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# Introduction

**OLIVER MTAPURI and BETTY C MUBANGIZI**

> *Don't set sail using someone else's star*
> *An African proverb*

Given its abundance of minerals, human resources, good climatic conditions as well as its vast flora and fauna - we imagine an Africa brimming with vibrant economies girded by good governance; an Africa free from hunger and poverty and one that is in tune with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.   In many parts of sub-Saharan Africa however, despite the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, the vision of vibrant economies girded by good governance remains out of reach it would seem. Kates and Dasgupta (2007) observe that '…the global number of people living below the poverty line of $1 per day decreased between 1981 and 2004 from 1,470 million to 969 million and the percentage of the extremely poor fell from 40% to 18%. However, in subSaharan Africa, the numbers almost doubled from 168 million to 298 million, and the percentage of the poor stayed almost constant from 42% to 41%'.  We ask, what is going wrong with Africa. We ask why, why, why, why Africa is lagging behind and in many instances even regressing leading others to postulate the hypothesis of 'Africa's exceptionalism'. Chitonge (2015: x) observes that 'some commentators have blamed the weak economic growth performance in Africa on the lack of adept leaders, poor policies, and the stunted nature of capitalism which has developed in Africa; while yet others have put the blame on trade, colonialism and now multi-lateral imperialism. Some have explained the African economic performance in terms of Africa's failure to emulate countries in Europe – and now Asia – in their quest for growth and development'.  Others blame poor governance, corruption, wars, poor leadership and debt to colonial countries, that never ends. We still ask again why, why, why, why Africa has got poor governance,

episodes of post-electoral violence and food insecurity, corruption, wars, poor leadership; and a mounting debt to colonial countries.

Warikanda, Nhemachena and Mtapuri (2017: xvii) attributes this squarely to slavery, colonialism and apartheid and add that "one of the weaknesses of 'globalization' is that it seeks to uproot Africans from their contexts and from their contextually defined propriety so as to place them in a realm of contextless agency and actions; contextless freedoms, liberties and democracies which do not pay heed to African struggles for restitution and restoration of what was looted by colonists and what is being looted by neo-imperial transnational corporations, that often show up in Africa as foreign investors when in fact they dispossess, exploit, loot and rob Africans of their resources". We agree. Slavery, colonialism and apartheid were punctuated with terror, humiliation, subjugation and conquest which Africans still endure to this day. This with often with complicity of its leadership turning African independence to a hollow portico and facade. To a large measure in connivance and imbrication, the fascia has its roots in slavery, colonialism and apartheid. We argue that if political independence was one step towards that futuristic Africa, economic independence is a *sine qua non*.

We also believe that if one knows the problem, it should be easy for one to adopt appropriate solutions. Wars must stop. The export of primary commodities in their raw form should stop. There is need to beneficiate the mineral wealth, build infrastructure, promote savings, increase productivity in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors, conserve the flora, fauna and the environment; educate, train and re-retrain the youth to take advantage of the population dividend; equitably re-distribute land for social justice and food security; re-negotiate those deals that are unfavorable to the peoples of Africa; unashamedly repudiate paying any colonial debt and all agreements inimical to Africans and Africa; promulgate pro-African policies, integrate African economies, work towards the free movement of its people, services and goods, ensure political stability and strengthen the African Union and all its organs and speak in one voice in this platform – an

African voice. We still harbor some fears in all this chequered history and varicolored milieu.

We shudder to think of our beloved Africa, without its minerals, its forests and animals but with degraded land and environment and silted rivers. We leave to you to ponder for the present and future generations. The time is now to act and to do the right things. We will only have ourselves to blame. Therefore, good governance and astute leadership, however defined, are important if they encumber corruption and deliver on infrastructure that benefits Africans and their posterity in a stable and peaceful environment. Complicating matters for Africa, are wars and the emergence of religious fundamentalism. We are inspired by a growing crop of African academics and researchers keen on understanding and explaining Africa's complexities by developing a body of knowledge on African issues. It is through this body of knowledge generated by African researchers, on the continent and in diaspora, that we just might, incrementally, find African solutions to Africa's problems and challenges.

In his article **Samuel Odobo** problematizes the issue of Boko Haram's internationalism and its implications on sub-regional security. He argues that authors have tended to underestimate the 'strength of ethnicity and religious fundamentalism as counter-forces to the spread of western democratic ideology'. He ascribes the emergence of the Boko haram to poverty in the north of the country as compared the more developed South which is dominated by Christians as well as 'massive corruption in government and highhandedness and brutality meted on the local population by security forces [in the South]'. He opines that 'Boko Haram's internationalization represents an emerging and bigger threat to national and regional security which can only be contained through a combination of national, regional and global efforts targeted at not only physical combat but also eliminating the incentives that continue to feed its ideology, recruitment process, radicalization and funding'. Mtapuri (2017: 127a) observes that 'Fundamentalism breeds

fundamentalism. It is borderless and its excesses or some tenets of it endanger humanity instead of protecting it as happiness, freedom, self and collective affirmation, and selfactualisation – the destination of humankind – are foregone' under such circumstances.  In their article, **Ebenezer Oni, Nicholas Erameh and Azeez Oladejo** analyse electoral administration and regime analysis in order to provide a holistic view of Nigeria's contemporary democratic practice since 1999. They argue that while election administration is a compass for any democratic process, regularity of elections is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to pronounce the entrenchment of democracy but what is critical are values that underpin that democratic (electoral) process, the institutions, constitutional and legal frameworks in which civil society has  a role to play.

**Samuel Mutukaa** tackles the issue of food security through an evaluation of a project in Kenya and found out that food insecurity is not only a consequence of lack of or inadequate rainfall but also a result of (in) effectiveness of county administrative and governance processes. He recommends scaffolding on best practices in administrative and governance processes to ensure both food security and project sustainability.

In their article, **Tinashe Sithole and Lucky Asuelime**, interrogate the role of the African Union with respect to post-election violence in Kenya. Delays in intervening by the AU in Kenya reflect its fragile coordination capacity and a propensity to protect the incumbent leaders. This failure by the AU to effectively manage conflict undermines its legitimacy. The reverberation of election violence in the 2017 had its seeds sown in unresolved issues from the 2007/8 period.  Mtapuri (2017b) is of the view that elections predicate the future, the future of the people and nation and as such elections matter, equally for the past, present and future as a platform to learn and do better in the future by perfecting the electoral praxis.

The articles that make up this issue, have one thing in common – trying to find solutions for Africa by Africans – be it about religious fundamentalism, elections and food security. The Japanese and Chinese have earned their respect. The time is now for Africa to secure

its future by turning those 'resource curses' to 'resource blessings' through home-grown solutions under-girded by our African-ness.

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# Boko Haram Internationalism & its Sub-Regional Security Implications

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## Abstract

*Boko Haram is a terrorist organization that sprung up from its Maiduguri base in Borno State, north-eastern Nigeria. Between 2011 and 2015 the group's attacks against the Nigerian State became increasingly virulent. Following its August 26, 2011 attack against the United Nations building in Abuja, Nigeria's Capital, the group evolved into a strong international terrorist organization finding support from terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab, and the Islamic State (ISIS) through its connections with Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Boko Haram has attracted increased international attention not only for its notoriety within Nigeria, but because of its transnational operations across Lake Chad and the West African sub-region. Its international connections and attacks beyond Nigeria's borders is cause for significant concern; yet how these activities impact subregional security has been rarely explored. This paper contributes to the debate on Boko Haram internationalism and its sub-regional security implications. Its main conclusion is that Boko Haram remains not only a threat to Nigeria's security, its transnational activities constitutes a bigger threat to regional security.*

**Keywords:** Boko Haram, Terrorism, Lake Chad, West Africa, Security.

### Introduction

When Fukuyama wrote *The End of History and the Last Man* in 1992 predicting the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the unrivalled and final form of governance which other civilizations had no option but to adopt under the leadership of the West,  he did not foresee any other force challenging the new world order. For example, it failed to adequately take into account the strength of ethnicity and religious fundamentalism as counter-forces to the spread of western democratic ideology, especially political Islam which is considered the most powerful of these forces. Samuel, P.

Huntington wrote a 1993 essay "*The Clash of Civilizations*", a direct response to *The End of History,* which he later expanded into a book in 1996, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.* In both write-ups, he argued that conflict between ideologies is being replaced by ancient conflicts between civilizations, and the primary axis of conflict would be along cultural and religious lines. He wrote:

> It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future (1993: 3).

Huntington specially singled out Islam which he described as having "bloody borders" and warned that radical Islam would pose serious threats to western civilization. The September 11, 2001 attacks (now widely referred to as 9/11 attacks) on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon in the United States by Islamic fundamentalists coordinated by Osama Bin Laden lent credence to Huntington's views and rekindled global consciousness on the threat of political Islam. Although Africa was not immediately seriously considered in the whole analysis of the threats of Islamic fundamentalism, over a decade after the 9/11 attacks, the continent is now littered with Islamist groups from Somalia to Algeria, Mali to Chad, including Niger, Nigeria and others. The international community led by the United States now devotes substantial resources in checkmating what had become known as political Islam or Islamic fundamentalism on the continent.

Nigeria especially has had its fair share of religion-related violence. In fact, in Nigeria, religion and violence interact in complex ways and one can hardly talk about Nigeria without reference to religion and its numerous negative contributions to national

development. It has been a cause of some of the most virulent controversies and conflicts in the country to the extent that Danjibo noted:

> The Jihad, the civil war propaganda, the *Sharia* law controversy, the tensions provoked by the Nigerian accession to the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) and the incessant religious crises that have engulfed the Northern part mainly indicate that religion cannot be ignored or wished away in the Nigerian political development (2009: 3).

Several religious conflicts have occurred in Nigeria. Some of them include the Maitatsine revolts between 1960 to 1980, the Zangon Kataf uprising (Kaduna State, 1992), the antiSharia violence episodes 1 and 2 (Kaduna State 2000), and the December 2015 Shiite-Army clash which resulted in the death of several members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria led by Ibrahim El-Zakzaky. Arguably, none of the previous experiences of sectarian violence in Nigeria have attracted greater attention like the Boko Haram insurgency. Since 2009 when the sect became openly violent against the state, its attacks have had far-reaching consequences leaving thousands of people dead and several other millions either as internally displaced persons or refugees (see ICG, 2016). What began as a local insurrection against the Nigerian state took an internationalized dimension on August 26, 2011 when Boko Haram attacked the United Nations building in Abuja, Nigeria's Capital City. Added to the socio-economic dislocation and security challenges it has created especially in north-eastern Nigeria, Boko Haram has forayed into transnational terrorist activities in West Africa, the Lake Chad region and beyond, thus attracting global attention.

While the Nigerian military since late 2015 have largely contained the group's activities within Nigeria, its association with global terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State (ISIS), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Shabaab as well as its capacity to carry out terror activities beyond Nigeria represents a threat not only to its country of origin or the neighbouring countries, but across the African continent and beyond. This

aspect of Boko Haram terrorism remains relatively unexplored especially taking into consideration its potential to impact security in West Africa and Lake Chad area – two regions with abundant socio-political, economic, and religious problems.

This study, therefore, is an attempt to assess Boko Haram's increasing internationalism and its implications for national and regional security. Its main conclusions are that Boko Haram remains one of the biggest local threats to Nigeria's security alongside others such as the farmer-herder conflicts. The group's internationalization represents an emerging and bigger threat to national and regional security which can only be contained through a combination of national, regional and global efforts targeted at not only armed confrontation but also eliminating the incentives that continue to feed its ideology, recruitment process, radicalization and funding.

## Conceptualizing International Terrorism

There is no universal definition of international terrorism (or even terrorism). At best, scholars often attempt to analyze the features that are peculiar to the concept. For Pokhilko (2014), the main features of international terrorism usually reflect global demonstrations, severe and negative dynamics, as well as the need of immediate solution to the threats they pose. Gusher (cited in Pokhilko 2014) observed too that the activities of international terrorist organizations are most often characterized by lack of expressed state borders, connection and interaction with international terrorist centers and organizations; fixed organizational structure that consists of management and operational level, intelligence and counter intelligence units, materials and logistic assistance, battle groups and cover; careful selection of staff;  presence of agents in law enforcement and state authorities; good equipment competing, and sometimes surpassing equipment of government troops; presence of extensive network of secret hideouts, training facilities and landfills.

International terrorism possesses three main characteristics according to the FBI (www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism):

- Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law;
- Appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
- Occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the US or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which the perpetrators operate or seek asylum.

International terrorism lies in the reach of its operations. That is, their ability to spread, and launch attacks across geographical boundaries. In this way, they somewhat operate like transnational corporations with various cells and activities in many countries. However, a U.S. Army TRADOC handbook (A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty Fist Century, 2007) attempted to distinguish between international terrorist organizations and those that could be said to be transnational in nature. According to the handbook, terrorist groups that are international in nature may conduct their activities in multiple countries, but these nations usually share geographical proximity. In other words, international terrorist groups usually retain a geographical focus for their activities such that the objective naturally will be on regional impact of their activities. On the other hand, those that are transnational are usually more expansive in their realm of operations traversing multiple and less geographically close countries. Their operational and strategic reach as well as impact are also global in nature. For these groups, there is the unique capability to deploy the cyberspace on a global scale, access worldwide financial institutions, maintain

satellite headquarters, and several clandestine cells in multiple locales across several continents (2007: 10).

A key feature of international terrorism is their sophistication in the use of the internet. As a matter of fact, the internet has become a crucial weapon in the hands of terrorist organizations mainly replacing print and other physical media. Hoffman (2013) in his study *Inside Terrorism* noted the increasing use of the internet by terrorist groups and the farreaching implications it could have. He argues that,

> "terrorists are now able to bypass traditional print and broadcast media via the internet, through expensive but professionally produced and edited video tape and even with their own dedicated 24/7 television and radio news stations. The consequences of these developments [are] farreaching as they are still poorly understood, having already transformed the ability of terrorists to communicate without censorship or other hindrance and thereby attract new sources of recruits, funding, and support that governments have found difficult, if not impossible, to counter" (Hoffman, 2013).

The use of the internet has allowed terrorists organizations to cheaply and effectively communicate their messages not just to the world but also their members everywhere. It has allowed them to easily recruit new members, coordinate local and global attacks as well as successfully evade global surveillance. The Islamic State (ISIS) terrorist group has been a leading terrorist organization that has effectively harnessed the power of the internet and social media in its campaigns. ISIS's well-organized online media campaign has been very useful in its efforts to recruit thousands of foreign fighters. Its online messages calling for lone wolf attacks in Europe arguably have yielded significant results. It is common knowledge that many of converts were seen to have pledged allegiance to the group and waving the Islamic State flag before executing terrorist attacks in parts of Europe, America and Australia.

Furthermore, Boko Haram has repeatedly employed online media to release short video and audio messages directly addressing the Nigeria President, the Nigerian military, the United States and the international community. It has also used the medium to talk up its relationship with international terrorist organizations, first pledging allegiance to al Qaeda, and latter ISIS, as well as using it to address its followers to stay the course and continue to support its activities. This in some ways represents a paradox: Like ISIS, Boko Haram projects an ideology that is anti-western and yet relies heavily on western technology in carrying its operations across borders. In other words, the argument could be made that these terrorist organizations have mainly advanced their operations through westernization and not Islamization.

As a matter of fact, Boko Haram feeds on online propaganda which it successfully used in the past to display its successes in north eastern Nigeria. Generally, it is a primary task of terrorist organizations to use the internet to achieve wide coverage of their attacks, spread their extremist ideological messages and instill fear on government and the society. The impact of Boko Haram information war actually compelled the Nigerian government to develop its own strategy to push for a counter-narrative of Boko haram activities, and how government's efforts to defeat Boko Haram in Nigeria has successfully weakened the group.

## Boko Haram

Boko Haram is a Salafist Islamic movement that is based in north-eastern Nigeria. It is believed that Boko Haram started in Maiduguri, Borno State and is primarily based in the states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, Katsina, Kaduna, Bauchi, Gombe and Kano from where it spread to virtually all parts of northern Nigeria and advancing towards other parts of the country (US House Committee on Homeland Security, 2013: 7). The group's official

name is *Jama"atu Ahlissunnah lidda"awati wal Jihad* which in Arabic means "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad". Boko Haram is literarily translated as the "Association of Sunnis for the propagation of Islam and Holy War" (Fayeye, 2013). Nevertheless, it is widely accepted among the local Hausa population that Boko Haram stands for "Western education is forbidden".

The exact date of Boko Haram's emergence remains controversial. Earliest report suggests that it was founded in 1995 as a religious study group by Abubakar Lawan, in the University of Maiduguri, Borno State and progressively metamorphosed into Boko Haram. What is however known is that Boko Haram did not begin to transform into the insurgent group it is today until Mohammed Yusuf assumed control of the group. From the early 2000 under Yusuf, the sect developed radical views about Islam that rejected westernization and modernization. Yusuf preached radical and provocative sermons against moderate Islamic clerics, and against political institutions. The group rejected all forms of western culture and influence and sought the imposition of Sharia law across the whole of Nigeria. The group draws its membership from among the poorest, unemployed, criminals, drug addicts, as well as the educated and the employed. They called themselves the "Nigerian Taliban" and adopted a modest lifestyle and established a camp in a remote area of northeast Nigeria, which the group dubbed "Afghanistan" (Sani, 2011).

Before 2009, Boko Haram was known not to be violent but only engaged in low level skirmishes with local police forces and some members of the community because of its brand of Islam which became worrisome to local residents. In 2009, following the refusal of the sect members to wear motorcycle helmet on their way for a funeral (Walker, 2012: 4), the police attempted a crackdown on the group. It backfired. In retaliation, the group attacked police stations and other government buildings in Yobe and Bauchi, killing several policemen. They also attacked mosques and churches. The fighting spread across five northern states: Bauchi, Borno, Kano, Katsina, and Yobe. The Nigerian military responded,

and five days of fighting left more than 800 dead, mostly Boko Haram members (Oftedal, 2013: 17). The fighting ended on July 30, 2009 when the sect's leader, Mohammed Yusuf was captured by the military and later handed over to police authorities where he was killed in custody. The manner of his death which was videotaped and broadcast on television led many to conclude that he was murdered in an extrajudicial manner.

The death of Mohammed Yusuf was a watershed in the evolution of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The group's members who went underground (within and outside the country) after the fighting ended in 2009 reemerged in 2010 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau as a more radical and violent group determined to avenge the death of its leader and further the course of the sect. In 2010, the group orchestrated several brutal attacks against government targets in many northern states. Worthy of note in these attacks include the September 2010 prison break in Bauchi that resulted in the release of 700 prisoners, including Boko Haram members, and series of Christmas Eve bombings in Jos that left over 80 people dead (Oftedal, 2013: 17). The gruesome nature of Boko Haram attacks was further emphasized by Retired Major General Paul Tarfa who in an interview narrated how members of the sect invaded his village located in Garkida, Adamawa State killing nine members of his immediate family (Daily Trust Newspaper, February 10, 2018).

Since its reemergence, Boko Haram has remained unrelenting in its attacks which are largely focused against government security forces, Christians and Muslim critics, community, political and religious leaders and other targets that they consider as "enemies". The sect demonstrated a change in its tactics with the use of suicide bombings when on August 26 it instigated a suicide attack on the UN headquarters in Abuja, in which 23 people were killed and an additional 116 injured (Civil-Military Fusion Center2012: 5). Other notable attacks include the January 20, 2012 coordinated bombing in Kano which killed about 185 persons. In June 2012, Boko Haram carried out suicide attacks at three churches at Kaduna and Zaria, sparking reprisal violence by Christian mobs who burnt

mosques and targeted their Muslim neighbours. More than 100 were killed in over a week of violence (IRIN, 2013).

Despite efforts by government to counter attacks by Boko Haram, the group continued to aim at high profile targets with greater casualties. Government declaration of a state of emergency and other systemic approaches to ending the violence appeared ineffective. Its efforts to establish dialogue with the sect members and the possibility of granting amnesty to the group has also not yielded the desired effect as key leaders of the group have turned down the offer of amnesty. In a video message, the leader of the sect, Shekau rejected government's proposed amnesty saying the group had done nothing wrong.

