AFRICAN JOURNAL OF GOVERNANCE & DEVELOPMENT

Vol 5 No 1 • June 2016

AFRICAN JOURNAL OF GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

EDITORS

PUBLISHERS
Centro de Investigação Científica (CIC)
University of St Thomas of Mozambique (USTM)
Avenida Ahmed Sekou Toure, 610, Maputo, Mozambique
Tel: +258 21 49 11 35 • Fax: +258 21 49 11 34
Email: research@ustm.ac.mz • www.ustm.ac.mz
Número de Registo: 7152/RLIND/2011
ISSN: 2218-5615

Artworks | www.artworks.co.za
30 Steel Road, Morningside, Durban 4001 (RSA)
Tel: +27 31 303 6466 • Fax: +27 31 303 4493
Email: shiki@artworks.co.za • www.artworks.co.za
CK reg no: 1988/020782/23

Contents

Introduction

SIMÃO NHAMBI & BETTY MUBANGIZI

The state bears the responsibility to provide services to its citizenry. This is not only because there are weak and vulnerable members of society that cannot afford the basics but also because some services are of a nature that cannot effectively be provided by the private sector. The effectiveness and transparency in the delivery of public services has long been a topic for discussion in political and academic discourse. Issues tend to focus around transparency and questions of whether the right, deserving people are receiving the services; whether the mode of service delivery is the most effective and whether or not government expenditure is fully accounted for in the service delivery continuum of input, output and impact.

In his article, **Stephen Moyo** reports on a study that sought to determine governance challenges in municipal service delivery in the North West Province of South Africa. Findings of this study suggest that the influence of political parties in municipalities determines the modus operandi in that local authority and impacts the quality of public services provided in terms of efficiency and impact.

Mahama and Dowetin report on a similar matter using the case study of Tema Metropolitan Assembly in Ghana. The authors show how the delivery of public services is shaped by the dynamics of politics. Specifically political dynamics between the service provision agencies impact critical issues of waste management, sanitation, drainage, safety and security, infrastructural development, cleanliness and urban planning. It is worth noting that the effort towards effective revenue collection is the strongest point of the municipality, which is said to be effective in revenue collection yet revenue collection does not match service delivery.

Abubakar Abdullahi's paper is empirical and examines the pattern of public housing distribution in Nigeria. The research reported in this paper shows that the targeting strategies adopted in public housing distribution have neglected the majority of the people who desperately need housing. These targeting strategies have transformed public housing into clientelistic goods designed to reward supporters and financiers of the ruling political party.

Targeting beneficiaries of public goods based on class, income status or political considerations denies a majority of citizens access to public goods. In this regard, it is recommended that a basic-need approach be adopted in the distribution of public housing and other public goods.

Governance challenges in service delivery: a case of local municipalities in the North West Province, South Africa

STEPHEN MOYO
North West University, South Africa.
stephen.moyo@yahoo.com

Abstract

Governance in municipalities is an old adage in South Africa and can be traced from the era of apartheid to the current period. The main focus of this study was to determine governance challenges in municipal service delivery in the North West Province. Audit reports from the Auditor-General's office and municipal reports from the North West Provincial government were consulted. A sample of 340 participants was used for the study. Key sources were the Budget Review (2014 and 2015), Stats SA Census 2011 and the 2007 Community Survey, the National Spatial Development Strategy, the latest Auditor-General's reports (2014/2015), the Provincial budget statements, South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletins, and local municipal reports. Simple, random sampling was used. However, findings established that politics plays a critical role in skills deployment and service delivery. The influence of a political party in a particular municipality determines the modus operandi in that local authority. The researcher proposes that though no political system has ever come into existence without constitutional dimensions, the purpose of good governance is to rethink policy principles. Such policy principles should support a framework that works at the level of novel budgeting techniques, management philosophy, skills deployment, transparency and citizen engagement. The study propose that a new service delivery framework that includes the domains of effective, efficient and sustainable service delivery be created, and should seek to coalesce into a common policy framework concerned with the mutual interdependence of a common strategy for the development of the public sector. Exclusive dependence on both exogenous and endogenous circumstances should be regarded as critical.

Key words: efficiency, governance, services, sustainable, transparency

Background to the study

More than two decades after the advent of a democratic dispensation in South Africa, local municipalities still continue to encounter the arduous task of running local government in a more accountable and transparent manner. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa explicitly empowers local municipalities to fulfil this institutional mandate in a

manner that is economic, efficient and effective (Auditor-General, 2015). Assessments revealed that party political factionalism and polarisation of interests over the last few years, and the subsequent creation of new political alliances and elites, have indeed contributed to the progressive deterioration of municipal functionality. Evidence dramatically illustrates how the political/administrative interface has resulted in factionalism on a scale that, in some areas, is akin to a battle over access to State resources rather than any ideological or policy differences (CoGTA, 2016). The lack of values, principles or ethics in these cases indicates that there are officials and public representatives for whom public service is not a concern, but accruing wealth at the expense of poor communities is their priority. Relationships at the local level are tainted by these contestations among the elites of local areas.

The critical issue is how government can bring the necessary checks into the system before a legislative intervention becomes a necessity. Integral to this would be mechanisms for improved monitoring, an early-warning system and strengthened means for intergovernmental oversight and support measures, particularly in the 'aftercare' phase. The problem areas cited as cause for intervention are symptomatic of problems within municipalities across the country. The provincial assessment reports have provided substantive evidence of serious irregularities, corruption, fraud, financial mismanagement and related wrongdoing. The capacity of national and provincial government to effectively resolve these matters is weak and therefore significant emphasis needs to be placed on this matter in the Turn-around Strategy (Nombembe, 2013).

Literature review

The Auditor-General (2016) reports that the Municipal Audit for 2013-2014 revealed a gloomy picture in the financial operations of most municipalities in the North West Province, thereby compromising service delivery. The table below summarises this unfortunate situation for each of the nine provinces of South Africa. Eastern Cape (EC); Free State (FS); Gauteng (Gtg); KwaZulu-Natal (KZN); Limpopo (Lp); Mpumalanga (Mp); Northern cape (NC) and Western Cape (WC).

TABLE 1: Local Government Municipal Audit for 2013/2014

Type of Decision	EC	FS	Gtg	KZN	Lp	Mp	NC	NW	WC
Clean Audit	0	0	0	5	2	4	0	0	2
Unqualified	13	6	5	47	3	7	6	2	20
Qualified	13	3	6	7	12	3	5	2	3

Adverse/ Disclaimer	18	13	0	2	10	6	10	5	0
Audits Outstanding	1	3	0	0	3	1	15	15	5

Source: Auditor-General, 2015

The above table shows that KwaZulu-Natal, Western Cape and Eastern Cape had the highest statistics in terms of unqualified audit reports. Two unqualified audit reports were observed in the North West Province, with 15 local municipalities having outstanding audit reports for Northern Cape and North West provinces. The North West municipalities are made up of four district municipalities and 19 local municipalities. The municipalities operate on a budget of R15,9 billion (operating expenditure: R12.2 billion and capital expenditure: R3.7 billion). The audit of Ngaka Modiri Molema District Municipality in the North West (NW) Province was outstanding at the end of January 2015, which was the cut-off date for inclusion in this report. There were still no clean audits in the province, despite the target of 100% clean audits by 2014 that the provincial government set itself through operation 'clean audit'. However, cognisance is taken of the encouraging decline in disclaimed opinions and growth in the number of unqualified with findings opinions. This positive movement has, however, been very slow.

In comparing the 2013/2014 outcomes to that of 2012/2013, there were six fewer disclaimers and two more financially unqualified opinions. An analysis of the movement in outcomes over the seven years clearly indicates that the majority of municipalities did not address audit findings at a root cause level, leaving the sustainability of improvements in doubt. The NWP's outcomes varied from one district to the other. District municipalities not only had to coordinate development and delivery throughout the district, but also needed to play a vital supporting role in the financial management of their local municipalities. All the districts continue to show marginal improvements, with the exception of Dr Ruth Mompati, which remained unchanged. Despite two district municipalities achieving financially unqualified with findings outcomes, it is clear from the slow progress made with improving the audit outcomes that the district municipalities did not effectively execute their roles to assist local municipalities within their jurisdiction. District municipalities should make a positive contribution towards improving the internal control and accountability of local government in their jurisdiction and in the province. This challenges the leadership of all district municipalities in the province to realise their

potential by taking the lead in restoring accountability in local government (Makwetu 2016).

Research methods and procedures

Questionnaires and indepth interviews were used to gather data from a random sample (N = 340) based on the works of Osborn, Hulme and Jones 2002:51: Creswell, 2010:84. The questionnaires were administered to community members and then collected once they had been filled out. The most important advantage of the questionnaires was that a large coverage of the population could be realised with little time and cost. Furthermore, anonymity was assured and that made it easier for respondents to answer honestly.

Indepth interviews were conducted with 20 municipal staff members. This technique was used for triangulation purposes on findings developed from community members. Municipal documents for the local authorities sampled were also consulted. Simple random sampling bears an unknown or zero equal opportunity to every unit of being selected for study (Mactavish and Schleien 2004:76). Notably, among the strengths of simple random sampling is that it tends to yield representative samples, and allows the use of inferential statistics in analysing collected data. Further, advanced auxiliary information on the elements in the population is not required.

Results

Results that the study established were based on responses from 340 participants. The study looked at the importance of municipal staff in municipal service delivery and the extent at which they render municipal service delivery in the NWP as the study will unfold.

Demographic information

Figures 1 and 2 that follow highlight the gender and age groups of the research participants.





Figure 1: Gender

Figure 2: Age group

Figure 1 shows that the majority of respondents were females (68.24%) and only about a third of the respondents were males (31.76%). The reflection can be an indication of more female configurations in society and the traditional adage that women as good care givers by nature are more involved in societal issues than their male counterparts. It could also be due to the fact that men as breadwinners are never at social gatherings mostly due to job commitments (Wade and Demb, 2009: 12). StatsSA (2011) further supports this assertion based on the population distribution reflected below, where more females accounted for the study than males (Table 2).

Figure 2 shows that the majority of respondents were in the age groups of 25-34 years and 35-44 years, each forming about a third of the respondents. An equal percentage of respondents was observed for age groups 45-54 years and 55 years and above, each making up 10.88% of the respondents. Respondents in the age group of 15-24 years comprise 17.35% of all respondents. This reflection of the majority of participants could

be a clear reflection of the influence emanating from the socially active groups. This assertion also is supported by (StatsSA, 2011), which propounds that "The unemployed are those people within the economically active population who do not work during the seven days and are ready to participate in any community initiative."

Table 2: Population distributions by gender in the NWP from 18 years and above

	Females	Males	Total
Area	351 514	337 637	689 152
DC37: Bojanala	127 374	123 570	250 944
DC38: Ngaka Modiri Molema	99 287	94 759	194 046
DC39: Dr Ruth Segomotsi Mompati	57 087	54 628	111 714
DC40: Dr Kenneth Kaunda	67 767	64 680	132 447

Stats SA 2011

Figures 3 and 4 give a reflection of respondents' marital status and race.





Figure 3: Marital Status **Figure 4: Race**

Figure 3 shows that more than half of the respondents (51.47%) were married, 45.76% were single and respondents were either divorced or widowed and each made up less than 2%. The marital status of the research participants could be an indication of the profound level of concern in the mindsets of people who have established in African traditional life settings who want to leave a legacy for their posterity. The level highlighted by those who were single could be a reflection of those who are not economically empowered. Through economic empowerment devolves autonomy, which also ushers in opulent decision-making and directedness.

Figure 4 shows slightly more than three thirds of the respondents (92.94%) are African, 5.56% are white, whereas less than 2% are either Indian or Coloured. This could have been so based on the population distribution in South Africa hence the NWP but it also could have been instigated by the fact that black South Africans have seen how marginalised

they have been pre-democracy in South Africa, therefore rendering more participative approaches in bread and butter issues. Figure 5 below focuses on level of education.



Figure 5: Level of Education

Figure 5 shows that slightly more than half of the respondents (50.88%) had only grade 11 schooling and below, slightly more than a quarter (25.88%) had matric only and only 10% had a degree. In addition, an almost equal percentage of the respondents (about 6%) had either a certificate or diploma. The impact of the educational discrepancies may have a negative impact on how local residents perceive service delivery and their appreciation thereof. In situations where information is provided, the literate and illiterate may have variances in levels of inquiry and apprehension.

Importance of municipal staff in service delivery

Reliability test results

Table 3: Reliability statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
0.963	49

The Cronbach's Alpha indicates that the variables are 90% reliable, hence they are appropriate for Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA). This part, therefore, confirms that the measures used in the study were consistent (Bless, 2013:222).

Determination of sampling adequacy and factorability of the correlation matrix

Taable 4: KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		0.929
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	6417.686
	Df	1 176
	Sig.	0.000

Sampling seeks to confirm generalisability. Table 1.2 indicates the population size used to determine the study's sample size (N=340) and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) and Bartlett's Test sought to confirm the adequacy of this sample. The KMO of 0.929 is greater 0.7, implying that the sample is adequate enough for factor analysis to be conducted.

Determination of the number of extractable factors

Table 5: Eigenvalues and total variance explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
Strategic impact	17.974	36.681	36.681
Organisational culture	2.417	4.932	41.613
Decision-making	1.725	3.52	45.133
Strategy alignment	1.575	3.213	48.347
Strategic planning	1.402	2.861	51.207
Problem solving ethos	1.329	2.711	53.919
Inter-personal relations	1.228	2.505	56.424
Compliance	1.222	2.494	58.918
Emotional intelligence	1.126	2.298	61.216
Organisational performance	1.046	2.134	63.35

Using the Kaiser's rule of eigenvalues greater than one, 10 factors should be extracted that accounted for about 63.35% of the total variation. These results were true for both Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). Determination of extractable factors was earmarked at data reduction so that information realised would be highly credible and easy to understand, as can be inferred from Table 6 on reduction of factors and Table 8 where all themes and sub-themes are highlighted.

Factor analysis results

Figure 6: Initial Factor Solutions

Figure 6, which is attached as Appendix 5, shows that most significant loadings (|loadings|>0.3) were allocated to factor 1; some factors violated the rule of thumb of at least three items per factor. As such, rotation of the initial factor matrix was necessary in order to improve interpretability of the factor matrix. The primary purpose of factor analysis was data reduction and summarisation and as could be seen from Figure 6, numerous sub-themes that are highlighted in Table 7 have resultantly been accommodated under 10 themes in order to enhance interpretability of themes. This was further highlighted in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Equamax Rotated Solution

Figure 7 is attached on the list of figures under as Appendix 6 shows that the Equamax 1 rotated factor solution is relatively easy to interpret as compared to the initial factor matrix in Figure 6. The 10 items are fairly distributed across factors and each factor has at least three significant loadings except for only one factor, which has two items (emotional intelligence). The rotated factor matrix is more easily interpretable as opposed to the initial one. As alluded to in Figure 6, Figure 7 shows the compared correlations of each factor against other factors and the correlations were less than one, indicating that each factor bore some correlation with other factors. The 10 factors or themes with their sub-themes are summarised in Table 7, which, if inference is made to Figure 6 and Figure 7 (summations), the sub-themes should not be reflected in order to improve factor interpretability on the importance of staff competencies in service delivery.

Table 6: Summary of factors for the importance of staff competencies

The table is attached as Appendix one on the list of tables attached. Factors for the importance of staff competencies were streamlined into 10 thematic areas encompassing strategic impact, organisational culture, decision-making, strategy alignment, institutional planning, and problem solving ethos, interpersonal relations, compliance, emotional intelligence and organisational performance. These themes sought to examine governance challenges in municipal service delivery, which was the aim of this research article.

Extent of demonstration by municipal staff on service delivery

Reliability test results

Table 7: Reliability statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
0.967	49

The Cronbach's Alpha indicates that the variables are 96.7% reliable, hence they are appropriate for EFA. This conclusive declaration shows that the sub-themes used for the study were appropriate for the conduct of this research study on the extent demonstrated by municipal staff in municipal service delivery in NWP.

Determination of sampling adequacy and factorability of the correlation matrix

Table 8: KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		0.933
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	6 212.763
	Df	1 176
	Sig.	0.000

The KMO of 0.933 is greater than 0.7, implying that the sample is adequate enough for factor analysis to be conducted. A significant Bartlett's test implies that the correlation matrix is factorable. Sampling denotes abandonment of certainty in favour of probability (Bless, 2013:160). Statistical inference is always an outcome of generalisations driven from findings. Therefore, it was imperative for the researcher to determine the adequacy of the sample size, which was put at 340 participants based on the population under study – 689 153 as depicted in Table 2 (StatsSA, 2011).

Determination of the number of extractable factors

Table 9: Eigenvalues and variance explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
Strategic impact	18.973	38.72	38.72
Organiaational culture	2.145	4.377	43.097

Decision-making	1.695	3.46	46.557
Strategy alignment	1.558	3.18	49.737
Strategic planning	1.385	2.827	52.564
Problem solving ethos	1.311	2.676	55.24
Inter-personal relations	1.265	2.581	57.821
Compliance	1.198	2.446	60.267
Emotional intelligence	1.092	2.228	62.495
Organisational performance	1.071	2.186	64.681

Using the Kaiser's rule of eigenvalues greater than one, 10 factors were extracted that accounted for 64.68% of the total variation. These results are true for both EFA and CFA. The role eigenvalues play in a factor analysis is similar to the role they play in principal components analysis; they allow one to know how much variation each factor or component can explain. This rule is intuitively satisfying in that any factors associated with eigenvalues under unity contain less information than the original variables that were used in the factor analysis. The 10 factors that were used to analyse the study's findings are captured as components in Table 9 above but are shown with their sub-themes in Table 10.

Factor analysis results

Figure 8: Factor solution

Figure 8 is attached as Appendix 7 and shows that most significant loadings (|loadings|>0.3) are allocated to factor 1; some factors violate the rule of thumb of at least three items per factor. As such, rotation of the initial factor matrix is necessary in order to improve interpretability of the factor matrix. Hence, it was critical to develop a summation of the variables that guided this study, which were configured as constructs of governance and this aspired to accomplish the study's objectives. These, inter alia, were: coordination of municipal development, supporting municipal financial management, improving internal municipal control and enhancing accountability.

Figure 9: Equamax rotated solution

The figure is attached. The goal of rotation is to obtain a simpler factor loading pattern that is easier to interpret than the original factor pattern. Figure 9 shows that the Equamax 2

rotated factor solution is relatively easy to interpret as compared to the initial factor matrix. The items are fairly distributed across factors and each factor has at least three significant loadings. As such, the rotated factor matrix can be interpreted with ease. The factors are summarised in Table 10, which is attached on the appendices list.

Determining the relationship between the importance of and the extent to which competencies are demonstrated by municipal staff

H_0: There is no correlation between the importance of and the extent to which the competencies are demonstrated by municipal staff.

