Theoretical appraisal of multimodal federalism as a framework of governance and the prospect of sustainable development in Nigeria

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Abstract

Arising from some retrogressive logic, an ongoing, unresolved debate rages about Nigeria's ever uncertain federalism. Compared to American history, five decades of nationhood is indeed relatively small. But with the opportunity of learning from existing successful federations coupled with her vast human and material resources, there seems no reason for Nigeria to remain as turbulent and underdeveloped as it stands at present. This paper adopts an historical approach and is subjected to the logic of comparative analysis and attempts, within the prism of well-developed prototype models of federalism, to appraise the workings of the Nigerian federal arrangement. It concludes that as a developing contentious multimodal federation, the leadership class has the arduous task of redefining the process of engagement and reconstruction in order to achieve much needed national consensus towards the attainment of equitable structures and accelerated national development.

Keywords: Federalism, multimodal federal systems, national consensus, leadership, nation building, development, Nigeria

Sumário

Suscitado de alguma lógica retrogressiva, um debate em curso, não resolvido, enfurece o federalismo sempre incerto da Nigéria. Em comparação com a história americana, cinco décadas de nacionalidade são relativamente poucas. Mas com a oportunidade de aprender com as federações bem-sucedidas existentes, juntamente com seus vastos recursos humanos e materiais, não parece haver nenhuma razão para a Nigéria permanecer tão turbulenta e subdesenvolvida como está atualmente. Este artigo adopta uma abordagem histórica e é submetido à lógica da análise comparativa e tenta, dentro do prisma de protótipos bem desenvolvidos do federalismo, avaliar o funcionamento do acordo federal nigeriano. Conclui que, como uma federação multimodal contenciosa em desenvolvimento, a classe de liderança tem a árdua tarefa de redefinir o processo de engajamento e reconstrução, a fim de alcançar o consenso nacional necessário para a obtenção de estruturas equitativas e desenvolvimento nacional acelerado.

Palavras-Chave: Federalismo, Sistema Federal Multimodelo, Consenso nacional, Lideranças, construção da nação, desenvolvimento, Nigéria.

Introduction

Of all the problems ravaging the Nigerian state, two have remained dominant and largely unmitigated. These are the persistent, uncertain logic of her federalism, and the attendant high prevalence of corruption. These two modal problems have cumulatively resulted in an incongruence of views on national goals and desirable path to development. Thus, not denying a few positive experiences such as the transition to democracy in 1979, 1999 and the pleasant surprises of the 2015 general election, after five decades of independence, Nigeria remains a federation by default. It is devoid of some critically needed positive motives and consensus on how to achieve the best possible acceleration of national consensus and attainment of sustainable development. Sensing the pronounced sociopolitical and economic incongruence of the nation before the advent of the ongoing Fourth Republic, Ayoade submitted:

> ...since 1963... the present day Nigeria remained a disaggregated federation... propelled by an adversarial relationship of near incompatibility... the Nigerian federation was, [and still remained], a design error... (Ayoade, 1997, p. 6)

According to Ogoma, however, Nigeria, "with the full participation and endorsement of Nigerian leaders then, and for the interests of the generality of Nigerians" (Ogoma 2014) adopted federalism as a framework of government. But even with its further modification with the federal character principle since 1979 as a mechanism for rationalisation of power and guiding principle of governance, which successive leaders have deployed as mere instruments of political appeasement (see Uhunmwuangho and Ekpu 2011), the fundamental question still is: how effectively has federalism, in view of rising aggression-soaked social taxonomies, contributed to addressing the problem of marginalisation and equitable sharing of power and resources in Nigeria? Ogoma concluded that despite the tendency to unite people and promote unity in diversity, unfortunately, federalism, as a framework of governance, has not been well utilised in Nigeria. Nigeria, at the close of the twentieth century, was a nation beset by avoidable uncertainties despite the adoption of the best framework suited for its governance. With diverse inhibitive factors working against the unity of the nation, there has been growing concern about the survival of the Nigerian federation. Isichei (1977) attested to cultural variegation. Suberu (1998) noted that it is one of the most ethnically diverse with over 250 ethno-linguistic groups. Osarhieme (1998), re-echoing Balewa, saw it as a country that merely exists on paper and is far from being a unified nation. Tamuno (1999) saw it as a country with combined forces of ethnic pluralism and cultural diversity, which tends to pull its people apart. To Otite, Nigeria is made up of apparently complimentary and yet contradictory social forces (Otite 1973), with distinctive dispersal and suffocating compressions of people (Osaghae 1999).