Instead, he retorted that it was the government who needed pardon (Mudashir, 2013). Several factors have been attributed for stoking the embers of Boko Haram violence and the perceived support it receives from the local population. Some of these factors include massive poverty and underdevelopment of the north compared to the more developed Christian dominated southern part of the country, massive corruption in the government and high-handedness and brutality meted on the local population by security forces. It is also believed by the sect that Nigeria's relation with the West is a corrupting influence on the country and responsible for many of the woes in the country and failure of governance. Northern Nigeria has a high level of poverty and many of the residents live in abject poverty.

## Ideology and Organization

It is not entirely clear what Boko Haram ideology is. On the one hand, it appears the group's objective is the creation of an Islamic state governed by Islamic laws. This is reflected in several statements and other media interviews released by the group though Johnson (2011) is of the view that there may be other objectives being pursued by the group since Sharia law is already being observed in 12 out of the 36 states of the Federation.

Nevertheless, it is observed that from inception, the sect leader had preached against the brand of Islam being practiced in northern Nigeria. Mohammed Yusuf for instance was known for "his radical and provocative preaching against other Islamic scholars such as Jafar Adam, Abba Aji and Yahaya Jingir and against established political institutions" (Danjibo, 2009: 6).

On the other hand, Boko Haram had repeatedly made one crucial demand relating to good governance. It has publicly stated its aim to overthrow the government, abolish democracy, and create an Islamic state. This probably accounts for the reason why the sect at one time asked former President Jonathan to either convert to Islam or resign. In fact, many of Shekau's statements in the past directly addressed to President Jonathan often focused on the government's inability to govern the country, with Boko Haram accusing the regime of corruption and apostasy. Such political statements were indicative of a strong sense of injustice and bad governance. Furthermore, Boko Haram's aspirations also reflected a desire to broaden its Islamist agenda beyond Nigerian border. The emergence of a splinter group, Ansaru points to this. Supporting this was Abubakar Shakau pledging allegiance to ISIS in a video released in March 2015. Hence, while it can be said that the group remains committed to the local agenda of creating an Islamist society in Nigeria, it has embraced international jihad and habours a broader objective of aligning with other international militant Islamist groups.

Little is known about the structure and composition of Boko Haram leadership because of the secretive nature of the group. However, Shekau is widely considered as the main leader of Boko Haram and works with a few select cell leaders who form his inner circle. Shekau has on several occasions, been reported to have been killed by the Nigerian military but keeps releasing videos that suggest he is alive. However, the announcement by ISIS of the appointment of a new leadership on August 3, 2016 shows the existence of division within the group. While Shekau claims to be the leader of Boko Haram, ISIS head,

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced a change of leadership naming Abu Musab al-Barnawi as the new head of Boko Haram—the West African branch of the Islamic State.

## Boko Haram Internationalism

Although Boko Haram had in the past openly indicated its aspirations as a globally minded Islamist group (see for example, *Vanguard*, August 14, 2012; Brock, 2012), the August 26, 2011 bombing of the United Nations building was its first major attack of international dimension. Though it occurred in Nigeria, its anti-American and anti-Western rhetoric did awaken global consciousness to Boko Haram internationalism. In May 2011, months before it attacked the UN building, two Europeans, a Briton and an Italian, were kidnapped by Boko Haram international wing Ansaru. Both were held captive for about a year before they were killed by the sect during a failed joint rescue operation by Nigerian and British forces in northern state of Sokoto. More specifically, Boko Haram internationalism lies mainly in its transnational attacks, recruitment process, as well as its international linkages and support system.

Boko Haram transnational attacks have largely remained regionally focused covering Nigeria and its neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The porosity of borders and multiple ungoverned spaces across these countries have allowed the group to thrive in its attacks. Apart from Nigeria where Boko Haram activities have been more pronounced, the group has carried out direct attacks on these foreign soils. The case of Cameroon is special considering the fact that Mohammed Marwa, the leader of Boko Haram's predecessor— Maitatsine originally came from the northern Cameroonian town of Maroua. Marwa had successfully planted the seed of rebellion in the area and his effortless ingress and egress across the Nigerian-Cameroon borders allowed it to successfully nurture and grow the seed of violence which Boko Haram arguably took

advantage of and successfully established formidable bases and staging areas in Cameroon from where it launched attacks both in Cameroon and Nigeria.

On October 20, 2012, the mayor of a Cameroonian border town was assassinated by Boko Haram while visiting Nigeria. Boko Haram also kidnapped seven Europeans, all from the same Tanguy Moulin-Fournier family in Dabanga, Cameroon in February 2013 for which a ransom of 3million Dollars was paid for their release. The group had noted that the abduction was a reaction to French anti-Islamist engagement in Mali (US House Committee on Homeland Security, 2013). One of the most high-profile Boko Haram attacks in Cameroon occurred on July 27, 2014 where the wife of Cameroon's Vice Prime Minister (Francoise Agnes Moukouri), the Lamido of Kolofata (Seini Lamine), and some foreigners were kidnapped in Kolofata, a northern Cameroonian town. Two months before, the sect had killed a Cameroonian soldier and abducted 10 Chinese workers from the town of Waza, Cameroon. It is reported that more than forty Cameroonian soldiers lost their lives to Boko Haram insurgency in 2014 alone (BBC, December 29, 2014).

Besides Cameroon, Boko Haram had also launched attacks in Chad and Niger partly as a response to both countries' involvement in local and regional efforts to rein in the sect's activities. Boko Haram attacked Chad's capital city, N'Djamena in June 2015 killing about 23 people with over a hundred others wounded (Daily Sun, June 16, 2015). The same report noted that a series of attacks targeted at Chadian security forces as well as security operations against the group had left more than seventy Chadian soldiers dead. In Niger's eastern town of Diffa, Boko Haram attacked using suicide bombers in response to the country's counterterrorism operation against the group. The May 2014 clashes between the Nigerien forces and Boko Haram members left some of the insurgents dead and several others arrested. Unlike in Nigeria where ethno-religious, socio-economic and political factors have been crucial to the emergence of Boko Haram, the military involvement by Cameroon, Chad and Niger could be adduced as inciting greater Boko Haram attacks

against those countries. Nevertheless, the cross-border activities of the sect show its capacity to constitute serious regional threats which requires greater cooperation among the countries to effectively contain the sect's activities.

Furthermore, Boko Haram has successfully targeted unemployed and uneducated youths as members particularly in the north-eastern parts of Nigeria. However, its recruitment and radicalization particularly of young Muslims also transcend Nigerian territory. Boko Haram has successfully indoctrinated and recruited not just the poor and illiterate but also very well-educated youths in Nigeria and other countries in West Africa and the Lake Chad region. Boko Haram operated training camps in northern Cameroon where it is reported that it successfully recruited and trained thousands of fighters who were later deployed into conflict theatres in Cameroon, Nigeria and elsewhere. Abdullahi (2015: 137) noted that over 1000 of such fighters had attacked five villages including Amchide, seizing the Achigachia military base and hoisting its flag.

The Cameroonian military repelled the attacks, regaining control of the Achigachia military base in an operation that led to the death of 41 Boko Haram insurgents and a Cameroonian soldier. Boko Haram incessant attacks in Cameroon triggered massive counter offensive by the country's military including deployment of Cameroon's elite forces. An operation in one of Boko Haram training bases left at least 34 insurgents killed. The soldiers rescued about 84 children who were undergoing training in the camp while the camp was dismantled (Abdullahi, 2015: 138).

The impressive transnational network that Boko Haram created for recruiting, radicalizing and training of members was recognized by former President Goodluck Jonathan in 2014 when he noted that intelligence reports suggested that Boko Haram runs advanced international training bases in places like Kidal and Gao in Mali, Maradi, Maina Soro and Diffa regions in Niger, Garoua and Maroua in Camerron, Ridina and Zango areas of

N'Djamena, Chad, Ranky Kotsy area of Sudan, as well as other clandestine bases in Central African Republic (Newswatch, June 2014: 18).

Additionally, Boko Haram external linkages have provided some form of support system to the group in executing its terrorist activities. Besides copy-catting techniques used by other Foreign terrorists Orgaanisations (FTOs) such as suicide bombings, beheading of victims, martyrdom videos in Arabic, kidnapping foreigners and demanding for ransom, and the dream of establishing an Islamic caliphate, its connections to foreign terrorist groups have aided not only its recruitment process but also the level of training as well as sophistication of operations. Beginning from 2009, Boko Haram members were noted to have trained in AQIM bases in West and North Africa where they learnt bomb making, and the use of advanced weapons and ammunitions including shoulder-fired weapons and surface to air missiles. Boko Haram members had also trained in faraway Somalia with alShabaab where they learnt how to make and detonate improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombings, propaganda and intelligence operations strategies which are useful for sustaining the insurgency.

Boko Haram's foot soldiers were believed to have fought alongside Islamists in northern Mali against the UN backed French-led operations to dislodge the Islamist militants in 2012. It is believed that about 200 Boko Haram members joined AQIM to fight in Timbuktu and Gao (Hinshaw, 2013). It was during the same period that Ansaru attacked a detachment of Nigerian security forces along Lokoja, Kogi State, Nigeria who were on their way to Mali on a peacekeeping mission. It is also known that foreigners have fought alongside Boko Haram members in Nigeria thus showing some form of back and forth support between the group and other external actors.

Beyond training and indoctrination support, Boko Haram has also received international assistance in the form of funding, weapons supplies and foreign fighters. The group is

known to have got funding from MusilimiYaa'ma, an Islamic organization based in Algeria. Also, the Nigerian military had on several occasions noted the use of advanced and more sophisticated weapons and ammunition by Boko Haram members and some of these weapons were not known to the Nigerian army thus indicating support from external sources. Local eyewitness report claimed that helicopters allegedly from Chad were seen dropping arms and food items for Boko Haram insurgents in their camps around Chikungudu and Kwalaram villages between Monguno and Marte. In 2014 when Mahamat Bichara Gnoti, a political associate of the Chadian President Idris Deby was arrested along Chad-Cameroon border with a cache of arms including surface-to-air missiles, he claimed the weapons were bought from Sudan and meant for Boko Haram insurgents operating in north eastern Nigeria. According to Abdullahi (2015: 58), it was alleged that President Idris Deby provided the funds for the weapons and gave the associate a presidential pass allowing him to freely transport the weapons to its destination.

These dimensions of Boko Haram internationalism show the extent to which the group entrenched itself as a transnational terrorist organization particularly in the West African and Lake Chad region. Though it cannot be said that an alliance exists between the group and other FTOs, there is a relationship between Boko Haram and other terrorist organizations. ISIS, al Qaeda and the Taliban have proved that their grand objective is not only to deepen their roots in the Arab world, but also to develop subsidiaries around the world. The 2016 declaration of Boko Haram as ISIS West Africa Province (ISWAP) by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi suggests that Boko Haram might evolve into an enduring terror group with greater capacity to cause monumental damages.

A clear indication of the transnational threat posed by Boko Haram can be gleaned from the scale of international response to the group's activities. The four major countries most directly affected by Boko Haram activities (Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger) were compelled to take unilateral and regional actions against the insurgency. At the regional

level, the four countries supported by Republic of Benin formed the multilateral joint task force (MJTF) to cooperate on intelligence sharing and other areas including joint/coordinated military operations to prevent cross-border attacks by the sect. Furthermore, the US on June 21, 2012 announced Shekau, along with two others (Abubakar Adam Kambar, and Khalid al Barnawi), as *Specially Designated Global Terrorist* (SDGT). In 2013 also, the US government placed a seven-million-dollar bounty on Shekau's capture, the highest of all African terror leaders. Additionally, it supported the MJTF with funding of $5billion to aid the MJTF military operation against Boko Haram insurgency.

Concerned about the threats posed by Boko Haram, the French government organized the 2014 Paris security summit. The Presidents of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger were present at the summit. Representatives of the European Union, the US, Britain and others were equally in attendance to discuss strategies to be adopted to contain Boko Haram security threats. The summit encouraged the setting up of bilateral and multinational frameworks especially on intelligence sharing and coordination of operations, effective border management as well as dealing with issues of refugees induced by the insurgency.

Given the above, scholars and security experts still have argued that Boko Haram cannot be classified as an international radicalized movement but a Nigerian-based group that relies on local and foreign support to pursue what it primarily a local agenda (Walker, 2012; Cook, 2013). Marc-Antoine Perouse (2014) has argued that international response to Boko Haram terrorism particularly by the US and other world powers is largely symbolic rather than a confirmation of the sect's internationalized threats. Symbolic or not, being able to compel such significant responses from major powers such as the US and France suggests a recognition of the group's capability to cause serious damages of greater international proportion which rightly should not be taken lightly. As the former commander of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), General Carter Ham puts it "Boko Haram leadership aspires to broader activities across the region, certainly to Europe, and I think again as their

name implies, anything that is western is a legitimate target in their eyes" (cited in US House Committee on Homeland Security Report, 2013:

10).

## Implications for Sub-Regional Security

Boko Haram insurgency has resulted in deteriorating humanitarian and security situations particularly in the Lake Chad region. Incessant attacks and suicide bombings have devastated vital infrastructures across the affected areas reducing access to essential services while causing widespread trauma, poverty and hardship. Refugee crises in the area have worsened forcing Nigeria and her immediate neighbours further down the underdevelopment path. Around 21 million people live in the affected area across the four Lake Chad countries. Over a hundred thousand Nigerian refugees and more than 2.5million IDPs induced by the insurgency have destabilized the poor and unprepared neighbours. More than 40,000 refugees have fled to Niger, with several other thousands in Cameroon and Chad. Most of the refugees and displaced people are sheltered by families and communities that themselves are victims of the crisis and count amongst the world's poorest and most vulnerable. This has put further strains on food supplies, limited medical and health facilities and other social infrastructures in these countries.

The conflict has exacerbated food insecurity and malnutrition in the affected area. An Oxfam report (2016) noted that at least 6.3million people (500,000 of which are children) have faced acute food insecurity. Of these figures, about 4million are in Nigeria, while more than 2million are in Chad, Niger and Cameroon. A report by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA 2016) on the north eastern part of Nigeria stated that up to 2.1million people fled their home at the height of the conflict with about 1.8million displaced due to Boko Haram insurgency. Almost 7million people more than 50% of whom are children are in need of humanitarian assistance in the three most affected states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe. The displaced people are in dire need of

protection, water, food, sanitation, education, shelter, and healthcare. The conflicts have resulted in the death of more than 20,000 people and countless number of women and children who have been abducted and drafted as suicide bombers.

Furthermore, much of the literatures have focused on Islamic radicalization in the West with little emphasis particularly on Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region. Field reports suggested that some of the Chibok girls kidnapped in April 2014 along with others also abducted by Boko Haram were dispersed across the region. This has serious security implications. A number of those abducted having been radicalized by the group were deployed as suicide bombers across the region. For example, an estimated 38 children were reported to have been used by the group to carryout suicide bombings in the Lake Chad region in 2016 bringing the total number of children used by the sect as suicide bombers to about 86 since 2014. The sect also used an estimated number of 15 women, 40 men and 20 other unknown attackers as suicide bombers in 2016 (UNICEF, 2016). The sect leaders have repeatedly boasted that a number of the captured Chibok girls and others had been married off and dispersed across the region and beyond as soldiers for the propagation of its mission. These radicalized "recruits' are a threat to stability and security of the region.

Furthermore, there was the added diplomatic row between Nigeria and Cameroon over cross-border attacks against Nigeria. Cameroon had initially showed willingness to support Nigeria's fight against Boko Haram but appeared to have tacitly withdrawn such support following Boko Haram's "warning" attacks against the country because of her cooperating with Nigeria. These attacks seemed to have forced Cameroon to reduce its tough stance against the sect including withholding intelligence on Boko Haram from the Nigerian government. It was also alleged that part of negotiations to prevent further Boko Haram attacks against Cameroon included a commitment by the government to release four Boko

Haram commanders in Cameroonian jails as well as supply of a considerable number of weapons and ammunitions to the group. This enabled Boko Haram to strengthen its bases in Cameroon and successfully launch attacks from such bases against Nigerian villages and communities in the north east.

Consequently, the Nigeria government accused Cameroon of doing little to secure its borders and curtail such attacks. It also accused the country of allowing the group to use Cameroon as a haven when fleeing from the advancing Nigerian security forces. The Cameroonian government however rejected the accusations. As a sign of improved relations with Nigeria, its security forces attacked several Boko Haram bases in Cameroon killing several of its members and arresting others. It has also cooperated with Nigeria in other areas such as intelligence sharing, prevention of illicit movement of arms and terrorists across shared borders as well as joint border patrols as part of the regional coalition to counter Boko Haram insurgency.

Besides Cameroon, there was also the suspicion that burgeoned in Nigeria against Chad over its alleged support for Boko Haram. There were reports that the Chadian government was the biggest supplier of arms to Boko Haram and that several illicit Boko Haram weapons and funds were traced to the country. The relationship between President Idris Deby, Ali Modu Sherif— a former governor of Borno State and Boko Haram leadership came under serious investigation by the Nigeria government in 2014 to determine if there were possible links between Chad and Boko Haram. These suspicions affected diplomatic relations between both countries. Thus, one of the first countries visited by the President Muhammadu Buhari on assumption of office in May 2015 was Chad ostensibly to seek reassurances that Chad and Nigeria were on the same page regarding Nigeria's counterterrorism operations against Boko Haram.

Furthermore, Nigeria's demonstrated capacity for peacekeeping operations globally was largely due to its comparative advantage in terms of population size, economic and military

strength, and more importantly, the relative stability in enjoyed domestically. It has in the past committed over $10bilion dollars to peacekeeping and stabilization missions especially through the Economic Community of West Africa's peacekeeping force commonly known as ECOMOG. Beyond regional commitments, Nigeria also ranked among the world's top troop contributors to international peacekeeping missions under the auspices of the United Nations. However, due to the demand to commit more troops and resources to prosecute its internal security operations against Boko Haram, it lost its status as highest ranked African troop contributing country to UN peace operations to Ethiopia in 2011. In 2016, the country contributed a meager 2,170 peacekeeping personnel to UN peacekeeping operations ranking number eight in Africa behind Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal and Tanzania. The war against Boko Haram insurgency also reduced its capacity to play the leader-motivator through the ECOWAS in the peace support and stabilization mission in Mali in 2013.

What this shows speculatively, is that an unsettled Nigeria is a threat to the security and stability of the ECOWAS sub-region. Boko Haram has already demonstrated its ability to exploited Nigeria's ethno-religious and geopolitical differences to fuel instability and threaten the unity of the country. Its attacks on worship centres in the past fueled existing religious tensions and in some instances sparked deadly reprisal attacks by Christians against Muslim civilians. Therefore, Boko Haram has the potential to further inflame sectarian tensions which could result to a religious civil war in the country. The impact of a Nigerian implosion would be massive, not just in terms the neighbourhood effects of instability and dislocation (massive refugee movement), but also that West Africa, a conflict-prone sub-region, would miss the country's stabilizing role.

Boko Haram became an ISIS-aligned jihadist organization when it pledged its loyalty to the former. This has led ISIS to encourage its foreign fighters to fight in West Africa if they could not join others in Iraq and Syria. This has serious security implications. Because the

sect has been considerably weakened by the Nigerian security forces and international coalition, it could quickly transform (itself in the short term) as a recruitment centre or a subsidiary for ISIS (or other FTOs) and deployed against local and foreign targets within the region. On the other hand, Boko Haram can also leverage on the support of ISIS and others to acquire the necessary funding, training, weapons, ammunitions and other equipment to greatly enhance its capacity to continue its terrorist activities beyond Nigeria's borders.

Creating an Islamic caliphate governed solely by strict interpretation and implementation of Sharia law has been a key objective of Boko Haram. Though achieving this objective is highly unlikely at the moment, it would be a mistake to dismiss the threat. Boko Haram has already killed thousands of people including Muslim critics and has demonstrated its resilience in withstanding sustained attacks by the Nigerian security forces in the past. While Nigeria's military offensive codenamed *Operation Lafiya Dolë* has achieved a measure of success in reducing the group's terrorist activities both in intensity and spread, it is still beset with a number of challenges such as operational inexperience in dealing with unconventional warfare, mismanagement of counter-terrorism funds and weak regional cooperation on counterterrorism. It therefore calls for improvement in counterterrorism measures against the sect's activities.