Table 10: Pearson's correlation coefficients between the importance of municipal staff and the extent to which the competencies of municipal staff are demonstrated

Factors		Pearson's Correlation	Direction and Strength
Strategic impact	Decision-making	-0.410**	Negative and moderate
Strategic impact	Strategic planning	0.227**	Positive and weak
Organisational culture	Strategic impact	-0.151*	Negative and weak
Organisational culture	Organizational performance	-0.333**	Negative and moderate
Organisational culture	Decision making	-0.171*	Negative and weak
Organisational culture	Strategic alignment	0.153*	Positive and weak
Organisational culture	Problem solving ethos	-0.303**	Negative and moderate
Organisational culture	Compliance	0.168*	Positive and weak
Decision-making	Strategic impact	-0.311**	Negative and moderate
Decision-making	Compliance	0.148*	Positive and weak
Decision-making	Strategic alignment	-0.177*	Negative and weak

Decision-making	Interpersonal relations	0.266**	Positive and weak
Strategy alignment	Strategic impact	-0.155*	Negative and weak
Strategy alignment	Decision-making	0.343**	Positive and moderate
Strategy alignment	Emotional intelligence	-0.144*	Negative and weak
Strategy alignment	Organisational performance	-0.140*	Negative and weak
Strategic planning	Problem solving ethos	0.151*	Positive and weak
Problem solving ethos	Strategic impact	0.144*	Positive and weak
Problem solving ethos	Compliance	-0.161*	Negative and weak
Interpersonal relations	Emotional intelligence	-0.164*	Negative and weak
Compliance	Inter-personal relations	-0.195**	Negative and weak
Compliance	Emotional intelligence	0.145*	Positive and weak
Organisational performance	Strategic impact	0.213**	Positive and weak
Organisational performance	Emotional intelligence	0.150*	Positive and weak

Table 10 summarises the pairwise correlations between the factors of the importance of and the extent to which the competencies are demonstrated by municipal staff, which are significant at 5% level of significance. It can be noticed that most correlations are weak ($0< r <0.3$) whereas some are moderate ($0.3\leq r < 0.5$) but none are strong ($r \geq 0.5$) (Randolph and Myers, 2013:42). A discussion of these pairwise correlations follows below.

Strategic impact and decision-making

The direction and strength reflected by Pearson's correlation coefficients between strategic impact and decision-making was considered negative and weak. It shows that municipal staff decisions on service delivery matters cannot be conclusively determined as being of any impact. A case in point is when Mafikeng Local Municipality was placed under

judiciary administration in 2014/2015 due to fruitless and unauthorised expenditure (AG, 2015). The decision hardly impacted on municipal staff as none of them were affected by the intervention from the appointed judiciary administrator. In the same financial year, 2013/2014, the municipality had a disclaimer opinion and despite the intervention retained the same audit opinion in the following financial year (AG, 2015). Ninety-two percent of the community respondents in Ventersdorp indicated that municipal staff had difficulty in interpreting their operational mandates as reflected by role conflict and duplication of duties in some instances. They further indicated that on paper, municipal plans were people centred but evidence on the ground disputed this as people are hardly involved in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of these strategic plans. It also impacts on developing collegiality with communities as promises seem to be made but nothing concrete is implemented.

Strategic impact and strategic planning

The Pearson correlation coefficient showed 227. The direction and strength reflection was positive and weak. The association showcases that there is a positive relationship between strategic impact and strategic planning in local municipal governance. Municipal managers are viewed as the accounting officers and are held responsible and accountable for the level of performance in the local municipalities (MFMA 56, 2003). It, therefore, implies that strategic plans developed in terms of the said Act certainly have a positive impact on municipal operations as confirmed by Pearson's regression analysis. Naledi Local Municipality's operations in 2014/2015 reflected cash flow challenges and it was indicated that service delivery plans were impacted on negatively (Lefora, 2014/15:5). In Matlosana, priorities raised in the local municipality's IDP for 2014/2015 financial year such as storm water drainage, road maintenance, community halls, and high mast lighting were not achieved. This impacted negatively on the municipal plans developed by the local council and compromised service delivery.

Organisational culture and strategic impact

The findings from the Pearson coefficients show that the relationship between organisational culture and strategic impact was negative and weak. Current local municipalities are an outcome of a constitutional mandate (AG, 2015). In terms of organisational culture, respondents looked at the synergy between municipal strategies and the National Development Plan, municipal values, and integrating municipal plans with socio-political changes. This relationship between the two sub-themes could be so due to failure by municipal staff to align their operational activities with municipal expectations, procedures and assumptions. Lefora (2014/2015) indicated a culture of poor organisational outcomes by municipal staff. The report indicated high levels of gross dishonesty, fraud, corruption and in-fighting among staff. The report further indicated how

service delivery has been affected, for example, sanitation, which stood at 25% of RDP standard.

Organisational culture and organisational performance

The Pearson correlation coefficient was -0.333. The direction and strength showed was negative and weak. The cultural-set in an organisation is determined by institutional ideologies presented by employees in an organisation (Municipal Fiscal Powers and Functions Act, 2007). The CoGTA (2014) reflects that a mismatch between the intent of organisational culture and organisational performance will negatively impact on service delivery. In Mafikeng Local Municipality, annual reports (2014/2015) accessed showed that party political factionalism and polarisation of interests promoted the progressive deterioration of municipal functionality. The reports further indicated that there were rampant cases where members of staff and public representatives hardly took service delivery as a major concern, as they accrued wealth at the detriment of poor communities.

Organisational culture and decision-making

Fox and Wissink (2010:41) are of the opinion that local government is as old as the history of man and that it was the first known form of government on earth. They further postulate that its existence can be traced as far back as when people started living together as a community, with collective needs to be satisfied. However, the most important value underlying local government is democracy. This value is best experienced in the local government sphere, because of its closeness to the local community, both in a geographical sense and as far as its potential responsiveness is concerned. It is in the local government sphere that ordinary people have direct access to government. Eighty-seven percent of community participants in Naledi indicated that municipal culture should be aligned to service delivery expectations and aspirations. They indicated that for that culture to prevail, there was a need for stakeholder engagement so that common beliefs, values and norms are developed.

Organisational culture and strategic alignment

Strategic alignment is about linking human capital to organisational goals. It embodies a phenomenon where employees should understand and devolve a commitment to organisational imperatives (Kearns, 2010:64). Gratton (2007:89) alludes that the levers to strategic alignment should focus on performance objectives, performance metrics, recruitment and placement, reward and recognition. The correlation coefficient between organisational culture and strategic alignment was 153 and shows a positive direction for the two sub-themes. Ventersdorp Local Municipality's Annual Report (2014-15) indicated that the council engages the community through intensive and interactive public participation exercises in the development of IDPs. The report indicated that collective effort was being used to identify gaps and strengths at such ward-based summits. Ninety-

seven percent of municipal staff in the Ventersdorp Local Municipality indicated that such public engagements enhanced accountability and transparency.

Organisational culture and problem solving ethos

Shibata (2008:11) perceives problem solving as a process that establishes solutions to difficult or complex issues. The Pearson correlation coefficient for the 2 sub-themes was -0.303 and was shown to be negative and weak. The city of Naledi has an explicit vision and mission statement. In its organisational culture, it embodies values like: accountability, fairness, integrity, leadership, commitment, responsibility, diversity and teamwork (Lefora 2015). Despite its institutional culture, the city continues to be faced with problems in Ward 4 where there are several unoccupied and incomplete RDP houses. In Ward 1 and Devondale, RDP beneficiaries have no title deeds and the oxidation pond in Stella (Ward 2) does not meet public health standards. In Matlosana, local residents live in abject poverty. The size of indigent households has increased sporadically from 35% in 2011-2013 to 41% in 2013-2014 (City of Matlosana Annual Report, 2015).

Organisational culture and compliance

Compliance implies the capacity of an organisation to meet its legal obligations (Edmunds 2016:12). Compliance issues become more complex the more an organisation grows. Responsibilities will also tend to expand from operational-related ones to governance matters. The Pearson co-efficient measure showed 153, which was positive. It reflected that organisational culture and compliance have a direct correlation. In order for an organisation to maintain effective organisational culture, staff have to be socialised through the values, expectations and knowledge imperative for employees to assume their roles in the organisation. The culture of the organisation is significant in that it influences attitudes and behaviours of staff (Peters and Waterman, 2012:10). Documents analysed at Matlosana Local Municipality indicated that compliance was complex. The report by the Audit-General (2015) indicated that there was massive distress in the local municipality's governance activities.

Decision-making and strategic impact

The Pearson correlation analysis reflected that there was no direct relationship between decision-making and strategic impact. Possibly borrowing from Parsons (2014:184-186), the impact of any decisions made is subjective. Eighty-five percent of community residents in Matlosana felt that on paper, basic service delivery and infrastructure development were aligned with growth, poverty alleviation, social cohesion, investment and job creation, but empirical evidence barely substantiated the foregoing institutional decisions. They indicated high dissatisfaction on the status of roads, electricity supply, housing, recreational facilities and potable water. However, Moloko (2015) indicated that they had some successes to rejoice about. They cited that 92% (Ward 1), 98% (Ward 8) and 94% (Ward 9)'s households had electricity for lighting.

Decision-making and compliance

Section 166 of the Municipal Financial Management Act indicated that all municipalities should establish audit committees whose majority should not be council employees. The King Report 111(2013) also underscores this by indicating that audit committees should comprise independent, and non-executive members in order to promote compliance through transparency, and oversight. Hence, substantiating the direct correlation between decision-making and compliance. Ninety-two percent of the local residents in the study in Mafikeng indicated that political decisions tended to impact on municipal compliance. They cited the appointment of a senior manager in the municipality without advertising the vacancy. They highlighted that such actions ultra vires the Municipal Systems Act as the person appointed lacked requisite credentials as per the post, consequently affecting quality service.

Decision-making and strategic alignment

The Pearson correlation analysis indicated that decision-making had no direct relationship with strategic alignment. Strategies in organisations need to be linked to organisational goals, norms and beliefs (Beetham, 2011:19). Hence, when decisions are made, they will lend themselves to policy dictates, staff autonomy and corporate culture. However, municipal bodies operate within a political milieu. The political party that commands the majority in any municipality influences most of the decisions made; even if public interests are hardly a focus, they will manage to pull through with their agenda (SALGA, 2015). This assertion was established in all the four municipalities sampled for the study where the current ruling party had the majority.

Decision-making and interpersonal relations

Interpersonal relations are about social connections with others. These relations can be short-lived, enduring or unique (Mazarin, 2013:41). Manaka (2015) reported that decisions made on some municipal issues rendered good governance wrong. The review indicated that there was a rife tendency in the municipality to attribute all failures in municipal performance to a lack of capacity. However, the report highlighted that the several municipal failures were directly due to political leadership.

Strategic alignment and strategic impact

The Pearson correlation analysis showed that strategic alignment in local municipalities bore no direct correlation with strategic impact. The study reviewed strategic alignment based on buy-in by top management, appreciation of dynamic changes in local municipalities, capacities to interpret client expectations and advocating for market-driven relations to communities' needs. However, despite legal frameworks in place to guide staff in the conduct of their duties, the core mandate of service delivery to their communities was cited by 78% in Mafikeng by community participants as poor. In Mafikeng Local Municipality, community participants indicated that a senior manager, who

had been dismissed from Tswaing Local Municipality for corruption, was hired by Mafikeng Local Municipality (MLM) in the traffic department without due consideration to the MSA (2011 as amended). This could be due to the misplacement of local authorities' strategic alignment, recruitment procedures, selection and placement of staff.

Strategic alignment and organisational performance

Strategic alignment denotes the level of fit between an organisation's strategic priorities and its environment. It is widely envisaged that strategic alignment in an organisation with its external environment enhances performance (Venkatranam and Prescott, 2010:9). The Pearson correlation analysis for the study indicated that there existed no direct relationship between strategic alignment and organisational performance in municipal entities in the NWP. The Ventersdorp Annual Report (2014/2015) highlighted that the Chief Finance Officer for the local municipality was appointed but did not meet the professional requirements for the position. This development showcases that the appointment was aligned to suffice political growth or performance of a particular organisation he belonged to, rather than enhancing municipal performance.

Strategic planning and problem solving ethos

The study established that Naledi Local Municipality reviews its Integrated Development Plan (IDP) on an annual basis following a process of comprehensive consultation with communities, stakeholders and Government at district, provincial and national level. The Integrated Development Plan is viewed as a strategic development tool to assist the municipality to achieve its developmental objectives. Its publication and adoption follows a comprehensive process of consultation with residents, communities and stakeholders (Lefora, 2016/17). Collectively, these strategies and policy documents provide the building blocks for the Naledi IDP, which highlights the priorities identified by residents and communities and the interventions required to address them. Resultantly, it showcases that problem solving in Naledi emanates from a collective platform of strategic planning. Ninety-seven percent of community respondents indicated that the mayor and her team engaged them in priority planning in their municipality and considered it as a health environment.

Problem solving and strategic impact

Problem solving is one dimension reflected in many organisational diagnostic models that promotes the success of an organisation (Vansconcelos, 2011:39). The Pearson correlation analysis indicated that there was a positive relationship between problem solving and strategic impact in local municipal activities in the NWP. This shows that the manner in which staff attend to matters in the municipalities has direct impact on municipal spheres. CoGTA (2016) reports that since the dawn of the new democracy, local government in South Africa has contributed to the achievement of a number of significant social and economic development advances. An interview with the Director of Macro-Planning and

Development in Matlosana revealed that engagement with the public had brought a high rate of business turnover as more people have started investing in the area. The Director further revealed that the Matlosana Development Forum (MDF) has also begun lobbying and advocating for the improvement of economic and other developmental opportunities for Matlosana and its local residents. However, these strategic developments are not without 'hiccups'. The local business entrepreneurs feel that these macro strides by the municipality have liberalised the business sector and the influx of foreign-owned business ventures had affected their levels of profitability.

Problem solving ethos and compliance

Researchers have studied the relationship between personality characteristics and problem-solving strategies (Hopper and Kirschenbaum, 1985: Myers, 1980). One conclusion that may be drawn from these investigations is that individual differences in problem solving and decision-making must be considered to adequately understand the dynamics of these processes (Stice, 2007:43). The foregoing concur with experiences established in Ventersdorp Local Municipality, where a senior manager was appointed without following the legal framework (MSA, 2011 as amended).

Interpersonal relations and emotional intelligence

Service delivery is an institutional function that local municipalities in South Africa are mandated to render (Reeves, 2011:14). The type of relationship is dependent upon the type of leadership or management (Mayor and Salovey, 2007:54). However, the turbulent climate prevailing in local municipalities in the NWP gives no guarantee to this culture as the study depicts that interpersonal relations bear a negative correlation with emotional intelligence. However, 90% of community respondents in Matlosana indicated that these imperative acts were not carried to the letter. They cited the incorporation of Klerksdorp, Orkney, Stilfontein and Hartebeesfontein into a single municipal body known as the City of Matlosana without their majority consent. They further indicated that though the slogan for the current city of Matlosana was 'City of People on the Move', they saw no positive outcomes to encourage the city to 'move' literally and economically as thawed relations perpetuated between the municipality and local residents.

Compliance and interpersonal relations

Gratton, (2007:98) renders his weight to compliance when he reiterated that "effective compliance is critical if organisations are to avoid devastating economic consequences that are increasingly triggered by unlawful and unethical behaviour." In Ventersdorp Local Municipality, it was established that ward-based public forums took place in April 2015 and that the public was consulted on the IDP (MPAC, 2015). However, 93% of local residents in the municipality indicated that issues they had raised were not incorporated at the Municipal Budget Steering Committee meeting held on 8 May 2015. They felt that the municipality should have complied with their proposals.

Compliance and emotional intelligence

Goleman (2005:12) views emotional intelligence "as the ability of an individual to know one's self, emotions, manage them, motivate oneself, recognize emotions in others and manage with others." He further highlights that the fundamental variables of emotional intelligence at the workplace, inter alia, entail self-management, self-awareness, relationship management and social awareness. The correlation between compliance and emotional intelligence was determined to be positive. Under compliance, the study focused on client centred decisions, clients' needs and driving of municipal results. The researcher analysed CoGTA (2016) overview reports for the sampled municipalities. It was established that in terms of sustainability profile, Mafikeng Local Municipality was strong in terms of economic growth, service delivery backlogs were being eradicated and it was active in business sector engagement. The overview report indicated that Naledi Local Municipality was outstanding in rates collection and public engagement. Ventersdorp Local Municipality was considered to be weak in development facilitation. The report shows that if governance imperatives are complied with, they expand the levels of growth in municipalities, hence qualifying that compliance and emotional intelligence directly relate to each other.

Organisational performance and strategic impact

Stoker (2008:17-18) propounds that governance is not about managerial techniques, but achieving efficiency in service delivery, as reflected in the conceptual framework. The Pearson correlation between the two variables was considered to be positive. According to the Naledi's IDP and Spatial Development Framework (2014/15) the study established that the municipality had performed significantly towards meeting its targets and that the majority of the municipality's stakeholders were satisfied. The report identified positive strides in the ensuing areas: water services, governance and administration, waste management, traffic and policing, municipal health and street lighting. However, 87% of the community respondents indicated that housing was way behind as a large number of local residents had no proper housing.

Organisational performance and emotional intelligence

Peters and Pierre (2006:232) advocate for tools that should be used to enhance emotional growth among staff. This calls for openness to novel ideas. In Matlosana, the study established that the city was cementing organised open relationships with local stakeholders to promote effective performance. In these associations, efforts were being spearheaded to desist from sending adverse municipal challenges to the press. Mining giants like Anglo Gold Ashanti has also been brought to the fore where it leverages partnerships with the municipality in stimulating and supporting local development in areas where they operate (Moloko, 2015:42). Lack of proper document maintenance, poor project planning, poor ICT systems, and lack of staff training were identified in Ventersdorp

municipality. The billing system was reported to be poor, hence affecting debt collection and total vacancies stood at 28%. Huge backlogs on water, sanitation, roads, refuse removal and electricity were also reported.

Conclusions and policy implications

Common in the foregoing viewpoints is that governance has connections and synergies that the proponents perceive as networks or associations. The other similarity relates to hierarchies, which through literature review, are referred to as structures. However, for the structures to interact, there is a need for a co-ordinating impetus. The implication here is about harmonising different municipal activities so that they effectively operate as a whole. The findings reflected that though legal frameworks exist in municipalities, evidence on the ground barely testified about the co-ordination efficacy of these frameworks as they are hardly complied with. The researcher will propose that mechanisms, regardless of co-ordination barriers, which could either be socio-political or cognitive, should be instituted as a strategic management measure to assist municipal staff to align their roles and responsibilities with municipal strategies.

The researcher agrees that involvement of the local community at an early stage is likely to improve design by ensuring that full advantage is taken of local technology and knowledge. The researcher further believes that community engagement can ensure a project's social acceptability and can increase the likelihood of beneficiaries participating in the project. He also believes that where projects in politically volatile areas are planned for without the systematic efforts to involve major community groups through consultation and planning meetings from the very beginning of the project, social acceptance of the project might be difficult and the services might not be used.