Still appraising Nigeria federal system, Osuntokun (1979) judged it as a country with an imposed asymmetric political system structure, colonially fabricated with the intent of neocolonial manipulation and sectional domination (William 1976), thereby laying a false foundation for development (Shagari 1994). In the final analysis, Ayoade posited that: it is a disaggregating

federal system propelled by an adversarial relationship of near incompatibility, a federation of design error (Ayoade, 1997). A country in which fiscal responsibility and taxing powers, despite the adoption of a federal system, still remain considerably centralised (Ewetan, 2012), and where, according to Lewis (1994), government's descent into unbridled corruption and patronage politics have led to the clear abandonment of the central objective of State existence (Joseph 1991). All these, breeding delinquent democratic experiences (Joseph, 1999) culminating in what Onyeoziri (1984) earlier described as an irrational system with an eroded state's capacity to ensure social cohesion and development, but instead, giving rise to unending chains of linear negativities, which led Easterly to conclude that ethnic conflict is "a tragic constant of human history". (Easterly, 2000). While there have been concerns and prepositions about the structure and survival of Nigeria's federal system, from power sharing, to balancing of national development and distribution of national resources, it remains very clear that federalism, as a mechanism of administrative/political coexistence and rapid national development, has essentially not been positively articulated and its principles not well-deplored in Nigeria.

The entrenchment of the federal character principle in the 1979 constitution shows the concern for the inclusion of diverse nationalities in the governance and development of the country at various levels. However, beyond nominal appointment of ministers into federal cabinet, attainment of these ideals has remained an uphill task for the operators of the Constitution. By their conducts and failures, they have only succeeded in exacerbating the negative aspect of ethno-regional differences. And, to the detriment of fostering national consensus on nation building and development, the political actors have, by their corrupt and parochial predisposition, reactivated centrifugal impulses within the polity. Just a little over 100 days in office, the Buhari administration, due to undue suspicion created by shortcomings of the immediate past administration that centralized almost every key position and national substance of the nation around Niger-Delta and the South East, was already being criticised just after making a few key appointments to establish his administration.

It is not gainsaying to submit that the immediate past administration of President Jonathan fell seriously short of expectation in most critical areas needing genuine national mobilisation and engagements, particularly in the last three years of his tenure as president. Though there were appointments of one minister per state, the administration ensured that the south-west and some part of the north were left out of the nucleus of the administration, to the exclusive gain of the Niger Delta and the south-east. Beyond ministerial appointments, most key positions in government were zoned to south-south and south-east – President, ministers of Finance, Petroleum, Education, Aviation, Health, Foreign Affairs, Secretary to the Government of the Federation, Deputy Senate President, Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives, Chief of Defence staff, Chief of Army staff and Governor of the Central Bank, among others, Director-General of the Security and Exchange Commission, the Director-General of the Directorate of State Security Services, among others. North-west, north-central and north- east had Vice-President, Senate President, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and in addition, ministers of Works, Justice, etc. Under the

immediate past administration, in contrast to the experience under the two administrations that preceded it (Obasanjo and Yar'Ardua), who both ensured that national offices and resources were evenly spread, the west and north-east were seriously marginalised. Under the administration, the south-west had only the Majority Leader of the Senate and ministers of Agriculture as key figures representing them in the administration.

The Chairman of the House of Representatives' Committee on Federal character, Honourable Azubuike, whose region arguably was a major beneficiary of government patronage and booty in 2012, was a guest on NTA's Nigeria Today where he said that the essence of federal character had been defeated in the present order. Though the Chairman of the Federal Character Commission, Professor Oba, (also seated at the interview panel) shared a different view, the Commission Chairman, however, agreed that for the federal character principle to be more meaningful, it should retrace the path of equity and merit (NTA Network Service 2012, August 31, 09h00-09h30am). Thus, under the Jonathan administration, merit in equity and rationality in operation, as essential requirements for national integration and development within the logic of federalism, has experienced a more complicated and sacrificial model in favour of the corrupt and partisan politics of greed and sheer opportunism.

With an apparent dearth of rationally agreed national agendas, Nigeria, as it stood in 2015, was, as in the past, beset with a myriad problems that seriously threaten her corporate existence and survival as a nation. With a declining quantum of genuine statesmanship, it seems obvious that massive corruption and systemic short-changing, occasioned by growing sociopolitical errors, now more than ever places severe pressure on further development. Consequently, in the midst of all of these, and as things stood at the eve of the 2015 election, baring the 'change mantra', there seemed to be no national consensus on how to move Nigeria forward just as there is a growing indication of eventual organic paralysis, if left unaddressed. With a view to unearthing probable structural and operational solutions, this paper, drawing insight from a set of four well-distilled models of federalism, probes the structural templates for the faulty evolution and confused developmental debate in the Nigerian federal system.

Federalism: A conceptual analysis

An overview of theoretical formulations of federalism, beyond the identity of parties and interests, provides us with a hint of the importance of equality as a fundamental ingredient of constructing an ideal federal system. This is hinted at in the submission by Laski that:

> Federalism provides the one plane upon which men may meet under the conditions of equality, which alone gives validity to such ultimate solutions as we adopt... because society is federal, authority must be federal also. That involves... the making of decisions out of the interests which will be affected by them and in turn their application by those interests (to the extent that)... it means making the mining industry a unit of administration in the same sense as Lancashire (Laski, 1967, pp. 271).