From a broader security perspective, the threat that Boko Haram internationalism poses to the sub-region can be best understood by examining the interest of its associates especially ISIS and AQIM. As observed by Ekhomu (cited in the Guardian Newspaper, 28 November 2015), ISIS has a strategic initiative to dominate global terrorism and is finding partners across various regions. Al-Qaeda too has an interest in sub-Saharan Africa – which is to create an Islamic state in the region. These international terrorist organizations intend to create a haven for Islamist terrorist organizations to operate and perpetuate their attacks against sub-regional and western targets. In recent times, ISIS and AQIM have penetrated further south into West Africa and has contacts/affiliates in countries such as

Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau; and has also successfully linked with Boko Haram in northern Nigeria (Le Sage, 2011; Ekhomu, 2015). If this burgeoning relationship between the various affiliates is allowed to fester and al-Qaeda or ISIS is able to provide them with sophisticated operational training, the consequence is that there would be more deadly attacks against sub-regional and western targets.

## Conclusion

Debate still exists on whether Boko Haram is nothing more than a radical Islamist sect with local aspirations or one whose ambitions transcend national boundaries. It is the author's view that Boko Haram is a jihadist group with sub-regional reach. At present however, the group may not be considered to be of the same ilk as other notorious extremist groups such as ISIS, AQIM or al-Shabaab. Nevertheless, its continued linkages with these terrorist groups should be a cause for concern not only for Nigeria, her neighbours and other members of the international community. The reason is, though security threats in West Africa and the Lake Chad region have existed for decades and from several sources, religious resurgence and the rise of political Islam is altering and leading to a reexamination of the nature of security threats in these affected areas. Therefore, not paying adequate attention to Boko Haram terrorism including its growing relationship with notorious foreign FTOs poses a greater risk of instability for the region and beyond.

True enough, Boko Haram attacks have been largely restricted to the northeast corner of Nigeria due to sustained government military operations. However, the sect's capacity to regenerate itself should also not be under-estimated given the experience of 2009. Besides, well established FTOs such as AQIM, al-Shabab, AQAP (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula), TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan) and others had similar formative years as localized radical anti-government movements and were overlooked by the respective authorities as posing no serious threat to peace and stability. This appeared to be grave

misjudgment of the groups considering their current status and the level of threat they pose to international peace and security today.

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# Nigeria's Fourth Republic: Electoral administration and the challenge of democratic consolidation

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## Abstract

*The place of election as a signpost of democracy is not in contention since democracy means first and foremost the process through which citizens freely choose their representatives. However, democratic practice in many developing countries are still regarded as electoral democracy because attentions are shifted away from the substance of democracy to focusing on conducting elections only as means of power transition and/or legitimation. The major challenge of democratic consolidation in developing democracies can therefore be linked to election administration which is a compass for any democratic process. Though, Nigeria has been able to maintain a viable set of periodic and regular elections since the return of party politics in 1999, the political values of that attainment is questionable. Against this backdrop, this paper examines the different contours Nigeria's electoral democracy has experienced since the enthronement of the present fourth republic and findings situate them within the contradictions of electoral administration. While studies on the challenges of electoral administration in Nigeria have focused on regime analysis, this study attempts a holistic view of Nigeria's contemporary democratic practice since 1999. The methodology of research is both descriptive and analytical.*

## Introduction

In every democracy, election is the essential ingredient that allows transition from one regime to the other. It is the means and process by which the electorate decides who and which group administers the affairs of the country based upon their perceived conviction on the agenda and programme presented by the group (Aniekwe and Kushie, 2011). In today's world, election is serving great purpose both in war torn, authoritarian as well as democratic societies. It serves as a means of transition from bitter experiences of war to civility in former war torn states. It provides opportunity for freedom in previous authoritarian regimes and offer citizens the space for free expression. It offers a government a unique opportunity for legitimacy and is a recognized way of building trust in former authoritarian states and also a way to validate negotiated political pacts (Brown, 2003; Sisk, 2008).

Election also serves as a transitory process in stable democracies and a way of strengthening an already assumed perfect system (Majekodunmi and Adejuwon, 2012: 44). However, the history of elections in Nigeria has been characterized by threats to statehood based on the manipulation of ethnicity as divisive mechanism for the acquisition of political power by political actors; the fragile nature of political cum democratic institutions is acquainted with poor democratic culture among Nigerian citizens (Omodia, 2012; Ojukwu and Oni, 2016). Nnamani (Cited in Onu, 2005) and Suberu (2007) assert that the fact that elections in Nigeria since inception of the fourth republic have continued to recycle in a ferocious violence and unthinkable manipulation especially from the political elites has attracted the attention of both local and international community. According to Yagboyaju (2011), Nigeria's present democratization, which culminated in the country's

Fourth Republic on May 29, 1999, started amidst great hope and expectations. He observed that though the military regime that mid-wived the process could not significantly convince the generality of the citizens on its success, a huge section of the populace still believed it could herald the dawn of good governance in the country.

The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria confines election administration within the purview of an independent electoral body known as the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Despite the fact that Nigeria has witnessed five general elections in this fourth republic from the Military conducted election of 1999 to the recently concluded 2015 general elections, the incumbency factor from the holders of power still remains a stumbling block to democratic consolidation (Nnamani, 2014). The alarming high handedness displayed by the ruling political party in manipulating the 1999, 2003 and 2007 electoral process, leading to political killings, religious bigotry, industrial actions, insecurity and other socio-economic malady (Ayoade, 2008) did not go unnoticed. However, the 2011 elections were indications that democracy is a pre-condition for good governance. Experiences before and after the elections suggested that Nigeria's democracy moved to a greater height through the exercise, for instance, Nnamani (cited in Vanguard Newspaper 10 January, 2012) observed that the governorship and Senatorial elections that brought Governor Rochas Okoracha of Imo state and Senator Chris Ngige of Anambra Central senatorial district to power in 2011 were clear testimonies that peoples vote can count in Nigerian elections despite all odds. The ground breaking feat achieved by the electoral umpire under the headship of Professor Attahiru Jega towards reforming and completely overhauling Nigeria's electoral body was another attempt at institutionalizing democratic consolidation. It was in this regard that the services of academic Professors were employed in all the polling centers nationwide as collation and returning officers. This was to sanitize the rot in the electoral body, thus, bringing the invaluable role of competent and unbiased umpire in election administration as a

harbinger of democratic consolidation to the front burner. This essay therefore examines the interface of election administration and democratic consolidation in Nigeria's fourth republic with reference to aspects of the electoral process constituting threats to democratic sustenance in Nigeria's contemporary democratic practice.

## Conceptual Discourse: Election, electoral administration, democratization and democratic consolidation

Election as an essential ingredient of a democratic process has received wide research coverage among scholars of different orientation (Herment, 1991; Schedler, 1998, 2002; Yagboyaju, 2011). Oni (2016) refers to election as a popular means of attaining governmental power in modern political systems by which people cast votes for their preferred candidates or parties in a competitive manner. By this process, he asserts that leaders are chosen to "represent the people in both the legislative and executive arms of government" (Oni, 2016: 229) at all levels of governance in the country. Election provides the platform for debate, persuasion and common rules for choosing representatives of the people who can serve in executive, legislative, and other institutions of government. Elections are in this sense a critical means of social conflict management through peaceful deliberations and decision-making processes in which parties abide by the pre-election promises and the looser given the opportunity to provide constructive criticism as the opposition or merely wait till the next election period.

Election remains crucial because it provides the platform that allows members of an organization or community to choose representatives who will hold positions of authority within it. In any democratic system, it is crucial that elections be free and fair. Mackenzie (1967) identified four conditions for the conduct of a free and fair election: (1) An independent judiciary to interpret the electoral laws. (2) An honest, competent

nonpartisan electoral body to manage the elections. (3) A developed system of political parties. (4) A general acceptance by the political community of the rules of the game. According to Arnold and Roy (1988) elections have been seen as central to competitive politics. Ideally, they guarantee political participation and competition, which in turn are fundamental to democratic transition and consolidation. Elections are also central to the institutionalization of orderly succession in a democratic setting, creating a legaladministrative framework for handling inter-elite rivalries. They also provide a modicum of popular backing for new rulers. Implicit in these assumptions is that elections are important for the institutionalization of popular participation, competition, and legitimacy which are three core foundations of democracy (Staffan, 2004: 61–105). Michael Bratton observes that 'the consolidation of democracy involves the widespread acceptance of rules to guarantee political participation and political competition. Elections which empower ordinary citizens to choose among contestants for top political offices clearly promote these rules (Oromareghake, 2013)

It is, however, important to note that elections are not in themselves a guarantee for sustainable democratic transition and consolidation. Elections can also be used to disguise authoritarian rule, what Schedler called 'electoral authoritarianism' (Schedler, 2002: 46). Under such circumstances, elections are only held as a transitional ritual where the people have little or no choice, as has been the case in many African countries (Adejumobi, 2000:59-73). This compromises the democratization process by preventing elections from playing their crucial role (Schedler, 2002: 103). It is, perhaps, with this in mind that Michael Bratton writes that while 'elections do not, in and of themselves, constitute a consolidated democracy', they remain fundamental, not only for installing democratic governments, but as a requisite for broader democratic consolidation.

The relationship between elections and democratic transition, in other words, is not a given, but is contingent upon a number of forces, central among which is the administration of the election. Thus, the regularity, openness and acceptability of elections signal whether basic constitutional, behavioural, and attitudinal foundations are being laid for sustainable democratic rule. While it is possible to have elections without democracy, it is quite impossible to have democracy without elections. If nothing else, the convening of scheduled multi-party elections serves the minimal function of making democracy survive. Lindberg (2006: 139) adds weight to this thinking, especially in the African context, when he speaks about the 'surprising significance' of African elections. He observes that 'the positive effects of holding repetitive elections are perhaps not restricted to free and fair elections, at least not in the early stages of democratization (Lindberg, 2006:6). He argues, for instance, that electoral problems such as 'inflated voters registries, political violence during the campaign and polling day, outright fraudulent voting and collation of votes, intimidation of voters and political opponents may stimulate activism in society even more than free elections'.

Lindberg's argument, however, underestimates the overall costs of poorly governed elections, including their impact on legitimacy. It is the contention of this article that the form and character of elections, either as a reinforcement of democratic consolidation or as regression, are largely contingent upon a series of factors. The most basic of these relates to the electoral monitoring body (EMB) and other institutional-political frameworks that surround it including political parties, mass media, the judiciary, and the interaction among them, and their degree of institutionalization (Robert, 1999; Jorgen and Andrew 2002). These institutions are important for effective electoral administration because 'the indeterminacy of elections', that is, the possibility of elections leading to alternation of power 'is to a large extent a function of an impartial administration of elections (Shaheen and Andreas, 2002: 7).

Electoral administration is the organisation and conduct of elections to elective public (political) office by an electoral body. Electoral administration can be seen as the process of arriving at free and fair selection of candidates to fill public positions. Such activity necessarily involves well coordinated action by men and women aimed at achieving the goal of peaceful and orderly elections in a political system. The overall goal of electoral administration is to ensure that democracy upon which such elections are based is sustained as a mechanism for choosing the peoples' representatives at regular intervals (Ighodalo, 2008). Election administration is 'the mechanics of how elections are run, ranging from preparations for the election, to the methods by which people cast their ballots, to how winners are declared' (United States Election Assistance Commission, USEAC, 2008:1).This is usually overseen by an electoral body. According to the Election Administration Research Centre (EARC) at the University of California, Berkeley, USA, election administration involves the 'facilitation of voting and the management of elections at all levels' (EARC, 2005:1). It also includes the organization of election agencies, the behaviour and characteristics of election officials, the process of conducting elections, and the implementation of election policies (EARC, 2005:1). For Jinadu (1997: 2), election administration connotes 'the organization and conduct of elections to elective public (political) offices by an electoral body'.

In varying degrees, these conceptualizations suggest that election administration is not an exercise restricted to Election Day events. It is a process that spans the pre- and postelection periods. For example, before the Election Day, adequate preparations must have been made in terms of voter registration, procurement of necessary equipments, including communication gadgets and vehicles, voter's education and sensitization, as well as the recruitment and training of poll workers. Also after the elections, there may be protests and contestations over results either in whole or in part that may lead to the search for electoral justice. The success or otherwise of litigation process also depends

largely on the support of election administrators to supply necessary election documents for litigants to pursue their case(s). This attests to the fact that electoral administration is a crucial aspect of electoral governance and democratic consolidation. Democratization of the political and electoral processes is significant in enhancing democratic practice that will eventually culminate in consolidation. Substantive political changes either from an authoritarian regime to democratic government or from one democratic regime to another must move in a democratic direction in order to achieve a sustainable democratic order. Democratization thus speaks of transition to a more democratic regime. The outcome of such transition may be consolidation as tpified by the United Kingdom or it may face frequent reversals as exemplified by democratization in Venezuela.

Ideally, democratization aims at ensuring that the people have the right to vote and have a voice in their political system. This ostensibly suggests that the political system must not be closed as currently observed in the United Nations which undeniably exacerbates calls for reforms and altered voting structure and voting systems to accommodate regional representation. Democratization has become more of a movement in various facets of the society including in corporations and in knowledge production, apart from its criticality in politics and governance. At the corporation level, there is a drive to alter the boss-knowsbest practice and the concentration of organizational power structrure in the top echelon of firms to favour a more decentralized process of consultation and empowerment of lower levels in a way that decision making is diffused. This move is otherwise known as the workplace democracy. At the realm of knowledge, there is a growing spread of knowledge encapsulated in information and skills acquisition among common people as opposed to the elite controlled knowledge syndrome. Edet (2011) writes that for democratization to produce a meaningful outcome, the electoral body, security agents, the political class and political parties must demonstrate democratic values in their internal operations and in inter-agency collaborations. The inability of the

stakeholders in the political system to abide by democratic principles especially in electoral governance gives room for democratic reversals. Huntington (1993) aptly captured this thought, arguing that the first and second waves of democratization in Europe, Northern America and the Middle-East suffered reversals because of unguarded and unsustainble democratic practices including lack of economic development, history and passive civil society. Since the emergence of the third wave of democratization in the 1970s especially in Latin America, Africa and the former Eastern Bloc, democratic consolidation has become the topical issue of concern to prevent democratic relapse.

Democratic consolidation is the identifiable phase in the transition from authoritarian rule to civil rule and by extension, democratic systems that are germane and fundamental to the establishment and enthronement of a stable, institutional and enduring democracy (Schedler, 1998). Achieving democratic consolidation therefore calls for the enthronement of democracy as a system of organizing both the society and government and thereafter creates concomitant institutions, culture, ethics, support system and the 'will' that are crucial in making it stable, efficient and responsive (Oni, 2014). It is important to mention that the process of democratic consolidation requires nurturing democratic values and ethos, principles and institutions in a sense that prevents a reversal to an authoritarian regime. Diamond (1994) noted that attaining democratic consolidation rests upon a strong and dynamic civil society whose responsibility it is to check repeated abuses of power; hold public officials accountable for their actions and inactions in the management of public resources and also serves to mitigate political conflicts. However, civil society is not an end in itself but a means to an end, as Diamond (1994, 7) instructively noted that 'a vibrant civil society is probably more essential for consolidating and maintaining democracy than for initiating it'.

Democratic consolidation as a process begins with the enthronement of democracy after a free and fair election, and spans through the period when its probability of breakdown is very low or on the other way round, when its probability of survival is very high (Ojo, 2006). Relatedly, there must then be the optimism expressed by major political actors, all relevant observers and the entire citizenry that the democratic regime can last into a foreseeable future, thereby having the capacity to build dams against what Huntington (1991) would describe as a 'reverse wave'. How then do we identify a consolidated democracy? Different criteria are suggested in literature to identify a consolidated democratic system (Schedler, 1998) but two are of critical importance to the foregoing discussion. First is the 'two election test' which is also known as the 'transfer of power test'. This identifiable factor reckons with the 'behavioural' aspects of democratic consolidation as it questions the attitude of political actors when defeated in an electoral contest. This criterion argues that the probability of democratic survival is not high until and unless democratically elected regimes loose elections in subsequent contests and accept the verdict (Ojo, 2006). Democracy is therefore consolidated when a ruling political party or class hands over power to an opposition party after losing the electoral contest. This scenario has been experienced in Ghana several times since the country's return to party politics in 1992.

The second way of assessing democratic consolidation is the 'simple longevity or generation test'. The underlying assumption of this criterion is that twenty years of regular competitive elections should be sufficient basis for adjudging a democracy consolidated irrespective of the fact that power is not transferred to another political party or class. It is in this sense one can classify South African democracy as consolidated having conducted competitive elections regularly and creditably since the demolition of the apartheid regime and enthronement of democracy in 1994. The criterion argues that continuous and regular elections would have created in people a mind-set that develops apathy for any near

alternative to democracy. It is therefore unthinkable for the electorates to explore another method of appointing their leaders (Ojo, 2006). However, the foregoing discussion has evidently demonstrated that no one criterion or condition is a 'pure type' on its own and that democratic sustainability is a product of a combination of factors or conditions operating together. Synergizing these facilitating conditions therefore offers the prospects of democratic survival and deepening to be enhanced.

## Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework proposed in Besley and Persson (2011), identifying two symptoms of state fragility: state ineffectiveness and political violence, provided the theoretical context within which this work is situated. Besley and Persson (2011) elaborately differentiate between the causes, symptoms and consequences of state fragility. Among the features that have been associated with fragile states are: the threats they impose to regional and global security and stability (European Report on Development, 2009); and the fact that they are plagued by high levels of poverty, and have had a slower progress towards development when compared to other developed countries (OECD, 2012; OECD, 2014). It is instructive to note that some of the attendant consequences of fragility of states are the lack of will or capacity of the state to perform its core functions, and frequency of political violence (Ferreira, 2015). Thus, fragile states impose great challenges for the effectiveness of developmental and democratization efforts.

The return of democracy in Nigeria in 1999 after sixteen years of uninterrupted military regime has recorded less than expected achievements in terms of popular participation, transparency and accountability in governance, rule of law as against rule of law and economic development. These values remain the basic tenets upon which democracy rests

(Edet, 2011). The seeming disappointment of democratic practice in contemporary Nigeria has been adduced to state fragility (Albert, 2011) and this is often revealed most during elections. Corroborating Albert, Edet (2011, 63) asserted that:

> Democratization in Nigeria is suppressed by the electoral fraud carried out by politicians in collaboration with electoral bodies and security agents, including the Nigeria police.

It is instructive to note that these critical stakekeholders institutions in the electoral process and their managers have been captured by political and non-political elite to fester their political and economic interests and those of their cronies. This obviously speaks of the extent to which the state is fragile (World Bank, 2000; Yagboyaju, 2011).

## Electoral administration in Nigeria: The fourth republic in perspective

After a long military intervention in the body politic of Nigeria starting with the military overthrow of democracy in 1983 and the many failures of military transition programmes since 1989, Nigeria finally returned to party politics in 1998 with the establishment of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) by the Abubarkar military regime which eventually culminated in the inauguration of the Obasanjo civilian administration on 29 May 1999. Since then, five general elections have been conducted in 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015. In terms of administration, 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections have been described as shoddy, muddled and shabby (Agbaje and Adejumobi, 2006; Ojo, 2006;

Suberu, 2007), all pointing toward democratic relapse in Nigeria. Only the 2011 and the 2015 elections have shown improvements in Nigeria's electoral process.

## Threats to sustainable electoral administration in Nigeria's fourth republic

Studies have shown that the administration of election in Nigeria is characterized by daunting challenges that question the credibility and integrity of the process and its outcomes (Suberu, 2007; Omotola, 2010; Yagboyaju, 2011; Yagboyaju, 2015). Oni (2014) observed that Elections in Nigeria's Fourth Republic are not only precarious, but have succeeded in exacerbating electoral apathy as many Nigerians shun the polling booths on many electoral occasions. He argued that since the inception of the present democratic practice in Nigeria in 1999, most of the general elections held have been conducted under an unfertile atmosphere because of the absence of enabling conditions for democratic participation which of course is the greatest obstacle to democracy as Ake (1996:11) noted. The Prebendal and predating nature of Nigerian politics (Joseph, 1991) has turned electoral competition into warfare among political elites which can no longer be regulated by the constitutive rules of the game. The soft and weak nature and character of the Nigerian state has also reduced electoral contests to the battle of the strongest and the potentialities of who holds the instruments of the state. The state thus became a tool in the hands of political elites to achieve sectional and particularistic interests. Politicians have tagged elections a 'do or die affair' going by the words of former President Olusegun Obasanjo of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in 2007. All sorts of dastardly acts are perpetrated by Nigerian politicians in order to win elections at all cost. Ashiru (2009:101) aptly summarized the electoral process in Nigeria's Fourth Republic thus:

Apart from the violent nature of our electoral competition, the contestants for state power also try to undo or outdo one another using all shades of electoral malpractices such as recruiting juvenile to vote, detaching ballot booklets, duplicating ballot papers, vandalizing voter materials, stuffing of ballot boxes, and outright intimidation of opponents as well as falsification of electoral results.