The researcher proposes that where such a tenet prevails, actors are capable of making decisions. If such decisions are made, ownership of outcomes is collective and when weaknesses arise, "...the language taken should seek to re-invent themes through collectivism." However, the findings established that this scenario is barely there in the NWP as the spirit of collectivism is absent. Literature review also highlighted that incidents of fruitless expenditure, qualified and disclaimer audits were rife in the NWP (AG, 2015). The research findings corroborated this by establishing that audit outcomes for 2013-2014 reflected that 74% of local municipalities in the NWP received qualified/ disclaimer opinions. The researcher accedes the implication that public entities experience governance challenges, and that modifying or refining current institutional patterns can militate against them. However, findings further established that politics plays a critical role in skills deployment and service delivery. The influence of a political party in a particular municipality determines the modus operandi in that local authority.

The researcher believes that good governance should conform neither to the ideology of wider 'rationality' of liberalism in terms of its agenda. Policy issues that relate to good governance should be promulgated in objectivity. The researcher further proposes that no political system has ever come into existence without constitutional dimensions; the purpose of good governance should rethink policy principles. Such policy principles should support a framework that works at the level of novel budgeting techniques, management philosophy, skills deployment, transparency and citizen engagement. The researcher will further propose that a new framework that includes all the domains of effective, efficient and sustainable service delivery should be created, and should seek to coalesce into a common policy framework concerned with the mutual interdependence of a common strategy for the development of the public sector. Exclusive dependence on both exogenous and endogenous circumstances should be regarded as critical.

Conclusion

It is evident that governance is a system and a process that seeks to provide organisational direction through structures and processes, and maintain a controlled environment with the assistance of members within an organisation in order to attain municipal objectives. This is critical to the governance challenges in service delivery in the case of local municipalities (especially in the NWP's ability to achieve its set objectives). As much as other governance principles are important, in most instances, accountability becomes crucial. There is a need by the powers that be to reinvigorate institutional capacity and regularly appraise in tandem with changing times. Resources should be availed and monitored closely. Interventions such as the Turn-Around-Strategy and Rebranding, Repositioning and Renewal should also be given the light of the day.

REFERENCES

1. Auditor-General. (2015). Municipal Reports 2014/15. Pretoria.
2. Beetham, IF. (2011). Housing Needs Survey Report. Gauteng.
3. Bless, T. (2013). *Social Research.* New York: Penguin.
4. Creswell, J.W. (2010). *Educational Research: Planning, Conducting and Evaluating Quantitative and Qualitative Research*. New Jersey: Pearson.
5. Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA). (2016). *Local Government Turn-Around Strategy: Working Together, Turning the Tide in Local Government.* Pretoria: Government Printers.
6. Edmunds, Y. (2016). *Experimental and Quasi-experimental Research Designs*. Chicago: Rand-McNally.

7. Fox, W. and Wissink, H. (2010). *Public Management.* Cape Town: Juta.
8. Goleman, M. (2005). *Conversational Analysis.* New York: Harper and Row.
9. Gratton, P. (2007). *Human Resources Management in South Africa.* Hampshire: Cengage Learning.
10. Kearns, G. (2010). *Work and the Nature of Man.* New York: World Publishers.
11. King Report 111. (2013). King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa. Prepared by the Committee on Corporate Governance. Johannesburg: Institute of Directors in Southern Africa.
12. Lefora, W. (2015). Naledi Integrated Development Plan 2015. Vryburg.
13. Lefora, W. (2015). Naledi Integrated Development Plan 2016/17. Vryburg.
14. Lefora, W. (2015). Naledi Local Municipality Annual Review 2015. Vryburg.
15. Lefora, W. (2015). Naledi Local Municipality Annual Performance Report 2014/15. Vryburg.
16. Lefora, W. (2015). Naledi Municipal Portfolio Audit Committee 2015. Vryburg.
17. Lefora, W. (2015). Naledi Municipal Portfolio Committee on Community Services 2015. Vryburg.
18. Leftwich, S. (2013). *Market Research*. London: Sage.
19. Mactavish, D. and Schleien, C. (2004). *Terrible Di Segno* and *Eroico Componimento: Mattia Preti's Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Italy*. Queens' University.
20. Makwetu, K. (2016). *Municipal Audit Outcomes 2014/15*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
21. Manaka, M.E. (2015). Mafikeng Local Government and Expenditure Review 2015. Mafikeng.
22. Manaka, M.E. (2015). Mafikeng Local Municipal Annual Report 2014/15. Mafikeng.
23. Mayor, M. and Saloney, T. (2007). *Business Research*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
24. Mazarin, M. (2013). *Organisational Behaviour.* New York: Thousand Oaks.
25. Moloko, G. (2015). Matlosana Integrated Development Plan 2016/17. Klerksdorp.
26. Moloko, G. (2015). Matlosana Local Municipality Annual Review 2015. Klerksdorp.
27. Moloko, G. (2015). Matlosana Local Municipality Annual Performance Report 2014/15. Klerksdorp.
28. Myers, B. (1980). *The Performing Organization.* New Jersey: Willey.

29. Nombembe, T. (2015). Municipal Audit Reports 2013/14. *Mail and Guardian*.
30. Osborn, C.P., Hulme, M. and Jones, P.D. (2002). Olive Phenology as a Sensitive Indicator of Future Climatic Warming in the Mediterranean. *Nature Genetics 2*(29), 321-325.
31. Parsons, K. (2014). Issues of Competition and Democracy in Post-colonial Africa. SAAPAM.
32. Peters, T. and Waterman, H. (2012). *The Disorganised Organisation*. London: Sage.
33. Randolph, K. and Myers, L. (2013). *Basic Statistics in Multivariate Analysis.* New York: Oxford University Press.
34. Reeves, K. (2011). *Fundamentals of Behavioural Statistics.* Massachusetts: Wiley.
35. Republic of South Africa. (2003). Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003. Pretoria: Government Printers.
36. Republic of South Africa. (1996). South African Constitution. Pretoria: Government Printers.
37. Republic of South Africa. (2001). Local Government Municipal Fiscal Powers and Functions Act. Pretoria.
38. Republic of South Africa. (2011) Local Government Municipal Structures Act 2011. Pretoria.
39. Republic of South Africa. (2015). Municipal Public Accounting Committee. Ventersdorp.
40. Republic of South Africa. (2000). Municipal Systems Act 2000. Pretoria.
41. Republic of South Africa. (2015). North West Department of Local Government and Traditional Affairs. Mmabatho.
42. Republic of South Africa. (2013). North West Provincial Legislature. Vote and Policy Speech for Financial Year 2012-2013. Mmabatho.
43. Republic of South Africa. (2014). North West Provincial Government. Municipal audit reports. Mmabatho.
44. Republic of South Africa. 2015. North West Provincial Government. Municipal audit reports. Mmabatho.
45. SALGA. (2015). Local government: Municipal Systems Act of 2000. Pretoria: Government Printers.
46. Shibata, F. (2008). Social Services. Gauteng.

47. South Africa. (1998). White Paper on Local Government: Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development. Pretoria: Government Printers.
48. Stice, H. (2007). *Developing a Philosophy of Management.* New York: Jossey Bass.
49. Statistics South Africa. (2011). Population Distribution in the North West Province. Pretoria.
50. Stoker, T. (2008). *Human Resources Management.* Boston: Elsevier.
51. Vansconcelos, M. (2011). *Public Services in South of the Sahara.* Cape Town: Juta.
52. Venkatranam, J. and Prescott, L. (2010). Rural Development in India. New Delhi.
53. Wade, V. and Demb, O. (2009). *Organisational Strategies.* London: Sage.

APPENDICES

List of Tables

Table 6: Summary of factors for the importance of staff competencies

Strategic impact

SC1. Interpret their operational mandate?

SC2. Generate top management buy-in for quality service delivery?

SC3. Implement any municipal strategy in line with the National Development Plan (NDP)?
SC4. Execute strategies?
SC5. Instil the municipal values?
SC9. Initiate consultative processes as part of strategic decision-making?
SC14. Integrate municipal and NDP strategies?
SC15. Integrate municipal activities with current and pending legislation?
SC16. Integrate municipal plans with existing socio-political changes?
Organisational culture
SC6. Establish a constructive organisational culture?
SC10. Develop people-centred strategic plans?
RC3. Manage the interface between municipal processes and systems?
LPC4. Establish connections with all key roleplayers?
LPC6. Deliver on promises?
LPC7. Have faith in others?
Decision-making
SC7. Assess the long-term impact of short-term decisions on people?
SC8. Understand the ever-changing municipal and environmental context?
SC19. Effectively establish communication channels to all clients?
Strategy alignment
SC11. Interpret client expectations?
SC12. Advocate a market-driven relation to people's needs?
SC13. Play an active role in organisational alignment of service delivery?
LPC10. Be seen as a strategic business partner?
OC3. Demonstrate value chain knowledge?
Strategic planning
SC17. Support the municipality to accomplish its constitutional mandate?
SC18. Be aware of the effect of strategic planning on sustainable service delivery?
Problem solving ethos
SC20. Develop an effective communication plan for the municipality?.
LPC1. Build credibility with all key role-players?
OC1. Establish the connections to municipal strategy?
OC7. Recruit individuals with innovative skills?
OC9. Cultivate a problem-solving ethos in the municipality?
Inter-personal relations
RC1. Oversee the need for sustainable service delivery in order to make effective client-centred decisions?

RC6. Ensure that municipal standards are implemented and adhered to?
LPC8. Create authentic relationships with key stakeholders?
LPC9. Ensure that municipal policies and programmes address the personal needs of clients?
LPC11. Establish fair performance standards?
LPC12. Communicate openly and frequently with clients?
OC4. Demonstrate Employee Value proposition knowledge?
Compliance
RC4. Manage client risks?
RC5. Ensure compliance to employment laws, rules, and codes?
RC7. Promote sustainable service throughout the municipality?
LPC13. Provide frequent feedback to clients?
Emotional intelligence
RC2. Contribute towards clients' needs?
LPC2. Develop trust with all key roleplayers?
LPC3. Create a balance of emotional intelligence with stakeholders?
LPC5. Drive municipal results?
OC2. Train departments in organisational processes, technology, systems, and structures?
Organisational performance
OC5. Ensure that innovative products and services are being developed in the municipality?
OC6. Organise all elements involved in organisational performance?
OC8. Create a learning culture in the municipality?

Table 7: Summary of factors for the extent of competencies by municipal staff in service delivery

Strategic impact
SC1. Interpret their operational mandate?
SC9. Initiate consultative processes as part of strategic decision-making?
SC10. Develop people-centred strategic plans?
LPC6. Deliver on promises?
LPC7. Have faith in others?
LPC8. Create authentic relationships with key stakeholders?
Organisational culture
SC3. Implement any municipal strategy in line with the National Development Plan (NDP)?
SC5. Instil the municipal values?

SC16. Integrate municipal plans with existing socio-political changes?
OC5. Ensure that innovative products and services are being developed in the municipality?
Decision-making
SC4. Execute strategies?
SC6. Establish a constructive Organisational Culture?
SC13. Play an active role in organisational alignment of service delivery?
RC4. Manage client risks?
Strategy alignment
SC2. Generate top management buy-in for quality service delivery?
SC8. Understand the ever changing municipal and environmental context?
SC11. Interpret client expectations?
SC12. Advocate a market-driven relation to people's needs?
Strategic planning
SC7. Assess the long-term impact of short-term decisions on people?
LPC1. Build credibility with all key roleplayers?
LPC13. Provide frequent feedback to clients?
OC1. Establish connections to municipal strategy?
OC2. Train departments in organisational processes, technology, systems, and structures?
OC3. Demonstrate value chain knowledge?
Problem-solving ethos
SC14. Integrate municipal and NDP strategies?
SC15. Integrate municipal activities with current and pending legislation?
SC19. Effectively establish communication channels to all clients?
SC20. Develop an effective communication plan for the municipality?
Inter-personal relations
SC17. Support the municipality to accomplish its constitutional mandate?
SC18. Be aware of the effect of strategic planning on sustainable service delivery?
RC6. Ensure that municipal standards are implemented and adhered to?
OC4. Demonstrate Employee Value proposition knowledge?
Compliance
RC1. Oversee the need for sustainable service delivery in order to make effective client-centred d
RC2. Contribute towards clients' needs?
RC7. Promote sustainable service throughout the municipality?
LPC4. Establish connections with all key roleplayers?
LPC5. Drive municipal results?
Emotional intelligence
RC3. Manage the interface between municipal processes and systems?

RC5. Ensure compliance to employment laws, rules, and codes?
LPC2. Develop trust with all key roleplayers?
OC7. Recruit individuals with innovative skills?
OC8. Create a learning culture in the municipality?
OC9. Cultivate a problem-solving ethos in the municipality?
Organisational performance
LPC3. Create a balance of emotional intelligence with stakeholders?
LPC9. Ensure that municipal policies and programmes address the personal needs of clients?
LPC10. Be seen as a strategic business partner?
LPC11. Establish fair performance standards?
LPC12. Communicate openly and frequently with clients?
OC6. Organise all elements involved in organisational performance?

Table 8: Summary of factors for the importance of staff competencies

Staff professionalism
SP1. Have relevant qualifications?
SP5. Achieve set objectives?
TM9. Track best performers in the municipality?
AM6. Ensure the municipality is staffed at the right levels?
AM8. Measure staffing trends?
TM10. Identify organisational gaps in linking talent with municipal outcomes?
Attitude to work
SP2. Demonstrate self-efficacy in job performance?
SP6. Produce high quality work?
SP7. Develop interpersonal skills?
TM11. Deploy talent focused on competencies to municipal outcomes?
Talent management
SP3. Display a desire towards the job?
SP4. Contribute to ethical conduct?
TM2. Grasp the concept of talent management in relation to service delivery?
IC3. Listen without interrupting?
CFTF2. Demonstrate a willingness to view change from a positive perspective?
Communication skills
SP8. Have good communication skills?
SP9. Participate as an active team player?
SP15. Maintain confidentiality?
TM1. View talent as a return on investment?

SD4. Reports on barriers to effective service delivery?
SCI8. Ensure managers are held accountable for the development of their employees?
SCI10. Generate ideas for improvement?
MT1. Drive efficiency and effectiveness of municipal strategies through the use of technology?
Tolerance
SP10. Be open to others' ideas and suggestions?
SP11. Display modesty in work performance?
SCI1. Transform the municipality's strategy into an effective and actionable service delivery strategy?
SCI2. Prioritise service delivery strategies into operational plans?
Self-management skills
SP12. Respect authority?
SP13. Recognise own strengths and limitations?
AM3. Play a primary role in delivering service delivery processes for measurement?
Self-development capacity
TM6. Identify talent pools in the municipality?
TM7. Generate a Talent Management Plan across all municipal structures?
TM13. Establish a rewards system for talented individuals based on their contribution?
IC4. Use a clear language when speaking to clients?
Assessment skills
TM14. Ensure that succession plans are in place for key positions?
TM15. Ensure that development plans are in place to develop internally as opposed to outsourcing?
AM4. Take a leading role in delivering service delivery systems?
AM9. Identify areas of risk measurement?
Diversity management
TM8. Establish effective and continuous talent management processes to consolidate service delivery?
AM1. Generate a systematic and integrated approach to service delivery analytics and measures?
SD5. Respect the practices, values, customs and norms of diverse groups?
IC1. Use a communication style that best suits the situation?
IC5. Communicate issues in a timely manner?
CFTF1. Seek information about impacts of change on the workplace?
SD1. Acknowledge stakeholder concerns and issues?
MT3. Using social media to promote service delivery in the municipality?

Evaluation skills
AM7. Manage labour hours and productivity?
AM12. Keep employee data secure but sharable with authorised permissions?
AM13. Evaluate service delivery performance?
SCI3. Translate service delivery strategy into key people initiatives and programmes?

Table 9: Summary of factors for the extent of staff competencies

Staff professionalism
SP1. Have relevant qualifications?
TM3. Demonstrate an understanding of contemporary talent management strategies?
TM9. Track best performers in the municipality?
TM13. Establish a rewards system for talented individuals based on their contribution?
TM14. Ensure that succession plans are in place for key positions?
SCI1.Transform the municipality's strategy into an effective and actionable service delivery strategy?
Attitude to work
SP2. Demonstrate self-efficacy in job performance?
SP7. Develop interpersonal skills?
SP10. Be open to others' ideas and suggestions?
SP11. Display modesty in work performance?
SP13. Recognise own strengths and limitations?
SP15. Maintain confidentiality?
TM10. Identify organisational gaps in linking talent with municipal outcomes?
TM15. Ensure that development plans are in place to develop internally as opposed to outsourcing?
Talent management
SP3. Display a desire towards job?
SP12. Respect authority?
TM5. Integrate talent management and municipal strategies?
AM3. Play a primary role in delivering service delivery processes for measurement?
Communication skills
SP8. Have good communication skills?
SP9. Participate as an active team player?
SP15. Maintain confidentiality?
TM1. View talent as a return on investment?
SD4. Reports on barriers to effective service delivery?
SCI8. Ensure managers are held accountable for the development of their employees?
SCI10. Generate ideas for improvement?
MT1. Drive efficiency and effectiveness of municipal strategies through the use of technology?

Tolerance
SP5. Achieve set objectives?
SCI6. Communication to clients is frequent, meaningful and two-way?
SCI7. Ensure that individual development plans are in place for all employees?
SCI8. Ensure managers are held accountable for the development of their employees?
SCI9. Seek opportunities to improve work practices?
IC1. Use a communication style that best suits the situation?
IC2. Communicate in a way that shows respect?
IC3. Listen without interrupting?
Self-management skills
SP6. Produce high quality work?
AM12. Keep employee data secure but sharable with authorised permissions?
AM13. Evaluate service delivery performance?
IC4. Use a clear language when speaking to the client?
CFTF4. Acquire relevant knowledge and skills to meet changing requirements?
Self-development capacity
SP9. Participate as an active team player?
AM9. Identify areas of risk measurement?
SCI4. Identify the best ways to attract, motivate, and retain new and existing workforce segments?
SCI5. Identify the critical workforce segments and tailor specific programmes and services?
Assessment skills
SP14. Clarify job responsibilities of employees?
TM12. Demonstrate an understanding of their role in service delivery?
SD2. Clarify stakeholder expectations?
SD3. Provide relevant and timeous feedback?
SD4. Reports on barriers to effective service delivery?
SCI2. Prioritise service delivery strategies into operational plans?
SCI3. Translate service delivery strategy into key people initiatives and programmes?
Diversity management
TM1. View talent as a return on investment?
TM2. Grasp the concept of talent management in relation to service delivery?
TM6. Identify talent pools in the municipality?
CFTF2. Demonstrate a willingness to view change from a positive perspective?
Evaluation skills
AM1. Generate a systematic and integrated approach to service delivery analytics and measures?
AM6. Ensure the municipality is staffed at the right levels?
AM8. Measuring staffing trends?