It is often held that federalism recognises denominations, interests and powers of sub-national groups and tendencies. But the need to achieve consensus and unity on a national basis is coupled to reconciliation of these diversities. Despite the infinite number of scholars working on the theory and practice of federalism, its main thrust remains the intermixing and balancing of compromises and concessions in generating and protecting individual and group liberty within a well-rationalised architecture of national unity. The issues involved in this balancing include determining which concession or compromise should come first, knowing which one could be greater than the other, and ascertaining the factors or conditions for making one accept more compromise than concession, or vice versa. No doubt for Nigeria, having endured close to a century worth of federal experimentation, these questions remained largely unanswered. Logically, therefore, the conceptual analysis here is predicated upon the understanding that national consensus is difficult to achieve in most developing multimodal federal systems. This is particularly more difficult in contentious multimodal federal systems such as Nigeria, and if not properly resolved, could constitute a delay on setting an agenda for nation building and development.

If federalism is this contentious and prone to the difficulties associated with achieving consensus on modalities of national existence and development, then, what was obtained in Nigeria in the recent past in contrast to the experience in formative years of US federation, should be seen as a process of patriotic effort towards constructive and impartial engagement of all parties. It calls for a display of selfless governance built on the principle of commonwealth. As it is known, federalism is a system that:

> ...is formed by a compact, and agreement between political units that surrender their individual sovereignty to a central authority, [but retained] residuary power of government... [and this]... is frequently the case in societies or states where people are not ready to surrender all power to a central authority or government (Bankole Okuwa in Oyeneye, 1994, p. 144, see also Vincent Ostrom, 1988).

Hence, Herman Pritchett (1976, p. 15), commenting on American federalism, sees it as a polity in which the exercise of power is divided between two or more levels of government, each having the use of those powers as a matter of right, and each acting on the same citizen body. Judging such arrangement as conflict prone, Pritchett went further to submit that: viewed over the long reaches of United States history, there is an obvious trend towards increasing the powers and functions of the federal government, just as there have been periods when the centralising trend was reversed. Ever present and everywhere, the central-local relationship has been the product of political conflict, compromise and consensus. Imbedded in such a struggle, therefore, is the need to reach consensus on modalities for sharing state power, functions and resources as equitably as possible. Reiterating this central local power-sharing tussle, William Riker (cited in Akinyemi, 1979, p. 37) wrote:

> An initial difficulty in any discussion of federalism is that the meaning of the word has been thoroughly confused by dramatic changes in the institutions to which it refers. Hence, a

word that originally referred to institutions with emphasis on local self-government has come to connote also domination by a gigantic impersonal concentration of force.

Deduction from this debate is that there is no single 'once and for all' rule for determining the structure and functioning of federal systems; what is paramount for successful operation of any political system, federations inclusive, as shall subsequently be established, are men willing to let go of their personal ego and hidden agenda of their primordial enclaves for the collective good of the whole. It is an irony, particularly in Nigeria, that most avowed apostles of devolution at the local and state levels often resort to centralisation and parochialisation upon graduation to a higher level of authority and influence in state affairs. Rationalisation of power and resources in a federal system thus seems to depend upon which end of the spectrum the advocate stands. Because in many instances, as devolution and equity is being canvassed with one edge of the mouth, selfish aggregation and acquisition is actively advanced and justified at the other. Therefore, over history, federalism is more or less a conceptual variable adjusted to meet the recurrent needs of nations and stakeholders as they evolve. And much of what could be achieved in this is subject to the cognisance attached, by those in power, to truly discern the implications of the structural origin and the unending process of federal reconstruction. In all of these, the role of true visionary leadership, as displayed by American federalists, cannot be misplaced.

Over history, federalism as a conceptual variable, has attracted as wide a range of definitions and conceptualisations as there are types and schools of thought concerning all shades of centripetal and centrifugal persuasions. However, for brevity, it is safe to adopt Wheare's classical conceptualisation that sees it as a system of government in which there exists two or more tiers of government, operating on the principles of independence and coordinacy, with each having within its unfettered control enough resources constitutionally guaranteed to enable it to discharge its allotted functions (Wheare and Ransome, 1943; Wheare, 1963). One gap in this framework, however, is non-notation of the variability of structural texture and the evolutionary trajectory of federal systems as a governing construct. Beyond Wheare, but also as distillations of American federalism, several types have been rationalised by scholars, policy analysts and decision-makers, not necessarily expeditiously, but that seems to have altered, to some extent, the neat observance of these Wheare's classical principles. Just to mention a few, we have had the following:

Dual federalism or layer-cake federalism of the US 1865-1945
Characterised by dualism, this was a form in which state and national governments have almost irreconcilable powers of existence and determination. From history, the Fourteenth Amendment of 1861-1868 in America led to the primacy of the national government and the entrenchment of the fundamental rights of citizens over and above the precarious manipulation of any state. It was generally agreed among analysts that rapid industrialisation and the consequent emergence of the US as a strong global economic power between 1868 and 1945 brought about an increased role for the private sector, with the federal government assuming greater regulation of both national

and international economic interests of America. Still rationalising further, the Roosevelt's New Deal Era that addressed the great depression through the early till mid-twentieth century was further observed as the beginning of the emergence of a new type of federalism in which all have a role to play but under the coordinating power of the national government. Though the US tagged this New Deal Federalism, it more or less resembled what is here considered as a Consensual Unimodal Federal System (see Diagram I below).

Cooperative or marble-cake federalism

This was a federal system that prevailed in the US between 1945 and 1969. It intertwined national-state-local relations, with the task of governance, seen as mutual responsibility of all in a seamless flow of power and activity. The system, which resembles the form considered in this paper as a 'consensual multimodal federal system', permits state and local governments to administer many of the federal programmes, with the states depending heavily on federal funds to support their own programmes. In this system, it does not matter which pole controls what power or resources, the object of governance remains seeing and meeting the raison d'être of the state as patriotic responsibility of all.

New federalism

In adjusting the power relations further towards ensuring more engaging development through the collaborative performance by all, the 'new federalism' that emerged in United States in 1969 championed the shedding of power to the sub-national entities. This reconstruction derived from the reasoning that the power of the central government was becoming too overwhelming and suffocating for the state and local governments. And this had to be readjusted to ensure that the goals of the state and governance were best served.

It should, however, be noted that many analysts of these typologies consider this a periodic or episodic effervescence of federal systems, with attention paid only to such variables as division of power, resource sharing, economic and administrative control; most have little or no consideration for structural origin and the evolutionary process as the nodal factors determining how federal systems function and respond to periodic challenges. In the US, the enduring lessons of the causes and effect of the civil war remains a guiding norm for successive careful and non-interruptive reconstruction of her federal system.

While a number of nations have survived many of the challenges they have had in relation to fostering national unity using a federal construct, many, particularly the less-developed heterogeneous ones, which also are more suited to federal arrangement, have failed to outlive their inorganic challenges using the federal framework. To achieve sustainable development, a federal system must have the capacity to achieve relative economic equilibrium among constituent units and, by extension, a balanced power relation if the union is to continue to exist (Babalola, 2015). Whereas, attentions are directed to other variables, it is here argued that what determines the efficacy of a federal system is, at all times, traceable to its structural origin and the process of

its continued reconstruction. This affirmed that it is neither the abundance nor lack of resources as given that determines the functionality of federations. But, just as it is in most successful systems, human rationality has been the magic – found only in the willingness and selflessness of stakeholders to allow for effective determination and balancing of federal consensus (gains and compromises by constituent interests), and in careful observance of the primary contradictions (their structural origin and evolutionary process). In this sense, no two countries run exactly similar systems of federalism, just as no system also ever succeeded using exactly the same system over a long period of time. What operates at any point in time is largely a product of structural origin and the process history of a nation's material existence. For nations such as the US, there was a major difference between the North and the South, a civil war and the bulk of patriotic and selfless statesmen – the federalists. In Nigeria, just like the US, there were strong ethno-cultural differences and a civil war, but less selfless and patriotic statesmen than the federalists of America. After recognising the fundamental fault lines and their guiding basic principles, pragmatic reengagement and reconstruction by stakeholders determines the degree of success or failure that a federal system can achieve. Along this line, four conceptual variables of federalism, based on the logic of their structural origin and process of reconstruction is here deduced, the understanding of which could help in better managing the fault lines.

Attempts to correctly appraise the origin-process logic of federalism beyond such concepts as ethnicity, heterogeneity, devolution, decentralisation, centralisation, national consensus and national integration, also warrant paying attention to the dynamics of statesmanship as supplemental theoretical underpinnings of federalism. Federalism has never succeeded anywhere without patriotic and selfless state leadership. For postcolonial entities that are further burdened by colonial, neocolonial, prebendal and clientelistic tendencies, and corruption, the utilitarian influence of leadership cannot be misplaced. A federal system, by its very nature, is constructed on the principle of one unit also seeking to advance its interest against the other, or at best primarily promoting its interests through collective platforms. Where the latter principle fails to avail expectations of component members, the former becomes the premium. Maintaining systemic equilibrium, therefore, lies in efficacy of moderating the leadership class. Particularly in nations such as Nigeria, the leadership class has failed, more apparently in the immediate past administration. Briefly explained, from the focus of this paper, the two principal determinants of how federal systems turns out are their structural origin and evolutionary process.