Many of the crises confronting election administration in Nigeria stem from what could be described as the administrative failure of electoral body with attendant consequences for disputed election results and the use of extra-constitutional means to seek redress or demonstrate anger and frustration (Akhakpe, 2008; Omotola, 2010). The immediate and remote causes of these challenges are holistically examined below.

## Legal framework of elections in Nigeria

Elections in Nigeria's contemporary democratic system are regulated by the 1999 Constitution and the Electoral Act designed for each general election, as well as regulations and guidelines issued by INEC. The 1999 Constitution provides that the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be a State based on the principles of democracy and social justice (FGN, 1999). Political rights such as the right to form and join political parties, to take part in political campaigns, to vote and be a candidate, amongst others, are granted. However, the 1999 Constitution does not specifically establish the fundamental principles and standards that apply to elections outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) as periodic, genuine, universal suffrage, equal suffrage, secret ballot, and the free will of the people.

A number of problems with the electoral framework were not addressed in the different adopted Electoral Acts since 1999 especially with regard to the independence of INEC. Most significantly, the President continues to be involved in the appointment of INEC Chair and its Commissioners. At the federal level, all Commissioners are still appointed by the President, after consultation with the Council of State and confirmation by the Senate, and at the state level, all 37 Resident Electoral Commissioners (RECs) are appointed directly by the President. Arguably, this practice portends the tendency for politically appointed electoral officials to be biased in favour of their pay masters thereby removing the independent mindedness of the electoral umpires. Other notable concerns that the law fails to address include, the absence of a requirement for results to be displayed at the polling station level and for a breakdown of polling station results to be displayed at all superior levels of the election administration, a lack of adequate procedures for the handling of complaints and appeals before election day, and a lack of time limits for the publication of election results.

The adopted Electoral Acts are also silent on a number of other important issues. Significantly, there are no provisions to promote transparency in the appointment of polling station staff or access to INEC decisions. In addition, election petitions challenging irregularities in election conduct can only be filed by candidates and political parties. Concerned citizens and the civil society do not enjoy the privilege of approaching the courts to seek redress that can enhance the credibility of the electoral process. Also, successive Electoral Acts did not provide any special provision for voting in institutions and certain restricted areas (e.g. prisons, hospitals) therefore, there is no mechanism in place to enhance active and effective enfranchisement of such eligible voters. Further, the right of domestic observers to observe the whole election process is not guaranteed by the law. The Electoral Act also lacks a procedure for the approval or rejection of an application for

accreditation of domestic observers. This loophole serves as a basis to deny certain organizations perceived as anti-government accreditation for election monitoring.

## Election litigation process and politicized judiciary

The Judiciary played a generally positive and independent role in the election process (Okoye, 2013). However, the fact that electoral administration in Nigeria is yet to pass the minimum standards of credibility- freeness and fairness, inclusiveness and transparency has constantly increased the role of the judiciary in sustaining democracy (Taiwo and Ajiboye, 2013: 437). Again, the inadequacies of the electoral administration process have exacerbated post-election ligations in Nigeria. For instance, a total of 1,475 election complaints were received by the election petition tribunals across the country after the conduct of the 2007 general elections, a figure that more than doubled the 570 received after the 2003 general elections (Ashiru 2009:105). Arguably, this challenge continues to constitute an albatrous to democratic sustenance in contemporary Nigeria. The courts that are established to resolve disputes arising from the conduct of elections have also been captured and constantly subjected to manipulations and influence that have characterized the electoral process since Nigeria's return to party politics in 1999. Judicial manipulations of the post-election litigation process have generated two problems for the administration of justice in contemporary Nigeria. First is the conflagration of the election litigation process through undue stretch of the judicial process beyond the imaginable sometimes till the winner from the elctoral ballot nearly ends his/her tenure of office before judgment is pronounced. Although, this infracture seems to have been resolved through the legal time limit of the judicial process to one hundred and eighty days (180 days), the emerging issue of technicality involved in dispensing justice in electoral disputes has added to the post-election litigation quagmire. Second is the prominence of conflicting judgments on election litigation cases with similar material facts and circumstances. A situation where

an election petition tribunal that sat on a petition bothering on wrongful substitution of a candidate's name by his political party in Rivers State gave a verdict different from a tribunal that sat on an election petition bothering on same allegations in a similar circumstance in Ogun State raises questions over the credibility and integrity of the Judiciary in raising the bars of democratic elections in Nigeria.

## *Voter registration*

Under the Electoral Act, any citizen above 18 years who resides, works or originates from the Local Government, Area Council or Ward covered by the registration centre is qualified to register in person. Voters' registration exercises in Nigeria have remained largely challenging and cumbersome, having serious threatening and devastating effects on democratic consolidation in the country. The European Union election observation mission report on 2015 general elections in Nigeria reveals that lack of reliable identification documents, very limited population registration data, and an absence of systematized recording of births and deaths are among the numerous threats to reliable voters' registration exercises in Nigeria.

Voters' register remains an important indispensable instrument in the electoral process and its validity has a significant effect on the entire process of election while a defective register undermines electoral outcomes and sometimes contributes to post-election tensions. This is why voters' registration exercise remains a cardinal aspect of election administration as well as democratic consolidation. In Nigeria, however, excessive manipulation of the electoral process begins with voter registration before actual voting during elections. Voters' registration exercises are usually marred by acute shortage of materials while some of those who succeed in registering their names sometimes find same missing on the voters' register during elections (EU, 2015).

The European Union election observation mission report on 2015 general elections in Nigeria captures this predicament more succinctly: "...observed the process to be cumbersome, crowded, marred by technical and staffing issues, with very few registrants presenting any documentation proving identity and age." The report went further to assert: "while the introduction of PVCs and card readers has been effective in increasing the reliability of the voter register ... their impact has been limited by the seemingly weak quality of biometric data captured during registration in 2010 and 2014. This ... contributed to card readers being ... unable to authenticate registrants' fingerprints in Polling Units".

Other challenges of election administration relating to voters' registration include the fact that the PVCs of many registered voters were not available for collection from their registration points (Offiong et al, 2015); the exercise was skewed in favour of the strongholds of selected party(s) (Odebode et al, 2015); below expectation rate of PVCs collection amounting to about 70 per cent of the total number of registered voters' (Jega, 2015a,b) among others, thereby leading to fingers being pointed at the INEC and its role in election administration being queried.

## Politicized security agencies

The centrality of electoral security to credible, free and fair election makes the roles of security agencies very vital in every democratic election. They are required to protect all eligible citizens participating in the electoral process. Their ability to play these roles without engaging in intimidation, coercion or violence against the citizens is crucial to the success of the elections. Of interest however is the role of security personnel in aiding and abetting election malpractices in the country. Assessment of electoral security in Nigeria's democracy particularly since the beginning of the Fourth Republic in 1999, indicate that the public is wary of the security personnel made up of the army officers, Nigeria Police,

Civil Defence Corps and State Security Service who have turned into small gods aiding and abetting electoral irregularities in the country (Chukwuma, 2001; National Democratic Institute, 2012). Their authority, power, and access to firearms, have on many occasions been used to intimidate the population and in extreme situations, reacted violently to constitutionally protected rights and activities such as opposition campaigns or rallies. In the past electoral process in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, the 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011 general elections, these security agencies have been very lethal and overly forceful in disbanding legally constituted gatherings and engaged in running battles with the civil society and opposition curtailing them to exercise their constitutional right to demonstration, assembly and balloting (Animashaun, 2010, INEC, 2011, Jega, 2012).

## Party politics and candidate selection

*The Herald*, a national daily, reveals that the 2007 elections recorded an alarming 6,180 court cases throughout the electoral process (Kayode Lawal, 2008: 1 and 23). For Oromareghake (2013), this may be correct given the high level of political gangsterism and the political culture of impunity that characterized the party politics prior to elections in Nigeria. Omotola (2010) asserts that the most relevant example relates to the manipulation of party primaries to pave the way for anointed candidates of the godfathers. Where this failed, the party hierarchy resorted to elimination by substituting the names of the preferred candidates in place of those who actually won the primaries. A typical case was in Imo State, where Senator Ifeanyi Ararume won the primaries but another candidate's name was put on the ballot nonetheless. Ararume challenged this and won in the Supreme Court, but the victory proved costly: the PDP in the state decided to expel him for anti-party activity, for it is an abomination to challenge an internal PDP decision in court. Whatever happens must be treated as a 'family affair'. The PDP also decided not to field a candidate for the governorship election in the state, and since the electoral laws do

not recognize independent candidacy, Ararume was tactically pushed out of the race. A similar case was that of Rivers state gubernatorial election where the candidate that won the party ticket was also substituted before the election, unfortunately for the party this time around, the rule of law prevailed as the substituted candidate was reinstated by the Supreme Court after the election (Shola Omotola, 2009: 195–221).

Regretably, parties that should promote democracy are themselves the most undemocratic entities. The political parties of the Fourth Republic were bred to be agents of democratic erosion and collapse, rather than strong ramparts for the construction and consolidation of democracy. Party politics in Nigeria's fourth republic has undoubtedly brought more pains than gains to the country's attempt at democratic consolidation. Political parties are a major building block of democracy. However, the inability of many political parties in Nigeria to operate in a democratic manner introduces tension and violence in the electoral process. In Nigeria, political godfathers control the parties at local and national levels (Human Rights Watch 2007; Omobowale and Olanrewaju 2007). These godfathers select the delegates who elect party leaders and candidates. Through their control of the delegates, the godfathers decide who gets the party's nomination and leadership positions. The activities of political godfathers create so much dissatisfaction in the political process because of their disregard of the formal procedures for party elections and nomination of candidates.

Ibrahim (2007:5) identifies five tactics used by Nigerian political godfathers to eliminate popular candidates from party primaries. These include: 1) declaration of one candidate as the 'consensus' candidate and the insistence by the godfathers that those entitled to vote must support the candidate and that other aspirants must withdraw, 2) use of zoning and other procedures to exclude unwanted candidates by moving the party zone for a particular seat or position to an area where the excluded candidate is not local, 3) use of violence by thugs or security personnel to harass and intimidate candidates (and the

supporters of candidates) who oppose the godfathers' protégés, 4) use of money to bribe officials and induce voters to support particular candidates, and 5) application of what Nigerians call 'results by declaration': an aspirant wins a nomination or election, but polling officials disregard the results and declare the loser the winner. In some instances, results of primary elections are simply overturned by the party godfathers. During the 2011 general elections, Olu Agunloye was replaced as candidate for one of the Ondo State senatorial seats by the party leadership. This forced him to defect from Labour Party to the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN). In another case, Mohammed Abacha's victory in the CPC gubernatorial primary for Kano State was rejected by the party leadership. He was replaced by Lawal Ja'afaru Isa despite the case he filed in court (ICG 2011:14-15). Party members who dare to express their dissatisfaction with the mafia-style political process in the parties are normally charged with engaging in 'anti-party' activities and suspended or expelled from the party. Depending on the capacity of the disgruntled party members to fight back, serious intra-party crisis and violence often follow each episode of party convention in Nigeria.

The 2015 general election was not any better. The PDP's primary election for the presidential candidate was 'completely closed', given that no other aspirants were allowed access to the nomination form. Even candidates who paid for the form did not receive one from the party secretariat (Fabiyi, 2014). The eventual convocation of the national convention was, therefore, nothing more than a political ritual to legitimise the candidacy of the incumbent. Party primaries appeared worse at state level, where processes were allegedly manipulated and hijacked by 'big boys and money bags' (Ejike, 2014). Evidence of actual or attempted electoral fraud manifested as factionalism within parties, often leading to splinter groups that eventually merge with other parties. Thus, the focus of parties on struggles to prevail over each other without reference to the common good in

the name of party politics has had far-reaching devastating consequences on the political environment in Nigeria over the years.

## Power of incumbency

In simple political parlance, incumbency refers to holders of political office who enjoy certain privileges (such as wider media coverage and security) which are not available to other contestants in the electoral contest. These privileges create some electoral margin for the incumbent running for re-election leading to an incumbency abuse factor. Incumbency as a singular most significant factor has always radiated in all elections in Nigeria since the advent of the fourth republic. In 2003 and 2007 elections, this factor reportedly promoted the appointment of corrupt and or compromised electoral officers, manipulation of the electoral law and the constitution, manipulation of the electoral tribunals to protect stolen mandates, use of state security forces and apparatus to intimidate opposition parties, denial of access to state owned media houses etc., to ensure ruling parties regain or elongate their tenure against popular will. Ajayi (2007: 148) noted that the pre-election exercises such as clearance of candidates and voters registration were manipulated by the PDP using its incumbency factor to give the party undue advantage. The screening of party candidates for elections by the independent National Electoral Commission, Economic and Financial crimes commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt and other related Crime Commission (ICPC) were all part of the plot to hunt down and disqualify opposition contestants.

Omotola (2010) also noted that during the 2007 general elections, The PDP had a landslide victory in the National Assembly elections, winning 75 of the 109 senatorial seats, leaving the ANPP and AD with 28 and 6 seats respectively. For him, the PDP's massive victory was due largely to the power of incumbency, which enabled it to have substantial and unhindered access to state machineries, including the treasury, mass media, INEC, and the security forces. As the party in power, it also enjoyed good patronage from wealthy

individuals and corporate bodies in terms of financial donations in exchange for the protection of their business interests.

Furthermore, the involvement of INEC in the determination of the eligibility of candidates for elections, which was clearly outside of its constitutional legal mandate, has always raised serious doubt regarding its independence and the expectation that it would create a level playing field for all the parties and contestants.

## Compromised electorate and inactive citizenry

Clearly, an active citizenry in a political system is crucial to the sustenance and deepening of a country's democratic experience. The active participation of citizens not only ensures sustained engagement and participation in the political and electoral processes, it could also be a bulwark against impunity in political culture. Among the most important principles of democratic governance is the principle of participation. While Muhammad (2014:38-9) suggests the concept of participation as collective engagement of human resources in the process of national development, he also noted that popular participation is the conscious and predetermined involvement of society in the process of governance and development. Electoral Management Bodies across the world, thus, need an active citizenry to compliment their efforts at ensuring that elections are free, fair and credible. Our experience in Nigeria is that the citizenry has been largely apathetic towards the political process due to widespread poverty, lack of literacy and distrust of government. Without an active citizenry, efforts towards enhancing the credibility of elections by the Commission would have limited impact on the electoral process. Whenever electorates end up participating, they are often compromised during the electoral process through vote buying among other factors (Omotola 2006; Ojo 2006).

Obviously in Nigeria, Money Politics and Vote Buying have taken the centre stage in our political activities. This is because parties and candidates have shown by their conduct

during political campaigns, that good party manifestoes and integrity of candidates jostling for public offices are no longer sufficient to guarantee electoral success; thus, the resort to vote-buying. On the other hand, the electorates too have obviously demonstrated cynical electoral behavior by the readiness to sell their votes to the highest bidder (Ojo, 2006). This uncharitable behavior or practice constitutes a blemish on public policy and on the electoral process. In fact, it portends dangers to the democratic process of electing officers and in turn prevents good Governance. The problem with this situation is that the electoral process is often compromised resulting in elections not being free and fair.

Vote-buying reached their pinnacles in the elections that ushered in the fourth republic in 1999 and the civilian-civilian transition elections of subsequent years such that it has successfully progressed steadily from open and shameless to outrageously indecent (Ojo, 2006). The fact is that the use of money or any other inducement for that matter, to influence the behaviour of the electorates creates problems for democratic consolidation in the country.

## Corruption

Perhaps the culture of corruption is basically the greatest challenge Nigeria is facing, it is the shortcoming of Nigeria's polity (Olofin, 2001; Yusuf, 2001). Fundamentally, Nigeria's political culture is embellished in political corruption which manifests itself in the use of and negative influence of money in politics, election rigging and thuggery. The major form of corruption that has remained obstacle to Nigeria's national progress is the 'political corruption'. As Apam (2011:24) succinctly puts it, the way of doing politics in this context, is not to live for it but to live from it. Politicians assume the role of political entrepreneurs who invest heavily in politics with the aim of claiming super profits and dividends in the ruthless appropriation of state resources. Obuah, (2010) found that 20 percent of Nigeria's Gross Domestic Product goes to corrupt practices.

Yusuf and Zaheruddin (2015) affirmed that the issue of corruption scandals in the executive arm of the government or in the Parliament to support or block a motion in its plenary sessions, irrespective of the importance of that motion to ordinary Nigerians has become part and parcel of governance in Nigeria. They cited Ogbonnaya, et al (2012:690) who rightly assessed that the legacy of erosion of the culture of rule of law and subsequent enthronement of the culture of arbitrariness and impunity which result to high level corruption has fundamentally impacted on power relations and democratic institutions such as the political parties, the Executive, Judiciary and Legislature as well as other agencies like Election commission. "The consequence of this has been the existence of subdued judiciary, weak oversight capacity of the legislature and dumbness of the electoral bodies both at the federal and state levels".

The events in Nigeria since 1999 have shown that the tidal waves of reversal have been contending with Nigeria's election administration. Consequently, elections and democracy remain grossly unstable and the future seems to be very bleak because of rampant bureaucratic and political corruption. Corruption has reached a high crescendo such that an average Nigerian now possibly associates election and democracy with it. The consequences of political corruption are potently manifest: cyclical crisis of legitimacy, fragile party structure, institutional decay of electoral system, chronic economic problem and unemployment, and above all general democratic volatility. Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the INEC's autonomy is the issue of corruption.

## Fundings

Another factor that is considered important in election administration is the issue of funding. Funding is critical in executing different stages of electoral process from capacity building to procurement of election materials, payment of electoral officials, security and material storage. Interestingly and sadly too, the financial budget for electoral conduct in

Nigeria has always been scaling downward rather than increase. Inadequate funding has the tendency of robing the electoral process of the desired efficiency and effectiveness thereby opening up the process for manovring and manipulations. The general elections of 2011 that were globally adjudged as successful and nearly error free were well funded according to the Chairman of Nigeria's election mamagement body (Jega, 2015a). Subsequent budgets have dramaticcaly dropped from #85 Billion (then approximately $515 Million) in 2011 to #35 Billion ($225 Million) in 2012 and #32 Billion ($200 Million) in 2013 respectively. Worst still, out of the #93 Billion ($560 Million) estimated to be expended on the conduct of the 2015 general elections, only #45 Billion ($272 Million) was released to the election management body. Inadequate funding has significant debelitating effect on the preparedness of the electoral management body in conducting credible, free and fair elections in Nigeria. These facts were alluded to by Attahiru Jega (2015b), former Chairman of INEC thus:

> The major challenge was storage. For the last three years, every time we prepared our budget, we requested funding to create a facility in order to appropriately store this equipment. Regrettably, we never had this funding requirement met, and the way the equipment was stored really left much to be desired. This was one of the reasons why the commission was not been able to produce a "clean" voter register six months before the elections.

## Conclusion: Towards democratized electoral administration in Nigeria

This paper captured the essence of elections as very central to the principle and practice of democracy all over the world. It argues that the genuine path to good governance and

development in Nigeria is not just premised on the conduct of elections, but also on the institution that manages the conduct of such elections. The institutional weakness of Nigeria's electoral process and legal framework for the conduct of elections as it relates to the INEC constitutes grave threat to democratic consolidation. A clear and more explicit constitutional and legal framework designed to enhance the independence and efficiency of INEC is germane at this point in time in our political history. Indeed, such reforms should be geared towards securing social justice for the citizens, who view a credible electoral process managed by INEC as the most potent weapon for transfer of power under a democratic system of government in Nigeria.

Consolidating democracy and ensuring credible elections in Nigeria requires building the institutional capacity of the electoral commission, comprehensive and broad based electoral framework as well as controlling the level of violence through a framework that would give responsibility to all stakeholders with radical reprimand for failure. Admittedly, the political class and the civil society have crucial roles to play to sustain democracy in this regard. The politicians must as a matter of fact play electoral politics according to the rules of the game as a way of sustaining democratic culture. The civil society requires strength of character and should remain a dynamic and vibrant watchdog over public institutions and their officials.

