her full realisation, that is, positive freedom, which invariably contextually consists with positive transformation. The significance of the explication is that, though, negative freedom does not necessarily yield positive freedom, and thus the two are not necessarily coextensive, both have been harmonised in the conception of emancipation in the present work. It must be iterated that the idea of development as positive transformation, being advanced here, does not connote that the post-colonial African state should revolt against being bound by morally sensible international law, or that the citizenry of the post-colonial African state should revolt against their state's subjection to a morally sensible international law. Rather, the claim is that the post-colonial African person, in the first instance, and the post-colonial African state, in the final analysis, should engage in an extensively constructive critique of the self so as to set things straight internally and subsequently garner respect internationally.

Fourth, in terms of focus, our contextual understanding of emancipation as positive transformation is not conceptually closed but open. It does not apply to the positive transformation of the human person or a group of people relative to only a given social phenomenon at a time, such as the political, the economic, the cultural, and so on. Rather, it is applicable across the board, that is, it applies to all of them at the same time.

Philosophy

Without bothering to go into its intellectually trite etymology, one could state that philosophy is definable in both descriptive and normative ways. In the descriptive sense, philosophy refers to the totality of the world-views of a people, the world-views that encapsulate their basic beliefs, concepts and attitudes in relation to their environment; or, the personal convictions of an individual about life. In this understanding of philosophy, the concern is just to present as is the thought and action of a people relative to their environment, or the personal convictions of the individual; it is not to subject the thought and action, or the personal convictions, to critical or logical analysis and



moral valuation, having a corrective focus in mind. This descriptive sense of philosophy is beyond the focus of the present study.

However, in the normative sense, philosophy may be a discipline of study, or a critically rational exercise. As the former, philosophy is one of many discourses in human societies, the practitioners of which are devoted to critical dialogue with their thoughts and actions as well as the realities in their environment, be it immediate or extended. In this understanding, philosophy may be second-order or first-order. As a second-order discourse, philosophy critically dialogues with the assumptions and presumptions of other discourses in human society, with a view to prescribing norms of proper disciplinary conduct to them. As a first-order discourse, philosophy essentially engages in auto-critique, that is, it critically dialogues with its own principles of disciplinary operation.

As a discipline, philosophy has four basic branches: epistemology, ethics, logic, and metaphysics, and each of them is to be contextually understood in this work. Generally, the four sub-sets of philosophy focus on different fundamentals that aid human beings to appropriately order their lives and flourish in society. Epistemology focuses on human knowledge or, generally, what one could call 'knowledge infrastructure;' ethics study human conduct with an ultimate aim of prescribing norms of proper conduct; logic trains human beings in the art of right reasoning or deep/critical thinking/analysis that substantially helps the agents to successfully navigate their existential environment; and metaphysics makes a systematic attempt to help human beings to recognise and distinguish reality (what is) from mere appearance (what appears to be but is not).³

As a critically rational exercise, philosophy may be engaged in by any person who pays enough attention to argumentation, criticality, analyticity, logicity, systematisation, and so on in his/her thought and action, whether or not the person is a trained philosopher; whether or not the person knows s/he is doing philosophy; whether or not the focus of the exercise is philosophical or otherwise. In this sense, even a political scientist or a sociologist who aligns with the foregoing features of 'philosophical spirit,' may be philosophical in his/her work without knowing s/he is doing just that. The only clarification here is that while the features mentioned are primary research methods in the discourse of philosophy, they may just be ancillary research methods for other essentially non-philosophical discourses in society, such as political science (but, they may be primary in political theory because of their philosophical leaning), sociology, psychology, and so on.

It is noteworthy that the two normative understandings of philosophy are generally mutually inclusive, in the final analysis, given that they both emphasise the methodological features mentioned earlier. Moreover, philosophy is used as a second-order discourse as well as a critically rational exercise in the present discourse. We aim to apply the four basic branches of philosophy, as contextually understood, to critically and constructively engage with the concept of emancipation as positive transformation in post-colonial African state.

Critical Engagement with Traditional Accounts of Emancipation in Africa

Some preliminary clarifications are apt, before we engage with some extant literature on the traditional accounts of emancipation in Africa. First, what we regard as traditional accounts of emancipation are so described because they constituted the very first sets of intellectual and popular attempts to address the problems of the African state in the post-colonial era. Second, since these accounts were (are) the intellectual efforts of people who were (are) domiciled in the African state of the post-colonial era, which is faced with the crisis of development, the accounts themselves are understandably development-focused. In other words, those who offer(ed) the accounts believe(d) that the pursuit of development is the only way the post-colonial African state could break free from its former colonial masters; thus, the traditional accounts equate emancipation with development. Third, some of the accounts were mainly offered in the early period of the post-independence Africa. The fact is that they are still supported, or called upon in one way or another, in the contemporary African state. Moreover, some variants of the accounts are of recent origin. Fourth, the neat categorisation of the accounts we give below seems to belie the fact that these accounts are practically interrelated; for example, the political account is both theoretically and practically related to the economic account. But, we still maintain the categorisation here on the basis of the main focus of each account as well as the disciplinary bent of the leading figures supportive of each account.

Political/ideological account of emancipation

The political or ideological account of emancipation was the brain-child of some politically-inclined nationalist leaders in the early period of post-independence Africa, such as Leopold Sedar Senghor (1906-2001) of Senegal; Kwame Nkrumah (1909-1972) of Ghana; Julius Nyerere (1922-1999) of Tanzania, and so on. The basic claim of the political/ideological account is that the freedom of the post-colonial African state lies, in the main, in its seeking for, and adopting of an autochthonous political system.⁴ According to Ikuli (2006:34), for the African political thinkers,

development is to be attained through creation of an egalitarian, just, and self-sufficient polity. The State is the instrument through which such aspiration could be attained and becomes the mechanism by which the economy is organized. Key to this school of thought is the belief that real economic development and societal transformation are hinged on political centralization and mobilization.

Certain inferences could be made from the position of Ikuli (2006). First, the African political thinkers believed that the post-colonial African society could not be truly regarded as politically independent if it could not conjure up something that would be both autochthonous and political in nature. Thus, it is reasonable to state that the politically inclined nationalist leaders equated emancipation with an indigenously inspired political development. Second, as noted earlier,



the African political thinkers believed, and rightly so, that economic development could not be disaggregated from political development.

To this extent, these politically inclined nationalist leaders uncritically came up with a political ideology, *African socialism*; though, individual political thinkers had different versions of it (see Ikuli, 2006:34-38). The summation of this political ideology is that the political organisation of the post-colonial African state should be grounded in the cosmology of communalism, which was existent in the pre-colonial African societies. According to Ikuenobe (2006:1), communalism (which he actually uses interchangeably with communitarianism) is the idea of people living together as a group in a specific location and sharing some commonalities of history, ideology, belief system, values, lineage, kinship, or political system. He explains further that the idea of community is a conceptual foundation on which most African ideas, beliefs, values, ontology, cosmology, and ways of life are grounded (p 53).