Structural origin

This hinges on the number of distinct, identifiable social groupings that make up a given federal political system; with the assumption that a federal system will consist of at least one (unimodal) or more (multimodal) major ethnic grouping(s) alongside other minor distinctions. This approach is justified because the evolution of most federal systems is predicated upon the existence of noticeable natural or cultural differences. Key among these differences is language. According to Isaac George (1976):

Members of any speech community that share one language usually have a feeling of belonging to a particular ethnic group, and all other speech communities with whom direct linguistic communication is impossible are automatically regarded as alien. It may, in fact, be the case that the aliens have many non-linguistic features in common with the group, but once they are separated by language; other similarities are almost obliterated. Language then is a magnetic force, binding a speech community together, since it provides a means of identifying its members as belonging to a specific group (see also Vincent Ostrom 1988).

Because of the exacerbation of this natural distinction, other distinctions such as religion, and differing levels of economic and human development, and the failure on the part of the leadership to govern for the interests of all, become very potent instruments of discord in developing federations like Nigeria.

Evolutionary process

The second criterion that determines the efficacy of a federal system from a theoretical viewpoint is the process of evolvement, construction and reconstruction. This hinges on how the socioeconomic and political principles and structures are crafted – whether voluntary, in which case it will be spontaneous, or negotiated or enforced. Whichever of these paths a nation takes in evolving a federal framework, it fundamentally affects the logic of operation of her federal system. And, this also determines what needs to be done, in terms of engagement, reengagement and reconstruction in order to ensure sustenance.

Therefore, in an attempt to theoretically distill modelling of federalism by nature or structural origin, two grand types can be identified, which when juxtaposed with the process of evolution, can give rise to four prototype models of federal systems (see Figure 1, 2 and 3). A third major type – bimodal, could also be distilled. But, the fact remains that federalism runs towards either unity or diversity (one or many), and aims at either integration or devolution. Since in every state or society there will always be other lines of social distinction as hinted above, for the purpose of conceptual clarity, it is here assumed that it is safe to subsume other possible denominations under the above spectrum; the rationale for this will become obvious upon deeper insight into the four models. Therefore, for analysis, we can conveniently settle on unimodal and multimodal federalism as archetypes of natural federations.

Fig. 1 Classification of federal systems

STRUCTURAL ORIGIN (1)	PROCESS (2)	
	Compulsive	Consensual
Unimodal	Dominative A	Integrative C
Multimodal	Contentious B	Cooperative D

The above diagram (see also Fig 2) reveals that either of the two types of federalism (unimodal or multimodal) can produce compulsive or consensual systems. In this case, it is possible to have a compulsively engineered, dominative unimodal federal system in which there is a high level of reprehension manifesting high degrees of socio, economic and political centralisation and turbulence, but usually not as catastrophic and intimidating as compulsively engineered, contentious multimodal federal systems, as obtained in Nigeria, Yugoslavia, and the South-Central African federation, whose disintegration gave birth to Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi.

On the reverse side, a federal system can be multimodal and yet cooperative just as unimodal can be genuinely integrative. It is the rudiments of socioeconomic and political processes of evolution, engagement and reconstruction that from a structural point of view determine whether or not a federal system fails or succeeds outstandingly. From the purview of this paper, in the main, three key factors determine the continued subsistence of all systems, including federations: one, the nature of a society; two, the circumstances of its formation; and three, developmental experiences. Of the three, given the natural determination of nature, once formed, most nations only have the privilege of managing just one of the above variables – developmental experience – here considered as the process of reengagement and reconstruction. Given visionary leadership, nations have used the process of reconstruction to rewrite their history, permitting desirable alignments and realignments in power and resources. The central postulation here reaffirmed is that, depending on how a nation, through the process of governance, handles her developmental experiences, almost every federal system could succeed or fail outstandingly. Analysts such as Woodrow Wilson, Bruce Catton, Gardner and O'Nell, Edwin C. Rozwene, Edward C. Martin, Martin W. Sandler and C. Herman Pritchett have all shown that America's arch-federalism did not attain the contiguity and congruency it has today without some trying moments; it takes the ingenuity of human agency to determine the fate of nations. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, history has shown that no matter how powerful, almost every federal system could fail if developmental experiences so condition.

'Structural origin' and 'evolutionary process' as the determinants of forms of federal systems

The origin and evolutionary process of federal systems are the grand norms that determine their success or failure. Even though the US emerged arguably from heterogeneous systems, like average African states such as Nigeria, with major distinct cultural affinities between the North and the South and between the original thirteen colonies, the process of pacting federalism in America had no direct input from colonial masters. Though, it was colonially-related, it was simply a response to colonial challenges and not its product. The American federation, unlike the Nigerian experience, had no colonial infrastructure and input, it was purely a product of ingenious political engineering of Americans completely devoid of British interest. This is evident considering the statement credited to Little Poor Richard of American's Commonsense, which drew the attention

of mankind into the American dispute with Great Britain. Paine, citing Richard, noted:

> *The British constitutional system was noble for the dark and slavish time in which it was erected, but no longer suffices for American need in a more complex era. England's system could not be America's. Its interest were no longer America's, England's future was limited. America was not... (cited in Gardner and O'Nell, 1974:49).*

Even though these two countries are the best of international allies and powers today, it nevertheless points to the importance of a people and nation independently determining what their goals and path to achieving it should be.