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# Project implementation in a decentralized state: Lessons from the Constituency Development funded food security projects in Kenya

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## Abstract

Like many Sub-Saharan African countries, Kenya often encounters incidents of food insecurity particularly in the arid and semi-arid lands like Kitui and Machakos counties. In response to this scenario, the government of Kenya introduced Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in 2003 with a view to improve food security through community based projects. To this effect, there has been an increase in the annual budget allocation to the CDF from Kshs 1.26 billion in 2003/2004 to Kshs 14.3billion in 2010/2011. But despite such an increase, this big investment has shown a serious discord between the project implementation process and the impact of CDF projects at local level. This paper reports on a study which sought to evaluate the perceived effectiveness of the implementation of CDF projects which, while formulated by the national government, are implemented by the county governments as a mean of improving food security among the rural communities in Kitui and Machakos counties of Kenya. This study drew on Fayol (1949) and Gulik (1936) organizational theory and on the concept of governance propositions put forward by Stoker (2002) in conceptualizing the role of administrative and governance processes on project implementation.This study employed descriptive research design. The data was collected by the use research questionnaire from Project Management Committees. The data was collected from both primary and secondary sources. The quantitative data was analyzed through descriptive statistics which involved frequencies, cross-tabulation and percentages. The data was computed by Statistical Package for Social

Scientists (SPSS) computer program version 17.0. The findings of the study revealed that the perceived effectiveness of county administrative and governance processes varied among sp ecific processes and within practices of those processes. Further, the study established that food security was perceived as being entirely dependent on availability of rainfall in the County when in reality a lot, in fact, depends on administrative and governance processes. From the study findings, it was concluded that administrative and governance processes are the major capacity gaps in the implementation process of CDF food security projects. The study recommended that best administrative and governance practices identified in this study should be promoted, documented, shared, disseminated and benchmarked for future and similar projects. The study further recommended that measures be put in place to address the poor practices in administrative and governance. Finally, the study recommended that food security should be viewed from administrative and governance perspective for policy-making if CDF projects are to contribute towards sustainable food security in Kenya.

**Keywords:** CDF Projects, Food Security, Administrative and Governance processes

## Introduction and background

After political independence in 1964, the government of Kenya decided to spearhead development from its colonial masters of administrative governance. The government identified poverty, disease and ignorance as the three main challenges that were impeding development in the country. Development is a multi-dimensional process that involves reorganization and major changes in social structures, national institutions, attitudes, cultures and increase in economic growth, accompanied by a reduction in unemployment, reduction in income inequalities and reduction in poverty (Todaro and Smith 2008). The government of Kenya started developing and supporting development programmes that aim at eliminating those development problems in the country. To

support poor countries' implementation of development programmes, the World Bank Group spent approximately USD23.7 billion between 1998 and 2008, including Kenya, much of this financial support was utilized for the purpose of boosting agricultural production particularly in the development of irrigation schemes, agricultural marketing, research and extension, improved technology and mechanization of agriculture for increased food productivity. Despite such efforts to boost agricultural food productivity, like many countries in the sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya has continued to experience escalating incidences of food shortages translating into poverty with over 52% of the population living below the poverty line (Economic Survey 2009). In 2008, for example, approximately 3.5 million Kenyans were reported to be in need of emergency food aid and latter in 2011, hunger was declared a national disaster in Kenya due to acute food shortage and high levels of malnutrition (USAID 2009). The food situation is worse in arid and semi arid areas (ASALs) of the country where the local communities depend on rain-fed agriculture to produce food for their livelihoods. Kitui and Machakos counties lie in the arid and semi-arid regions of Kenya and sustaining food security has been very difficult over the years despite the fact that, they are abundantly endowed with natural resources from where development projects can be leveraged to improve food security; but instead the local people continue to live in poverty.

## Poverty in Kenya

Poverty is one of the main challenges facing Kenya particularly in arid and semi-arid zones where most people live below the poverty line. In Kenya, the poverty line is set at Kshs 2,648 per adult equivalent in urban areas and at Kshs 1,238 in rural areas (GOK 2009). Anecdotal evidence suggests that an increasing number of households are experiencing hunger and malnutrition despite the many government development

projects that have been introduced in the country to bring about social and economic development. Nyoro and Jayne (2001) acknowledge that the majority of the households in rural areas of Kenya are food insecure since most of the rural population depends on agriculture-related activities for their livelihood while the performance of the agricultural sector in Kenya has been declining over time. To respond to this problem of hunger the Government of Kenya developed a number of strategies as presented in the following discussion.

## Government efforts to tackle poverty in Kenya

The Government of Kenya (GOK) has come up with a number of strategies to tackle poverty in the country. For instance, in March 1999, the government officially launched the National Poverty Eradication Plan 1999-2015 (Aseto et al. 2003). In 2000, the Government endorsed Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by declaring its commitment to facilitate the realization of MDGs, specifically halving the number of people living below the poverty line and earning less than one US dollar per day by 2015. The strategies put in place by the Kenya government towards the realization of the MDGs include the following:

Firstly, the development of Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2000-2003. Secondly, the launch of Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2001-2004. Thirdly, the launch of Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation 2003-2007 in June 2003. Fourthly, the launch of Kenya Vision 2030 in 2006 (GOK 2009). Finally, the establishment of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) by the central government as a public fund through the CDF Act 2003 passed by the 8th Parliament of Kenya. Among all these strategies, this paper focuses on Constituency Development Fund. This involved the provision of an annual budgetary allocation of at least 2.5% of the annual government revenue to be disbursed under the CDF programme in order to balance regional

development by providing the rural communities with an opportunity to identify prioritize and implement projects that meet their development needs (Kimenyi 2005:2).

Mwenzwa (2009:1) further emphasizes that, CDF is an initiative by the government of Kenya to devolve funds and transfer financial resources to rural areas as a strategy of empowering the local people by creating means and giving them the capacity to exploit their available resources for improved livelihoods. The national government has been increasing its annual budget allocation and disbursement of CDF progressively from 2003 to 2011 to support the implementation of development projects at the grass-roots level. The various government departments, in collaboration with other development partners such as the World Bank, have been tasked with the responsibility of implementing development programmes aimed at tackling poverty at the local level. Nevertheless, food insecurity is still on the rise as if no development interventions have been put in place in the past (Omolo 2010). While the government has made significant achievements in the efforts to develop actionable strategies for alleviating poverty, a lot still remains to be done. In particular, the CDF projects have been plagued by a number of challenges which compromise the achievement of its intended objective.

## Statement of the problem

Food security is a major problem in Kenya; one that has persistently affected the rural communities, particularly those living in arid and semi-arid lands who are subjected to escalating incidence of absolute poverty. In a bid to alleviate the problem of food insecurity and poverty, the government of Kenya introduced the Constituency Development Fund in 2003 at local level to leverage community development projects to improve food security at the grass-roots, among other goals, within the framework of decentralization. Therefore, since 2003, the Kenya public service machinery from the central government through the National Treasury has been doing a commendable job of injecting financial capital into the rural economy through the use of the Constituency

Development Fund. This has been witnessed by an increase in annual budget allocation to the CDF from Kshs 1.26 billion in 2003/2004 to Kshs 14.3 billion in 2010/2011, with a total of Kshs 70.3 billion (TISA 2012). However, despite such an increase in budget allocation and disbursement of billions of shillings into the CDF projects, there has been a great disparity between the project implementation process and the impact of CDF projects at the local level (Gikonyo 2010).

The above scenario raises two main questions. The first concerns the government administrative processes that ought to facilitate the implementation of CDF food security projects. How are they functioning in terms of planning, coordination, organizing, reporting mechanisms and budgeting functions of the county government? The second question is about the governance processes within the decentralized structures of the county government. How effective are they on the implementation of CDF food security projects at different stages of the project cycle life? Hinting on the possible cause of these dilemmas. Gikonyo (2010) asserts that CDF management has faced accountability problems that have been compounded by the inability of the average Kenyan to hold anyone accountable. It was against this backdrop, therefore, that this study sought to establish perceptions on the effectiveness of the implementation process of CDF projects in guaranteeing sustainable food security in Kitui and Machakos Counties within the framework of administrative and governance processes.

## Purpose of the study

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the perceived effectiveness of administrative and governance processes in facilitating Implementation of CDF projects in Kitui and Machakos Counties of Kenya.

## Objectives

i. To establish perceptions on the effectiveness of county government administrative processes in the implementation of CDF-funded projects aimed at improving food security in Kitui and Machakos counties.

ii. To establish perceptions on the effectiveness of county government governance processes in the implementation of CDF-funded projects aimed at improving food security in Kitui and Machakos counties.

## Theoretical framework

This paper put forward a theoretical framework consisting of two modules which provide an explanation of how CDF project implementation process takes place within the decentralized structures of the County government in Kitui and Machakos Counties of Kenya and how this process is linked to the food security at local level. The first module presents the organizational theory by Fayol (1949) and Gulik (1936) while the second module examines the concept of governance propounded by Stoker (2002).

## Organizational theory by Fayol (1949) and Gulik (1936)

Fayol (1949) suggested five management functions that should be performed by all managers at all levels of an organization. These include planning, organizing, commanding, coordinating and controlling. These Fayol's five management functions were later expanded by Gulik (1936) into seven administrative processes. The seven administrative processes abbreviated as "POSDCORB" are used in the field of Public Administration and Management to reflect administrative management. These

included: planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordination, reporting and budgeting.

## Governance as theory: The five propositions by Stoker (2002)

Drawing from Stoker (2002), the governance perspective rests in its capacity to provide a framework for understanding the complex realities of the changing processes of governing. Stoker maintains that governance can be viewed in five propositions, namely: Governance is a set of institutions and actors that are drawn up by, but also beholden to government. Governance identifies the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues. Governance identifies the power dependence involved in the relationships between institutions involved in collective action. Governance is about autonomous self-governing network of actors. Finally, governance recognizes the capacity to get things done which does not rest on power of the government to command or use its authority.

## Applications of the theories to this study

Kenya is one of the developing countries that are currently on the transition of implementing devolved systems of government and development to the county levels. The complexity and realities of the CDF projects implementation at County levels of government to realize food security in Kitui and Machakos counties, therefore, needed to be examined through the lens of administrative and governance perspective. Therefore, the governance theory by Stoker (2002) with organizational theory by Fayol (1949) and Gulik (1936) were deemed appropriate in providing answers to the research

questions of this study. While this research study did not focus on testing hypotheses, it was qualitative in nature and was, therefore, conducted based on the knowledge of what previous research has found. The research questions were developed to interrogate these theories using an inductive approach with the aim of exploring, giving insights and providing a broad understanding of how CDF-funded food security projects are implemented within decentralized structures of the selected County governments in Kenya.

## Administrative and governance processes

This paper is about project implementation in a decentralized state: Lessons from Constituency Development Funded projects for Food Security in Kenya. The CDF projects are used to implement the decentralized development policy by devolving funds to all the constituencies in Kenya which is seen to operate within the framework of administrative and governance processes. For the government to carry out its administrative functions effectively, it is required to employ the administrative management theory and practice that is largely drawn from the work of the Henri Fayol (1925) and latter expanded by Luther Gulik (1936).

The administrative processes can be conceptualized by analyzing seven elements which specify the functional elements of the work of executives. These include: planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting and budgeting. Governance is a positive idea of examining 'what is' while good governance involves a normative model of scrutinizing 'what ought to be'. Hence, good governance requires must be contextualized and based on specific geographical location. It is the way different stakeholders interact to shape and influence development policies. These processes need to be defined, evaluated and agreed upon by all stakeholders of a particular locality on what good governance means for them (Bovaird and Loffler 2005).

From the above definition of governance, it is clear that, governance deals with the way in which decisions are made over the management and control of resources by those in power and authority. Good governance therefore, involves checks and balances with responsibility and accountability relationships that are vital to foster economic development. Abdellatif (2003) asserts that, good governance is characterized by eight main principles. These principles were later adopted in UNDP Report on good governance for Sustainable Human Development. These principles include: participation, consensus orientation, strategic vision, transparency and accountability, responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, equity and rule of law.

## Research methodology

This study employed descriptive research design. The data was collected by the use of a questionnaire from Project Management Committees. The data was collected from both primary and secondary sources. The quantitative data was analyzed through descriptive statistics which involved frequencies, cross-tabulation and percentages. The data was computed by Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) computer program version 17.0. The target population of the study consisted of six constituencies, namely Mwingi Central, Kitui West and Kitui Central constituencies in Kitui County and Yatta, Machakos Town and Masinga constituencies in Machakos County, Eastern Province of Kenya. The two counties were selected purposively, because they were the most affected by hunger and poverty in the region. In this study, the sampling frame included a list of all registered CDF Project Management Committee (PMC's) who are the community representatives in implementing CDF projects at local level assisted and guided by the relevant government departments. The projects in the state departments relevant to food security included: Water projects, Agricultural, Roads construction Education and capacity-building projects and environmental conservation projects.

In this study, a sample of 48 PMC's was selected based on the Central Limit Theorem stated by Lipschutz and Scheller (1998) which points out that, a sample size (n ≥ 30%) satisfies the requirement for most practical purposes even when the population is finite and that, it is sufficient and representative of the entire population under study to be in,cluded in the sample. A simple random sampling method was used to select PMC's because the method is simple to use and analyze, and it helps to ensure that there is no bias in sample selection. The researcher used purposive sampling to select a sample that fulfilled the purpose of the study by selecting the Kitui and Machakos Counties as the counties that closely met the characteristics of the population affected by food security problems in Kenya.

Mugenda and Mugenda (1999) define validity as the extent to which a research instrument measures what it claims to measure, that is, the relevance. In this study a combination of data collection techniques or triangulation was used to ensure validity. A pilot study was carried out before the main study where a test-retest method was used to test the reliability of the research instruments. Teddy (2008) observes that, reliability of the research findings in qualitative research depends on the accuracy, consistency and completeness of the research instruments. The data was collected by use of semi-structured interviews from Project Management Committees (PMC's) supplemented by self-administered questionnaires. The data was collected from both primary and secondary sources.

## Summary of findings  Effectiveness of county administrative processes

The first objective of the study sought to establish the perceptions of the effectiveness of county administrative processes in the implementation of CDF food security projects in Kitui and Machakos Counties. The research findings were as summarized below.

**Table 1: Effectiveness of County Administrative Processes**

| No. | Administrative Process | Effective | | Not Effective | | Total |
|-----|------------------------|-----------|------|---------------|-------|-------|
| | | Frequency | % | Frequency | % | |
| 1 | Planning | 37 | 77.08 | 11 | 22.92 | 100 |
| 2 | Organizing | 31 | 64.58 | 17 | 35.42 | 100 |
| 3 | Staffing | 10 | 20.83 | 38 | 79.13 | 100 |
| 4 | Directing | 30 | 62.5 | 18 | 37.50 | 100 |
| 5 | Coordinating | 9 | 18.75 | 39 | 81.25 | 100 |
| 6 | Reporting | 20 | 41.67 | 28 | 58.33 | 100 |
| 7 | Budgeting | 15 | 31.25 | 33 | 68.75 | 100 |

The research findings in Table 1 above indicate that, 37(77.08%) PMC's reported that the planning process at their respective counties was effective in facilitating the implementation of the CDF projects at community level. The development plans drafted by the County governments were clear, available and accessible a t the Office of the Governor for the members of the public. Besides, the mission and objectives of CDF projects were clearly defined. 31(64.58%) PMC's cited that the organizing process at

county governments facilitated the creation of a business environment conducive for smooth project implementation.

There were also strong organizational structures within the CDF committee that supported project implementation. 38(79.13%) PMC's reported that the staffing processes of the county government did not facilitate the implementation of the CDF projects. This is because of recruiting unqualified and incompetent staff to manage of the CDF projects and unfair selection process of CDF staff. It was reported that the recruitment of CDF staff was marred with favoritism and nepotism and political interference in the recruitment process which impacted negatively on the selection of competent staff to work in CDF projects. 30(62.5%) PMC's agreed that the directing process was promoting CDF project implementation. This is because PMC's were motivated to work in CDF projects by their leaders, effective communication systems, use of democratic leadership style and proper channels for work approvals that were followed during project implementation. 39(98.25%) admitted that coordination by county government officers was poor during project implementation. This was evident by conflicts of interests and political differences. For instance, the area MPs, the Governors and the County government departmental staffs were not working together in consultation with PMC's.

These differences caused delays in completing CDF projects, overlaps and duplication of duties during project implementation process. 28 (58.33%) of the PMC's cited that reporting system by county government was not effective in facilitating project implementation, because some expenditure reports could not be traced. While PMC's did not know how to prepare work plans, keep financial records; use Gantt Charts and MSproject software to prepare reports. There was also lack of free information sharing on project reports. Finally, 33 (68.75%) PMC's reported that, budgeting for CDF projects was not promoting implementation of CDF project. This is because despite the fact that the county government receives 15% funding from the National Treasury to support regional

and county projects and programmes, it was surprisingly noted that the county governments have never developed interest to partner with CDF in the funding of food security projects. There was unfair budgetary allocation to different projects at community level and lack of cost controls on project expenditures.

## *Effectiveness of the County Governance Processes*

The second objective of this study sought to establish perceptions on the effectiveness of county governance processes in the implementation of CDF food security projects in Kitui and Machakos Counties of Kenya. The research findings were as summarized below.

**Table 2: Effectiveness of the County Governance Processes**

| No. | Governance Process | Effective | | Not Effective | | Total |
|-----|--------------------|-----------|-------|---------------|-------|-------|
| | | Frequency | % | Frequency | % | |
| 1 | Participation | 13 | 27.08 | 35 | 72.92 | 100 |
| 2 | Consensusorientation | 10 | 20.83 | 38 | 79.17 | 100 |
| 3 | Strategic vision | 27 | 56.25 | 21 | 43.75 | 100 |
| 4 | Transparency and Accountability | 3 | 6.25 | 45 | 93.75 | 100 |
| 5 | Responsiveness | 25 | 52.08 | 23 | 47.92 | 100 |
| 6 | Effectiveness and Efficiency | 11 | 22.92 | 37 | 77.08 | 100 |

| 7 | Equity | 43 | 89.58 | 5 | 10.42 | 100 |
| 8 | Rule of law | 26 | 33.33 | 32 | 66.67 | 100 |

The research findings in Table 2 above indicate that 35 (72.92%) PMC's agreed that participation was not effective in supporting project implementation. This is because during stakeholders meetings, rarely were PMC's given chance to speak and therefore, they were not involved in decision-making. This suggest that CDF were influenced by local MPs. 38 (79.17%) PMC's cited said that decisions made concerning CDF projects implementation were not based on consensus. The stakeholders were not consulted in decision-making. Instead the local politicians imposed their ideas and issued directives regardless of the views of the local communities leading to governance failures as explained by Stoker (2002). 27 (56.25%) PMC's pointed out that the county government leaders had vision on development issues in the region. The respondents admitted that the leaders in the county government have good plans for regional development, the leaders inspired teams for results, and the county administrators still carried the vision for their people. 45(93.75%) PMC's, reported that county government lacked transparency and accountability. There were allegations of corruption in project selection and allocation of funds, lack of accountability mechanisms in procurements processes and ineffective monitoring and evaluation systems.

These findings agree with the propositions of Stroker's (2002) governance theory that, government institutions tend to dominate service delivery to the citizens by adopting traditional models of a unitary state where local government is the only centre of power to undermine accountability. 25 (52.08%) of the PMC's reported that the county governments were effective in responding to the citizens demands. They were attentive to the needs and development priorities of the local people, and that county government

officers assisted them in writing technical reports, designing and planning of CDF projects when needed. 37 (77.08%) PMC's revealed that the county government was not effective and efficient, because there were few projects implemented and those on progress were not fully-funded, and therefore they did not deliver to their expectations of the people. 43 (89.58%) PMC's revealed that there was equity and inclusiveness in county governments. There was representation in project meetings by gender, including equal opportunity by gender in leadership positions, and that citizens were empowered and knew their rights. They pointed out that women constituted of more than 30% which is the minimum threshold for women in any form of group formation according to Kenya's constitution. 32 (66.67%) PMC's reported that the rule of law was not effective. This is because rule of law was not fully enforced, CDF funds were mismanaged and money could not be accounted for, while community projects were hijacked by politicians. The CDF Act was not followed when handling issues of gross misconduct and mismanagement of funds.