The political/ideological account of emancipation in Africa is undeniably laudable, given its merit of showcasing that our pre-colonial thinking and practice in Africa had something of political value to contribute to the development of the post-colonial African state. But, the political ideology could still be fundamentally critiqued. The weakness is that the account over-romanticised the African past, wrongly believing that whatever derived from the past of Africa is unquestionably applicable now. Every epoch of human development, as history teaches us, is a composite of the good and the bad. Given this, to over-romanticise the past of any given people is something less than good scholarship. Here, we should not be mistaken to state that the African past has nothing of value to contribute to the present developmental efforts in Africa, which would be a fallaciously absolute statement. Rather, the claim is that over-dependence on the *episteme* of the past life, as the foundation of the present approach to life, is a didactic fallacy, given that it is consistent with always deriving the universal from the particular; it is like saying that since lessons can sometimes (particular) be learnt from the past/history, therefore they *should* always (universal) be learnt from the past/history. In order to learn anything from the past, we have to assume that it resembles the future closely enough that any lesson from prior experience can be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to new situations (see Spoerhase & King, 2009:271).⁵ It is true that we can learn from the past, but we must also remember that things do change in fundamental terms over a period of time. The present may not, in most cases, resemble the past. Thus, we should only use past knowledge in the present only where it is applicable; it is not in all cases that it is holistically applicable, that is, applicable without modification; failure to recognise this fact makes it fallacious (Badru, 2013b).

Moreover, uncritically foisting any political ideology, past or present, local or foreign, on the post-colonial African state is less than ideal, apart from being strictly unphilosophical.

Cultural/sociological account of emancipation

This account states that the emancipation of the post-colonial African state could be achieved if we bring back to the foreground, in the present era, our traditional cultural values, which have been denigrated and relegated to the background because of our colonial legacy and neo-colonial

thinking and practice. Thus, it is a cultural variant of the political/ideological account examined earlier. The cultural account, it must be noted, is reactive to the so-called Euro-centrism as well as the epi-phenomenal cultural imperialism of the colonialists – the thinking that denigrated whatever was ascribable to the African culture. Steve Biko (1987: 29) aptly captures the way Africa is culturally demoted by the *foreign other*, thus:

No longer was reference made to African culture, it became barbarism... Religious practices and customs were referred to as superstition... No wonder the African child learns to hate his heritage in his days at school. So negative is the image presented to him that he tends to find solace only in close identification with the white society.

It is also noteworthy that Western philosophers, such as David Hume (1711-1776), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), and Hegel (1770-1831), among others grounded the so-called Euro-centrism and the epi-phenomenal cultural imperialism of the colonialists. Hume (1854:228-9), cited in William (2005:82), specifically states:

“I am apt to suspect the negroes and in general all other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences...there are Negroe slaves dispersed all over Europe, of which none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity; tho' low people, without education, will start up amongst us, and distinguish themselves in every possession. In Jamaica indeed they talk of one negroe as a man of parts and learning; but it is likely he is admired for very slender accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks a few words plainly. ”

From the words of Hume, we could reasonably infer that absence of arts and sciences connotes absence of developed and rational culture, given that arts and sciences are the fulcrum of Western culture. If this is accepted, it consistently flows that if it is true that Negroes have no arts and sciences, then it logically follows that they are not culturally developed. But, there is a problem with this Humean view. Hume is a thorough-paced empiricist, but his position becomes intellectually ludicrous if it is subjected to his empiricist framework. According to Hume (2007:18):

All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, *Relations of Ideas*, and *Matters of Fact*. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation, which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. *That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the square of the two sides*, is a proposition, which expresses a relation between these figures. *That three times five is*



equal to the half of thirty, expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is any where existent in the universe...Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of any matter of fact is still possible, because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality...

For Hume (2007:23), the foundation of all our reasoning and conclusions concerning matters of fact is experience. Now, the acceptability of Hume's conclusion about the black people and other non-whites must either be located in relations of ideas or matters of fact. But, we could not rightly assert that the truth of the assertions of Hume is discoverable by the mere operation of thought, thus belonging to the relations of ideas, given that there is nothing in the views that is intuitively certain: the predicate of the statement, *the Negroes and in general all other species of men are naturally inferior to whites*, is not implied in the subject. This makes us turn to experience, which Hume argues, validates matters of fact. But, even experience does not validate Hume's conclusion, given that the statement that *the Negroes and in general all other species of men are naturally inferior to whites* is not a kind of statement that any contextual and transient experience of the human person could validate once and for all, since it is a universally affirmative statement. On the basis of this justifiable critique, the views of Hume are devoid of merit.

Kant and Hegel also echoed racist views and Euro centrism. Kant maintains that the indigenous Americans and the blacks are spiritually inferior in the human species (Makumba, 2007:37). For Hegel (1956:103, 99, 93), human history, as a manifestation of the world spirit (*Weltgeist*), "...travels from East to West, the Europe is absolutely the end of history, Asia the beginning...The Greco-Roman World represents the antithesis of the Oriental World, which unites in the dialectical triad to form a synthesis in the Modern Christian-Germanic World..." But, what role has Africa in the manifestation of the world spirit? For Hegel, Africa has no role to play; thus, it should be excluded from the manifestation of the world spirit since "...it has no movement or development to exhibit... [and thus] is the Unhistorical, Undeveloped Spirit, still involved in the conditions of mere nature... in Negro life the characteristic point is that consciousness has not yet attained to the realization of any substantial objective existence..."

Just as with Hume's views, the Euro-centrism of both Kant and Hegel does not also stand up to reason, and this is unfortunate, given the significance that Kant and Hegel attach to reason in their individual works. Furthermore, the Eurocentric views are not justified by experience, given that there was no conclusive evidence in the past, and neither is there in the present, that decidedly gives supremacy to one race over the other(s).

In response to Euro-centrism and cultural imperialism of the former colonialists and their legacy, some African scholars have spiritedly argued that the post-colonial Africa, in its drive for

development, should also elevate and employ indigenous cultures to offset the deficit of foreign cultural imperialism. In fact, Claude Ake (2001:15) decries the way culture has been construed relative to development, thus:

Culture, like the institutional framework, has been largely ignored as if it, too, had no serious implication for the success of development strategies...Instead of looking at traditional culture as something that the development paradigm has to come to terms with and even built on positively, many disdained it...they construed anything traditional, including the rural people, negatively...Unfortunately, taking this position makes the people and their culture problematic rather than the process of development itself.