Although it has been noted that factors of heterogeneity are many, the following appears more deterministic: ethnicity (race, language, culture, etc.), resources: (socio, economic political inequalities or variations); history (this exists where people do not experience a similar past socially, economically or politically). However, with the history of the United States, Switzerland, and the reinvented Germany, all federal systems can be successful, depending on the degree to which the process efforts are geared toward success, paying informed attention to the 'origin' of such political architecture, and in the process, producing either a federal system that is organic or inorganic. In furtherance of the process argument that hinges more on the importance of leadership, the ongoing arguments are further reinforced, that: one, society is made up of several groupings and each subset strives for survival and self-preservation; and, two, cells or groups will embrace any relationship that guarantees their continued existence, but dispel if otherwise. This is largely a function of process.

Fig. 2 The conceptual variables of the prototype models of federalism

Type A: Compulsive Unimodal Federalism (Dominative)	Type B: Consensual Unimodal Federalism (Integrative)
1. One visible dominant group	1. One visible dominant group
2. Formation by coercion or compulsion such as the colonial balkanisation and packaging of African states	2. Formation by negotiation and agreement arising from curiosity to cooperate as a result of socio, economic exigencies such as threat of war, or external domination, etc.
3. Asymmetric order	3. Consociationalism
4. Autocratic political system	4. Popular participation in governance
5. Parochial, conservative and characterised by primitive accumulation	5. Equity, liberty and fairness
6. Ethnic domination, deprivation and terrosism	6. National integration and cooperation
7. Poor sense of national identity	7. High degree of national loyalty and patriotism
8. Oligarchical government	8. Aristocratic coalition of various interests in governance
9. Poor socio, economic and political development	9. Commendable socio-economic development

10. Occasional breakdown of law and order	10. Major positive breakthroughs
Type C: Compulsive Multimodal Federalism (Contentious)	**Type D: Consensual Multimodal Federalism (Cooperative)**
1. Prevalence of several distinct socio ethnic groups with a strong basis of ethnic pride and means	1. Prevalence of several distinct dominant but unity-desiring groups
2. Mostly formed as a legacy of colonial compression	2. Formation by negotiation and agreement to either withstand external aggression or for socio-economic and political advantages
3. Have dominant features of domination and contention	3. Cooperative and highly mobilised citizens
4. Praetorian and unstable sociopolitical order	4. Cooperative polycentrism and a commendable degree of democratic institutionalisation
5. Undue centralisation, parochial and prebendalistic economic order	5. Institutional and economic liberalisation aimed at mutual development of all based on nationally agreed modalities
6. Poor national cooperation and unsuccessful integration efforts	6. High level of social cooperation, integration, social diffusion and mobilisation
7. Poor national identity, high degree of ethnocentrism, prevalence of ethnic acute rivalry, disturbance and terrorism.	7. High sense of national loyalty and patriotism as displayed by the political authority in America to protect the universal interest of Americans and avoid the tarnishing of its image over the Bush/Florida saga in the last presidential election of George Bush (Jnr)
8. Conservatively autocratic	8. Proven observance of ethics of liberal democracy
9. Distorted socio-economic and political development	9. Stably developing socio-economic, political and scientific order
10. Major breakdown of law and order, sporadic ethnic confrontation, civil war and disturbances.	10. Major breakthroughs that makes significant contribution to the well-being of the society.

Fig. 3   Criteria of classification

1	Societal social structure
2	Origin of the federal structure
3	Nature of the federal arrangement
4	The political order
5	Institutional order of economic control
6	Social condition
7	Degree of patriotism and national unity
8	Nature of governance
9	Developmental level
10	Major occurrences or events

It is appropriate to state at this point that most federating systems in Africa are inorganic; a kind of federation in which the line of demarcation remains apparent, maintained and aggravated for the specific, exclusive objectives of each of the subsisting component units, with little or no care for the continued health of the systemic whole. Only organic federations can properly function as a political system, in that each and every component sees itself contributing to, and deriving its existence and well-being from the health of the whole. America, Canada, Switzerland and Germany have achieved this feat. It is also appropriate to affirm that Nigerian federalism is largely construed, and has been functioning as, an inorganic political system. As a contentious multimodal federal system, rarely is a sufficient good number of leaders from component units greatly burdened about the survival of the whole other than preservation of their respective primordial interests.