## Conclusions

From the research findings on effectiveness of administrative processes the study concluded that: the views on effectiveness of county administrative processes varied significantly among specific administrative processes and within the various elements of those processes. Evidently, the planning, organizing and directing processes at the county governments were perceived to be effective in facilitating the implementation of the CDF projects at community level. In addition, staffing, coordinating, reporting and budgeting processes were perceived to be ineffective in facilitating the implementation of the CDF projects at community level. These processes were identified as the main administrative challenges impeding the implementation process that need to be addressed to ensure that CDF projects are successfully implemented. It is important to note that despite the fact that the Fayol's five management functions are widely accepted as universal in the

application of management, there is interference and dominance by the local politicians in the management of government resources. The political interference affects decisionmaking processes and allocation of resources. In this study, political interference was singled out as a major threat to the implementation of the decentralization development policy.

From the research findings on effectiveness of governance processes, it can be concluded that the views on the effectiveness of county governance processes varied considerably among specific governance processes and within the various elements of those processes. The strategic vision, responsiveness, equity processes were perceived to be effective in facilitating the implementation of CDF projects at the County level. On the other hand, participation, consensus orientation, transparency and accountability, the rule of law, effectiveness and efficiency were not effective, and so they were the main governance challenges that need to be addressed to ensure that CDF projects are successfully implemented. Finally, the study concluded that, food security cannot be realized if administrative and governance processes are limiting the implementation of CDF projects. Therefore, lack of food security is not solely depended on the traditional view of natural factors and productive inputs but more on administrative and governance processes of the County government.

## Recommendations

Arising from the conclusions of this study, it was established that, planning, organizing and directing processes were perceived to be the most effective administrative processes by the PMC's  in facilitating implementation of CDF projects. This study thus recommends that, the best administrative practices that made planning, organizing and directing processes to effectively facilitate implementation of CDF projects should be promoted, documented, shared, disseminated and benchmarked for future and similar projects.

These best administrative practices include: The development plans drafted by the County governments were clear, available and accessible at the Office of the Governor for the members of the public; developing a clear mission and objectives of development projects like CDF projects; establishing strong organizational structures within the CDF committee; ensuring that there is effective communication among different stakeholders; creating an environment conducive for smooth project implementation; motivating project staff for increased performance and delivery of results; use of democratic leadership style where stakeholders are involved in decision-making and developing proper channels for work approvals during project implementation.

The study also recommended that, measures should be put in place to address the administrative challenges that slow down the CDF project implementation process in the areas of staffing, coordinating, reporting and budgeting processes. These include: Staffing should be improved by developing a recruitment policy that ensures that, recruitment is done on merit and that only qualified and competent staffs are recruited. This will reduce favoritism, nepotism and conflicts brought by political interference due to lack of clear staffing policies. CDF staff should be trained on project management skills. Coordination should be improved by having regular steering committees meetings to review project progress. Unification of diverse and specialized activities of individuals is needed to avoid delays and internal conflicts. Collaboration with County government staffs should be strengthened to mentor the PMC's on preparation of quality project reports, work plans and budgets. Reporting should be improved by providing platforms for free access to project reports and information sharing. Introduction of strict cost controls measures to monitor project expenditures such as conducting audits and adherence to monthly reporting. Budgeting should be improved by training PMCs on MS-project software for the purpose of preparing work plans and how to keep financial records and prepare budgets. The county government should support the allocation of funds to CDF projects from the 15% they get from the National Treasury to support regional and county projects and

programmes. This will help to ensure fair budgetary allocation to different projects at community level. This study further established that, strategic vision, equity and responsiveness were perceived by the citizens to be the most effective governance processes in facilitate the implementation of CDF projects.

The study thus recommends that best governance practices that facilitated CDF project implementation should be promoted, documented, shared, disseminated and benchmarked for future and similar projects. These included:; proper gender representation in project meetings and in PMC's; having visionary leaders who inspire teams for results and clarifying the objective of decentralization policy to the community; the leaders in the county government committing to support PMC's in development of work plans and writing technical reports for project implementation; government officers who are responsive to the needs and development priorities of the local people; representativeness in project meetings by gender and equal opportunity by gender in leadership positions as it is stipulated in the Kenya's new constitution by having women be at least 30% of those involved in the formation of any new group.

The study also recommends that governance challenges in the areas of participation, consensus orientation, effectiveness and efficiency and the rule of law that slowed down the CDF project implementation process should be addressed by putting the following measures in place. First, participation should be improved by opening spaces for engagements and ensuring that community members are allowed to participate effectively in project identification and are part of the decision-making. Secondly, consensus orientation can be achieved by ensuring that the key stakeholders are consulted in decision-making on all matter concerning CDF from project selection to project closure.

Thirdly, transparency and   can be realized by separating MPs from the CDF committee to reduce hijacking community projects by politicians. Designing an effective monitoring and

evaluation system where citizens can monitor and evaluate the performance of CDF at local level is necessary. There is need to improve access to information if transparency and accountability in project selection and allocation of funds is going to be achieved. Fourthly, effectiveness and efficiency can be realized if the focus of CDF projects will remain on needs and development priorities of the community. This is where project activities will focus on promoting improved household food security, improved rural livelihoods, increased employment and household incomes to eradicate poverty and not to focus on interest of few individuals. The rule of law is not taking its course in CDF projects. Finally, there is need to ensure the rule of law is fully enforced to reduce hijacking of community projects by individuals with agendas that do not meet the needs and demands of the local community. The use the CDF Act 2003 is fundamental in making decisions when it comes to gross misconduct and mismanagement of CDF funds as well as designing institutions that are capable of evolving, that are open and easy adapt to new forms of government that recognize the rule of law as suggested by Stoker (2002).

## Areas for further research

From this study, further research should be conducted in the following areas. From the findings of this study, it was established that political interference is one of the main challenges facing implementation of CDF projects in Kitui and Machakos Counties of Kenya. The political influence is seen more in governance perspective; however, it is not very clear how this political influence is related to administrative processes. Therefore, a study is necessary to examine the relationship between the political influence and administrative processes in the implementation of CDF projects in the County government. The study also established that public participation is a major problem affecting the successful implementation of CDF projects. Thus, a study is needed to determine how the local communities can be effectively involved in project planning and implementation of CDF projects in order to address the real problems that affect their lives.

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# The Role of the African Union in Post-Election Violence in Kenya

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## Abstract

*Although post-colonial Kenya avoided major conflicts, it failed to develop political and institutional arrangements capable of promoting social cohesion and co-operation among a divided people. What emerged after the fall of colonialism were political and institutional arrangements that fostered patterns of domination and exclusion. These observations lay the basis for the issues surrounding the post-election violence that broke out in Kenya in December 2007.This paper provides a critical analysis of the causes, extent and nature of the post-election crisis in Kenya, paying particular attention to the processes employed by the AU to deal with conflict, the AU's strengths and challenges in managing electoral conflict and the gaps within the AU's current approach to electoral conflict management. Hall (1996) and Steinmo' (2001) Institutional Theory provides an analytical lens in examining the AU's role. Institutional theory assumes how institutional values shape/constrain the behaviour of individual members and produce change.*

**Keywords**: *African Union, Kenya, Violence, Election, Conflict Trends, Conflict.*

## Introduction

The life cycles of intrastate conflict are prevalent in Africa. Though a categorisation of Kenya as the 'round table' of the so-called conflict-ridden countries, especially in comparison with other countries in its region (such as Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, and Eritrea

i.e., in the East African Community (EAC) is tempting, it is nonetheless, problematic (Nnaeme and Asuelime, 2015). It is important to note that Kenya has enjoyed relatively stable economic growth as the biggest and most advanced economy in Central and East Africa. However, a situational analysis shows that conflict is observable. Such conflict has shaped Kenya's history, beginning from the colonial era, spilling into post-colonial era. With the causes originating from both external and internal forces, the latter has received much attention especially considering the post-colonial state. In his writings, Materu (2014: 18) states that the Kenyan fight for freedom and recognition of their rights came with the Mau Mau movement between 1952 and 1960. A number of heroes are noted, and these include Jomo Kenyatta (Kikuyu hero; first president of Independent Kenya) and Daniel Arap Moi (a Kalenjin) who became the second president (Materu, 2014: 22-23).

The causes of conflict in Kenya's post-colonial state are traced to the monopoly of politics within the Kenyan political system. The post-colonial state predominantly encompasses both interparty and intra-party conflict. During the colonial period in Kenya, the British introduced "a divide-and-rule system that entailed a purposeful stratification of the colony's population in several ways, including along ethnic lines, mostly for ease of ruling and exploitation" (Oguyi, 1997: 2). Hence, under this system some ethnic groups benefited more than the other thus, sowing the seeds of resentment leading to future conflicts. Oyugi (1997 cited in Materu, 2014: 17) highlights that "soon after independence, the dominance of government and political arena by the Kikuyu-Luo alliance became clear and overwhelming". Soon after seizing state power, Kenyatta implemented his agenda which entailed taking care of the needs of his Kikuyu community (Oguyi, 1997). By 1978, Kenyatta had secured (captured) for the Kikuyu tribe, the state, and a homeland along the Kenyan Coast and in the Rift Valley, which put "commerce in the hands of the Kikuyu" (Oguyi, 1997). Not surprisingly, these regions i.e., the Coastal Region and the Rift Valley experienced "serious ethnic violence in the decade of the 1990s" (Oyugi, 1997).

Historically, there have been regional conflict amongst the Kalenjin and Kikuyu communities over landownership of these 2 regions; often cited as a cause of conflict. Hence ethnic conflict often escalates during election periods (1992, 1997, 2008, 2012) amongst these rival communities resulting in many deaths. Elections often are the primary forum of inter-group competition. When President Kenyatta died in 1978, his successor Daniel Arap Moi set out to redress the inequalities suffered by his ethnic group, the Kalenjin, under Kenyatta (Oyugi, 1997: 49).

The government, the security apparatus (military, police, intelligence), most of the available fertile land, and the private sector were all dominated and controlled by the Kikuyu. Oyugi notes that land was an underlying factor behind much of the organized violence in the Rift Valley, as well as being critical to the more localized ongoing conflicts in Mt Elgon and Molo (1997: 41-69). Materu submits that when Kenya became independent, political parties represented ethnic demands of their respective members, although the differences between the parties also entailed an ideological aspect (2014: 18). The ethnic aspect remained one of the key issues dominating Kenyan post-colonial politics including the 2007 elections. For example, the Luos complained of marginalization in the political leadership of the country. Throughout the post-colonial state, the presence of ethnically motivated violence suggests that politicization of ethnicity has been a source of conflict. In all, the conflict trends in Kenya suggest that the country had unresolved issues stemming from the marginalization of other groups in the political leadership of the country. The 20072008 post-electoral violence in Kenya can only be understood by combining its immediate causes and the explosive cocktail of complex historical political processes (Carvalho, 2013: 114). This further instigated the violent clashes in the 2007/8post-election period.

## Causes of Conflict in Kenya in 2007/8

It is apparent that conflict has been recurring in post-colonial Kenya. However, a focus on the year 2007 was necessitated by the fact that this is the immediate episode of conflict. It is also among the deadliest episodes of electoral violence in Africa in recent decades (Salehyan & Linbearger, 2015: 23). The nature and context of conflict during the 2007 was a heated and volatile one, which erupted after presidential elections of 30 December 2007. According to Dersso (2008: 3-4), post-election violence began on 30 December 2007, the date which the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) declared "Mwai Kibaki the winner of the concluded presidential election. Following this announcement, tensions arose, as allegations emerged that there had been large-scale rigging of the election, mostly levelled against the Party of National Unity (PNU), Kibaki's party alliance" (Materu, 2014: 49). Iraki (2010) identified two key issues that directly caused tension, namely, the announcement of the presidential poll and the quick swearing in of Kibaki. Lafargue (2009: 14) notes that both the pre-and post-election periods were marred by conflict with the latter experiencing more of this conflict. He further indicates that initial reports suggested that over 70 people were killed and over 2 000 displaced during the pre-election violence. The extent and magnitude of the violence that followed in the post-election period was immense (Human Rights Watch, 2008). The violence took the form of attacks on civilians, involving acts considered as crimes under the laws of Kenya (Materu, 2014: 50). Official records show that about 1 133 people were murdered, "3 000 were raped and 350 000 others were internally displaced (IDP)" (Materu, 2014). Furthermore, "there were 3 561 incidents of grievous bodily injuries and 117 216 incidents of destruction of properties, including 41 000 houses. Six provinces, namely, Nyanza, Rift Valley, Central, Nairobi, Coastal provinces, and Western provinces, were most affected, but in varying degrees" (Materu, 2014: 50). This situation necessitated a quick response given the high numbers of casualties and IDPs.

The first huge controversy surrounded the utterances by Samuel Kivuitu, the then Chairperson of the KEC. He declared publicly that although as the chairperson he had announced the presidential results, he could not say for sure if Kibaki had won fairly. Materu (2014: 49) further states that Samuel Kivuitu declared the results "under immense pressure; and that as the chairperson he did not have full control of the electoral commission". On top of that, Materu highlights that international observers stated emphatically that the presidential vote counting and tallying processes were flawed or had been tampered with" (2014: 49). Similarly, regional observers, namely the AU and EAC, stated irregularities in vote counting but, were quick to approve the election as free and fair. Informed by these developments, the majority of the public saw the entire presidential election as flawed. Such sentiments spurred the opposition calls for a ballot recount. The Kenyan Law Society also demanded that Kibaki should step down immediately due to a lack of legitimacy (Materu, 2014: 49). In all, this provided a veritable ground for clashes between and amongst people of opposing views concerning election results, with clashes based on political party affiliation which are often organized along ethnic lines. The Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) supporters (dominated by Kalenjin-Luo tribe) argued that the PNU (dominated by Kikuyu tribe) had stolen the election while PNU supporters claimed to have legitimacy.

The ODM under Ralia Odinga's leadership viewed the election result as not free and fair, claiming that its victory had been 'stolen' (Materu, 2014: 49). According to the official results by the "Electoral Commission, Kibaki garnered 4 584 721 votes (46 %)" whilst Raila Odinga garnered 4 352 903 votes (44 %) (Materu, 2014: 49). The ODM claimed that the utterances by Samuel Kivuitu proved beyond doubt that the "election had been 'stolen'. The Kenyan Constitution had a clear legal mechanism, which could be used to challenge the announced presidential results in the High Court. However, the ODM denounced this mechanism publicly, alleging that the existing judiciary was incapable of rendering *impartial justice*" (Materu, 2014: 50). According to Human Rights Watch (2008:

59), the ODM argued that it was "not possible to obtain justice from a partisan judiciary that was known to subvert justice in electoral matters," and that Mwai Kibaki's appointment of new judges two days prior to the elections was done in "preparation for a biased consideration of the anticipated election petitions". Roberts (2009: 9) acknowledges that the perceived bias of the judiciary led to the ODM resorting "to mass action, which included protests and demonstrations countrywide". Materu (2014:50) adds that "as part of this strategy, they threatened to swear in Raila Odinga as the 'people's president' if Kibaki did not agree to a re-run". The culmination of these events resulted in clashes between the supporters of the ODM and PNU, which quickly spiralled into ethnic violence, which impacted most of Kenya. Considering this, the immediate cause of the conflict was the announcement of the presidential election results amid allegations of the flawed electoral process (i.e. discrepancies in vote counting and tallying). Therefore, one can categorize the type of conflict as post-election conflict.

## Extent, nature and patterns of the violence in Kenya

The initial stages of the violence were in the form of protests against the announced results. As already alluded to, the clashes were either between Kibaki (PNU) and Odinga (ODM) supporters or vice-versa. For example, in the Rift Valley Province, "a stronghold of the ODM during the 2007 elections, the violence targeted the *unwanted* communities, the Kikuyus (Kibaki's ethnic group) and other non-Kalenjin communities or groups, which were perceived to be PNU supporters" (Materu, 2014: 51).

The violence acquired a "pattern of massive and revengeful attacks directed against specific groups of people" or their properties (Moremong, 2008: 3-4). This politically motivated conflict further sparked other conflicts as some communities saw this as an opportunity to settle old scores. There were reports suggesting calls for ethnic cleansing by certain ethnic leaders (African Press International, 2008). For instance, "in the

Rift Valley province, whose original inhabitants are Kalenjins, the Kikuyus and nonKalenjins in general were viewed as foreigners on the land" (Materu, 2014: 51). Evidently, traditional leaders and local political leaders, interested in fixing long-standing grievances within their communities regarding land "and other perceived discrimination against the targeted victims, were largely involved in violence" (Materu,0 2014: 51). In the Central provinces and the Rift Valley province, several incidents were reported in which various statements were said which incited violence. Violence also took the form of organized killings of people based on their political inclination, regional and or ethnic affiliation. The ethnic antagonism that persisted in the post-election violence indicated long time unresolved land issues and negative ethnicity, which politicians had used to incite divisions in the country (Materu, 2014). In the case of Kenya, Dersso (2010) notes that ethnic violence that persisted in the post-election period was instigated by the overall perception that since attaining independence, certain ethnic communities had benefited more than others in various aspects, such as being excluded from the country's leadership.

In retaliation, in Nairobi and the Central Province, "which were PNU's strongholds, the Kikuyus, through their militia gang, attacked the Luos (Odinga's tribe) and Kalenjins, who were perceived to be ODM supporters" (Materu, 2014: 51). Armed gangs "carried out attacks in Nakuru against perceived enemy communities, by beheading Luo men or forcefully circumcising them by using pan gas and broken bottles" (Materu, 2014: 51; Moremong, 2008: 3-4). Materu (2014: 50) further demonstrates that "in preparation for these attacks, prior plans had reportedly been in place, including one for alleged recruitment of 300 new members into the armed gangs specifically for this task. Moreover, intelligence reports revealed that local leaders in Nakuru conducted fund-raising meetings to raise money for financing the revenge or attacks against the Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin". That kind of organisation consequently led to many deaths.

During the electoral violence, not all civilian deaths were because of civilians

attacking fellow civilians. Ideological State Apparatus (ISAs) i.e., media outlets and Repressive State Apparatus (RSAs) i.e., police; armed forces were also used by Mwai Kibaki to instill fear and intimidation on perceived opposition. For instance, one ought to acknowledge the role the vernacular radio stations played in inciting the violence. Arguably, Materu (2014: 55) notes, their role was perhaps "similar to that of the Kigalibased *Radio Télévision Libre des Milles Collines*, which was used in inciting the Hutus against the Tutsis during the Rwandan genocide of 1994".The role played by four vernacular state-owned radio stations, namely, "KASS FM (Kalenjin station), Kameme (Kikuyu stations) and Lake Victoria FM (Luo station)" (Materu, 2014: 54), was particularly notorious in the distribution of hate speech in favour of Mwai Kibaki's ruling party. It is assumed that the Kalenjin local leaders incited the people to violence by using derogatory statements such as "remove the roots", against the Kikuyus. Leaders in the ODM, "including Raila Odinga and William Ruto, once asked the Kalenjin community to remove all 'madoadoa' (stains) from Rift Valley" (Materu, 2014: 55).

On RSA's, it has been reported that, generally, the role of the police in this respect changed between being commendable to being responsible for perpetrating some atrocities (Okia, 2011:1-3). For example, mounting evidence points to the police being implicated in some of the atrocities as they actively perpetrated violent acts. Lynch (2008) concurs that state apparatus such as the police and the army also instigated violence in some instances. A case in point is the Nakuru, Kisumu and the Nairobi slums, where violent clashes occurred between the police and the demonstrators (Dersso, 2008: 3-4). The police also allegedly participated by omission, which indirectly encouraged the civilian perpetrators to commit the atrocities (Okia, 2011: 1-3). As previously noted, this cast doubt on the assertion that "the post-election violence was a citizen-to-citizen violence" (Materu, 2014: 52). The police were often used by the political party in power to perpetrate violence on its behalf.

All of these atrocities that happened during the course of the post-election

violence were indisputably appalling. One such incident which happened in Kiambaa area in Rift Valley province is summarized below;

> On 31 December 2007, about 3,500-armed Kalenjin members raided and torched the
> Kiambaa settlement area in Eldoret, predominantly inhabited by Kikuyus. The residents were forced to flee. Some of them sought refuge in a church building in the
> locality, the only place they considered safe in the circumstances… (Materu, 2014: 53).

Accounts of other similar incidents of this magnitude are well-documented. What is clear is that this violence was "more than just citizen-to-citizen opportunistic assaults" (Materu, 2014: 55). From the discussion, the political violence entailed coordinated or organized attacks on civilians based on their political leanings and ethnicity. In addition, there was evidence of police involvement in the post-election violence. Furthermore, "there was a manifestation of politicized commands, which entailed non-interference whenever progovernment mobs committed crimes against the opposition" (Dersso, 2010: 3-4). The extent, organization and nature of political violence have been outlined, including the main actors involved in the post-election violence.