Supportive of Ake (2001)'s view, Kwesi Kwaa Prah (2011:160,161) states:

For one thing, it is important to make a point that people best develop from the foundations of their indigenous knowledge. African societies like all non-Western, non-industrialized societies of Asia and Latin-America are made up of populations which have ancient collective memories and funds of knowledge about their environments and which they utilize in the implementation of their modes of livelihood. Such knowledge has deep and penetrating roots embedded in the cultures of the people. Development, to be meaningful, needs to acknowledge this fund of indigenous knowledge and construct new knowledge on the foundations of what the people already know...Culture is a large and encompassing concept. It implies the totality of products that have resulted from the creative ingenuity of humans. Some of these products are material and are therefore tangible; while others, in such areas of social life like religion, language, beliefs, customs and values, are intangible, but are often more instrumental in the guidance of behaviour than the more recognizable material products of culture. While culture is the result of human creativity, it is also the key factor which shapes the way people behave.

Undoubtedly, contemporary elevation and application of aspects of indigenous cultures is a way towards true emancipation as development in the post-colonial Africa, since it shows the relevance of those cultural aspects to contemporary issues as well as supplies the contextual knowledge to the success of any development activity, and that no development programme could succeed in the absence of a solid understanding of contextual realities. The foregoing constitutes its merit. Nonetheless, it still remains one of the ways; it is not the only way, as Kwesi Kwaa Prah (2011) seems to suggest. After all, there are other existential issues that are not addressed by this cultural account, such as the moral deficit of administrative leadership in Africa; epistemically skewed policy process within the public sector, and so on. Moreover, the cultural account is only sociologically descriptive; there is no critical and sustained engagement with the indigenous cultures to be employed to counterpoise the legacy of colonial cultural imperialism.



Kwesi Kwaa Prah (2011:161-163; 165-166) emphasises indigenous languages as the key to African cultural emancipation as development. But, his cultural account does not specifically task professional African linguists and African philosophers of language, for instance, to brainstorm on how to further develop the use of indigenous languages to a high level that could make them constructively engage with serious scientific research and development (R&D).

Also, it is noteworthy that both the political and cultural accounts of emancipation as development are highly ethnographic: they are only interested in studying African cultures and deploying out of them what they think to be of relevance to social development in the post-colonial era. The accounts do not critically examine and interrogate the cultures themselves or what they take out of them as relevant to development purposes. Thus, they are strictly not philosophical as some African scholars are wont to refer to them (see, for example, Chachage, 1994).

Economic/scientific theory of emancipation

As it suggests, the economic/scientific account of African emancipation entails two inter-related claims. The first claim is that the development of the post-colonial African state would ultimately be an outcome of economic development. The second claim, which derives from the first, is that the economic development of the post-colonial African state could only be achieved through the path of science and technology. It is noteworthy that the economic/scientific account is perhaps the most popular of all the accounts, given that even other accounts refer to it in one way or another, and that it was and is still being advanced by some of the best intellectuals in economics and political economy on the continent of Africa. Also worth noting is that the economic/scientific account of emancipation as economic development is theoretically grounded in the popular Marxian thesis of economic determinism. According to this thesis, the economic system is the foundation on which socio-political, religious and other institutions are erected (see Mark & Engels, 1959:9). Now, if we accept that the economic system is the foundation for the superstructure of other social institutions, using the Marxian expression, it logically follows that the development of the economic system is basic to the development of the superstructure.

Many prominent African intellectuals have supported the economic account of emancipation as economic development. According to Asante (1991:45, 60), quoting Adedeji Adebayo, a new approach to African development, on the part of Africans, entails a:

complete break with the old externally-oriented theories of development. It emphasizes the domestic natural resources base as the basis for determining profiles of development and economic growth and for designing and implementing appropriate strategies for manpower development, industrialization and the promotion of goods and services based on intra-and inter-sectional linkages and the expansion of national and regional markets...to forge a comprehensive unified approach to economic development of their continent.

Similarly, Akinjide Osuntokun (2013:5) states that:

...Africa's gross contribution to world economy is still abysmally low; and most of Africa's contribution to global trade is in form of low agricultural raw materials and minerals; and Africa's contribution is largely shared between the oil producing countries of Nigeria and Angola and the mineral producing countries of Southern Africa including the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)...If Africa wants to have influence in the rest of the world, it would have to concentrate on rapid economic development for which its vast natural resources entitle her.

Following on the stance of Osuntokun (2013), Nwoke (2013:5) bemoans Africa's underdevelopment, noting that:

...much of Africa's underdevelopment is the result of its engagement predominantly in primary resource production, which is controlled by foreign transactional entities, merely for export to metropolitan countries. This contrived and structural development of underdevelopment is, therefore, largely externally-induced.

In order to address the crisis of underdevelopment in Africa, Nwoke (2013:74-81) offers a largely economic strategic agenda, which includes, among others, (i) A 100% national ownership and control of the minerals sector; (ii) Application of mineral resources towards industrial transformation; (iii) Embarking on a gradual and progressive phase-out of mineral exports; (iv) Embarking on local geological survey and exploration; (v) Establishing indigenous technological research and development centers of excellence; (vi) Investing in human capital development; (vii) Reviving iron and steel industries; (viii) Producing for economic emancipation; (ix) Developing international competitiveness for our goods and services; (x) Ensuring food security, and (xi) Providing the basic needs of people.

Admittedly, the economic premise of the post-colonial African state has much strength to alter, positively or negatively, the premises for all other questions within the state: economic buoyancy or depression fundamentally affects the success or failure of administrative leadership, which in turn affects other social institutions in the final analysis. But, it is equally arguable that economic buoyancy or depression itself may be an outcome of the policy inclinations of an excellent or unwholesome administrative leadership within the post-colonial African state. However, the economic account does not address the problem of unwholesome administrative leadership in the post-colonial Africa. Moreover, economic buoyancy of the post-colonial African state does not necessarily correlate with human development within the state. The economic account of emancipation as development grossly downplays this problem.



A Holistic Philosophy of Emancipation and the Post-Colonial African State

Before discussing a holistic philosophy of emancipation for the post-colonial African state, we should make some important comments about the traditional accounts just examined. First, none of the accounts inquires into the kinds of ontology and cosmology that could contribute to positive transformation, and thus be promoted in the person in Africa. Second, none of the accounts place much emphasis on the development of moral capital by the administrative leadership and the followership. Third, the accounts are largely silent on the institutional inefficiency in Africa because of corruption and exploitation by managers of human and non-human resources on the continent. Fourth, they largely ignore addressing the foreign foundation of the knowledge infrastructure in Africa, a fundamental basis of the unresolved problem of intellectual imperialism, which is the domination of one people by another in their world of thinking (Alatas, 2000:24), on the continent. Fifth, the traditional accounts are silent on the significant role of objectively sound logical analysis of extant realities in Africa, before deciding upon any political or/and economic ideology for adoption. Sixth, in terms of causation, the traditional accounts solely view the burden of Africa's underdevelopment from the externalist angle, to which the theories are responsive.