SCI12. Monitor work results?
CFTF3. Manage personal reaction in the appearance of changing circumstances?
CFTF5. Maintain effective work ethos in changing conditions?
CFTF6. Assist in the development of processes and programmes that could guide the municipality through tr

List of figures

Figure 6: Initial Factor Solutions

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
SC1	0.751	0.26	0.031	0.267	0.141	0.054	0.027	0.065	0.118
SC2	0.579	0.488	0.076	0.099	0.108	0.084	0.101	0.177	0.053
SC3	0.6	0.272	0.046	0.301	0.02	0.15	0.209	0.037	0.026
SC4	0.691	0.324	0.114	0.256	0.036	0.066	0.012	0.133	0.086
SC5	0.541	0.409	0.139	0.202	0.065	0.105	0.119	0.155	0.341
SC6	0.661	0.313	0.155	0.082	0.059	0.082	0.046	0.153	0.088
SC7	0.512	0.231	0.282	0.072	0.121	0.373	0.08	0.123	0.311
SC8	0.558	0.12	0.02	0.178	0.106	0.089	0.159	0.306	0.082
SC9	0.531	0.387	0.228	0.082	0.144	0.039	0.309	0.062	0.004
SC10	0.575	0.223	0.101	0.129	0.182	0.222	0.231	0.147	0.116
SC11	0.598	0.048	0.311	0.093	0.021	0.128	0.018	0.412	0.119
SC12	0.554	0.116	0.243	0.237	0.23	0.069	0.031	0.187	0.173
SC13	0.564	0.145	0.05	0.13	0.085	0.089	0.256	0.237	0.225
SC14	0.548	0.27	0.065	0.024	0.268	0.208	0.029	0.165	0.003
SC15	0.45	0.405	0.029	0.1	0.418	0.028	0.05	0.125	0.111
SC16	0.492	0.267	0.272	0.261	0.155	0.17	0.291	0.131	0.023
SC17	0.522	0.216	0.211	0.293	0.077	0.041	0.133	0.132	0.303
SC18	0.475	0.132	0.218	0.299	0.105	0.173	0.303	0.17	0.314
SC19	0.537	0.207	0.248	0.269	0.067	0.368	0.001	0.179	0.114
SC20	0.655	0.063	0.331	0.134	0.104	0.043	0.05	0	0.19
GOV_RC1	0.808	0.215	0.006	0.07	0.044	0.081	0	0.072	0.084
GOV_RC2	0.663	0.102	0.21	0.172	0.06	0.109	0.139	0.024	0.121
GOV_RC3	0.578	0.067	0.242	0.27	0.301	0.08	0.182	0.111	0.076
GOV_RC4	0.546	0.18	0.318	0.056	0.047	0.25	0.243	0.105	0.255
GOV_RC5	0.522	0.265	0.27	0.237	0.164	0.262	0.128	0.105	0.04
GOV_RC6	0.652	0.235	0.105	0.08	0.07	0.106	0.002	0.15	0.087
GOV_RC7	0.619	0.285	0.253	0.133	0.123	0.24	0.03	0.232	0.037
LPC1	0.713	0.196	0.021	0.072	0.169	0.026	0.037	0.174	0.011
LPC2	0.508	0.16	0.194	0.329	0.369	0.288	0.041	0.182	0.066
LPC3	0.462	0.217	0.257	0.221	0.434	0.068	0.14	0.014	0.121
LPC4	0.582	0.199	0.072	0.008	0.116	0.137	0.298	0.01	0.215
LPC5	0.614	0.216	0.117	0.187	0.094	0.035	0.206	0.125	0.102
LPC6	0.574	0.113	0.239	0.12	0.135	0.288	0.225	0.12	0.011
LPC7	0.619	0.047	0.289	0.173	0.066	0.163	0.095	0.059	0.068
LPC8	0.613	0.154	0.116	0.023	0.02	0.019	0.105	0.143	0.071
LPC9	0.611	0.173	0.327	0.039	0.059	0.199	0.075	0.014	0.14
LPC10	0.677	0.243	0.092	0.164	0.128	0.118	0.003	0.176	0.016
LPC11	0.727	0.135	0.115	0.273	0.018	0.086	0.127	0.188	0.11
LPC12	0.649	0.164	0.01	0.237	0.058	0.021	0.195	0.037	0.034
LPC13	0.679	0.202	0.087	0.165	0.018	0.021	0.003	0.189	0.093
OC1	0.782	0.138	0.006	0.23	0.039	0.198	0.002	0.031	0.03
OC2	0.636	0.191	0.236	0.048	0.08	0.236	0.063	0.101	0.02
OC3	0.636	0.309	0.255	0.067	0.109	0.098	0.017	0.17	0.138
OC4	0.794	0.121	0.003	0.086	0.126	0.096	0.012	0.192	0.051
OC5	0.543	0.121	0.177	0.173	0.284	0.054	0.043	0.302	0.18
OC6	0.612	0.045	0.143	0.065	0.184	0.272	0.075	0.251	0.011
OC7	0.582	0.05	0.07	0.003	0.011	0.077	0.476	0.027	0.282
OC8	0.473	0.028	0.195	0.199	0.409	0.037	0.239	0.098	0.25
OC9	0.514	0.214	0.191	0.208	0.181	0.321	0.02	0.084	0.291

Figure 7: Equamax Rotated Solution

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
SC1	0.534	0.397	0.16	0.213	0.174	0.088	0.227	0.047	0.3
SC2	0.641	0.127	0.035	0.169	0.052	0.094	0.087	0.22	0.289
SC3	0.537	0.338	0.215	0.01	0.195	0.021	0.214	0.117	0.001
SC4	0.567	0.299	0.139	0.216	0.242	0.038	0.212	0.177	0.267
SC5	0.593	0.038	0.125	0.287	0.362	0.019	0.101	0.142	0.101
SC6	0.343	0.177	0.049	0.22	0.185	0.022	0.42	0.1	0.268
SC7	0.262	0.062	0.114	0.081	0.038	0.187	0.093	0.15	0.047
SC8	0.052	0	0.032	0.249	0.334	0.12	0.169	0.158	0.214
SC9	0.492	0.109	0.023	0.108	0.276	0.079	0.382	0.268	0.027
SC10	0.266	0.118	0.071	0.193	0.398	0.063	0.515	0.157	0.235
SC11	0.162	0.163	0.123	0.319	0.634	0.097	0.168	0.104	0.177
SC12	0.09	0.063	0.154	0.027	0.659	0.099	0.063	0.266	0.296
SC13	0.058	0.265	0.08	0.033	0.43	0.141	0.041	0.171	0.374
SC14	0.502	0.063	0.015	0.275	0.044	0.274	0.219	0.081	0.306
SC15	0.569	0.003	0.071	0.021	0.013	0.356	0.109	0.048	0.281
SC16	0.442	0.167	0.322	0.052	0.304	0.272	0.116	0.141	0.295
SC17	0.145	0.04	0.107	0.15	0.19	0.001	0.249	0.174	0.67
SC18	0.063	0.105	0.181	0.063	0.095	0.068	0.007	0.084	0.739
SC19	0.175	0.059	0.393	0.021	0.357	0.101	0.045	0.056	0.288
SC20	0.348	0.136	0.408	0.425	0.231	0.063	0.049	0.034	0.181
GOV_RC1	0.161	0.456	0.3	0.257	0.267	0.349	0.206	0.262	0.203
GOV_RC2	0.025	0.187	0.008	0.313	0.071	0.372	0.366	0.213	0.354
GOV_RC3	0.072	0.04	0.133	0.045	0.108	0.105	0.493	0.483	0.224
GOV_RC4	0.091	0.011	0.695	0.217	0.12	0.028	0.199	0.148	0.044
GOV_RC5	0.052	0.123	0.618	0.029	0.132	0.257	0.093	0.05	0.296
GOV_RC6	0.06	0.441	0.399	0.15	0.207	0.133	0.123	0.26	0.192
GOV_RC7	0.071	0.395	0.578	0.287	0.003	0.082	0.126	0.045	0.273
LPC1	0.079	0.256	0.26	0.457	0.151	0.293	0.354	0.049	0.182
LPC2	0.046	0.04	0.003	0.153	0.219	0.776	0.024	0.119	0.129
LPC3	0.082	0.083	0.196	0.072	0.054	0.699	0.158	0.055	0.033
LPC4	0.11	0.231	0.23	0.136	0.127	0.347	0.533	0.033	0.143
LPC5	0.015	0.092	0.312	0.136	0.178	0.442	0.333	0.163	0.03
LPC6	0.044	0.132	0.253	0.045	0.069	0.137	0.56	0.182	0.07
LPC7	0.174	0.404	0.139	0.115	0.011	0.112	0.442	0.21	0.071
LPC8	0.133	0.38	0.246	0.019	0.203	0.327	0.139	0.358	0.102
LPC9	0.003	0.472	0.096	0.077	0.017	0.289	0.282	0.174	0.174
LPC10	0.043	0.382	0.219	0.349	0.437	0.182	0.206	0.179	0.019
LPC11	0.112	0.57	0.099	0.283	0.293	0.171	0.231	0.094	0.1
LPC12	0.15	0.486	0.174	0.372	0.146	0.177	0.089	0.134	0.167
LPC13	0.185	0.39	0.402	0.307	0.119	0.157	0.121	0.275	0.093
OC1	0.227	0.398	0.167	0.453	0.265	0.215	0.352	0.193	0.107
OC2	0.108	0.362	0.002	0.269	0.235	0.478	0.161	0.248	0.017
OC3	0.013	0.223	0.38	0.422	0.437	0.18	0.123	0.164	0.01
OC4	0.195	0.482	0.363	0.13	0.231	0.159	0.171	0.41	0.198
OC5	0.226	0.077	0.11	0.084	0.06	0.105	0.098	0.67	0.145
OC6	0.176	0.235	0.043	0.228	0.13	0.231	0.184	0.544	0.202
OC7	0.103	0.123	0.093	0.655	0.036	0.131	0.069	0.247	0.252
OC8	0.052	0.063	0.038	0.232	0.09	0.022	0.058	0.643	0.094
OC9	0.007	0.161	0.298	0.517	0.182	0.198	0.201	0.39	0.074

Figure 8: Factor Solution

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
SC1_1	0.581	0.047	0.272	0.214	0.216	0.171	0.278	0.071	0.129
SC2_1	0.575	0.257	0	0.031	0.039	0.1	0.106	0.336	0.117
SC3_1	0.519	0.277	0.033	0.12	0.422	0.163	0.004	0.166	0.067
SC4_1	0.476	0.017	0.262	0.061	0.013	0.566	0.189	0.065	0.252
SC5_1	0.614	0.28	0.059	0.173	0.27	0.012	0.214	0.165	0.258
SC6_1	0.57	0.223	0.299	0.125	0.074	0.086	0.252	0.128	0.129
SC7_1	0.522	0.154	0.321	0.056	0.06	0.145	0.022	0.001	0.123
SC8_1	0.591	0.17	0.022	0.258	0.162	0.237	0.259	0.101	0.261
SC9_1	0.625	0.096	0.271	0.04	0.247	0.101	0.122	0.068	0.083
SC10_1	0.567	0.142	0.274	0.001	0.131	0.216	0.225	0.127	0.026
SC11_1	0.615	0.293	0.135	0.049	0.093	0.039	0.138	0.258	0.079
SC12_1	0.552	0.357	0.367	0.161	0.019	0.003	0.212	0.022	0.207
SC13_1	0.474	0.284	0.122	0.173	0.183	0.105	0.071	0.096	0.044
SC14_1	0.532	0.139	0.057	0.143	0.319	0.075	0.299	0.189	0
SC15_1	0.522	0.233	0.024	0.018	0.35	0.081	0.464	0.054	0.093
SC16_1	0.62	0.31	0.035	0.058	0.136	0.134	0.177	0.149	0.111
SC17_1	0.572	0.32	0.021	0.01	0.058	0.103	0.068	0.406	0.218
SC18_1	0.553	0.388	0.097	0.063	0.192	0.069	0.081	0.286	0.089
SC19_1	0.574	0.375	0.092	0.083	0.02	0.085	0.212	0.175	0.151
SC20_1	0.583	0.152	0.07	0.466	0.041	0.14	0.236	0.181	0.043
GOV_RC1_	0.659	0.143	0.156	0.095	0.19	0.196	0.103	0.003	0.129
GOV_RC2_	0.643	0.136	0.077	0.076	0.261	0.199	0.082	0.096	0.094
GOV_RC3_	0.686	0.038	0.147	0.303	0.078	0.039	0.021	0.01	0.025
GOV_RC4_	0.596	0.247	0.425	0.053	0.018	0.103	0.004	0.146	0.102
GOV_RC5_	0.645	0.109	0.055	0.157	0.216	0.352	0.035	0.092	0.074
GOV_RC6_	0.627	0.045	0.122	0.008	0.186	0.122	0.024	0.264	0.163
GOV_RC7_	0.626	0.144	0.062	0.141	0.251	0.053	0.195	0.027	0.205
LPC1_1	0.609	0.358	0.294	0.272	0.054	0.033	0	0.049	0.031
LPC2_1	0.658	0.259	0.012	0.252	0.029	0.082	0.145	0.052	0.048
LPC3_1	0.622	0.114	0.018	0.296	0.206	0.024	0.198	0.098	0.266
LPC4_1	0.639	0.171	0.1	0.211	0.181	0.195	0.076	0.014	0.02
LPC5_1	0.714	0.096	0.141	0.061	0.058	0.171	0.05	0.242	0.223
LPC6_1	0.637	0.335	0.18	0.081	0.006	0.028	0.089	0.323	0.131
LPC7_1	0.707	0.084	0.255	0.134	0.081	0.09	0.084	0.061	0.04
LPC8_1	0.711	0.059	0.299	0.07	0.156	0.115	0.139	0.056	0.065
LPC9_1	0.662	0.205	0.188	0.196	0.076	0.119	0.096	0.04	0.239
LPC10_1	0.673	0.169	0.089	0.065	0.098	0.343	0.009	0.014	0.139
LPC11_1	0.659	0.252	0.219	0.086	0.141	0.191	0.026	0.172	0.273
LPC12_1	0.693	0.268	0.098	0.082	0.051	0.123	0.092	0.189	0.242
LPC13_1	0.65	0.152	0.338	0.3	0.077	0.232	0.04	0.032	0.001
OC1_1	0.575	0.244	0.136	0.298	0.114	0.045	0.013	0.194	0.203
OC2_1	0.675	0.219	0.056	0.147	0.132	0.046	0.086	0.084	0.171
OC3_1	0.647	0.136	0.181	0.33	0.254	0.063	0.068	0.102	0.021
OC4_1	0.653	0.127	0.225	0.131	0.018	0.019	0.146	0.245	0.018
OC5_1	0.736	0.07	0.085	0.062	0.274	0.217	0.131	0.17	0.083
OC6_1	0.736	0.012	0.01	0.036	0.013	0.12	0.23	0.059	0.228
OC7_1	0.679	0.069	0.248	0.191	0.053	0.234	0.136	0.038	0.174
OC8_1	0.646	0.035	0.008	0.259	0.21	0.063	0.261	0.108	0.131
OC9_1	0.636	0.149	0.254	0.343	0.124	0.052	0.103	0.066	0.151

Figure 9: Equamax Rotated Solution

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
SC1_1	0.075	0.2	0.015	0.073	0.575	0.274	0.181	0.142	0.344	0.141
SC2_1	0.069	0.032	0.199	0.215	0.325	0.134	0.508	0.265	0.003	0.076
SC3_1	0.027	0.179	0.042	0.585	0.233	0.004	0.163	0.012	0.249	0.283
SC4_1	0.1	0.183	0.057	0.088	0.095	0.044	0.066	0.199	0.157	0.773
SC5_1	0.035	0.097	0.219	0.552	0.229	0.207	0.128	0.317	0.068	0.366
SC6_1	0.044	0.065	0.312	0.168	0.144	0.135	0.455	0.003	0.146	0.463
SC7_1	0.039	0.386	0.337	0.103	0.094	0.163	0.376	0.311	0.202	0.009
SC8_1	0.169	0.231	0.031	0.057	0.142	0.335	0.628	0.135	0.223	0.07
SC9_1	0.242	0.112	0.138	0.377	0.558	0.036	0.188	0.094	0.144	0.067
SC10_1	0.116	0.098	0.098	0.213	0.668	0.003	0.187	0.09	0.184	0.132
SC11_1	0.151	0.137	0.071	0.169	0.284	0.35	0.51	0.221	0.143	0.194
SC12_1	0.029	0.295	0.109	0.138	0.057	0.062	0.666	0.125	0.242	0.199
SC13_1	0.185	0.134	0.1	0.073	0.042	0.143	0.366	0.12	0.339	0.38
SC14_1	0.196	0.037	0.16	0.001	0.074	0.138	0.182	0.58	0.104	0.298
SC15_1	0.066	0.058	0.093	0.096	0.037	0.123	0.067	0.757	0.261	0.109
SC16_1	0.005	0.155	0.142	0.495	0.133	0.094	0.163	0.338	0.362	0.091
SC17_1	0.014	0.097	0.116	0.256	0.114	0.053	0.123	0.111	0.659	0.307
SC18_1	0.169	0.005	0.12	0.173	0.159	0.01	0.312	0.243	0.606	0.008
SC19_1	0.086	0.166	0.032	0.295	0.223	0.127	0.387	0.506	0.1	0.174
SC20_1	0.032	0.339	0.272	0.228	0.234	0.3	0.215	0.446	0.084	0.256
GOV_RC1	0.381	0.217	0.134	0.112	0.13	0.431	0.165	0.327	0.191	0.03
GOV_RC2	0.151	0.274	0.286	0.001	0.07	0.432	0.171	0.373	0.159	0.117
GOV_RC3	0.315	0.081	0.462	0.274	0.086	0.155	0.211	0.155	0.132	0.296
GOV_RC4	0.293	0.383	0.357	0.008	0.002	0.132	0.275	0.131	0.097	0.407
GOV_RC5	0.165	0.212	0.523	0.407	0.087	0.274	0.128	0.067	0.168	0.009
GOV_RC6	0.221	0.102	0.185	0.136	0.055	0.464	0.045	0.134	0.475	0.163
GOV_RC7	0.109	0.261	0.188	0.068	0.242	0.493	0.133	0.112	0.331	0.18
LPC1_1	0.227	0.696	0.23	0.081	0.095	0.153	0.096	0.102	0.046	0.195
LPC2_1	0.382	0.141	0.395	0.184	0.192	0.22	0.036	0.228	0.027	0.321
LPC3_1	0.519	0.15	0.383	0.395	0.121	0.071	0.076	0.215	0.06	0.085
LPC4_1	0.263	0.294	0.058	0.398	0.062	0.543	0.139	0.085	0.064	0.087
LPC5_1	0.063	0.199	0.276	0.279	0.342	0.503	0.112	0.298	0.035	0.133
LPC6_1	0.231	0.23	0.378	0.092	0.479	0.317	0.066	0.338	0.119	0.091
LPC7_1	0.341	0.026	0.205	0.263	0.409	0.359	0.109	0.087	0.156	0.255
LPC8_1	0.384	0.069	0.133	0.311	0.477	0.301	0.169	0.032	0.145	0.196
LPC9_1	0.571	0.09	0.246	0.058	0.372	0.182	0.158	0.118	0.119	0.14
LPC10_1	0.501	0.212	0.114	0.034	0.363	0.101	0.089	0.175	0.17	0.35
LPC11_1	0.669	0.179	0.105	0.041	0.284	0.184	0.056	0.11	0.265	0.153
LPC12_1	0.571	0.39	0.09	0.139	0.004	0.253	0.141	0.121	0.183	0.288
LPC13_1	0.16	0.588	0.076	0.121	0.118	0.169	0.253	0.083	0.052	0.456
OC1_1	0.101	0.538	0.149	0.057	0.334	0.227	0.156	0.231	0.361	0.036
OC2_1	0.103	0.409	0.265	0.223	0.259	0.393	0.116	0.07	0.062	0.228
OC3_1	0.136	0.601	0.131	0.347	0.121	0.219	0.217	0.004	0.132	0.142
OC4_1	0.274	0.175	0.04	0.373	0.194	0.216	0.074	0.263	0.42	0.111
OC5_1	0.311	0.161	0.252	0.598	0.095	0.24	0.18	0.175	0.246	0.051
OC6_1	0.438	0.197	0.192	0.353	0.03	0.212	0.248	0.359	0.172	0.11
OC7_1	0.067	0.193	0.582	0.21	0.069	0.31	0.259	0.085	0.155	0.226
OC8_1	0.163	0.047	0.482	0.007	0.275	0.174	0.207	0.108	0.439	0.166
OC9_1	0.177	0.207	0.677	0.001	0.158	0.04	0.09	0.17	0.253	0.241

Political dynamics and service delivery in urban Ghana: The case of Tema Metropolitan Assembly

PATRICK YIN MAHAMA
University of Professional Studies,Ghana
patrick.mahama@upsamail.edu.gh
& THERESA DOWETIN
Ghana Business School.