The conflict in Kenya in 2007 was mainly because of allegations of a flawed electoral process (i.e., discrepancies in vote counting and tallying), and as indicated by Materu (2014), a 'stolen' election by the PNU. The conflict was a turning point in the country's history. Further clashes that ensued were based on ethnic and regional affiliations. Although there were other underlying factors such as poor economy, poor services delivery and high rates of unemployment among the youth, one can argue that the 2007 election provided an opportune moment for marginalized ethnic groups to vent their frustration against the ruling party and its power base. Because of the casualties in the pre-and post-election period, there was a need for to the AU to intervene. The following section highlights the role of AU in conflict management in Kenya through the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

Institutional theoretical lens will be used in the analysis of the AU's intervention. The premise of institutional theory lies on the assumption that, "institutions create elements of order and predictability" in which they "fashion, enable and constrain political actors as they act within a logical and appropriate action" (March and Olsen, 2005: 2; 3). The theory assumes that institutions as organisations with rules, norms, values and principles translate to established authoritative guidelines for appropriate behaviour for political actors. Hence institutions constrain/shape the behaviour of actors within the environment they act to conform to these rules and values. Such assumptions will enable an analysis of the AU as an institution created to promote and safeguard peace and security through democratic values and principles. In so doing the analysis will review how the political values of the institution are translated into practice *vis-a-vis* intervention.

## The African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Kenyan crisis

According to Article 2.1 of the Protocol establishing the PSC, the Security Council is a "standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict" (Protocol Establishing the PSC, 2002: 4). The agenda for meetings is determined by on-going conflict and crisis situations, which is usually done in consultation with the PSC members and proposals submitted by the commissioner of Peace and Security (Williams, 2009:612; Protocol PSC, 2002: 12). Through formal meetings, briefing meetings and consultations, the PSC deliberates on the way forward regarding conflict interventions. Williams's notes that the PSC "has taken policy decisions requiring action, whether in the form of mediation, peace operations, or sanctions regimes" (2009: 614).

In line with its role, the PSC reached consensus to begin mediation in the Kenyan crisis on 21 January 2008 within an African framework: a recommendation it had received by the AU commission after consultations (Juma, 2009: 413). The then AU chair President

John Kufuor of Ghana met with Mwai Kibaki and Ralia Odinga upon agreeing to an AU-led mediation. Williams notes that emphasis on consensus by the PSC is important as the "council operates with a significant degree of collective responsibility" (Williams, 2009: 615). As stated above, the PSC declared its full support for the mediation initiative (Juma, 2009: 413). On 21 January 2008, a week before the start of the AU summit, the PSC met at ambassadorial level in Addis Ababa to consider the situation in Kenya. In their communique, the PSC condemned "the gross violations of human rights in Kenya, stressed the need for the parties to extend full co-operation to the mediation effort, and requested the AU commission to follow up and report on the situation in Kenya" (Juma, 2009: 154. This is in line with the stated role of the PSC as the decision-making body for conflict management. Through the official statements, the PSC was able to elicit substantial and sustainable commitments from member states to support its decisions. The inclusion of Kenya on the AU agenda indicates the seriousness of the PSC in its efforts in finding a political solution to the Kenyan crisis.

Given that leaders were in consensus regarding the need for cessation of conflict in Kenya, the adoption of the PSC's recommendations was swift. This concurs with Hentz's (2013: 194) study on the role of the PSC in the case of Comoros conflict in 2004 where leaders reached a consensus regarding the deployment of peacekeepers. Hentz suggests that where there is agreement, the action is swift. One can conclude that this is in line with Institutional Theory's assumptions that institutions with norms, values and principles are able to establish authoritative guidelines for its members. Consequently, an institution becomes effective in executing its mandate when it observes its norms and values. Bouka (2016: 5) suggests that the PSC's efforts in prevention, management and resolution of conflict often face resistance. Often, incumbent Presidents receive PSC reviews with negativity when subjected to early warning, for instance in the c risis in Burundi in 2015.

# The African Union Panel of the Wise (POW) and the Kenyan crisis

The POW is the AU's "most high-profile structure for preventing conflict, conducting on the ground fact finding, presenting policy options, and brokering agreements" (Nantulya, 2016: 2). Laibuta (2014: 7) notes, "in order to stop the humanitarian crisis in Kenya, the AU facilitated a mediation process through the Panel of African Eminent Personalities, under the leadership of the former UN Secretary General Kofi Anan". This study found that POW played an important advisory role during the mediation process in Kenya. This is in line with Juma's sentiments on POW which reveals that, for instance, Julius Nyerere played an important role in Burundi and Rwanda conflict with Nelson Mandela, Jacques Chissano in Northern Uganda, Thabo Mbeki in Côte d'Ivoire and Obasanjo in the DRC (2009: 417). The AU chairperson, John Kufuor, "was instrumental in convincing the parties to the conflict to cease hostilities" (Baldauf, 2008).

An important factor of the POW is the moral integrity of the leaders on the panel. For example, Ralia Odinga of the ODM, who was sceptical of Museveni's' human rights record, rejected early mediation efforts by President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, who was the chair of the EAC. Hence, when the POW came in, the composition of its delegates proved significant as Juma (2009: 413) argued, "clearly the stature of Kufuor and his position as the chair of the AU yielded positive results." On 29 January 2008, the Panel managed to engage the PNU and ODM in this process, which was carried out within a framework called the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR). According to Juma (2009: 417), Koffi Annan "brought value that helped navigate the complex Kenyan political terrain." Hence, the POW was able to bring the protagonists to agree on the immediate cessation of hostilities including "putting immediate measures to address the humanitarian crisis and promote reconciliation" (Laibuta, 2014: 14). In a similar study by Williams (2011: 13), the POW was able to bring a cessation of conflicts in DRC when it

brokered a truce between President Joseph Kabila and opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi after a heated election. Juma (2009) argues that the willingness of the protagonists to negotiate was also significant in determining the successes of POW.

The outcome of the mediation process did, however, **left** more to be desired. The formation of a unity government was in contrary to the values and principles that established the organisation. The POW compromised despite mounting evidence of election irregularities by the incumbent, which constituted an unconstitutional change of government as stated in the African Charter on Democracy Election and Governance (ACDEG) under article 23(4) of (2007). The whole exercise of creating unity governments "contradicts the purpose of elections whose sole purpose is to give the winners opportunity to govern the country and the losers to accept" (Mapuva, 2013). Mapuva (2013: 109) notes that such compromises had an unintended consequence as it gave losing political candidates the opportunity "to get back into mainstream politics through the backdoor". The inclination towards compromising exposes the institutional culture of the AU as it protects incumbents, as Omotola (2014: 29) highlights that, "unwritten rules and informal alliances within the AU suggest that incumbents should be protected from humiliation". Similarly, EISA (2016: 5) notes that the AU *does not act decisively* against incumbents. Furthermore, Bouka (2016: 6) adds that the continued reluctance of the AU about what constitutes an unconstitutional change of government beyond coups lies within the institutional culture. Hence, the organization remains hesitant in using a forceful approach, as was the case in Kenya. Despite these criticisms, the formation of a unity government led to the decrease of the violence and unnecessary loss of lives. Although the creation of a unity government somewhat contradicted the principle of free and fair elections determining the outcome of who will govern, it did lead to a decrease in violence in the country.

The role of the POW in the Kenyan conflict created a middle ground for conflicting

parties to enter negotiations and have a transitional arrangement. The success of this organ hinged on the characteristics and capabilities of the prominent personalities within it. The initial mediation efforts by Yoweri Museveni, the then chair of the EAC proved fruitless, as he was rejected due to his low human rights record. The intervention of the Kufour mission was successful for a number of reasons, including the fact that both parties regarded him as a trustworthy broker. However, as much as the composition of the POW is significant for its success, the willingness of the protagonists has a profound effect on the outcome. As indicated by Moller (2009: 11),

> One should however not place too much emphasis on the organizational set up, as what
> matters is the political will to do what is needed. If the will is there, states will find a way
> around organizational obstacles, but if it is lacking even the best organizational set up
> under the most binding commitments will be of little help.

## The Continental early warning system and the Kenyan crisis in 2007

The CEWS was established to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of violent conflicts by "gathering and analyzing information to enable the Chairperson of the AU Commission, the PSC and other actors under the peace and security architecture to prevent violent conflict in a timely manner" (Porto & Engel, 2010: 9). According to Juma (2009), the CEWS failed to anticipate the escalation of conflict in the Kenyan election of 2007 and this compromised the AU's ability to manage this conflict. However, this is not the first time that CEWS failed to anticipate the incidence of conflict. A study by Williams (2011: 9-10), showed that "CEWS personnel were unable to generate early discussions within the PSC on the crisis" and instability in Guinea-Bissau in late 2008. Another study by Williams

(2014: 148) suggests that the "African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) remains incomplete with several of its institutions still work in progress", including the CEWS and the ASF. The lack of coordination between the CEWS and PSC led to the delayed response of the AU in Kenya. Institutional Theory submits that the competence of an institution relies heavily on proper coordination and harmonization of units and departments that make up a system, in this case, APSA. This, therefore, implies that without this coordination, the system will hardly meet its objectives.

## The role of other actors in conflict management in Kenya

Despite the rhetoric of African solutions to African problems by the African Union, Africa seemed more reluctant to find solutions to its own problems (Simura and Asuelime, 2015, 2017). Other actors involved in the mediation process include the international actors, civil society groups, faith-based groups and women organizations (Baldauf, 2008; Kanyinga, 2007; McGhie, 2011). According to Juma (2009: 421), international actors such as the World Bank (WB), the EU and the US put "enormous pressure on the Kibaki government to abide by the mediation and threatened to suspend assistance (donor aid) if a diplomatic solution to the political crisis was not found". Baldauf (2008) notes that significant progress occurred during the two months of negotiation through the "concerted international support for the AU-led process" (Juma, 2009: 421). For example, the UN "provided technical assistance in the form of staff members who assisted in analysis, policy advice and general staff support for the mediation team" (Juma, 2009: 422).

Although the efforts by the AU were instrumental at the beginning of mediation to end the violence, its success was partly due to the increasingly intense domestic and international pressure. The consensus among international actors created a formidable pressure group, which generated momentum for the mediation process. Similarly, the WB and the African Development Bank (ADB) "encouraged Kenyans to seek a viable long-term

solution, and expressed willingness to support the Annan team, under the African Union initiative" (Juma, 2009: 424). Furthermore, the UN "called on the political leadership to find an acceptable solution through dialogue so that the country could return to its peaceful and democratic path" (Juma, 2009: 425; United Nations, 2008). This call from the UN chief was significant in encouraging the parties to stay the course. The UN Security Council commended the efforts of the PSC and emphasized "its full support for the mediation in assisting the parties find a political solution" (United Nations Security Council, 2008, Juma, 2009: 425).

Civil society groups also contributed immensely to the mediation process. Kanyinga (2010: 4) note that since the "period between the early 1990s and the 2002 general elections, civil society was synonymous with the democratization process in Kenya". Hence in the post-election election violence of 2007/8, it played a significant role. According to Kanyinga (2010: 2), "Kenyan civil society organisations and their networks generated and sustained domestic pressure to end the violence". For instance, the Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP) participated through media engagement and dialogue with different actors and engaged with the AU Panel of Eminent African Personalities on a regular basis (Kanyinga, 2010: 10). Also, they were part of regional and international advocacy to highlight the crisis and to ensure the International community had unbiased facts about the causes of the crisis and its consequences. Hence, they "petitioned international donors and governments to bring pressure on the two political parties to resolve the crisis" (Kanyinga, 2010: 9). From the foregoing one can, therefore, acknowledge the importance of domestic actors in the mediation process of the conflict.

In all, the multiplicity of actors in the mediation process suggests that conflict management relies on the balance and incorporation of combined efforts from various stakeholders. Their impact was of great significance in as far as making the political parties

abide by the mediation process. Therefore, one can say that conflict management relies on the combined efforts of the various actors.

## Outcomes

The case study of Kenya established that the country evolved from a relatively peaceful nation to a volatile one following the 2007 election. Prior to 2007, Kenya was seen as a ray of hope for African democracies (Juma, 2009: 408). However, findings from the research highlight that despite elections being central to democracy, they have become a source of conflict. This study submits that essentially, the AU's intervention through APSA came at an opportune time leading to the formation of a GNU, a decrease in violence, loss of life and disruption of livelihoods. The mediation process brought about immediate benefits in the peacebuilding process. Some of the positive benefits that came out of the mediation include the formation of an independent Commission of Inquiry by the coalition government (Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission, TJRC) into the post-election violence (Materu, 2014: 57).

Laibuta (2014: 17) adds that the inquiry had the mandate to investigate crimes such as "gross violations and abuses of human rights, including abductions, disappearances, detentions, torture, sexual violations, murder, extrajudicial, killings", which had occurred during the post-election violence and make recommendation thereof. Independent bodies such as the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner inquiries for Human Rights (UNHCHR) and the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, which acts as a watchdog, conducted enquiries over the government "in pursuit of the protection and promotion of human rights in Kenya" (Materu, 2014: 58). Therefore, there is need to acknowledge the role played by other actors such as the EU, UN, civil society and women groups in the mediation process. conflict management requires complementary efforts from all stakeholders.

The research makes relevant observations consistent with the fact that the AU's institutional culture is inclined to protecting the incumbents (Mapuva, 2013). Laibuta (2014: 8) submits that the "early AU involvement highlights the need for prompt intervention by AU leadership whenever a member state is facing a conflict or constitutional crisis." The events in Kenya where a power-sharing agreement was created with a losing candidate, established a trend on the African continent where "losing political candidates get back into mainstream politics by claiming to hold the mandate of the electorate" (Mapuva, 2013: 109). As Bwanya (2008: 109) and Mapuva (2013) acknowledge, it had the unintended consequence of opening floodgates of similar scenarios elsewhere in the continent the moment political elites realised that they could "come back into the political fold even if they are defeated in an electoral contestation".

Consequently, in Zimbabwe 2008, the AU resorted to a power sharing agreement despite overwhelming evidence pointing to the illegitimacy of the incumbent Robert Mugabe. The consequence of its conflict management approach towards intervening in election related conflict inadvertently *encouraged* electoral related violence as it set precedent for future incumbents to refuse to relinquish power, as was true in Zimbabwe 2008 and in Cote d'Ivoire 2010/11 crises.

Therefore, the AU faces several challenges in its conflict management approach in election-related violence, particularly that of protecting incumbents. Bouka (2016: 6) states that, "the continued reluctance of the AU about what constitutes an unconstitutional change of government beyond coups lies within the institutional culture of protecting incumbents". In Kenya, the AU pushed for unity government despite evidence showing that the incumbent had rigged the election. Institutional Theory assumes that institutional (political) values and actual commitment are sustained through practice and implementation of these norms. Rather than abiding by its principles to protect democracy, the AU continues to falter towards its commitment through compromising.

The intervention of the PSC was commendable. Through consultations between the PSC and the AU Commission, the PSC was able to reach a consensus, which resulted in the decision to mediate in the conflict. Failure to reach consensus results in delayed or no response as was the Case in Burundi 2015 (Bouka, 2016). Also, in Comoros 2004, the AU PSC's consensus on the need to deploy peacekeepers resulted in the swift intervention in the country. Therefore, the ability of the PSC in managing the electoral crisis in Kenya is noteworthy. A study on Kenya by Juma (2009: 408) suggests, "The Kenyan experience underscores the value of speed and rapid response in intervention". It further illustrates that the AU's delayed intervention was due to delays in the passing of early warning information to the PSC. This study, however, expresses that the efforts by the PSC averted the continued killings of the citizens.

On the role of the POW, a study by Williams (2011) attributes the success of the POW as determined by the calibre of the members on the panel. In the case of Kenya, the panel consisted of former President of Tanzania Benjamin Mkapa, Graca Machel and Koffi Annan who are well-respected in the African political circles. Therefore, one can safely conclude that the success of the POW strongly hinges on the characteristics and capabilities of the prominent personalities who are usually former heads of governments.

In summary, one cannot underestimate the impact of the AU's mediation efforts in as far as decreasing the incidence of violence in Kenya, the mending of the deteriorated relationship between the PNU and ODM, and stability that came with the cessation of conflict. As noted in the discussion, the AU capacity to manage electoral related conflict is challenged by many factors including the institutional culture of the organisation of protecting incumbents. This research argues that there has been a rise of post-election violence because the AU's response to it has been inadequate mostly because it heavily relies on mediation even though in some instances forceful intervention is required to remove incumbents. Omotola (2014: 29) states that unwritten rules and informal alliances within the AU suggest that, "incumbents should be protected from humiliation" resulting

in the AU not acting in accordance within its norms and values. EISA (2016: 5) supports this view by stating that the AU pushes for a government of unity rather than acts against them, as was the case in the Kenya post-election violence in 2007/8. The consequence of its conflict management approach towards intervening in election-related conflict inadvertently encouraged electoral related violence as it set precedent for future incumbents to refuse to relinquish power as was in Zimbabwe 2008 and in Cote d'Ivoire 2010/11 crises.

Given that the same conflict reoccurred in 2017 in Kenya, the sustainability of power-sharing agreements comes into question. The AU has often been criticized of merely rubber-stamping election results (Louw-vaudran, 2017). However, it is important to note that, the AU has improved its system of observing elections by looking more comprehensively at a country's political situation ahead of elections. Despite this approach, however other factors that are also at play in the interaction between the AU and its member states have meant that these missions are often of little consequence (Louw-vaudran, 2017). The AU pre-election mission findings acknowledged the exploitation of ethnic divisions through the use of deeply polarising campaign messages by major political actors was a cause for concern. Ethnic violence was at the centre of the post-election violence of 2007/8. The election in 2017 was marred with inconsistences as opposition leader Ralia Odinga accused the incumbent Kenyatta of rigging the election. The AU observers declared the election free and fair, but the Kenyan Supreme court nullified the results which consequently put the AU in the spot light. From this Kenyan episode, it is fair to say that the AU still has a long way to go in as far as upholding and enforcing democratic development in the continent. Mehler (2009) argues that, power sharing, has reversed democratisation efforts in Africa in the last twenty years centred on state-building and political liberalisation, thus prioritising peace before process. Hence, what the AU needs to embrace its principles of intervention as stipulated in its founding documents the Constitutive Act.

The reoccurrence of the conflict suggests that power sharing did not deal with the underlying causes of the conflict in the first place. Mukuhlani (2014:174-175) highlights that "narrow settlements

that focus on political power-sharing alone are less likely to endure…" a view that highlights the inadequacies of power-sharing as a conflict management towards electionrelated conflict.The Kenyan episode reinforces the views by Jarstad and Sisk (2008) that, power sharing in fact, "fuels extremist, radical and anti-democratic behaviour; inhibits the transition of conflict-management to conflict-resolution and damages the relationship of transparency and accountability".Therefore, the above underscores the challenges the AU faces in managing election-related violence as demonstrated in Kenya 2008.

## Conclusion

This paper highlights conflict trends from pre to post-colonial Kenya. The politicization of ethnicity dominated Kenyan politics and this created marginalization of certain ethnic groups in strategic sectors such as land ownership and control, the economy and political leadership. Throughout Kenyan history, there has been cases of ethnically motivated conflict over issues such as land and isolated cases of violence during election periods. Despite various issues ranging from youth unemployment and the economy dominating the election, the 2007/2008 post-election violence was a turning point in Kenyan politics. The manifestation of ethnic violence highlights unresolved issues stemming from years of discriminatory politics. This further instigated the violent clashes in the post-election period. This paper highlights the intervention of the AU through APSA and the utility of the PSC, CEWS and POW. Emphasis was on three of its five pillars based on their application during this conflict. The assessment of these pillars in the management of this conflict assisted in demonstrating the capacity of the organization in Kenya's conflict. For instance,

the failure of the CEWS undermined the role of the PSC in making early and sound judgements on the Kenyan election. The challenges noted include the lack of coordination among the arms of the APSA i.e., PSC, POW and CEWS. The failure of the AU in conflict management highlights the challenges the institution faces which have undermined its stability and legitimacy. The delays in the AU's intervention in Kenya highlight some of the challenges presented by coordination of its conflict management mechanisms and its institutional culture of protecting incumbents. Bouka (2016) acknowledges this fact and further points out that the AU reacts promptly to coups while it is reluctant to react in election-related violence.