On the basis of all these failings, the traditional accounts of emancipation as development are neither holistic in their problem identification/analysis, nor in their prescriptions of solutions. To address the mentioned failings of the accounts, we have come up with what we could regard as holistic philosophy that takes emancipation as positive transformation. The present account of emancipation, to reiterate, is to be pursued within the disciplinary branches of philosophy.

The metaphysics of positive transformation in Africa

To begin with, we should note that the metaphysics of positive transformation in Africa employs ontology and cosmology, the basic sub-sets of metaphysics, to dialogue with the African person, in the first instance. But, why is the African person the focus? The reason is that the African person should be the primary subject and object of positive transformation, which in turn should positively transform the African socio-political space, in the final analysis.

Ontology is used here to mean a metaphysical enterprise that philosophically studies the nature and qualities of being or what is. There are certain questions to address relative to the positive transformation of the African person. First, what kind of Africanity should be promoted in Africa? Second, how should it to be promoted? Africanity is understood here as what the self is essentially taken to be, or the core identity of the self within the African social space, in contradistinction with the non-African order. Four kinds of Africanity or personality paradigms in Africa have emerged. They are: (i) **Authentic/traditional Africanity**, which was existent before the occurrence of any overwhelming influence from the outside of Africa, be it from the Arab world or the Western world; (ii) **Arabo-Islamic Africanity**, which evolved from the Arabo-Islamic incursion into the African sociocultural space, through the Trans-Saharan slave trade and the Islamic jihads; (iii) **Euro-**

Christian Africanity, which was initiated, within the African sociocultural space, by the Trans-Atlantic slave trade and later consolidated through colonisation by the Western world; and (iv) **Eclectic Africanity**, which is a contemporary outcome of the dilution of the authentic/traditional Africanity by the combined forces of Arabo-Islamism and Euro-Christianity.

A lot of criticisms could be raised against any effort to ensure a holistic return to the first kind of Africanity. To start with, it is doubtful whether we could successfully achieve it, given the overwhelming influences of Arabo-Islamism and Euro-Christianity in contemporary Africa. We should also think about the cultural force of globalisation from outside Africa. Also, even if we could successfully make a holistic return, the question is whether it is advisable to do so, when advances are being made in other cultures of the world. Thus, a holistic return to the authentic/traditional Africanity may be more problematic than salutary. But, this conclusion does not emphatically state we could never derive any good from our authentic/traditional Africanity, even in the contemporary world. We return to this point later.

The conclusion above makes us turn to Arabo-Islamism and Euro-Christianity. In spite of the merit of enabling the African self to know about, and benefit from, the civilisations of their respective regions, the fact is that both Arabo-Islamism and Euro-Christianity have fundamentally polarised Africans among themselves, leading to conflicts and wars in Africa. Examples abound in the Christian-Muslim relations between the North and the South in Nigeria; the North and the South in Sudan, and so on. Thus, both Arabo-Islamism and Euro-Christianity may not be good candidates for the emancipation as positive transformation of the African person.

This takes us to eclectic Africanity. A fundamental challenge is that it is an amalgam of incongruous elements, because of different cultural values – Arabo-Islamism and Euro-Christianity with traditional Africanity. The outcome of this is, at least, twofold: (i) There is the emergence of an African self that is inherently contradictory, the fact being that it is a composite of the foreign and the local; (ii) The African self is also indecisive of its true identity, given that it is not wholly foreign, just as it is not wholly local. But, eclectic Africanity may still have some merit, though. It is expected to be an enriched form of Africanity: it borrows from the foreign other to enrich the African self, giving it a more robust outlook. This, of course, assumes that the borrowings are critically selective, pragmatically appropriate, and properly synthesised, all of which call for a deep or critical thinking on the part of the African self. The foregoing connects the metaphysics and the logic of positive transformation in Africa.

Unfortunately, however, this supposed enrichment is largely still in the abstract because the African self has not yet fully succeeded in (i) Being critically selective in choosing what to embrace from the foreign other; (ii) Knowing what to reject from the foreign other if they are not pragmatically appropriate to the social space in Africa; (iii) Knowing how to properly synthesise the borrowings from the foreign other. The problem of uncritical borrowing as well as pragmatic impropriety is practically instantiated in some Africans, old and young, who bleach their dark skin in order to appear light complexioned and, thus, indirectly showing that a light complexion is superior to a dark complexion. The relevant ontological question here is: What constitutes an ideal complexion?



Derivative from this are other questions, such as: Is a light complexion an ideal complexion, while a dark-complexion is not? What is ontologically wrong with a dark complexion that those Africans are not proud of? Critical reasoning must be deployed here to address the questions.

Cosmology is used here to mean a metaphysical enterprise that philosophically studies the worldviews of a people about a host of existential realities, such as birth, death, reincarnation, social relationships, and so on, or extra-sensible entities, such as God, evil, and such like. One of the central interrogatives that must be addressed with respect to the positive transformation of the African person is: Are all our traditional worldviews still pragmatically relevant to the contemporary epoch in Africa? Mere reason tells us that it is only an uncritical approach to truth to say that all our traditional worldviews are still pragmatically relevant in the contemporary African state to fully appreciate emancipation as positive transformation. But, to know what to accept from the worldviews as relevant and what to reject from them as irrelevant requires deep/critical analysis. It is this deep/critical analysis that shows us the path to what is relevant and where is relevant as well as what is not relevant and why it is not relevant. For example, the idea of communalism, which is a basic in African cosmology (see Ikuenobe, 2006; 53), may be critically examined from moral and political angles as to its propriety in post-colonial Africa.

Morally, the communal idea of common ownership of social resources fosters the value of fellow feeling, which invariably builds social cohesion, given that whatever resources for common distribution, regardless of the diversity of the would-be beneficiaries, are taken as ideally, though it may not be practically, owned by all in society; if ideally taken as owned by all, then the interests of all the would-be beneficiaries of resource distribution are taken into consideration. Politically, we should note that communal practice thrives best in a small community with a homogenous population, making it administratively possible for practical common ownership of social resources. But, most post-colonial African states are not small communities, apart from the fact that most are largely poly-ethnic and religious. Thus, critical analysis has shown that what we could call political communalism may not be administratively feasible in much of post-colonial Africa. But, we strongly feel that moral communalism may still be feasible in post-colonial Africa, given that it is attitudinal, and this could be cultivated if people are properly attuned to doing just that. Thus, its applicability is not a function of spatio-temporality, which negates the applicability of political communalism in post-colonial Africa. As we could see, our ontology of the African self is co-relative with our cosmology in the understanding of emancipation as positive transformation.