Abstract

This paper makes a case study of Tema Metropolitan Assembly (TMA) and how it is shaped by the dynamics of politics and the implications of such dynamics for service delivery. The paper contends that local politics engaged in by local politicians, including the Metropolitan Chief Executive, Assembly members, chiefs, religious leaders, powerful individuals and the community (described generally as stakeholders) as well as central government and supra-national bodies, shape urban governance in Ghana, including TMA in terms of structure, operational priorities, policy choices and implementation, and ultimately service delivery. Using a qualitative approach to data collection, specifically, purposive sampling, a number of key officers of TMA and a sample of residents were interviewed to ascertain how political dynamics define the activities and structures of TMA and its implications for service delivery. While it is acknowledged that the political dynamics have enormous implications for service delivery in that it has to strike a balance between delivering efficient service to the community while at the same time serving as the implementation arm of the government, it is also the case that this balance is not always carried through to perfection, since most often than not, service delivery is said to be mere propaganda and rhetoric rather than reality. Using the Institutional Collective Action (Leroy, *et al*) framework, the areas of service delivery, including sanitation, waste management, safety and security, infrastructural development,, have been discussed from the perspectives of TMA and the stakeholders, on the one hand, and the residents on the other. While the governance model adopts a bottom-up approach where programmes and projects are said to be proposed by assembly members after gathering inputs from the grassroots, and eventually validated through town hall meetings, need assessments and community engagements, service delivery is said to be less than expected, as revealed by residents through interviews. How come some members of the community don't seem to know or appreciate that the services delivered by the TMA is a matter of serious reflection on the political dynamics that underpin the activities of urban government largely and TMA specifically?

Key words: politics, service delivery, Tema Metropolitan Assembly, urban areas, Ghana

Introduction

Political dynamics shape every sphere of governance in any polity. In democratic settings, decisions on policy, projects, programmes and service delivery generally are reached through a web of ideas from a multi-stakeholder consultation and influence of local, national and supra-national politics and political entities and the influence of these on urban governance in Ghana is no exception. In such democratic polities, decision outcomes are the product of contested opinions, which are influenced by the structures of power within the organisation, but with an external political streak thats external from the national spheres of power. Public policies are arrived at in the context of political interplays and puzzles, which are discernible in decisions for development and service delivery at every level of governance, including the governance of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) under Ghana's decentralisation programme. The structures and agencies for decision-making, as far as the governance of MMDAs in Ghana are concerned, are politically charged, resulting in many intricacies and trajectories for governance and service delivery at the MMDAs with its accompanying implications. In this study, an attempt is made to focus on the case of Tema Metropolitan Assembly (TMA) to examine how politics and political economy dynamics, including collective action, shape decision-making in the area of service delivery but a case is also made of how these dynamics shape urban governance generally in Ghana.

Geography of the Tema Metropolis

Devolution of authority and resources to decentralised units is significant as it allows for the adaptation of local needs for possible tailored policies in service delivery (Nørgaard and Pallesen, 2003, Ahwoi, 2010). Tema is one of the famous cities in Ghana. It is located at the coast in the Greater Accra Region of Ghana. The Tema Metropolis is a coastal district situated about 30 kilometres east of Accra, the Capital City of Ghana. It is well recognised as an industrial hub in the Ghanaian economy. The Greenwich Meridian (i.e. longitude 0º) passes through the Metropolis, which meets the equator or latitude 0° in the Ghanaian waters off the Gulf of Guinea.

The Metropolis' proximity to the sea, with its low-lying terrain that projects into the sea, makes it a natural endowment for a harbour. This, evidently, informed the decision of the construction of the Tema Harbour in 1957, making the Metropolis 'the Eastern Gateway of Ghana'.

According to the 2010 Population and Housing Census, the total population of the Tema Metropolitan area is 292 773. This consists of 139 958 males representing 47.8% and 152 815 females representing 52.2%. The Metropolis has no rural settlements. The 2014

projected population of the Metropolis is pegged at 324 429 persons. The distribution of the population of Tema Metropolitan area shows that the age group 25-29 recorded the highest population with 11.4 percent while 90-94 and 95-99 age groups had the least population, which represents 0.1 percent respectively. On average, there are more females than males in the metropolis, with a male-female ratio of 92:100. This means that for every 100 females in the Metropolitan area, there are approximately 92 males.

The built up area of the Metropolis is made up of well-planned communities, beachfronts and the industrial area. The residential areas (both well planned and squatter settlements) form about 60% of the total land area, with industrial and commercial areas making up the remaining 40% of land cover. With rapid population increase, the built up areas continue to increase and this has compounded the environmental and sanitation problems and challenges that face the Metropolis in terms of service needs and delivery. Some houses have been constructed in waterways, and this, together with the proliferation of other unauthorised structures, contributes to congestion and flooding, among other scurges.

Purpose of the study

The purpose of this study is to understand some of the peculiar challenges that undermine the effective performance of the MMDAs in service delivery at the local level, especially the urban metropolis. Particularly, the study discusses how political dynamics shape the structure and governance of TMA and the implications of that on service delivery. In the main, it examines (Constitution) why it is difficult or otherwise for TMA to make certain decisions as they pertain to service delivery (Constitution), community members' participation and expectations and how TMA goes about service delivery (3). It examines the political undertones and influences on decision-making and how this shapes TMA and its service delivery, (4) the role of local politicians and collective action and how they influence service delivery and (5) how national politics and supra-national funding agencies define certain actions of TMA and how they drive a wedge between policy and practice.

The problem

According to Slack (2009), "the challenge for local governments is to keep cities economically viable by delivering a high level of services and, at the same time, keeping taxes sufficiently low so as not to discourage individuals and businesses from locating in their jurisdiction. Over the past two decades, local governments have faced a number of issues and challenges that have put stress on their ability to meet this objective"(p10). The growth of the urban population has created and will continue to create serious challenges for municipal and metropolitan governments in both developed and less developed countries in terms of air and water pollution, transportation gridlock, shortage of

affordable housing, inadequate waste collection, deteriorating infrastructure, mounting violence and crime, and income polarisation. Local governments are required to provide transportation and communications networks, water and sewers, fire and police protection, parks, recreational facilities, cultural institutions, social services, social housing and public health. These services and infrastructure are, in many cases, already overstretched and rapid population growth, combined with limited funding for infrastructure, has put further strain on local governments to maintain existing services and meet future demands. The result is an infrastructure deficit that is large and growing (Slack, 2009). Dirie (2005) points out that in order to deliver its services effectively, local governments need adequate resources, local autonomy and increased capacity.

Research questions

Main question

Why are urban areas in the developing countries unable to meet the service needs of the urban communities?

Sub-questions

1.Why is TMA unable to provide satisfactory services to the Tema Metropolitan Area in spite of its relative effectiveness in revenue mobilisation in Ghana?

2. How is the co-existence between TMA and TDC affecting service delivery at the Tema area?

3. What are the politics and political dynamics that influence service delivery in the urban communities generally, and TMA specifically?

Theory/literature review

Politics has played important and strategic roles in decision-making in many facets of any nation's life. Political economy, which looks at various aspects of decision-making, including the structures and actors, has not spared the dynamics of governance as far as decentralisation in Ghana is concerned, and more so, how political economy dynamics affects performance and service delivery at the MMDAs in Ghana. Resnick (2014), explains that urbanisation represents one of the main demographic transformations confronting sub-Saharan Africa today, with its attendant implications for the region's long-term development trajectory. Focusing on key governance challenges related to addressing gaps in urban service delivery in sub-Saharan Africa, she asserts that vertically-divided authority can augment the trade-offs between autonomy and accountability that are inherent in the decentralisation process, leading to possible 'strategies of subversion' by national

governments that are loathe to see political opponents win credit for good performance but eager to assign blame when services are poorly delivered. Haus, *et al*. (2004) assert that complementarity between leadership and community involvement is key for good urban governance. Leadership in urban governance has many visible and invisible dimensions or local and national dimensions, each of which plays critical roles in decisions that affect governance at the level of MMDAs. It is established in the literature that political economy and governance factors affect the provision and delivery of services (Jones*, et al*, 2014). The governance context within which service delivery takes place is important for analysing the performance of MMDAs and for understanding how policies and decisions are reached and implemented.

Bertone & Witter (2015) argue that it is essential to look beyond policy-making to reflect on actual practices, and on how, by whom, and why policies are potentially reshaped in the translation process. They examined evidence-based practice to improve health outcomes but the political economy dynamics played a significant role in their analysis of the translation process. Various theories, including the rational choice model and the institutional collective action framework, have been used to discuss urban governance. A rational choice explanation for regional governance focuses attention not only on service costs and the benefits of interlocal cooperation, but also on transaction costs of cooperation. Transaction costs are reduced by formal and informal institutional arrangements that increase the availability of information, reduce obstacles to bargaining, and reinforce social capital. Advocates of both decentralised governance and of progressive consolidation each promote a particular governance mechanism generally. Rather than this unitary approach, a second-generation rational choice explanation posits that the potential for voluntary governance is contingent on contextual factors that reduce the transaction costs of negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing an agreement (Feiock, 2008). As in many other situations, we believe governance structures depend on contextual factors. For example, Oliver Williamson (1985) argued that the benefits and costs of external production versus vertical integration in firms depended on the transaction cost properties of goods and the frequency of transactions. Better understanding of the context of metropolitan governance not only advances our theoretical understanding of institutional collective action, but it also has practical policy implications. Systematic evaluation of the contextual factors that shape governance and transaction costs may allow policy makers and advocates of progressive consolidation to identify situations in which the costs of voluntary regional governance arrangements are high, and governmental approaches to regionalism may be more viable. Scholz, Berardo, & Kile (2008), discuss the institutional collective action (Leroy *et al*) framework, which focuses on the dynamics of decentralised systems of governance. The framework argues that as cooperation continues to provide benefits to participants, the parties to these

exchanges build reputations for being trustworthy, providing in the process a feedback mechanism that enhances future cooperation and collective action. Thus, service cooperation provides mechanisms for exchange of resources, commitments and trust that can reinforce cooperative norms. This approach was further explained by Feiock (2013). He argues that the ICA framework provides a conceptual system to understand and investigate the variety of ICA dilemmas ubiquitous in contemporary societies and governance arrangements. As a research approach, it integrates multiple research traditions and theoretical approaches under the same research programme umbrella to better understand how ICA dilemmas are resolved. He argues that this framework can be applied to a wide range of policy dilemmas in which local governing units can potentially achieve better outcomes collectively rather than acting individually by reducing barriers to mutually advantageous collaborative action, as represented by the transaction costs required for achieving joint projects. The ICA framework integrates elements of collective action theories, transaction cost theories of organisations, the public economy framework, network theories of social embeddedness, and theories of policy design in political markets.

The study of how these mechanisms operate in the face of multiple stakeholders and outsourced services and the political dynamics that shape governance at TMA can fully be discussed by drawing from the theoretical underpinnings of the ICA.

National level political dynamics

The shape and form of Ghana's public institutions have been modelled according to the tenets of patrimonialism bequeathed to the country by the colonialists. This patrimonial mindset and attitude has made it difficult for Ghanaian public institutions to be left alone by the political elite, or function without recourse to the same for many underpinning reasons, including receiving directives, influence of all kinds, and budget support, among others. Public institutions are largely funded by the government of the day and their activities are directed and influenced by the political elite, either overtly or covertly. Even bureaucrats who are expected to be neutral and anonymous cannot be said to be entirely free of these national political economy dynamics as they make policies and implement them for the benefit of the larger public. As a result, these public institutions, especially the bureaucracy, which are largely undemocratic and unaccountable to the people, make rules and policies that affect the economy and individual lives (Cooper, 2015). So the colonial heritage and governance mentality still largely undergird the practices and structure of most public institutions in Ghana and this has implications for governance and for service delivery in all sectors of the public sphere, including decentralisation and the MMDAs.

After independence, Ghana's political trajectories have played an immense role in shaping the identity of public institutions. To maintain the patrimonial and political identity of some of these institutions, the heads are government appointees who are expected to sing the praise and dance to the tune of the government of the day. Major decisions are made, not just on the basis of prudence and efficiency, but largely due to political influences for whatever the gains may be. Major decisions in these institutions are not devoid of political twists and turns, and this affects governance, policy and decision outcomes and service delivery in the public institutions.

Methodology

The study adopted a qualitative approach through purposive sampling to enable a focus on key informants/data collection units at TMA for relevant information. Data was obtained through unstructured interviews with the Public Relations Officer, the Deputy Public Relations Officer, the Planning Officer, the Deputy Budget Officer, the Finance Director, the CEO of the Tema Development Corporation and 50 community members, including document analysis to ascertain their collective views on the nature and effectiveness of services provided by the TMA.

Discussion

Local politics and TMA

The Tema Metropolitan Assembly (TMA), as with many public institutions, is shaped by internal, national and even supra-national politics through foreign funding agencies. Hence, the institutional set-up and political environment is key to the understanding (Ayee *et al*, 2011) and analysis of the operations of the MMDAs in Ghana. Internally, local politicians, including the Assembly Members, chiefs, and some powerful groups within the community, are seen as stakeholders whose inputs are taken into consideration during the planning processes. Through community engagements, needs assessment, and town hall meetings, views of the community are sorted, which feed into the overall plans of TMA, and later sent to the community through the same channels for validation. Local politicians, traditional leaders, ethnic and religious groups are considered key stakeholders whose ideas shape the policies and programmes of the TMA. The politics of who gets what, when and how (Lasswell Harold, 1936) plays out here where the Assembly Members, the MCE, the chiefs and some powerful groups in the community politically manoeuver to have their interests advanced through service delivery at TMA. For example, interviews with some community members revealed that some squatters at TMA have serious political backing from some local politicians, which make it difficult for them to be evicted by the

rightful property owners. The influence of politics on service delivery seems to permeate every facet of service delivery, including the key areas of latrine promotion, sanitation, waste management, street lighting, safety and security, and infrastructural development. From the time of community engagement through to the final planning and implementation of projects and programmes is the interplay of various and competing interests, which eventually shapes decision outcomes. Through its activities in service delivery, the TMA has to plan in line with the thematic areas of the government strategic focus, in this case, the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSWDA). The politics that undergird the development of these strategic programmes of government also flow through to these public institutions and shape their internal dynamics. According to the Public Relations Officer, "We implement central government policies to a large extent. We are the implementation arm of the central government. We do that alongside our own policy implementation. We also receive some funding from central government to undertake specific projects. We have no much say in decisions regarding those funds" (in-depth interview, TMA). The influence of central government through the intergovernmental transfer of funds is another aspect where central government exerts political influence on TMA. The District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF), which was established under the DACF Act 1993 (Act 455) and came to power in 1994, has as its main objective "…annually make provision for the allocation of not less than five percent of the total revenues of Ghana to the District Assemblies for development" (the 1992 Constitution). The MCE, which ensures that the fund is applied effectively for development locally, is a political appointee. This makes it difficult to divorce national political influences from decisions on funds provided by the central government for service delivery at the local level. Also, intergovernmental transfers come with projects attached and very little is usually achieved through negotiations for application of part of those funds to other local priority areas. This is one place where there are clear manifestations of local political engagement with national political institutions, thus, it is the ministry of local government and rural development to apply funds for local development. With the head of TMA being a political appointee working to advance the development agenda of the government of the day, there is usually a thin line between local development priorities and national development priorities and these dynamics underpin the functioning, service delivery and development of MMDAs in Ghana. The politics that shape the MMDAs in Ghana transcend the limits of internal organisational as well as national politics. Urban grants, which are usually given by the World Bank to develop some specific projects, are funds that attract serious competition from the more capable MMDAs. The World Bank itself, being a political institution, ties these grants to projects that have some significance, not only to the development of the urban areas that qualify for it, but beyond, where there are other political undertones.

Collective action/multi-stakeholder governance

We now turn to the interests that motivate outsourcing and local collaboration and argue that voluntary agreements emerge from a dynamic political contracting process. Outsourcing and local bilateral contracting and multilateral collective action are mechanisms by which two or more governments act collectively to capture the gains from providing or producing services across a larger area. Creation of these institutional mechanisms presents a problem of 'institutional collective action' (Leroy *et al*) for local units (Carr and Feiock, 2004, Feiock, 2007). The ICA focuses on how local government officials perceive and weigh the various costs and benefits of joint action as they contemplate inter-local service agreements and other forms of intergovernmental collaborations (Feiock, 2008). Although service collaborations can produce substantial benefits, local officials often perceive the costs of attaining those benefits as exceeding potential gains. How officials understand these costs will depend on the context of the decision setting, including the characteristics of the goods or services being considered, the configurations of political institutions under which they operate, and the networks of existing relationships among local government officials. This is reflected in service delivery in the area of waste management and sanitation services provided at TMA. J. Stanley, Amaia, and Zoomlion are some of the institutions that have been contracted to deliver these services. Collective action in the area of inter-local service agreements between TMA and outsourced bodies as well as community participation during clean-up campaigns, have been major ways of achieving the objectives of TMA in the areas of waste management and sanitation. However, interviews revealed that waste management, sanitation, the menace of squatters and security are still problematic in the Tema area. Accordingly, contract killings have increased in recent times, drains are left unattended and residents are made to pay extra fees for drainage services that should be provided on a regular basis without extra charges. According to one respondent, "sewage is left unattended, zebra crossing unmarked, and the menace of squatters highly political" (indepth interview, TMA).