The paper also submits that various domestic and international actors played a significant role in the mediation process. For instance, the EU's threats of withholding donor funds pressured Kibaki to abide by the mediation process. Also, domestic actors such as the civil society and women groups petitioned international donors and governments to bring pressure on the two political parties to resolve the crisis. Hence, they sensitized the entire community to the importance of peaceful means to the postelection conflict.

The outcomes of the mediation process led to the decrease in violence between supporters of PNU and ODM. In addition, a National Accord was signed which resulted in the formation of the Government of National Unity. However, the recurrence of election conflict in the 2017 highlights that the root causes of election conflict was not completely addressed.

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|---|---|---|
| Non-periodical | Author, A. A. (1994). *Title of work.* Location: Publisher. | Non-periodicals include items published separately: books, reports, brochures, certain monographs, manuals, and audiovisual media. |
| Part of a Nonperiodical | Author, A.A., & Author, B.B. (1994). Title of chapter. In A. Editor, B. Editor, & C. Editor (Eds.), *Title of book* (pp. xxxxxxx). Location: Publisher. | |
| Periodical | Author, A.A., Author, B. B., & Author, C.C. (1994). Title of article. *Title of Periodical*, xx, xxx-xxxx. | Periodicals include items published on a regular basis: journals, magazines, scholarly newsletters, etc. |
| Online periodical | Author, A.A., Author, B.B., & Author, C.C. (2000). Title of article. *Title of Periodical*, xx, xxx-xxxx. Retrieved Month day, year, from web address | |
| Online document | Author, A.A. (2000). *Title of work.* Retrieved Month day, year, from web address | |
| **Referencing other sources** | | |

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|---|---|---|
| A book with only one author | Rose, L. (1977). *Crime and punishment.* London: Batsford. | |
| A book by two authors | Gordon, E.W., & Rourke, A. (1966). *Compensatory education for the disadvantaged.* New York: College Entrance Examination Board.<br>In order to avoid possible communication problems all procedures should be explained to the patient (Gardner & Sheldon, 1967, p. 40)… Gardner and Sheldon (1967, p. 40) | When quoting a book with two authors in the text, use the word 'and' between the names; if the reference is in parentheses, use '&' examine the problem… |

| A book by three or more authors | Meyer, B.S., Anderson, D.P., Bohning, R.H., & Fratanna, D.G., Jr. (1973). *Introduction to plant physiology.* New York: Van Nostrand. …the traditionalist personality (Riesman, Denney & Glazer, 1968, p. 40) restrains him from doing… …due to his "other-directness" modern Western man in a sense is at home everywhere and yet nowhere (Riesman et al., 1968, p. 40). | In referring to a work by three, four or five authors all the relevant names have to be furnished in the **first** reference to the work. In **later** references to this work only the first author's name is stated, and the abbreviation '*et al.* ' is used. In referring to a work by six or more authors, cite only the surname of the first author followed by *et al*. (italicised and with a full stop after "al"), and the year for the first and subsequent citations. **In the reference list, provide the initials and surnames of the first six authors, and shorten any remaining authors to et al.** |

| Reference to more than one publication of the same author in the same year | Johnson (1994a, p. 48) discussed the subject… In his later works (Johnson, 1994b, p. 56) he argued… Johnson, P.D. (1994a). *Pedagogy.* London: Routledge. Johnson, P.D. (1994b). *Advanced Pedagogy.* London: Routledge. | |
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| Different authors with the same surname | According to B. Smith (1989) and F. Smith (1997), … | When you refer to publications by different authors with the same surname, use their initials in the reference. |
| A book with an institution, organisation or association as author | You can also use the name of the body as part of the sentence.<br>…it had long been evident that the intellectual potential of the Afrikaners on the Witwatersrand was under utilised (Rand Afrikaans University,1976, p. 48)…<br>…thus the Rand Afrikaans University (1963, p. 30) concluded that… Rand Afrikaans University (1970). *The new university: A practical guideline.* Johannesburg, Gauteng: Rand Afrikaans University. | Where reference is made to the work by a body (institution, organisation, association, etc.) where no specific author is responsible for the work, the official name of the body is used as author. When the author and publisher are identical, use the word Author as the name of the publisher. |
| A book with (an) editor(s) | Driver, E., & Broisen, A. (Eds. ). (1989). *Child sexual abuse.* Basingstoke, UK: MacMillan Education Ltd.<br>Strunk, W. (Ed.). (1976). *Adult learning.* New York:<br>MacMillan. | |

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| A chapter in a book (not edited) | Capra, F. (1983). The systems view of life. In *The turning point: science, society and the rising culture* (pp. 376-399). London: Fontana Press | |
| Part/chapter of an edited book | Hartley, J.T., Harker, J.O., & Walsh, D.A. (1980). Contemporary issues and new directions in adult development of learning and memory. In L.W. Poon (Ed. ), *Aging in the 1980's: Psychological issues*, (pp. 239-252). Washington: American Psychological Association. Shirom, A. (1989). Burnout in work organisations. In C. L. Cooper & I.T. Robertson (Eds.), *International review of Industrial and Organizational Psychology*, Vol. IV (pp. 25-49). New York: Wiley. | |
| Anonymous work | A recent article (Anonymous, 1993) stated that… In the case of articles in newspapers or magazines where no author is named, the title is used instead | When a work's author is designated as "Anonymous", cite in text the word 'Anonymous'. |

| | of the author.   A recent article (War over, 1991) stated that…<br>Anonymous. (1993, 17 February). Best practices. *The Star*, p. 10. War over. (1991, 7 January). *The Star,* p. 1. | |

| **Referencing other sources (continued)** | | |
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| A work with a foreign title | Spyridakis, A. (1987). *E historia tis Helladas* [A history of Greece]. Athens: Therios ita Iona. | |
| Translated works | Luria, A.R. (1968). *The mind of a mnemonist: A little book about a vast memory.* (L. Solotaroff, Trans.). New York: Basic Books. (Original work published 1967). | In text, cite the original publication date and the date of the translation. |
| | A recent study (Luria, 1967/1968). | |
| Second, further or revised editions | Dyson, G.G.H. (1977). *The mechanics of athletics.* (7th edn.).<br>New York: Homes and Meier.   Cohen, J. (1977). *Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences* (Rev. edn.). New York: Academic Press. | |
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| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Date of publication unknown | Wolverton, H. (n.d.). *The geological structure of the Black Hills*. Wilmington: Prairie Press. | |
| Dictionaries | *The concise Macquarie dictionary.* (1982). New South Wales: Lane Cove. <br> Nguyen, D.H. (1966). *Vietnamese-English dictionary.* <br> Rutland Vermont: Charles Tuttle Company. <br> Sadie, S. (Ed. ). (1980). *The new Grove dictionary of music and musicians* (6th edn, Vols. 1-20). London: MacMillan. | |
| Encyclopedia | Bergmann, P.G. (1993). Relativity. In *The new Encyclopaedia Brittanica* (Vol. 26, pp. 501-508). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Brittanica. | If an entry has no byline, place the title in the author position. |
| Personal communication | According to T.K. Lutes (personal communication, April 18, 2001)… | Personal |

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| | | communications may be letters, memos, some electronic communication (e. g., email or messages from non-archived discussion groups or electronic bulletin boards), personal interviews, telephone conversations, and the like. Because they do not provide recoverable data, personal communications are not included in the reference list. Cite personal communications in text only. Give the initials as well as the surname of the communicator, and provide as exact a date as possible. |
| Unpublished manuscript submitted for publication | Jordan, B. (1989). *Psychology of adolescent parents*. Manuscript submitted for publication. | |

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| Unpublished manuscript not submitted for publication | Ryder, M. (1987). *Wonder woman: An Amazon legacy.* Unpublished manuscript. | |
| Newspaper article | Lamb, J. (1970, 20 October). The perfect plants for lazy gardeners. *Weekend Australian,* p. 3. | |
| Periodical article | Phillips, E. (1985). The Australian scene. *Australian Journal of Ecology*, 3(2), 25-29. | If a journal or newsletter does not use volume numbers, include the month, season, or other designation with the year, for example (1994, April). Only indicate the issue number after the volume number if each issue begins on page 1. |
| Journal article in press | Phillips, E. (in press). The Australian scene. *Australian Journal of Ecology.* In text: | |

| | Phillips (in press) or (Phillips, in press) | |
|---|---|---|
| Abstract | Phillips, E. (1985). The Australian scene [Abstract]. *Australian Journal of Ecology*, 3(2), 25-29. | |

| Referencing other sources (continued) | | |
|---|---|---|
| Non-English journal article | Ising, M. (2000). Intensitätsabhängigkeit evozierter Potenzial im EEG: Sind impulsive Personen Augmenter oder Reducer? [Intensity dependence in event related EEG potentials: Are impulsive individuals augmenters or reducers?]. *Zeitschrift für Differentielle und Diagnostische Psychologie*, 21, 208-217. | Give the original title, as well as an English translation in brackets. |
| Published dissertation or thesis | Bevins, G.D. (1987). *Theory and practice at an Australian university.* Doctoral dissertation. Montreal: McGill University. | |
| Unpublished dissertation or thesis | Little, P. (1965). *Helplessness, depression and mood in end stage renal disease.* Unpublished master's thesis, Wits University, Johannesburg, South Africa. Or: Unpublished doctoral dissertation… | |

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| Dissertation abstract | Ross. D.F. (1990). Unconscious transference and mistaken identity: When a witness misidentifies a familiar but innocent person from a lineup (Doctoral dissertation, Cornell University, 1990). *Dissertation Abstracts International*, 51, 417. | |
| Government publications | According to The Bill of Rights (1996)… Education is in the process of transformation (Department of Education, 1995)… The Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Republic of South African. (1996). *Government Gazette.* (No. 17678). Department of Education. (1995). White Paper on Education. *Government Gazette.* (Vol. 375, No. 45621). Commission on Civil Rights. (1967). *Racial isolation in the public schools.* Washington: United States Government Printing Office. Republic of South Africa. (1997). Basic Conditions of Employment Act, No. 75 of 1997. Pretoria: Government Printers. | When referring to a government publication, the date is sufficient for in text referencing. Provide all numbers, sections, chapters or volume numbers that is available, in brackets. |
| Unpublished raw data, untitled | Bordi, F., & LeDoux, J.E. (1993). [Auditory response latencies in rat auditory cortex]. Unpublished raw data. | Use brackets to indicate that the material is a description of the content, not a title. |

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| Booklet, pamphlet or leaflet | South African College of Advanced Education. (1976). *Referencing: the footnote and Harvard system* [Brochure]. Johannesburg: Wits Technikon. Research and Training Center in Independent Living. (1993). *Guidelines for reporting and writing about people with disabilities* (4th edn.). [Brochure]. Lawrence, K.S.: Author. | |
| Study guide | Speedy, C. (1999). *Study Guide: Electrical Engineering 1*. America: South American College of Engineering. | |
| Conference proceedings, no author or title | International Microcomputer Conference. (1984). *Conference proceedings held at the Western Australian Institute of Technology*, Perth, 22-24 May 1984. Perth: Western Australian Institute of technology. | |
| Conference proceedings, with author | Field, G. (2001). Rethinking reference rethought. In *Revelling in Reference: Reference and Information Services Section Symposium, 12-14 October 2001* (pp. 59-64). Melbourne, Victoria, Australia: Australian Library and Information Association. | |

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| Unpublished paper presented at a meeting | Lanktree, C., & Briere, J. (1991, January). *Early data on the Trauma Symptom Checklist for Children (TSC-C).* Paper presented at the meeting of the American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children, San Diego, CA. | |

**Referencing other sources (continued)**

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| Publication of limited circulation | Klombers, N. (Ed.). (1993, Spring). *ADAA Reporter.* (Available from the Anxiety Disorders Association of America, 6000 Executive Boulevard, Suite 513, Rockville, MD20852). | For a publication of limited circulation, give in parentheses immediately after the title a name and address from which the publication can be obtained. |

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|---|---|---|
| Review | Schatz, B.R. (2000). Learning by text or context? [Review of the book *The social life of information*]. *Science,* 290, 1304. Kraus, S.J. (1992). Visions of psychology: A videotext of classic studies [Review of the motion picture *Discovering Psychology*]. *Contemporary Psychology*, 37, 1146-1147. | |
| **Electronic sources** | | |
| In-text reference where the author of the electronic source is known | The project website was created using *Aldus Pagemaker version 3* (1987-1988)… Several films (e.g. Bertolucci, 1988) have used this technique… Azar and Martin (1999) found that… | Simply use whatever you used as author in the reference, as well as the year of publication. |
| In-text reference to a website | Rainbow MOO is a virtual space designed especially for teachers and their elementaryschool students (http://it. uwp. edu/rainbow). Jones, 2000: ¶5) Jones, 2000: Conclusion, para. 7) | To cite an entire website (but not a specific document on the site), simply give the site's URL in the text. When a specific part of an electronic source has to be quoted and no page number can be found, use the paragraph number if |

| | | available, preceded by the ¶ symbol or the abbreviation para. If these are absent, cite the heading and the number of the paragraph following it. |
|---|---|---|
| Internet site with author | Holmes, A. (1998). *Greenpeace wins media war.* Retrieved November 25, 1998, from http://www.independent.co.uk/ international/green25.htm | |
| Internet document without author | GVU's 8th WWW user survey. (n.d.). Retrieved August 8, 2000, from http://www.cc.gatech.edu/gvu/user_surveys/ survey-1997-10/ | |
| Article from an online periodical with DOI assigned | Author, A.A., & Author, B.B. (Date of publication). Title of article. *Title of Journal, volume number* (issue number). doi: 0000000/000000000000 | |

| Personal electronic communication (email) | According to T.K. Lutes (personal communication, April 18, 2001)… | Because personal email do not provide recoverable data, they (like other personal communications) are not included in the reference list. Cite personal communications in text only. Give the initials as well as the surname of the communicator, and<br><br>provide as exact a date as possible. |
|---|---|---|
| Article in an Internet-only journal | Fredrickson, B.L. (2000, March 7). Cultivating positive emotions to optimise health and well-being. Prevention & Treatment, 3, Article 0001a. Retrieved November 20, 2000, from http://journals. apa. org/prevention/volume3/ pre0030001a. html | |

**Electronic sources**

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| Electronic copy of a journal article retrieved from database | Borman, W.C. (1993). Role of early supervisory experience in supervisor performance. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 78, 443-449. Retrieved October 23, 2000, from PsycARTICLES database. | |
| Internet articles based on a print source | VandenBos, G., Knapp, S., & Doe, J. (2001). Role of reference elements in the selection of resources by psychology undergraduates [Electronic version]. *Journal of Bibliographic Research*, 5, 117-123. | If you have reason to believe that the article might be subject to change, you should add the date you retrieved the document, and the URL |

| Newsgroups, online forums, electronic mailing lists | **FORMAT:** Author. (Year, Day Month). Subject of message. Message posted to Name mailing list, archived at URL Brack, Ernie (1995, 2 May). Re: Computing short courses. Message posted to LisLink mailing list, archived at http:// archive.lislink.com<br>Jensen, L.R. (1995, 12 December). Recommendation of student radio/tv in English. Message posted to IASTAR mailing list, archived at http://nrg.dtu.dk<br>Brett, P. (1999, June 6). Experiments proving the collective unconscious<br>[Msg 1]. Message posted to news://alt.psychology.jung lrm583@aol.com (1996, May 26). Thinking of adoption. Message posted to news://alt. adoption | If you cannot determine the author's name or screen name, then use the author's email address as the main entry. When deciding where in your Reference List to insert such a source, treat the first letter of the email address as though it were capitalised. If the message is not retrievable from an archive, it should not be included in the reference list. It can be cited as a personal communication. |

| Paper presented at a virtual conference | Tan, G., & Lewandowsky, S. (1996). *A comparison of operator trust in humans versus machines.* Paper presented at the CybErg 96 virtual conference. Retrieved May 16, 2000, from http://www.curtin.edu.au/conference/ cyberg/centre/outline.cgi/frame?dir=tan | |
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| Abstract | Isaac. J. D., Sansone, C., & Smith, J.L. (1999, May). Other people as a source of interest in an activity. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 35, 239-265. Abstract retrieved June 7, 1999, from IDEAL database: http://www.europe.idealibrary.com | |
| Article in an electronic magazine (ezine) | Adler, J. (1999, May 17). Ghost of Everest. *Newsweek.* Retrieved May 19, 1999. | |
| Newspaper article | Azar, B., & Martin, S. (1999, October). APA's Council of Representatives endorses new standards for testing, highschool psychology. *APA Monitor.* Retrieved October 7, 1999, from http://www.apa.org/monitor/oct99/in1.html | |

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| Review | Parfit, M. (1997, December 7). Breathless [Review of the book *The climb: Tragic ambitions on Everest]. New York Times on the Web.* Retrieved October 7, 1999, from http://search. nytimes. com/books/97/12/07/reviews/971207.07parfitt.html | |
| Letter to the editor | Gray, J. (1999, May 7). Pesticides linger in land and air— and in our bodies [Letter to the editor]. *Lexington Herald-Leader.* Retrieved October 7, 1999, from http://www.kentuckyconnect.com/heraldleader/news/050799/lettersdocs/507letters.htm | |

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| Government publication | Bush, G. (1989, April 12). Principles of ethical conduct for government officers and employees Exec. Order No. 12674. Pt. 1. Retrieved November 18, 1997, from http://www.usoge.gov/exorders/eo12674.html |
| CD-ROM | Hawking, S. (1994). *A brief history of time: An interactive adventure* [CD]. Sacramento: Crunch Pod Media. |
| **Electronic sources** | |
| Sound recording | Williamson, C. (1985). Prairie fire. *On Arkansas traveller* [CD]. Oakland, California: Olivia Records.<br><br>*Rock 'n roll classics.* (1986). [Cassette] San Diego, California: Uptown Sound. |
| Motion picture/film | *Transactional analysis* [Motion picture]. (1974). Los Angeles: Research Films.<br>Bertolucci, B. (Producer). (1988). *The last emperor* [Motion picture]. Los Angeles: Columbia Pictures. |
| Television broadcast | Crystal, L. (Executive Producer). (1993, October 11). *The MacNeil/Lehrer news hour* [Television broadcast]. New York and Washington, DC: Public Broadcasting Service. |

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| Video recording | *Babakuieria.* (1986). [Video recording]. Sydney: ABC Drama Department.<br>Sutton, P. (Producer). (1986). *Kay Cottee: First Lady* [Video Recording]. New South Wales: Direct Video Pty Ltd.<br>Cochrane, C., (Executive Producer) & Graham S., (Director). (1988). *The Superkids' fitness video* [Video Recording]. Perth: Dynami Australia. | |
| Microfiche | Illinois State Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction (1971). *Toys for early development of the young blind child: a guide for parents.* (ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 065 201) | |
| Computer programme | *Aldus Pagemaker version 3. 0* [Computer software] (19871988). Seattle, Washington: Aldus Corporation.<br>Schwarzer, R. (1989). Statistics software for metaanalysis [Computer software and manual]. Retrieved from http://www.yorku.ca/faculty/academic/schwarze/meta_e.htm | |

Commonly used abbreviations

Appendix – app. Chapter – ch. Column – col.

Columns – cols.

Editor – ed. Editors – eds. Edition – edn. Editions – edns. Number – no. Numbers – nos.

No date – n. d. No publisher, no page – n. p. Page – p.

Pages – pp. Paragraph – para.

Revised – rev. Reprinted – rpt.

Supplement – Suppl.

Technical Report – Tech. Rep. Translated, translator – trans. Volume –

vol. Volumes – vols. Written – writ.

**Rule:** a capital letter for the abbreviation for editor or editors i.e. Ed. or Eds. Use lower case for edition i.e. 2nd edn.

Latin abbreviations

And others – *et al.* (et alii) Used where there are too many authors to list

In the same work – *ibid*. (ibidem) Signifies the same work as the one cited immediately before, but a different page

The same – *id.* (idem) The item cited is by the author of the item cited immediately before

In the work cited – *op. cit.* (opere citato) Refers the reader back to the author's previously cited work, but to a different page Without place – *s. l.* (sine loco)

**For more resources visit:** http://www.waikato.ac.nz/library/apaguide.shtml

• http://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/560/07/

• http://library.osu.  edu/sites/guides/apagd.php#articleone

This referencing guide is compiled from various resources, our appreciation to http://www.infosecsa.co.za/Reference_  Techniques.pdf