The epistemology of positive transformation in Africa

As noted earlier, epistemology philosophically engages with the knowledge of the individual person or, generally, the knowledge infrastructure of the human group. Knowledge infrastructure, as used here, embraces both human and non-human resources of knowledge generation, structuring, and dissemination to achieve specific individual and/or common goals. The human aspect is composed of, but not limited to, those who are trained to actively engage in systematic research and dissemination of the research output, while the latter is represented by universities, specialised

institutes, polytechnics, and other research centres. Since knowledge infrastructure ultimately aims at social growth and development, then we could also state that the knowledge infrastructure of a people is also their epistemic capital in the instrumental sense. Here, we emphasise that knowledge infrastructure or epistemic capital is foundational to our understanding of emancipation as positive transformation. The centrality of it is fore-grounded in a Yoruba adage: *Ologbon nii oga alagbara*, which in English means 'a wise person is superior to an unwise mighty person,' given that the former could wisely manipulate the latter to do the former's biddings.

One of the cogent reasons why the developing world (inclusive of Africa) is largely behind the developed world is because of over-dependency by the former on the knowledge infrastructure or epistemic capital of the latter. There are, at least, four major levels of this over-dependency: (i) Ideational level; (ii) Funding level; (iii) Research-focus level, and (iv) Research methodology level.

At the first level, the defining characteristic is the inundation of the scholarship of Africans by scientific and social scientific theories, hypothesis, and models postulated and developed by Western scholars. African scholars use these theories, hypothesis, and models to address social problems on the continent, not considering the cultural inclinations of the theories, hypothesis, and models as well as the peculiarities of African societies. Therefore, Western scholarship seems to have become an interpretative community, to which scholarship in Africa looks to determine what is intellectually acceptable and what is not, what the areas of current intellectual debates are and the methodologies of the conduct of the debates. Alatas (2008:11) graphically captures this by noting that 'academic dependency at the level of ideas is the general condition of knowledge in the South'.

At the second, third, and fourth levels, we know that many scholars in Africa seek for and obtain funding support from the West to conduct various forms of research or attend important international conferences outside the continent. Even African institutions like the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) in Senegal⁶ derive much funding from the West to support social scientific research on the continent, and these institutions duly acknowledge this financial support. Because of this support, there is a high tendency for the foci of research of those African scholars and African institutions to be influenced by the foreign donors. Moreover, since specific foci of research usually call for specific methods of enquiry, it logically follows that foreign influence of research foci brings about foreign influence on research methods.

But, why is the West at the vertex of epistemic ladder in the humanities and the social sciences (or even sciences)? Reason tells us that the following may be significant: inquisitiveness of the mind; willingness to engage in risks in order to make novel discoveries; a high value placed on creativity; individual and group commitment to the promotion of intellectual excellence and success; problem-oriented research; deep interest in contributing to social development, and so on. Thus, to build the requisite epistemic capital in post-colonial Africa, African scholars and relevant others should cultivate all the noted features of scholarship in the West. Moreover, the idea of publishing just for promotion purposes and any form of academic fraud in some of our higher institutions and research centres in Africa should be discouraged. Put differently, what could be regarded as intellectual corruption should be avoided in the scholarship of post-colonial Africa. Intellectual



corruption, for Omotola (2007:31), connotes the perversion of intellectual responsibilities, be it deliberate or not, for personal gain at the expense of the system; it is what one could regard as the morally depraved deployment of the intellectual resource for the course of dubious achievement. It should be emphasised that the sense of problem-oriented research, with a focus on extant realities in Africa, should be fully developed and sustained by scholars in Africa, and this should also be further encouraged by corporate bodies and the post-colonial African state, through adequate funding of research and development (R&D). In helping to fund research and development (R&D), or founding research institutes in Africa, indigenous corporate bodies should not be overly profit-conscious, given that an all-out profit-consciousness may sometimes sacrifice quality (and even morality) for quantity. Rather, they should take it as part of their corporate social responsibility (CSR) to their business environment.

The ethics of positive transformation in Africa

Further to the discussion so far, we should also aver that the post-colonial African state requires an ethical framework to achieve the goal of emancipation as positive transformation. This ethical framework is to address the problem of unwholesome administrative leadership in the post-colonial Africa. Moreover, the normative framework adverts to the internalist angle of the burden of African underdevelopment, which the traditional accounts grossly overlook. The relevance of this framework could not be over-emphasised. For example, in Nigeria, according to Jinadu (2012:9), 'The tragedy of our politics is that our political class continues to push its self-interest, almost to the point not only of their own self-destruction but also of stultifying our national development.' For Ogbeidi (2012:3), the logic of the Nigerian political leadership class has been that of self-service as some of the leaders are mired in the pursuit of selfish and personal goals at the expense of broader national interests. What has been predicated of Nigeria is also true of most African states. According to Ogbonnaya & Ofoeze (1994:49), most African states are predatory or vampire states. Ujomu (2002:209) explains further:

The predatory state is characterized by both prebendalism and predation understood as political patronage, systematic government corruption, concentration of power at the top and the personalization of networks for the delegation of power...The African state has attained this unenviable status through the age long process of the institutionalization of a decadent political culture which has led to...some of the most tyrannical and destructive patterns of political rule in the 20th century. The cases of Abacha in Nigeria, Mobutu in Zaire, Idi Amin in Uganda, Bokassa in Central African Republic, Doe in Liberia, Barre in Somalia, are illustrative here.

All the political misdeeds of the African leaders mentioned and suchlike leaders in Africa have created a sort of vertical distrust within the post-colonial African state: the African citizenry have lost much confidence in the post-colonial African state to further their socio-political and economic

interests. Thus, to get out of this clime of 'state capture'⁷ in much of Africa and achieve emancipation as positive transformation, there should be a constitutionally-entrenched ethical framework of political utilitarianism, which should guide whom to elect/choose as administrative leaders in Africa and why they are so elected/chosen as leaders. This ethical framework emphasises on three fundamentals: (i) Probity and professionalism in bureaucratic positions; (ii) Moral capital in politics; and (iii) Performance-driven political leadership. A strong constitutional emphasis on the criteria would, all things being equal, bring about ethical revolution in post-colonial Africa, and ultimately achieve emancipation as positive transformation, while a de-emphasis of the criteria would spell doom for the achievement of emancipation as positive transformation in the post-colonial African state (see Badru, 2014).