According to Feiock (2008), collaborative agreements generate collective benefit by producing efficiencies and economies of scale in the provision and production of services and in internalising spillover problems. They also generate selective benefits if they advance the individual interests of local government officials. Collaboration or outsourcing of some services of TMA such as waste management and sanitation have yielded some benefits but at the same time, the level of efficiency resulting from the economies of scale that underpin such collaborations, leaves much to be desired. It is important to point out,

however, that a decentralised system of government like TMA enhances allocative efficiency if it produces a match between community preferences for quantity and quality of services and actual service choices and resource allocations, but it can also result in diseconomies of scale in service production and inter-jurisdictional externalities (Feiock, 2008, Bish, 2000, Post, 2002). Economies of scale result when average costs decline as output increases. TMA generates revenue through various sources, including tolls, fees, fines, and rates, which are collected directly from the people besides the DACF and urban grants, which are generated from the government through intergovernmental transfers and World Bank respectively. However, service delivery from the perspective of the consumer is below expectation. The general view is that TMA is very effective in revenue mobilisation but highly ineffective in service provision. One interviewee had this to say: "all TMA knows how to do is revenue collection, beyond that, I don't know what they are doing" (indepth interview, TMA).

It is not an exaggeration to say that any casual observer around the Tema Metropolitan area is likely to see all kinds of plastic and sachet rubbers and drainage congestion. The competing interests and self-interests of the local stakeholders also help shape the dynamics as far as service delivery at TMA is concerned. The politics of siting projects for political gains may result in the MCE, the Assembly Member, and the Member of Parliament from the area becoming embroiled in a political turf war. The result is not necessarily the best possible outcome, but likely the most politically powerful outcome that can advance the interest of one political figure or the other. As the Planning Officer noted: "We cannot underestimate the competing interests and political forces in the determination of project implementation, but we try to get the best possible outcome" (indepth interview, TMA).

Collective action and a multi-stakeholder approach to governance characterises practice at the TMA with multi-dimensional political underpinnings. The local politicians, chiefs, religious groups, assembly members, the parliamentarian from the area and the community at large, through town hall meetings on the one hand, and the place of national and supra-national political influences on the other, play significant roles in shaping the governance of TMA.

Automation and revenue mobilisation

Revenue mobilisation is one of the most important aspects of the decentralisation programme. The use of an industry-standard application can help promote the efficiency of government and management operations. The efficiency gain may come in the form of work hours or money saved in carrying out the same transactions through the Point of

Service Device compared to the manual practice (Chen and Gant, 2002).

Ghana's MMDAs development conundrum is underpinned by a woeful lack of sufficient funds even in the face of a constitutional provision guaranteeing the provision of such funds (Article 240(c) of the 1992 Constitution). The same Constitution mandates the MMDAs to raise funds for local development. What it means, therefore, is that apart from government funding through the District Assembles Common Fund (DACF), MMDAs are supposed to raise enough funds through their local sources, usually referred to as the internally generated funds, and through collaborations and other means through, for example, the urban grants, which come from the World Bank, to support local development. MMDAs in Ghana have uneven opportunities for revenue mobilisation due to the fact that while some are more privileged to have well functioning markets, road networks, well settled population with decent property, companies, and a wide range of businesses with innovative revenue collection strategies, others are left without the same facilities and mainly depend on the DACF for the day-to-day running of their set-ups and for development. These less endowed MMDAs are not also competitive enough to be able to outcompete the more endowed ones for funds such as the urban grants. The issue of revenue collection over the years has also been worrisome due to the fact that no adequate data exists in most of the MMDAs on property identification and efficient revenue mobilisation. In the case of TMA, the loss of significant revenue due to the manual revenue collection methods compelled management to look for innovative ways of revenue mobilisation as a key strategy to increase their revenue base for efficient service delivery. The sources of revenue available to TMA include property rates, fees, fines, tolls, own investments, licenses and urban grants and the DACF, which are run through donor support and intergovernmental transfers respectively. Maximising the methods of revenue collection has repositioned TMA to be able to collect more revenue from existing revenue sources to boost their revenue basket. This has enhanced their chances of effectively delivering services in the areas of safety and security, infrastructural development, as well as keeping the city clean. The automation began in 2014 with data collection through the introduction of the 3D system. This system allowed TMA to capture the whole of the housing property around the Tema area and to locate properties and identify those that were not included for property rates and other forms of charges up until that point. The Point of Service Device (POSD), which now makes for electronic receipting, replaces the manual receipting and this makes for efficiency in revenue collection. An interviewee had this to say: "Before the automation, revenue mobilisation was not good at all. Previously, it was manual receipting, but now the receipt is electronically generated and that ensures efficiency. This is done for all the revenue collection units. All revenue collection points are automated" (indepth interview, TMA).

The table below shows the trajectory of revenue mobilisation before and after automation.

Before Automation	**Actuals (GHC)**
2012	8 295 482.92
2013	11 556 365.65
2014	13 748 336.80
After Automation	
2015	19 090 766.88

Source: TMA Budget Office. Figures were provided by the Deputy Budget Officer.

The table above is a clear depiction of the revenue collection situation. Even though the table shows a progressive increase in revenue collection year after year from 2012-2014, the biggest difference (Ghc 2 191 971.1) between 2013 and 2014 under the same regime (non-automated) is far less compared to the difference (Ghc 5 342 430.1) between 2014 and 2015 after automation. While this is attributable to underpayment of rates by some organisations because of the hitherto manual system and non-payment due to the fact of their non-inclusion in the revenue basket, lack of proper accountability by some revenue collecting officers also explains the difference in revenue before and after automation. An effective receipt collection system, nevertheless, allows funds to flow as quickly as possible to the TMA bank accounts. It may also provide ways to enhance revenues by increasing collections, lowering processing costs, and increasing interest earnings. As a local government institution, an evaluation of the costs and benefits of various revenue collection alternatives, using measures such as the amount of time it takes to process a tax or fee payment, number of collections processed, cost per transaction, errors per 1 000 transactions, customer satisfaction and convenience is instructive. This will ensure more efficiency and effectiveness. Public-Private Partnerships have also helped revenue mobilisation at TMA. The services of private organisations, also referred to as 'Revenue Contractors' have been utilised on a commission basis, to help in the revenue mobilisation effort. However, while the automation has enhanced revenue mobilisation at TMA, it is not without its inherent deficiencies. Device malfunctioning due to system failures and manipulation by point of service personnel, are some of the challenges that have the potential to derail the effectiveness of the automated system at TMA.

Tema Development Corporation and Tema Metropolitan Assembly

One phenomenon that is of central significance as far as the governance of TMA is concerned is the presence of Tema Development Corporation (TDC). The presence of TDC in Tema introduces some peculiarity into urban governance in Ghana apart from Akosombo with some interesting political dynamics. The TDC was established in 1952 by an Act of Parliament with the sole responsibility to plan and develop about 63 square miles of public land and also to manage the township that had been created to provide accommodation to those who would be engaged in various kinds of economic activities. TDC was given a 125-year lease term to manage this land area known as the Tema Acquisition Area. Currently, the Corporation functions under LI 1468 of 1989 with the core functions being to plan, lay out and develop the Tema Acquisition Area, and also construct roads and public buildings, prepare and execute housing schemes, develop industrial and commercial sites, provide public utilities such as sewage and street lights, and carry out such activities as are incidental or conducive to the attainment of their objectives, but with the prior approval of TMA. Historically, TDC's existence far outdates TMA and its core functions (regarded as the 'landowners').

The political intricacies that play out between TDC and TMA are seen in various aspects of their working relationship. Unlike other MMDAs, in Tema, prospective land buyers would have to acquire their land from TDC and obtain the building permit from TMA. Again, TDC ensures that the structural design is appropriate before TMA grants the building permit. TDC has a taskforce to ensure that buildings are properly sited, which operates parallel with the taskforce of TMA. The politics that surround these dynamics can be high, which actually permeates many spheres of the governance of TMA. Interviews revealed that some of the difficult areas of their relationship include the enforcement of the by-laws in the areas of property siting, especially containers and unauthorised structures, which are usually demolished by TDC when thought to be wrongfully sited. The two public and legally established institutions have obligations and functions, which are outlined in the acts that established them, that are not radically different in terms of service delivery. Even though those services that were originally provided by TDC such as the provision of sewage disposal and street lights are said to have been taken over by TMA, TDC still has some of these services as their core mandate to the people of Tema in the current LI 1468 Act 1989, thus, blurring the lines between service and responsibility as far as the Tema area is concerned.

Conclusion

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that political dynamics fundamentally underpin governance at TMA, and by extension, all MMDAs in Ghana and other developing countries in the quest for service delivery in their respective jurisdictions. It has also been pointed out that the political dynamics, which shape governance at TMA, are peculiar because of the aspect of TDC, which is not a common feature of the rest of the MMDAs in Ghana, apart from Akosombo. The politics involving TMA, TDC, collective action, national and supra-national political institutions, including the World Bank, have variously influenced TMA through its structures, policy making and implementation, to service delivery. The political dynamics make TMA largely political, warranting a compelling understanding of what constitutes rhetoric and what is the reality. The contending opposing views of residents who claim ignorance of what TMA is actually doing by way of service delivery begs the question of its effectiveness for service delivery, and this has been underscored in the discussion above. Needless to say, the politics of service provision between TDC and TMA, the management of waste, sanitation, drainage, safety and security, infrastructural development, cleanliness and urban planning, are still areas of concern to residents and objective observers. The effort towards effective revenue collection is said to be the strongest point for TMA, as pointed out by residents even before the introduction of the automated system. It is established that TMA is very effective in that regard but that revenue collection does not match service delivery. It is contended that while strenuous efforts are usually made for revenue collection, little is done by way of service delivery, since the drains, refuse, litter, squatters, land litigation, poor planning and laxity in response to service provision still characterise the operations of TMA. The political dynamics are so interlocked that it is sometimes difficult to know who is telling the truth – TMA or the residents. Be it as it may, the discussion above points to some implications of the political dynamics and how they affect governance in urban areas of Ghana through service delivery as those dynamics define the institution, and their operational dynamics and implications for service delivery.

Reference

1. Ahwoi, K. (2010). *Local Government & Decentralisation in Ghana*: Unimax Macmillan.
2. Ayee, J., Soreide, T., Shukla, G. & Le, T.M. (2011). Political economy of the mining sector in Ghana. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-5730*
3. Bish, R.L. (2000). Evolutionary alternatives for metropolitan areas: The capital region of British Columbia. *Canadian Journal of Regional Science, 23* (Constitution), pp. 73-87.
4. Carr, J.B. & Feiock, R.C. (2004). *Reshaping the Local Landscape: Perspective on City County Consolidation and its Alternatives.* Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe.
5. Chen, Y.C. & Gant, J. (2002). Transforming Local E-government Services: The Use of Application Service Providers. *Government Information Quarterly, 18*(4), pp. 343-355.
6. Dirie, I. (2005). *Municipal Finance: Innovative Resourcing for Municipal Infrastructure and Service Provision.* CLG International LLC: Washington, DC.
7. Feiock, R.C. (2007). Rational Choice and Regional Governance. *Journal of Urban Affairs, 29* (Constitution), pp. 47-63.
8. Feiock, R.C. (2008). Institutional Collective Action and Local Government Collaboration. *Big Ideas in Collaborative Public Management*, pp. 195-210.
9. AHWOI, K. (2010). *Local Government & Decentralisation in Ghana*. Unimax: Macmillan.
10. Ayee, J., Soreide, T., Shukla, G. & Le, T.M. (2011). Political Economy of the Mining Sector in Ghana. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series,* Vol. ??
11. Bish, R.L. (2000). Evolutionary Alternatives for Metropolitan Areas: The Capital Region of British Columbia. *Canadian Journal of Regional Science,* 23**,** pp. 73-87.
12. Carr, J.B. & Feiock, R.C. (2004). *Reshaping the Local Landscape: Perspective on City County Consolidation and its Alternatives.* Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe.
13. Chen, Y.C. & Gant, J. (2002). Transforming Local E-government Services: The Use of Application Service Providers. *Government Information Quarterly,* 18**,** pp. 343-355.
14. Constitution. (1992). *Constitution of the Republic of Ghana*.
15. Dirie, I. (2005). *Municipal Finance: Innovative Resourcing for Municipal Infrastructure and Service Provision.* CLG International LLC: Washington, DC.
16. Feiock, R.C. (2007). Rational Choice and Regional Governance. *Journal of Urban Affairs,* 29**,** pp. 47-63.

17. Feiock, R.C. (2008). Institutional Collective Action and Local Government Collaboration. *Big Ideas in Collaborative Public Management***,** pp. 195-210.
18. Lasswell H.D. (1936). *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How.* New York: Peter Smith.
19. Leroy, E.M., Kumulungui, B., Pourrut, X., Rouquet, P., Hassanin, A., Yaba, P., Délicat, A., Paweska, J.T., Gonzalez, J.P. & Swanepoel, R. (2005). Fruit Bats as Reservoirs of Ebola Virus. *Nature,* 438**,** pp. 575-576.
20. Nørgaard, A.S. & Pallesen, T. (2003). Governing Structures and Structured Governing: Local Political Control of Public Services in Denmark. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,* 13**,** pp. 543-561.
21. Post, S. (2002). *Local Government Cooperation: The Relationship between Metropolitan Area Government Geography and Service Provision.* Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, Boston, Massachusetts.
22. Slack, E. (2009). Guide to Municipal Finance. *United Nations Human Settlement Programme,* 379**,** pp. 2206-2211.
23. Jones, H.C.C.A.H.N. (2014). *Services in the City. Governance and Political Economy in Urban Service Delivery*: ODI Discussion Paper.
24. Resnick, D. (2014). Urban Governance and Service Delivery in African Cities: The Role of Politics and Policies. *Development Policy Review, 32*(s1), pp. 3-17.
25. The 1992 Constitution of Ghana. Retrieved date 12th October 2015from (http://www.tdctema.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1&Itemid=3).

Who do politicians target in the distribution of public goods? Evidence from public housing provision in selected states in Nigeria

ABUBAKAR ABDULLAHI
USMANU DANFODIYO UNIVERSITY, SOKOTO
ABUABDU484@GMAIL.COM

Abstract

This paper examines the pattern of public housing distribution in Nigeria. Using qualitative data from Sokoto, Kebbi and Zamfara state housing programmes from 2000-2013, the study revealed that over 6 000 housing units were constructed and distributed in the selected states under various public housing programmes since 2000. The study further revealed that the housing units were distributed to public servants and politicians. However, other social groups such as business and miscreant groups (based on political considerations) also benefitted from the programmes. Similarly, the paper also found that these groups of beneficiaries were selected based on their perceived roles and contributions in voter mobilisation, electioneering campaigns as well as influencing electoral outcome. Thus, the paper concludes that the targeting strategies adopted in public housing distribution have neglected the majority of the people who desperately need housing. These targeting strategies have transformed public housing into clientelistic goods designed to reward supporters and financiers of the ruling political party. It thus creates clientelistic networks employed by politicians to influence, control and maintain existing power relations in their favour. Given the number of people in need of housing, the paper recommends the adoption of a basic needs approach in targeting beneficiaries of public housing in order to ensure equitable distribution of public goods in the selected states.

Keywords: distributive politics, public housing, public goods, clientelism, Nigeria

Introduction

This paper concerns itself with the question of who politicians target in the distribution of public housing in selected states of Nigeria. Public goods distribution is increasingly becoming an interesting topical issue among students and scholars in Political Science. This is because of the significance of public goods distribution in understanding power relations as well as providing a template for assessing the quality of governance in developed and developing democracies. Moreover, the pattern and manner with which public goods are distributed have a direct link to citizens' affinity for democratic rule.

It is an undeniable fact that public goods are distributed in both democratic and non-democratic regimes. However, different targeting strategies and selection of beneficiaries are adopted from one regime to another. This variation is increasingly making distributive politics an interesting subject of debate among political scientists. While in some cases, politicians distribute goods to increase their political fortunes during elections such as in the United States of America (USA) and United Kingdom (UK), in several others such as Kenya, Egypt and Ghana, to mention a few, ethnic favouritism influences public goods distribution (Kramon and Posner, 2013, Hoffman and Long, 2013). While this pattern of distribution was a subject of debate in the literature, other forms of cleintelistic distribution are yet to be explored. This paper examines why and what types of targeting strategies were adopted by politicians in public goods distribution in Nigeria. Exploring the experience of Sokoto, Kebbi and Zamfara states' public housing programmes, the paper specifically identifies the targeting strategies adopted in public housing distribution and their implications to adequate housing provision in the selected states. This will no doubt contribute to the growing debate on distributive politics, service delivery and the prospects of democratic governance in Nigeria. The next section of the paper is an overview of the pattern of distributive politics in Nigeria, followed by the methods of data collection and analysis of the study. The third section examines the targeting strategies adopted in the distribution of public housing in the selected state and their implications in adequate housing provision, while the last section concludes the paper.

Explaining the pattern of distributive politics in Nigeria

It is an undeniable fact that the concept of distributive politics has little definitional ambiguity as most studies relate it to the methods and ways adopted by politicians, patrons and public authorities in the distribution of public goods to citizens (see Hicken, 2011; Wantchekon, 2003; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012). It is equally related to mobilisation of taxes and transfers as well as decisions made concerning allocation of government goods and services to identifiable localities or groups (Golden and Min, 2013). This implies that tax payment is a condition for public goods distribution and thus, public goods provision to citizens is a contract entered into between the state and its citizens. Perhaps this explains why Laswell (1936) and Easton (1957) described politics as resource allocation or who gets what. However, in African scholarship, there is a gap in the literature as to who and why politicians distribute public goods in ways different from others. The relevance of these questionsm at least in the African context, lies in their capacity to provide answers and justify the legitimacy of the pattern of public good distribution. It may interest us to note that African conflicts could be partly explained as a product of state failure to

distribute public goods judiciously and fairly to all citizens. While some of the emerging civilian governments in Africa emerged through vote buying and other forms of electoral frauds, many others could not distribute goods due to the high level of impunity that characterised governance. These factors partly gave rise to political clientelism in Africa and could be used to explain distributive politics and the pattern of goods distribution on the continent.

Political clientelism, as opined by van de Walle (2007), exists in all polities but in different dimensions and ways. This, therefore, suggests that political clientelism is a framework adopted by politicians across the world to distribute goods and services such as education, roads, cash transfers, infant mortality services and municipal services. Essentially, the choice of political clientelism as a method of public goods distribution in Africa is to offer politicians the opportunity to secure more votes, even in areas described as opposition stronghold. Hicken (2011) maintained that politicians supply benefit to individuals or groups that support or promise to support them regardless of their ethnicity or geographical locations. The essence of this support is to create clients who often benefit from the politicians in return for electoral support.