However, there is consensus among scholars that Ancient Greek and even some traditional African societies, as found in the large kingdoms and empires and in micro kingdoms with well-ordered layered systems of government among the Ekitis, the Ijebus and the Egbas, had some semblance of a federation. However, there is no iota of doubt as to the fact that the orthodox and contemporaneous concept and practice of federalism had its origin in America. According to Alexis de Tocqueville (cited in Vincent Ostrom, 1988):

> In that land (North America) the great experiment of the attempt to construct society upon a new basis was to be made by civilized man; and it was there, for the first time, that theories hitherto unknown or deemed impracticable; were to exhibit a spectacle for which the world had not been prepared by the history of the past.

Hence, the American system, which correlates to the cooperative multimodal model (D) in the above figures, is often referred to as mother or arch-federalism. The circumstances leading to the evolution of federalism in America was well documented by Gardner and O'Nell (1974, p.68), noting that since their fight against British colonialism was waged, in their view then, to destroy tyranny, "public men in the post-war era were naturally most concerned with preventing its reoccurrence." This was the central political issue of the time and it was recognised as such by everyone, whether federalists or anti-federalists. "They differ mainly in the degree of power the central government ought to have and also where threat to liberty originated" (ibid). Obviously, the then American leaders compartmentalised into two opposing major groups, had mutual fear of possible domination. Those in the party of Washington and Hamilton were federalists demanding or eager to see an America where there would be "less local autonomy and a stronger central government will exist to facilitate trade and partly to check democratizing tendencies" which to them was the chief threat to liberty thought to be the strongest at the grassroots level (ibid). Gardner and O'Nell continued by saying that the second major party composed of anti-federalists – notable among which were Jefferson and Madison, who feared: "centralized power more than they did local democracy. They were more concerned with preserving agriculture than with encouraging trade. They idealised farmers and detested towns and townsmen" (ibid). This shows that a gulf of differences exist between the two contending parties. Therefore, the need

for negotiation, arrangements, compromises and consensus cannot be over-exaggerated. Hence, according to the analysts, "the result of these competing forces and ambition was an ingenious compromise that worked because it secured or conceded the chief interests of both sides" (*ibid*).

It is, therefore, needless to spend time convincing anyone that where tendencies towards over-centralisation exist in a profoundly heterogeneous society, there cannot be but fear, rivalry, jealousy and fear of domination. Where the fear seems imminent due to an uncaring disposition of those in government, each subunit will have no alternative but to be determined to protect and advance their interests over and above the health of others within the commonwealth. This further makes the task of nation-building an arduous one, as the units nursing the fear of central encroachment on their authority will not easily find it expedient to cooperate in the art of state governance. Burn in 1963 (cited in Ostrom, 1988) had affirmed that:

> *... the structural characteristics of decision-making arrangements comprising each unit of government (reveals that) the juxtaposition of opposite and rival interest among autonomous units capable of imposing vetoes in relation to one another is likely to be accompanied by stalemate among those decision structure and yield what might be referred to as a deadlock of democracy.*

Examples of such stalemates are many in Nigeria. There have been stalemates in leadership elections at party and national levels. As revealed in press reports on 7 August, 2001, there was a stalemate on resource control and the revenue allocation formula. There have been several skirmishes on the secularity of the Nigerian State, just as there have been controversies and stalemates on corruption control, sometimes leading to disagreement between the federal authorities and State governments, or between parties in and out of government, and between groups within the nation as to how corruption should be handled, depending on who or what region, or class of culprit was concerned.

Just as controversies trail the federal state fiscal and politico-administrative relations at higher tiers of government, so there are conflicts between the State and the local governments. A discussion on the network service of the Nigerian Television Authority on 3 September, 2012 just as it was happening in virtually all the states in Nigeria, revealed the high tension between Imo state government and the local government authorities over revenue sharing. Babalola (2015), in his appraisal of Nigeria, submitted that fiscal federalism has not spurred the desired development as envisaged by the architects of the system. In Babalola's analysis, the country's over-dependence on oil, as well as the concentration of economic resources at the federal centre, are at the heart of the country's lack of economic success. Placing the 'local component' as a fundamental subset of federalism, in his rationalisation, which must have been informed by 'Dillon rule', Dominel asserted: "in the final analysis, state-local relations are conditioned by the doctrine of state supremacy". And, based on the Nigerian constitutional framework and experience, Ayoade noted that the negation of the principle of a third tier of government is revealed in the action of state legislatures abrogating the flat tax. Whereas the constitution allocated the function of the

collection of rates, radio and television licenses to the local governments, the political authority at the state level took political decision, thereby abrogating the flat tax. Ayoade summed up the functional and constitutional consequences thus: "apart from creating problems of economic viability, one wonders whether that is not tantamount to a positive breach of the constitution". As an added sign of improper pacting of federal arrangement in Nigeria, in so far as the states, just like the national authorities, unilaterally decide to usurp the powers and functions, and keep the constitutionally allocated rights and resources of the local government to itself, it is to that extent that there will exist an incongruence of opinions between the federation and the state on the one hand, and between the state and local governments on the other hand, in matters of national development. When this occurs, other sociological discord variables easily crept in, leading to "fissiparous ethnic loyalties, resulting in the modern forms of segementary oppositions ... [where] the salience of ethnic domains contend against the authority and autonomy of the African state" (Ekeh, 1989 p. 2).