Moreover, since a society does not rise above its values, it follows that the citizenry itself, the quality of which is reflective in the quality of leadership, ought to engage in (i) Moral de-orientation, and (ii) Moral re-orientation. By the former, we mean that the citizenry in post-colonial Africa must eschew morally based values, such as high-level materialism, exploitative interaction⁸ between the self and the other in Africa, back-biting, etc.; the values that are now dominant in Africa. By the latter, we mean the citizenry in post-colonial Africa ought to re-embrace morally desirable values, such as altruism, kindness, fellow-feeling, etc. that have been largely lost in the present-day Africa. This moral prescription somewhat affirms that the burden of Africa's underdevelopment constitutes both positive and negative duty that both the administrative leadership and the followership in Africa ought to jointly and conscientiously attend to. The duty is positive in that it requires both the leadership and the followers to take some given concrete steps to attend to, and the duty is also negative in that it also requires both the leadership and the followers to refrain from following certain behavioural patterns, which is inimical to addressing the problem.

The logic of positive transformation in Africa

The logic of emancipation as positive transformation in the post-colonial Africa entails a continual and constructively critical analysis and interrogation of our socio-political and economic institutions on the continent. Just as the critical reflections of moral and political philosophers, such as Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704), Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Adam Smith (1723-1790), G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) and so on, fundamentally influenced the socio-political and economic landscapes in the Renaissance and the Enlightenment epochs in Europe, and still largely do, moral and political philosophers and political scientists in Africa must also engage in critical reflections to pragmatically address socio-political problems in post-colonial Africa, such as the best political ideology to adopt, given our peculiarities in Africa; how to make the African state promote the greatest interests of the greatest number, what ought to be the basis of political obligation of the African people to the state, how best to frontally address the deficit of security within some African states (such as Nigeria) and across state boundaries in Africa, how best to build and maintain peace within the African state, and so on without always relying on foreign prescriptions and paradigms of socio-political



institutions. All these critical reflections must be done in sync with the extant realities in Africa.

Economically, a think-tank of African scholars should be formed, funded and charged with the responsibility of constructively brainstorming on the best economic ideology for achieving emancipation as positive transformation in post-colonial Africa. They should not uncritically advance on the continent a mere given economic ideology because some powers that be in the global economic/financial institutions, such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank (WB), support and recommend it to Africa. In the think tank, there should be expert economists, political scientists, and political and moral philosophers. The economists are to critically use their disciplinary knowledge to see which is best for Africa among (i) An economic ideology that supports state dominance in economic policy-decisions or command economy; (ii) An economic ideology that favours the dominance of the private sector in the determination of economic policy-decisions, or market economy; and (iii) An economic ideology that combines the basic features of (i) and (ii) or a mixed economy. The political scientists should deploy their professional knowledge to unravel the short-run and the long-run implications on governance of any choice made by the economists. The political and moral philosophers should critically look into the deep philosophical assumptions of each of the economic ideologies and try to make a reasoned pronouncement on the basis of which (or combination of which) successfully addresses the extant realities in Africa, such as a high population of the socially disadvantaged.

Perhaps, there might be a counter that, while expert economists and political scientists are relevant in the present consideration, moral and political philosophers have no business being there. This position, however, is not sustainable. Economics is essentially all about social distribution of income and wealth or goods and services with respect to human beings who have values. Thus, moral consideration/valuation necessarily comes in (see Kolm, 2007; Hausman & MacPherson, 2006(1996)).

It might also be argued that (i) There is nothing to think of the command (or socialist) ideology, that the ideology has been dead since the balkanisation of the old Soviet Union in the 1990s; that (ii) The socialist ideology failed because it had not in the past developed any practicing state in the Eastern bloc and would not in the future develop any state, even if it were to be revived – an idea that is unthinkable given that we are now witnessing ‘the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government’...and that...‘the basic principles of the liberal democratic state could not be improved upon’ (Fukuyama, 1989:1,3). We are not particularly concerned with whether or not liberal capitalism is the end point of human economic evolution. But, we should quickly dismiss the belief that the socialist ideology could never be developmental by noting that the old Soviet Union substantially developed through socialist collectivisation of labour.

Two central questions that should guide the think tank are: (i) The question of maximisation of economic growth and development in Africa; and (ii) The question of minimisation of a high level of poverty on the African continent. They should try to see how answers to the two questions could be pragmatically harmonised, without unnecessary trade-offs.

Summary and Conclusion

In this work, we have attempted to critically examine the social scientific perspectives of some traditional accounts of emancipation in Africa. We noted that these accounts were not holistic because each of them focused on a specific aspect of the problem and prescribed its solution(s) accordingly. Nonetheless, we noted that the consensus among them was that emancipation in the post-colonial African state should be pursued within the conceptual framework of development. Reactive to the problem of reductionism and insufficiency of scholarly coverage of other salient issues in the concept of emancipation as development by the traditional accounts, we proposed a holistic philosophy of emancipation as positive transformation. In the discussion of this proposal, using the disciplinary framework of epistemology, ethics, logic, and metaphysics, we argued that the concept of emancipation as positive transformation entails a host of interrelated issues, which should be frontally addressed before the post-colonial African state is said to be largely emancipated.

Endnotes

- 1 That we have used 'post-colonial African state' and 'contemporary African state' synonymously here does not mean they are semantically identical. The usage is only adopted for convenience.
- 2 This has been slightly modified, though the main idea is still retained, as it appears
- 3 See Badru et al (2013a:60).
- 4 See Kwame Nkrumah (1973; 1974); Nyerere (1968; 1969); Senghor (1964), etc.
- 5 The words *particular* and *universal* were the additions of Badru (2013b); they were not in the original work of Spoerhase & King (2009).
- 6 See www.codesria.org for information on its donors.
- 7 'State capture' emerges where the political and economic resources of the state are overtly or covertly controlled and distributed by members of a powerful clique, who pretend to be representative of common interests of the people within the state.
- 8 By exploitative interaction, we mean a kind of interaction that always instrumentalises the other; a relationship mainly based on what the self stands to gain in any encounter with the other. This kind of relationship does not recognise that the instrumentalisation disregards the ontological worth of the other.



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* We are compelled to use the adjectival 'post-colonial' in the title of the work because there is no better linguistic alternative. It does not denote that we subscribe to the view that the African State after colonisation is free of the colonial.