The second dimension to political clientelism is what I describe as elitist favouritism, where politicians grant favours to politically loyal bureaucrats and political elites regardless of their ethnic or religious backgrounds. These loyalists and elites are used as vehicles for the transfer of public goods to targeted groups such as miscreant youths for electoral favours. In this regard, the bureaucrats collaborate with political elites to distribute goods such as job offers and lucrative appointments to their supporters. In most cases, public sector and political parties provide the channels for distribution of public goods. While public sector organisations were used to distribute public goods in the form of job offers and lucrative postings to their perceived supporters within the civil service, political parties were employed as the vehicle for exchange of public goods such as foodstuffs, location and rehabilitation of infrastructures, etc. in constituencies perceived to be the politicians' stronghold. Political parties and youth associations such as ward or local party offices served as the chain for the distribution of public goods. In this regard, collaborative arrangements were made between politicians, bureaucrats and youth groups to identify loyal supporters who were chosen based on their perceived roles in the electoral process. For instance, it was observed that youth groups who usually perform symbolic functions such as pasting of candidates' posters on streets as well as attending party campaigns/rallies benefit from cash rewards and skill acquisition programmes in order to continue to perform such functions. The second group of beneficiaries are the civil servants who were appointed into public office through patronage and were used as the gateways for the delivery of goods to target groups. The anointed civil servants embezzled public funds to support the political party in power in their constituencies during elections. They

continue to enjoy lucrative postings as gateways to state resources for the benefit of the political party. This patronage network of goods distribution and its sustenance create what Hicken (2011) describes as volition.

Volition is a strategy that binds clientelistic relations together and includes the use of power/force, needs/demands or voluntary obligations (Muno, 2010). Politicians adopt different volition strategies to deliver goods to target groups. But this depends on the situation, type of voters, their level of income and circumstances. In rural areas with a large concentration of poor voters, the common strategy in Nigeria is the use of needs/demands strategy to distribute household items such as fertilisation, foodstuffs, detergents and other domestic items before or at the peak of the election period. Similarly, such goods could also be distributed by imposition of forceful deduction from local government allocation by the state governments. For example, some state governments in Nigeria procure goods such as tractors, fertiliser and generating plants and impose it on local government areas without recourse to their needs and demands. In this regard, local government councils are subjected to indiscriminate deductions from their monthly federal allocation. This unprofessional conduct of the state governments does not only affect the financial capacity of local government areas but also expose the weakness of Nigeria's fiscal federalism. In view of the foregoing, it could be argued that political clientelism is a strategy developed to create a network of dominance and accumulation of state resources by the politicians for political gains. But how this network is created and maintained varies from one country to another, with severe implications to national development.

Sources of data and the study area

This study is a qualitative piece and it employed varieties of qualitative instruments such as structured interview and focus group discussions for the collection of data. The study employed purposive sampling method and selected respondents from among the staff of the Ministry of Lands and Housing to elicit information on housing policies in the selected states. On the other, focus group discussion was organised to generate information from the beneficiaries of the public housing programmes in the selected states. About 6 000 housing units, comprising one, two and three bedrooms, were constructed and distributed in the selected states. Approximately 2 000 housing units of various types were constructed in each state from 2000-2013. In this regard, 12 respondents were selected for the focus group from each of the selected states under study.

Similarly, the study employed documentary evidence to examine the nature and basis of public housing programmes in the selected states. Some of the documents utilised include relevant literature on distributive politics, public housing policies and budget documents

of the selected states. Essentially, the documents were reviewed to examine general and specific contexts relating to government housing programmes. This would no doubt enrich the quality of the study, particularly as it relates to providing useful recommendations to aid distribution of government housing units in the selected states and Nigeria in general. The study area comprises Sokoto, Kebbi and Zamfara states, which were carved out from the old sokoto state created in 1976, 1991 and 1996 respectively and are all located in the north-western part of Nigeria (NPC, 2006). Currently, the selected states have a combined population of over 10 million people largely living in rural areas characterised by inadequate infrastructure such as housing and other basic social services (NPC, 2006; NBS, 2009; CBN, 2012). The choice of the states was due to similarities in terms of their approach in housing programmes and general levels of development.

Pattern of public housing distribution in the selected states

Public housing provision is not a new phenomenon in Africa. This is due to the fact that since the colonial period, public housing provision has been a major strategy for providing housing accommodation to expatriate colonial staff, which later extended to indigenous citizens working in the colonial civil service (Abdullahi, 2014). It is instructive to note that the colonial housing programmes were designed to lure the beneficiaries to work for the colonial government. In view of its enormous significance to consolidation of post-colonial government, the Nigerian government placed housing provision under concurrent powers in which both the national and state governments are empowered to provide housing to citizens (National Development Plans, 1968, 1974, 1980; Nigerian Constitution, 1999). Against this background, various state governments came up with different housing schemes to provide affordable housing to citizens. Abundant evidence shows that thousands of housing units were developed and distributed to people across Nigeria. In the selected states, housing units were developed through different initiatives, which include owner-occupier, outright purchase, sight and service schemes (interview, 2012). It was revealed that over 6 000 units were constructed and allocated to people from 2000 to 2013 in the selected states (interview, 2012). This represents less than 10% of households in need of housing in the states. It is important to note that demand for housing among residents in the selected states is a difficult task due to the poor economic status of the majority of the people, the scant attention given to the housing sector by the state, as well as the inability of the informal sector to provide housing to people.

Given the dire need of housing among households in the selected states, different targeting strategies were employed in the distribution of housing units to people. Although the governments of the selected states have been prioritising the poor households in their

public housing policy statements, empirical evidence shows that civil servants, businessmen and politicians were the major beneficiaries of public housing programmes (Sokoto State Ministry of Lands & Housing, 2012; Kebbi State Ministry of Lands & Housing, 2010; Zamfara State Ministry of Lands and Housing, 2011). Recent housing programmes in the selected states revealed that over 50% of public housing beneficiaries were the civil servants, 30% were members of political parties and the remaining 20% were selected from the business groups (see records of housing allocations from ministries of Housing of Sokoto, Kebbi and Zamfara states, 2012). These groups of people were identified based on their employment status, membership or affiliation to the party in power (interview, 2012). Consequently, the beneficiaries, according to a respondent, were selected through the office of the secretary to the state governments, head of service, party offices and marketer associations (interview, 2012). While the Office of the Secretary to the state government and head of civil service selected beneficiaries from the civil service, local party offices and marketer associations linked to the ruling political party selected beneficiaries among politicians and businessmen respectively. In addition, a respondent revealed that the ruling political parties regularly requested its leadership at the constituency levels to identify supporters among people to benefit from distribution of public goods (Interview, 2013). Some of the requirements for selection of beneficiaries include their roles in mobilisation of funds for the ruling party and support during political campaigns and elections, among others.

In view of the aforementioned, it could be argued that support to a ruling political party remains the yardstick for access to public goods. This support is usually in terms of financial and logistics support provided by members to the party over time. Thus, civil servants, politicians and business associations continuously provide financial and non-financial assistance to a political party to qualify for public goods. This is not only related to public housing provision but also includes other forms of public goods such as employment, deployment to lucrative jobs, enrolment into vocational and skills acquisition programmes, access to subsidised education and fertiliser, among others. This argument was affirmed by some respondents that their names were submitted through local party offices for allocation of housing units. They further argued that some of them have to lobby politicians to be included in the housing distribution (FGD, 2012). Lobby for public goods by the electorates creates informal networks and loyalty to politicians and their parties. Thus, regardless of the party, electorates support politicians that could provide them access to public goods. Consequently, informal networks are increasingly becoming alternative strategies to formal bureaucratic structure in the delivery of public goods to citizens. In their separate studies, van de Walle (2007) and Weitz-Shapiro (2012) maintained that politicians adopt different strategies and means to buy support, which, in the long run, influences voter choice during election. In adopting informal strategy,

politicians employ any available means at their disposal to create clientelistic networks in order to control citizens' voting behaviour. This clientelistic network is maintained in different ways depending on the types of voters involved. For instance, politicians and businessmen were awarded lucrative contracts by their party members in government in exchange for their financial support. On the other hand, civil servants were rewarded with lucrative postings in anticipation of their roles in the electoral process. This patronage of appointments and postings provided civil servants access to public funds to finance local party activities in their constituencies. Evidently, civil servants' access to public resources had, over the years, increased the prevalence of political corruption and affected government efforts, towards equitable provision of public goods. Reported cases of abandoned development projects due to financial constraints resulting from the activities of corrupt civil servants were eminent across the selected states. These groups of civil servants are godsons and daughters of politicians absorbed into civil service without regard for merit and competency. The resultant effects of patronage appointments and postings include excessive politicisation of public service and recruitment as well as retention of incompetent employees interested in mass embezzlement of public resources for political gain. Regardless of their incompetency, politicians often choose to work with civil servants who promote their political interests. This was aptly echoed by Holmgren, that:

> As long as politicians believe that bureaucrats will act in their interest, they delegate generously and leave the details to be filled in at the agency's discretion. If, however, they find reason to believe that delegated powers may be used against them, they write detailed instructions, screen and select for loyal personnel, monitor agency activities, mandate regular reporting requirements, enfranchise affected constituencies, embed veto-points in administrative procedures, and direct appropriations. In this way, the staff, structure, and process of the bureaucracy emerges, not as a set of impartial administrative institutions, but as a vehicle for advancing and protecting the partisan interests of the political coalitions responsible for its enactment (Holmgren, 2015).

Added to the above scenario was the expected role of the civil servants in the electoral process. Empirical evidence revealed that politicians have come to recognise the indispensability of civil servants in the electoral process. For instance, the appointments of the national chairman and senior directors of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in Nigeria had been from the civil service. Apart from being government appointees, they were also responsible for administration and management of national elections in the country. In this regard, civil servants play an important role in shaping and influencing the conduct of elections and where opportunities arise, politicians connive with them to influence the electoral process. This form of collaboration creates a clientelistic network, which has become a common trait in African politics. For example, in Mubarak's Egypt, civil servants were provided with various forms of social welfare packages such as soft loans, vehicles and access to internet facilities in anticipation of their support during elections. They were also used to punish communities perceived to be opposition strongholds. Civil servants responsible for the provision of municipal services such as water and sewage were instructed to deliberately neglect communities such as the Giza district that provides the highest votes to the Muslim brotherhood in the various national elections (Blaydes, 2011). Based on the aforementioned, it could be argued that politicians adopt a clientelistic form of public housing distribution to build coalitions and support from different social groups based on their perceived role in elections. The experience of the selected states indicates that a political leader is less risk averse to loss of political control if he prioritises politicians, businessmen and civil servants in public goods distribution. Similarly, it was also observed that public housing provision was used in the selected states as a means of fighting opposition – a campaign tool as well as a way of improving electoral fortunes of the politicians. This finding concurred with the argument of Golden and Min (2013) that politicians distribute goods to their loyal supporters to reward them for voting during elections. In fact, a lot of benefits accrue to electorates that support politicians to win elections. Perhaps this explains why citizens are increasingly forming associations in support of politicians in anticipation of distributive benefits across the selected states. In view of this, it could be argued that the targeting strategy for distribution of public housing was deliberately designed to exclude the majority of unemployed citizens' access to public goods. This, however, is not meant to punish the citizens as voters, rather as a means of buying support from citizens to win elections.

To further exclude the majority of the citizens from access to affordable housing, a repayment arrangement was designed in favour of selected beneficiaries. It is important to note that public housing is a paid service provided by the state at a subsidised rate. The idea of repayment is to provide a revolving fund scheme that could be used for development of public housing programmes. Empirical evidence revealed that there were two modes of mortgage repayments in the selected states, including monthly deductions

from workers' salaries and outright payments. Benefitting civil servants paid through deductions from their monthly salaries for a period of 10 to 15 years, whereas politicians and businessmen's payment was in the form of outright purchase. This implies that the informal sector employees and unemployed households, who constituted 35% of the population and are in dire need of houses in the selected states, were completely ignored (FGD, 2013). More so, the repayment arrangements transformed the selected states into a one-party state because distribution of public goods is often tied to citizens' support to the electoral victories of politicians. Thus, citizens, due to their poverty level, always would want to support the ruling political party. It is interesting to note that repayment of public housing was also selective as some families, friends and supporters of politicians with unshakable loyalty were allocated public houses free of charge. This further exposed sharp irregularities that characterised housing programmes with serious implications on the state revenue and development.

Conclusion

This paper examines the pattern of housing distribution in Sokoto, Kebbi and Zamfara states of Nigeria. The study revealed that unlike other African countries such as Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia where ethnic or religious favours influence who gets public goods, support to political parties in the electoral process is a major determining factor for access to public goods in the selected states. This is evident in the way public officials target supporters who provide financial and logistical support to ruling political parties. This discredits, to some extent, the utility of core and swing voter theories and models in explaining the pattern of goods distribution in some African countries. In this regard, there is a need for further studies of African countries in order to develop new distributive frameworks that take into cognisance the peculiarities of some African political settings. As the study shows, targeting beneficiaries of public goods based on class, income status or political considerations would deny the majority access to public goods. In this regard, it is recommended that the basic-need approach be adopted in the distribution of public housing and other public goods in the selected states. This, however, requires comprehensive reviewing of public housing policies, expanding of targeting strategies to include the poor majority, creating and making available non-interest funds by the state, conducting housing census to establish number of households in need as well as determing the involvement of community-based associations in the determination of beneficiaries of public goods.

Increased budgetary allocation to the housing sector is crucial in improving and expanding access to public housing. It is evident that many housing projects in the selected states could not be executed due to a meager amount of funds allocated to the sector as revealed in the budget documents of the selected states. This was further compounded by an

irregular release of funds and a culture of impunity that characterised public financial management in the selected states. Thus, a proper system of accountability in the management of public funds needs to be instituted to ensure judicious utilisation of state resources.

Acknowledgement

I wish to thank Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and the American Political Science Association (APSA) for providing me with a Professional Development Grant to write and present this paper at a conference at the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

References

1. Abdullahi, A. (2014). The Politics of Housing Policies in Nigeria: A Study of Public Private Partnership in Sokoto State. Unpublished PhD thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto.
2. Blaydes, L. (2011). The Politics of Infrastructure Provision, in Blaydes, L. (ed.) *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. USA: Cambridge University Press.
3. CBN. (2012). CBN Annual Report. *CBN Bulletin*, Vol. 3(4).
4. Easton, D. (1957). An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems. *World Politics*, Vol. 9, No. 3: pp. 393-400.
5. Golden, M. & Min, B. (2013). Distributive Politics Around the World. *The Annual Review of Political Science*. Vol. 16, pp. 73-99.
6. Hicken, A. (2011). Clientelism. *Annual Review of Political Science*. Vol. 14, pp. 289-310.
7. Hoffman, B.D. and Long, J.D. (2013). Parties, Ethnicity, and Voting in African Elections. *Comparative Politics*. Vol. (n. i), pp. 127-146.
8. Holmgren, M. (2015). *Endogenous Bureaucracy*. Working Paper Series 2015:3, the Quality of Government Institute and Department of Political Science: University of Gothenburg.
9. Kebbi State Government (2012). *State Annual Budget from 2000-2012*. State Ministry of Budget: Government Printers: Kebbi.
10. Kramon, E. & Posner, D.N. (2013). Who Benefits from Distributive Politics? How the Outcome one Studies Affects the Answer one Gets. *Perspective on Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 461-474.
11. Laswell, H.D. (1936). *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

12. Muno, W. (2010). *Conceptualising and Measuring Clientelism*. Paper presented at a workshop on Neo-patrimonialism in various World Regions. GIGA: Hamburg.
13. NBS. (2009). *Social Statistics in Nigeria*. National Bureau of Statistics: Abuja, Nigeria.
14. NBS. (2012). *Social Statistics in Nigeria*. National Bureau of Statistics: Abuja, Nigeria.
15. NPC. (2006). *National Housing and Population Census Result*. National Population Commission: Abuja, Nigeria.
16. Saliu, H.A. (2010). *Democracy, Governance and International Relations*, Ilorin: College Press and Publishers and African Centre for Peace Research, Empowerment and Documentation (ACPRED).
17. Sokoto State Government (2012). *State Annual Budget from 2000-2012*. State Ministry of Budget and Economic Planning: Sokoto State Government Printers.
18. Stokes, S. Dunning, T. Nazareno, M & Brusco, V. (2013). *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
19. Van Vliet, W. (ed.) (1990). *International Handbook of Housing Policies and Practices*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
20. Van de, W. (2007). Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss? The Evolution of Political Clientelism in Africa. In Kitschelt, H. and Wilkinson, S.I. (ed.). *Patrons, Clients, and Policies*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
21. Wantchekon, L. (2003). Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin. *World Politics*, Vol. 55(3): pp. 399-422.
22. Weitz-Shapiro, R. (2012). What Wins Votes: Why some Politicians Opt Out of Clientelism. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 56, No. 3, pp. 568-583.
23. Zamfara State Government (2012). *State Annual Budget for 10 Years*, Zamfara State House of Assembly: Gusau.

Guide for Authors

The *African Journal of Governance and Development* is a multidisciplinary publication that seeks to bring academic researchers from beyond territorial and regional boundaries to share scientific knowledge focused at the intersection of governance and development. The journal aims at providing space for sharing and debating issues of social, political and economic development not only for academic consumption, but also for policy consideration. The journal is published on a biannual basis and is peer reviewed.

Formatting

- Prospective authors should ensure that their papers are edited and proofread accordingly before submission.
- Submissions must not have been previously published, nor be under review by another journal.
- All papers should have a maximum of 8 000 words and at least five keywords.
- All papers should have the name/s of the contributor/s, institutional affiliation, country and a short biography referring to the current and/or previous position/occupation of the contributor.
- Contributors must employ the Harvard system of citation (see provided guide on the adjacent page). Where extended comments are necessary, they can appear in footnotes.
- Manuscripts should be sent to: Simão Nhambi, Managing Editor: research@ustm.ac.mz and simaono@yahoo.com

Referencing

Notes: Please 'copy' the title of a book/an article/whatever (as far as the spelling of words such as
'behaviour'/'behavioural' are concerned (and this also goes for direct quotations) exactly as in the original.

- When referring to any work that is NOT a journal, such as a book, article, or Web page, capitalise only the first letter of the first word of a title and subtitle, the first word after a colon or a dash in the title, and proper nouns. Do not capitalise the first letter of the second word in a hyphenated compound word.
- Capitalise all major words in journal titles.
- If within the same paragraph, reference is made to **the same author(s) for a second and further time(s)**, the year of publication is omitted in the second and further references – as long as it does not lead to confusion.