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He authored and contributed to several publications. He recently authored a handbook on child responsive budgeting for the government of South Sudan, edited a range of publications on poverty and development for SADC-CNGO and contributed a chapter on 'Child friendly and gender-sensitive budgeting' in a book on social accountability and governance by the World Bank. Before he moved to Save the Children in 2012, he worked for a regional organisation (SADC-CNGO) as the senior programme manager from 2009. Before that, he held several positions with the National Association of NGOs in Zimbabwe, including Programmes Director. He holds two Masters degrees in business administration and development studies in addition to an Honours degree in business. Bob can be contacted on boblibertm@gmail.com

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Newspaper article	Lamb, J. (1970, 20 October). The perfect plants for lazy gardeners. <i>Weekend Australian</i> , p. 3.	
Periodical article	Phillips, E. (1985). The Australian scene. <i>Australian Journal of Ecology</i> , 3(2), 25-29.	If a journal or newsletter does not use volume numbers, include the month, season, or other designation with the year, for example (1994, April). Only indicate the issue number after the volume number if each issue begins on page 1.
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Abstract	Phillips, E. (1985). The Australian scene [Abstract]. <i>Australian Journal of Ecology</i> , 3(2), 25-29.	

Referencing other sources (continued)		
Non-English journal article	Ising, M. (2000). Intensitätsabhängigkeit evozierter Potenzial im EEG: Sind impulsive Personen Augmenter oder Reducer? [Intensity dependence in event related EEG potentials: Are impulsive individuals augmenters or reducers?]. <i>Zeitschrift für Differentielle und Diagnostische Psychologie</i> , 21, 208-217.	Give the original title, as well as an English translation in brackets.
Published dissertation or thesis	Bevins, G.D. (1987). <i>Theory and practice at an Australian university</i> . Doctoral dissertation. Montreal: McGill University.	
Unpublished dissertation or thesis	Little, P. (1965). <i>Helplessness, depression and mood in end stage renal disease</i> . Unpublished master's thesis, Wits University, Johannesburg, South Africa. Or: Unpublished doctoral dissertation...	
Dissertation abstract	Ross, D.F. (1990). Unconscious transference and mistaken identity: When a witness misidentifies a familiar but innocent person from a lineup (Doctoral dissertation, Cornell University, 1990). <i>Dissertation Abstracts International</i> , 51, 417.	
Government publications	According to The Bill of Rights (1996)... Education is in the process of transformation (Department of Education, 1995)... The Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Republic of South African. (1996). <i>Government Gazette</i> . (No. 17678). Department of Education. (1995). White Paper on Education. <i>Government Gazette</i> . (Vol. 375, No. 45621). Commission on Civil Rights. (1967). <i>Racial isolation in the public schools</i> . Washington: United States Government Printing Office. Republic of South Africa. (1997). Basic Conditions of Employment Act, No. 75 of 1997. Pretoria: Government Printers.	When referring to a government publication, the date is sufficient for in text referencing. Provide all numbers, sections, chapters or volume numbers that is available, in brackets.
Unpublished raw data, untitled	Bordi, F., & LeDoux, J.E. (1993). [Auditory response latencies in rat auditory cortex]. Unpublished raw data.	Use brackets to indicate that the material is a description of the content, not a title.
Booklet, pamphlet or leaflet	South African College of Advanced Education. (1976). <i>Referencing: the footnote and Harvard system</i> [Brochure]. Johannesburg: Wits Technikon. Research and Training Center in Independent Living. (1993). <i>Guidelines for reporting and writing about people with disabilities</i> (4th edn.). [Brochure]. Lawrence, K.S.: Author.	
Study guide	Speedy, C. (1999). <i>Study Guide: Electrical Engineering 1</i> . America: South American College of Engineering.	
Conference proceedings, no author or title	International Microcomputer Conference. (1984). <i>Conference proceedings held at the Western Australian Institute of Technology</i> , Perth, 22-24 May 1984. Perth: Western Australian Institute of technology.	
Conference proceedings, with author	Field, G. (2001). Rethinking reference rethought. In <i>Revelling in Reference: Reference and Information Services Section Symposium, 12-14 October 2001</i> (pp. 59-64). Melbourne, Victoria, Australia: Australian Library and Information Association.	
Unpublished paper presented at a meeting	Lanktree, C., & Briere, J. (1991, January). <i>Early data on the Trauma Symptom Checklist for Children (TSC-C)</i> . Paper presented at the meeting of the American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children, San Diego, CA.	



Referencing other sources (continued)		
Publication of limited circulation	Klomers, N. (Ed.). (1993, Spring). <i>ADAA Reporter</i> . (Available from the Anxiety Disorders Association of America, 6000 Executive Boulevard, Suite 513, Rockville, MD20852).	For a publication of limited circulation, give in parentheses immediately after the title a name and address from which the publication can be obtained.
Review	Schatz, B.R. (2000). Learning by text or context? [Review of the book <i>The social life of information</i>]. <i>Science</i> , 290, 1304. Kraus, S.J. (1992). Visions of psychology: A videotext of classic studies [Review of the motion picture <i>Discovering Psychology</i>]. <i>Contemporary Psychology</i> , 37, 1146-1147.	
Electronic sources		
In-text reference where the author of the electronic source is known	The project website was created using <i>Aldus Pagemaker version 3</i> (1987-1988)... Several films (e.g. Bertolucci, 1988) have used this technique... Azar and Martin (1999) found that...	Simply use whatever you used as author in the reference, as well as the year of publication.
In-text reference to a web site	Rainbow MOO is a virtual space designed especially for teachers and their elementary-school students (http://it.uwp.edu/rainbow). Jones, 2000: ¶15 Jones, 2000: Conclusion, para. 7)	To cite an entire web site (but not a specific document on the site), simply give the site's URL in the text. When a specific part of an electronic source has to be quoted and no page number can be found, use the paragraph number if available, preceded by the ¶ symbol or the abbreviation para. If these are absent, cite the heading and the number of the paragraph following it.
Internet site with author	Holmes, A. (1998). <i>Greenpeace wins media war</i> . Retrieved November 25, 1998, from http://www.independent.co.uk/international/green25.htm	
Internet document without author	GVU's 8th WWW user survey. (n.d.). Retrieved August 8, 2000, from http://www.cc.gatech.edu/gvu/user_surveys/survey-1997-10/	
Article from an online periodical with DOI assigned	Author, A.A., & Author, B.B. (Date of publication). Title of article. <i>Title of Journal</i> , volume number (issue number). doi: 0000000/000000000000	
Personal electronic communication (email)	According to T.K. Lutes (personal communication, April 18, 2001)...	Because personal email do not provide recoverable data, they (like other personal communications) are not included in the reference list. Cite personal communications in text only. Give the initials as well as the surname of the communicator, and provide as exact a date as possible.
Article in an Internet-only journal	Fredrickson, B.L. (2000, March 7). Cultivating positive emotions to optimise health and well-being. <i>Prevention & Treatment</i> , 3, Article 0001a. Retrieved November 20, 2000, from http://journals.apa.org/prevention/volume3/pre0030001a.html	

Electronic sources		
Electronic copy of a journal article retrieved from database	Borman, W.C. (1993). Role of early supervisory experience in supervisor performance. <i>Journal of Applied Psychology</i> , 78, 443-449. Retrieved October 23, 2000, from PsycARTICLES database.	
Internet articles based on a print source	VandenBos, G., Knapp, S., & Doe, J. (2001). Role of reference elements in the selection of resources by psychology undergraduates [Electronic version]. <i>Journal of Bibliographic Research</i> , 5, 117-123.	If you have reason to believe that the article might be subject to change, you should add the date you retrieved the document, and the URL
Newsgroups, online forums, electronic mailing lists	FORMAT: Author. (Year, Day Month). Subject of message. Message posted to Name mailing list, archived at URL Brack, Ernie (1995, 2 May). Re: Computing short courses. Message posted to LisLink mailing list, archived at http://archive.lislink.com Jensen, L.R. (1995, 12 December). Recommendation of student radio/tv in English. Message posted to IASTAR mailing list, archived at http://nrg.dtu.dk Brett, P. (1999, June 6). Experiments proving the collective unconscious [Msg 1]. Message posted to news://alt.psychology.jung Irm583@aol.com (1996, May 26). Thinking of adoption. Message posted to news://alt.adoption	If you cannot determine the author's name or screen name, then use the author's email address as the main entry. When deciding where in your Reference List to insert such a source, treat the first letter of the email address as though it were capitalised. If the message is not retrievable from an archive, it should not be included in the reference list. It can be cited as a personal communication.
Paper presented at a virtual conference	Tan, G., & Lewandowsky, S. (1996). <i>A comparison of operator trust in humans versus machines</i> . Paper presented at the CybErg 96 virtual conference. Retrieved May 16, 2000, from http://www.curtin.edu.au/conference/cyberg/centre/outline.cgi/frame?dir=tan	
Abstract	Isaac, J. D., Sansone, C., & Smith, J.L. (1999, May). Other people as a source of interest in an activity. <i>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology</i> , 35, 239-265. Abstract retrieved June 7, 1999, from IDEAL database: http://www.europe.idealibrary.com	
Article in an electronic magazine (ezine)	Adler, J. (1999, May 17). Ghost of Everest. <i>Newsweek</i> . Retrieved May 19, 1999.	
Newspaper article	Azar, B., & Martin, S. (1999, October). APA's Council of Representatives endorses new standards for testing, highschool psychology. <i>APA Monitor</i> . Retrieved October 7, 1999, from http://www.apa.org/monitor/oct99/in1.html	
Review	Parfit, M. (1997, December 7). Breathless [Review of the book <i>The climb: Tragic ambitions on Everest</i>]. <i>New York Times on the Web</i> . Retrieved October 7, 1999, from http://search.nytimes.com/books/97/12/07/reviews/971207.07parfitt.html	
Letter to the editor	Gray, J. (1999, May 7). Pesticides linger in land and air—and in our bodies [Letter to the editor]. <i>Lexington Herald-Leader</i> . Retrieved October 7, 1999, from http://www.kentuckyconnect.com/heraldleader/news/050799/lettersdocs/507letters.htm	
Government publication	Bush, G. (1989, April 12). Principles of ethical conduct for government officers and employees Exec. Order No. 12674. Pt. 1. Retrieved November 18, 1997, from http://www.usoge.gov/exorders/eo12674.html	
CD-ROM	Hawking, S. (1994). <i>A brief history of time: An interactive adventure</i> [CD]. Sacramento: Crunch Pod Media.	



Electronic sources		
Sound recording	Williamson, C. (1985). <i>Prairie fire. On Arkansas traveler</i> [CD]. Oakland, California: Olivia Records. <i>Rock 'n roll classics</i> . (1986). [Cassette] San Diego, California: Uptown Sound.	
Motion picture/film	<i>Transactional analysis</i> [Motion picture]. (1974). Los Angeles: Research Films. Bertolucci, B. (Producer). (1988). <i>The last emperor</i> [Motion picture]. Los Angeles: Columbia Pictures.	
Television broadcast	Crystal, L. (Executive Producer). (1993, October 11). <i>The MacNeil/Lehrer news hour</i> [Television broadcast]. New York and Washington, DC: Public Broadcasting Service.	
Video recording	<i>Babakuieria</i> . (1986). [Video recording]. Sydney: ABC Drama Department. Sutton, P. (Producer). (1986). <i>Kay Cottee: First Lady</i> [Video Recording]. New South Wales: Direct Video Pty Ltd. Cochrane, C., (Executive Producer) & Graham S., (Director). (1988). <i>The Superkids' fitness video</i> [Video Recording]. Perth: Dynami Australia.	
Microfiche	Illinois State Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction (1971). <i>Toys for early development of the young blind child: a guide for parents</i> . (ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 065 201)	
Computer programme	<i>Aldus Pagemaker version 3. 0</i> [Computer software] (1987-1988). Seattle, Washington: Aldus Corporation. Schwarzer, R. (1989). <i>Statistics software for meta-analysis</i> [Computer software and manual]. Retrieved from http://www.yorku.ca/faculty/academic/schwarze/meta_e.htm	

Commonly used abbreviations

Appendix – app. Chapter – ch. Column – col.

Columns – cols.

Editor – ed. Editors – eds. Edition – edn. Editions – edns. Number – no. Numbers – nos. No date – n. d.

No publisher, no page – n. p. Page – p.

Pages – pp. Paragraph – para.

Revised – rev. Reprinted – rpt.

Supplement – Suppl.

Technical Report – Tech. Rep. Translated, translator – trans. Volume – vol.

Volumes – vols. Written – writ.

Rule: a capital letter for the abbreviation for editor or editors i.e. Ed. or Eds. Use lower case for edition i.e. 2nd edn.

Latin abbreviations

And others – *et al.* (et alii) Used where there are too many authors to list

In the same work – *ibid.* (ibidem) Signifies the same work as the one cited immediately before, but a different page

The same – *id.* (idem) The item cited is by the author of the item cited immediately before

In the work cited – *op. cit.* (opere citato) Refers the reader back to the author's previously cited work, but to a different page

Without place – *s. l.* (sine loco)

For more resources visit:

<http://www.waikato.ac.nz/library/apaguide.shtml> • <http://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/560/07/> • <http://library.osu.edu/sites/guides/apagd.php#articleone>

This referencing guide is compiled from various resources, our appreciation to http://www.infosecsa.co.za/Reference_Techniques.pdf