Compiled by OpenJournals Publishing and assisted by Prof George Sieberhagen (North-West University)

Basic in-text referencing		
In-text reference where the author of the source is known	…the result of this is a 'technical super identity' (Erikson, 1967, p. 20). Azar and Martin (1999) found that… (As part of the sentence) …thus Cox (1966, p. 52) refers to the modern urbanite as…	Simply use whatever you used as author in the reference, as well as the year of publication. Only insert the page number when using a direct quote. Do not include suffixes such as *Jr.*
In-text reference to more than one source	More recent studies (Bartlett, 1992; James, 1998) show that… The researchers (Bartlett, 1992, p. 54; Brown, 1876, p. 45; James, 1998, p. 45) refer to…	In-text reference to more than one author should be ordered alphabetically.
General forms for reference lists		
Non-periodical	Author, A. A. (1994). *Title of work.* Location: Publisher.	Non-periodicals include items published separately: books, reports, brochures,

		certain monographs, manuals, and audiovisual media.
Part of a Non-periodical	Author, A.A., & Author, B.B. (1994). Title of chapter. In A. Editor, B. Editor, & C. Editor (Eds.), *Title of book* (pp. xxx-xxxx). Location: Publisher.	
Periodical	Author, A.A., Author, B. B., & Author, C.C. (1994). Title of article. *Title of Periodical*, xx, xxx-xxxx.	Periodicals include items published on a regular basis: journals, magazines, scholarly newsletters, etc.
Online periodical	Author, A.A., Author, B.B., & Author, C.C. (2000). Title of article. *Title of Periodical*, xx, xxx-xxxx. Retrieved Month day, year, from web address	
Online document	Author, A.A. (2000). *Title of work.* Retrieved Month day, year, from web address	
Referencing other sources		
A book with only one author	Rose, L. (1977). *Crime and punishment.* London: Batsford.	
A book by two authors	Gordon, E.W., & Rourke, A. (1966). *Compensatory education for the disadvantaged.* New York: College Entrance Examination Board. In order to avoid possible communication problems all procedures should be explained to the patient (Gardner & Sheldon, 1967, p. 40)… Gardner and Sheldon (1967, p. 40)	When quoting a book with two authors in the text, use the word 'and' between the names; if the reference is in parentheses, use '&' examine the problem…

Referencing other sources (continued)

A book by three or more authors	Meyer, B.S., Anderson, D.P., Bohning, R.H., & Fratanna, D.G., Jr. (1973). *Introduction to plant physiology.* New York: Van Nostrand. …the traditionalist personality (Riesman, Denney & Glazer, 1968, p. 40) restrains him from doing… …due to his "other-directness" modern Western man in a sense is at home everywhere and yet nowhere (Riesman et al., 1968, p. 40).	In referring to a work by three, four or five authors all the relevant names have to be furnished in the **first** reference to the work. In **later** references to this work only the first author's name is stated, and the abbreviation '*et al*. ' is used. In referring to a work by six or more authors, cite only the surname of the first author followed by *et al*. (italicised and with a full stop after "al"), and the year for the first and subsequent citations. **In the reference list, provide the initials and surnames of the first six authors, and shorten any remaining authors to et al.**
Reference to more than one publication of the same author in the same year	Johnson (1994a, p. 48) discussed the subject… In his later works (Johnson, 1994b, p. 56) he argued… Johnson, P.D. (1994a). *Pedagogy.* London: Routledge. Johnson, P.D. (1994b). *Advanced Pedagogy.* London: Routledge.	

Different authors with the same surname	According to B. Smith (1989) and F. Smith (1997), …	When you refer to publications by different authors with the same surname, use their initials in the reference.
A book with an institution, organisation or association as author	You can also use the name of the body as part of the sentence. …it had long been evident that the intellectual potential of the Afrikaners on the Witwatersrand was under utilised (Rand Afrikaans University,1976, p. 48)… …thus the Rand Afrikaans University (1963, p. 30) concluded that… Rand Afrikaans University (1970). *The new university: A practical guideline.* Johannesburg, Gauteng: Rand Afrikaans University.	Where reference is made to the work by a body (institution, organisation, association, etc.) where no specific author is responsible for the work, the official name of the body is used as author. When the author and publisher are identical, use the word Author as the name of the publisher.
A book with (an) editor(s)	Driver, E., & Broisen, A. (Eds.). (1989). *Child sexual abuse.* Basingstoke, UK: MacMillan Education Ltd. Strunk, W. (Ed.). (1976). *Adult learning.* New York: MacMillan.	
A chapter in a book (not edited)	Capra, F. (1983). The systems view of life. In *The turning point: science, society and the rising culture* (pp. 376-399). London: Fontana Press	

Part/chapter of an edited book	Hartley, J.T., Harker, J.O., & Walsh, D.A. (1980). Contemporary issues and new directions in adult development of learning and memory. In L.W. Poon (Ed.), *Aging in the 1980's: Psychological issues*, (pp. 239-252). Washington: American Psychological Association. Shirom, A. (1989). Burnout in work organisations. In C. L. Cooper & I.T. Robertson (Eds.), *International review of Industrial and Organizational Psychology*, Vol. IV (pp. 25-49). New York: Wiley.	
Anonymous work	A recent article (Anonymous, 1993) stated that… In the case of articles in newspapers or magazines where no author is named, the title is used instead of the author. A recent article (War over, 1991) stated that… Anonymous. (1993, 17 February). Best practices. *The* *Star*, p. 10. War over. (1991, 7 January). *The Star,* p. 1.	When a work's author is designated as "Anonymous", cite in text the word 'Anonymous'.

Referencing other sources (continued)		
A work with a foreign title	Spyridakis, A. (1987). *E historia tis Helladas* [A history of Greece]. Athens: Therios ita Iona.	
Translated works	Luria, A.R. (1968). *The mind of a mnemonist: A little book about a vast memory.* (L. Solotaroff, Trans.). New York: Basic Books. (Original work published 1967).	In text, cite the original publication date and the date of the translation.

	A recent study (Luria, 1967/1968).	
Second, further or revised editions	Dyson, G.G.H. (1977). *The mechanics of athletics.* (7th edn.). New York: Homes and Meier. Cohen, J. (1977). *Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences* (Rev. edn.). New York: Academic Press.	
Date of publication unknown	Wolverton, H. (n.d.). *The geological structure of the Black Hills*. Wilmington: Prairie Press.	
Dictionaries	*The concise Macquarie dictionary.* (1982). New South Wales: Lane Cove. Nguyen, D.H. (1966). *Vietnamese-English dictionary.* Rutland Vermont: Charles Tuttle Company. Sadie, S. (Ed.). (1980). *The new Grove dictionary of music and musicians* (6th edn, Vols. 1-20). London: MacMillan.	
Encyclopedia	Bergmann, P.G. (1993). Relativity. In *The new* *Encyclopaedia Brittanica* (Vol. 26, pp. 501-508). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Brittanica.	If an entry has no byline, place the title in the author position.

Personal communication	According to T.K. Lutes (personal communication, April 18, 2001)…	Personal communications may be letters, memos, some electronic communication (e. g., email or messages from non-archived discussion groups or electronic bulletin boards), personal interviews, telephone conversations, and the like. Because they do not provide recoverable data, personal communications are not included in the reference list. Cite personal communications in text only. Give the initials as well as the surname of the communicator, and provide as exact a date as possible.
Unpublished manuscript submitted for publication	Jordan, B. (1989). *Psychology of adolescent parents*. Manuscript submitted for publication.	
Unpublished manuscript not submitted for publication	Ryder, M. (1987). *Wonder woman: An Amazon legacy.* Unpublished manuscript.	

Newspaper article	Lamb, J. (1970, 20 October). The perfect plants for lazy gardeners. *Weekend Australian,* p. 3.	
Periodical article	Phillips, E. (1985). The Australian scene. *Australian Journal of Ecology*, 3(2), 25-29.	If a journal or newsletter does not use volume numbers, include the month, season, or other designation with the year, for example (1994, April). Only indicate the issue number after the volume number if each issue begins on page 1.
Journal article in press	Phillips, E. (in press). The Australian scene. *Australian Journal of Ecology.* In text: Phillips (in press) or (Phillips, in press)	
Abstract	Phillips, E. (1985). The Australian scene [Abstract]. *Australian Journal of Ecology*, 3(2), 25-29.	

Referencing other sources (continued)		
Non-English journal article	Ising, M. (2000). Intensitätsabhängigkeit evozierter Potenzial im EEG: Sind impulsive Personen Augmenter oder Reducer? [Intensity dependence in event related EEG potentials: Are impulsive individuals augmenters or reducers?]. *Zeitschrift für Differentielle und Diagnostische Psychologie*, 21, 208-217.	Give the original title, as well as an English translation in brackets.
Published dissertation or thesis	Bevins, G.D. (1987). *Theory and practice at an Australian university.* Doctoral dissertation. Montreal: McGill University.	

Unpublished dissertation or thesis	Little, P. (1965). *Helplessness, depression and mood in end stage renal disease.* Unpublished master's thesis, Wits University, Johannesburg, South Africa. Or: Unpublished doctoral dissertation…	
Dissertation abstract	Ross. D.F. (1990). Unconscious transference and mistaken identity: When a witness misidentifies a familiar but innocent person from a lineup (Doctoral dissertation, Cornell University, 1990). *Dissertation Abstracts International*, 51, 417.	
Government publications	According to The Bill of Rights (1996)… Education is in the process of transformation (Department of Education, 1995)… The Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Republic of South African. (1996). *Government Gazette.* (No. 17678). Department of Education. (1995). White Paper on Education. *Government Gazette.* (Vol. 375, No. 45621). Commission on Civil Rights. (1967). *Racial isolation in the public schools.* Washington: United States Government Printing Office. Republic of South Africa. (1997). Basic Conditions of Employment Act, No. 75 of 1997. Pretoria: Government Printers.	When referring to a government publication, the date is sufficient for in text referencing. Provide all numbers, sections, chapters or volume numbers that is available, in brackets.
Unpublished raw data, untitled	Bordi, F., & LeDoux, J.E. (1993). [Auditory response latencies in rat auditory cortex]. Unpublished raw data.	Use brackets to indicate that the material is a description of the content, not a title.

Booklet, pamphlet or leaflet	South African College of Advanced Education. (1976). *Referencing: the footnote and Harvard system* [Brochure]. Johannesburg: Wits Technikon. Research and Training Center in Independent Living. (1993). *Guidelines for reporting and writing about people with disabilities* (4th edn.). [Brochure]. Lawrence, K.S.: Author.	
Study guide	Speedy, C. (1999). *Study Guide: Electrical Engineering 1*. America: South American College of Engineering.	
Conference proceedings, no author or title	International Microcomputer Conference. (1984). *Conference proceedings held at the Western Australian Institute of Technology*, Perth, 22-24 May 1984. Perth: Western Australian Institute of technology.	
Conference proceedings, with author	Field, G. (2001). Rethinking reference rethought. In *Revelling in Reference: Reference and Information Services Section Symposium, 12-14 October 2001* (pp. 59-64). Melbourne, Victoria, Australia: Australian Library and Information Association.	
Unpublished paper presented at a meeting	Lanktree, C., & Briere, J. (1991, January). *Early data on the Trauma Symptom Checklist for Children (TSC-C).* Paper presented at the meeting of the American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children, San Diego, CA.	

Referencing other sources (continued)

Publication of limited circulation	Klombers, N. (Ed.). (1993, Spring). *ADAA Reporter.* (Available from the Anxiety Disorders Association of America, 6000 Executive Boulevard, Suite 513, Rockville, MD20852).	For a publication of limited circulation, give in parentheses immediately after the title a name and address from which the publication can be obtained.
Review	Schatz, B.R. (2000). Learning by text or context? [Review of the book *The social life of information]. Science,* 290, 1304. Kraus, S.J. (1992). Visions of psychology: A videotext of classic studies [Review of the motion picture *Discovering Psychology]. Contemporary Psychology*, 37, 1146-1147.	
Electronic sources		
In-text reference where the author of the electronic source is known	The project website was created using *Aldus Pagemaker version 3* (1987-1988)… Several films (e.g. Bertolucci, 1988) have used this technique… Azar and Martin (1999) found that…	Simply use whatever you used as author in the reference, as well as the year of publication.
In-text reference to a web site	Rainbow MOO is a virtual space designed especially for teachers and their elementary-school students (http://it. uwp. edu/rainbow). Jones, 2000: ¶5) Jones, 2000: Conclusion, para. 7)	To cite an entire web site (but not a specific document on the site), simply give the site's URL in the text. When a specific part of an electronic source has to be quoted and no page number can be found, use the paragraph number if

		available, preceded by the ¶ symbol or the abbreviation para. If these are absent, cite the heading and the number of the paragraph following it.
Internet site with author	Holmes, A. (1998). *Greenpeace wins media war.* Retrieved November 25, 1998, from http://www.independent.co.uk/international/green25.htm	
Internet document without author	GVU's 8th WWW user survey. (n.d.). Retrieved August 8, 2000, from http://www.cc.gatech.edu/gvu/user_surveys/survey-1997-10/	
Article from an online periodical with DOI assigned	Author, A.A., & Author, B.B. (Date of publication). Title of article. *Title of Journal, volume number* (issue number). doi: 0000000/000000000000	
Personal electronic communication (email)	According to T.K. Lutes (personal communication, April 18, 2001)…	Because personal email do not provide recoverable data, they (like other personal communications) are not included in the reference list. Cite personal communications in text only. Give the initials as well as the surname of the communicator, and

		provide as exact a date as possible.
Article in an Internet-only journal	Fredrickson, B.L. (2000, March 7). Cultivating positive emotions to optimise health and well-being. Prevention & Treatment, 3, Article 0001a. Retrieved November 20, 2000, from http://journals. apa. org/prevention/volume3/ pre0030001a. html	

Electronic sources		
Electronic copy of a journal article retrieved from database	Borman, W.C. (1993). Role of early supervisory experience in supervisor performance. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 78, 443-449. Retrieved October 23, 2000, from PsycARTICLES database.	
Internet articles based on a print source	VandenBos, G., Knapp, S., & Doe, J. (2001). Role of reference elements in the selection of resources by psychology undergraduates [Electronic version]. *Journal of Bibliographic Research*, 5, 117-123.	If you have reason to believe that the article might be subject to change, you should add the date you retrieved the document, and the URL

Newsgroups, online forums, electronic mailing lists	**FORMAT:** Author. (Year, Day Month). Subject of message. Message posted to Name mailing list, archived at URL Brack, Ernie (1995, 2 May). Re: Computing short courses. Message posted to LisLink mailing list, archived at http:// archive.lislink.com Jensen, L.R. (1995, 12 December). Recommendation of student radio/tv in English. Message posted to IASTAR mailing list, archived at http://nrg.dtu.dk Brett, P. (1999, June 6). Experiments proving the collective unconscious [Msg 1]. Message posted to news://alt.psychology.jung lrm583@aol.com (1996, May 26). Thinking of adoption. Message posted to news://alt. adoption	If you cannot determine the author's name or screen name, then use the author's email address as the main entry. When deciding where in your Reference List to insert such a source, treat the first letter of the email address as though it were capitalised. If the message is not retrievable from an archive, it should not be included in the reference list. It can be cited as a personal communication.
Paper presented at a virtual conference	Tan, G., & Lewandowsky, S. (1996). *A comparison of operator trust in humans versus machines.* Paper presented at the CybErg 96 virtual conference. Retrieved May 16, 2000, from http://www.curtin.edu.au/conference/ cyberg/centre/outline.cgi/frame?dir=tan	

Abstract	Isaac. J. D., Sansone, C., & Smith, J.L. (1999, May). Other people as a source of interest in an activity. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 35, 239-265. Abstract retrieved June 7, 1999, from IDEAL database: http://www.europe.idealibrary.com	
Article in an electronic magazine (ezine)	Adler, J. (1999, May 17). Ghost of Everest. *Newsweek.* Retrieved May 19, 1999.	
Newspaper article	Azar, B., & Martin, S. (1999, October). APA's Council of Representatives endorses new standards for testing, highschool psychology. *APA Monitor.* Retrieved October 7, 1999, from http://www.apa.org/monitor/oct99/in1.html	
Review	Parfit, M. (1997, December 7). Breathless [Review of the book *The climb: Tragic ambitions on Everest]. New York Times on the Web.* Retrieved October 7, 1999, from http://search. nytimes. com/books/97/12/07/ reviews/971207.07parfitt.html	
Letter to the editor	Gray, J. (1999, May 7). Pesticides linger in land and air—and in our bodies [Letter to the editor]. *Lexington Herald-Leader.* Retrieved October 7, 1999, from http:// www.kentuckyconnect.com/heraldleader/news/050799/ lettersdocs/507letters.htm	
Government publication	Bush, G. (1989, April 12). Principles of ethical conduct for government officers and employees Exec. Order No. 12674. Pt. 1. Retrieved November 18, 1997, from http:// www.usoge.gov/exorders/eo12674.html	
CD-ROM	Hawking, S. (1994). *A brief history of time: An interactive adventure* [CD]. Sacramento: Crunch Pod Media.	
Electronic sources		
Sound recording	Williamson, C. (1985). Prairie fire. *On Arkansas traveler* [CD]. Oakland, California: Olivia Records.	

	Rock 'n roll classics. (1986). [Cassette] San Diego, California: Uptown Sound.	
Motion picture/film	*Transactional analysis* [Motion picture]. (1974). Los Angeles: Research Films. Bertolucci, B. (Producer). (1988). *The last emperor* [Motion picture]. Los Angeles: Columbia Pictures.	
Television broadcast	Crystal, L. (Executive Producer). (1993, October 11). *The MacNeil/Lehrer news hour* [Television broadcast]. New York and Washington, DC: Public Broadcasting Service.	
Video recording	*Babakuieria.* (1986). [Video recording]. Sydney: ABC Drama Department. Sutton, P. (Producer). (1986). *Kay Cottee: First Lady* [Video Recording]. New South Wales: Direct Video Pty Ltd. Cochrane, C., (Executive Producer) & Graham S., (Director). (1988). *The Superkids' fitness video* [Video Recording]. Perth: Dynami Australia.	
Microfiche	Illinois State Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction (1971). *Toys for early development of the young blind child: a guide for parents.* (ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 065 201)	
Computer programme	*Aldus Pagemaker version 3. 0* [Computer software] (19871988). Seattle, Washington: Aldus Corporation. Schwarzer, R. (1989). Statistics software for meta-analysis [Computer software and manual]. Retrieved from http:// www.yorku.ca/faculty/academic/schwarze/meta_e.htm	

Commonly used abbreviations

Appendix – app. Chapter – ch. Column – col.
Columns – cols.
Editor – ed. Editors – eds. Edition – edn. Editions – edns. Number – no.
Numbers – nos. No date – n. d. No publisher, no page – n. p. Page – p.
Pages – pp. Paragraph – para.
Revised – rev. Reprinted – rpt.

Supplement – Suppl.
Technical Report – Tech. Rep. Translated, translator –
trans. Volume – vol. Volumes – vols. Written – writ.

Rule: a capital letter for the abbreviation for editor or editors i.e. Ed. or Eds. Use lower case for edition i.e. 2nd edn.

Latin abbreviations
And others – *et al.* (et alii) Used where there are too many authors to list
In the same work – *ibid*. (ibidem) Signifies the same work as the one cited immediately before, but a different page
The same – *id.* (idem) The item cited is by the author of the item cited immediately before
In the work cited – *op. cit.* (opere citato) Refers the reader back to the author's previously cited work, but to a different page Without place – *s. l.* (sine loco)

For more resources visit:
http://www.waikato.ac.nz/library/apaguide.shtml •
http://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/560/07/• http://library.osu.edu/sites/guides/apagd.php#articleone
This referencing guide is compiled from various resources, our appreciation to
http://www.infosecsa.co.za/Reference_
Techniques.pdf

NOTES

NOTES