Probing into the problem of achieving cohesion in a multiethnic society, Grigulevish (1979:292) noted that the so-called tribes and clan groups of certain people hid deep class antagonism. In the same vein, Ismagilova cited Soviet Africanists – Olderogge, Potekhin, Ismagilova, Yablochkov and others – to establish the fact that tribes and clan communities survive in Africa in many cases only as an outer shell that does not correspond to the new social content. In their submission, behind the external diversity of ethnic tribes, anonymous, bigger ethnic communities are already concealed. It is indisputable that despite several decades of attempt at national unity, to these analysts, there are still considerable traces of a clan/tribal consciousness in Nigeria and Africa, as relics of clan/tribal structures and of many social phenomena characteristic of past epochs. As a result of the poor attempt at nation-building and jaundiced developmental experiences, a number of developing federal systems in Africa still portray a semblance of the nineteenth century German society in which:

> Everywhere was rigidly stratified into hide bound castes which looked upon each other with contempt or envy and movement between which was extremely difficult (Elie Kedourie, 1979 p. 42-.56.)

In such societies where distinct social structures are dictatorially subsumed under a gigantic ethnicised central domination, we cannot but have "the overriding and pervasive feelings of alienation... the indeterminacy of what are the citizens' rights, obligations and responsibilities... [as well as the consequential], weakness of the state" (Olowu et al p. 2). To Olowu et al (1995 p. 2) therefore:

> everywhere one turns in Nigeria, one is confronted by the strong feeling of alienation among people... reflected in people not being sure how they belong to the 'modern' postcolonial Nigerian state, and whether they are expected to have any stake, commitment or obligation to that state.

In the middle of the second decade of the twenty-first century, due to failure of the leadership class to fashion and keep reconstructing mutually beneficial federal logics in Nigeria, various groups, ranging from socio-economic to cultural and from political to tribal, seem mainly to be interested in their own advancement. Many of these groups rarely see Nigeria as a project worth nurturing, let alone to begin to think of how to ensure its smooth governance through nationally agreed modalities.

Conclusion

One major implication drawn from the above is that federations are of various types based on structure and process. Federations are never static but dynamic systems that structures and logistics of operation change according to times and tides. It has also been proven that most developing federations such as Nigeria, consequent upon failure of the leadership class at pacting, as occasions demands, systems that are mutually beneficial to all, often have to contend with inherent and incessant social discord and developmental stalemates. All the constitutional tinkering has come to naught and the power to make the constitution is held by leaders with monarchical ambition or those for whom power is an inevitable life support system (Abdul-Rahman 2012). Thus, the failure at following the path towards availing equitable structures and processes has also stalled the achievement of effective and strong states that developed federations such as America, Switzerland, and Germany have. Therefore, these dominant and contentious federations in the less-developed region of Africa, unlike the integrative and cooperative federal models and experiences of the developed federations, using the expression of Migdal (1988), overtly lacked the genuine capacity to penetrate their society, regulate its social relationships, and has prevented them, the states, from being able to extract the resources they need from the society. As it is in Nigeria, almost in all cases, due to corrupt governance that is absent of national ideals and goals, they have also all failed to appropriate or use those resources towards national development. With continued leadership failure at fostering national unity and development, several of these federal experiments remains threatened as they grow in age.

With major fault lines such as heterogeneity, imagined or real manifestation of ethnic domination, consequent ethnic motivated polycentric tendencies, lack of national loyalty and patriotism, and the ever increasing attendant scourge of corrupt governance, most developing multimodal federal systems such as Nigeria urgently require the emergence of a leadership class that will transcend primordial proclivity. Sustaining federal arrangement in systems such as Nigeria requires statesmanship that will, through selfless commitment to the task of nation-building, demonstrate with noticeable patriotic examples and achievements, that federations are not frameworks constructed for unending struggles for survival of the fittest, but a veritable means of pooling resources to enjoy political economics of scale (see Anyebe, 2015) by consenting to sub-national component units. On the contrary, from the theoretical distillations attempted here, the more attempts at neglecting the fundamental differences in social taxonomies and interests,

the more the prevalence of corrupt and parochial leadership in acutely underdeveloped and contentious multimodal federal systems like Nigeria, and the more the continued eruption of catastrophic political landmines. It is precisely this difficulty of pacting a mutually-benefitting federal arrangement that has made the task of setting, pursuing and attaining national development agendas very difficult. Also, it is the same bane that has made the control of all forms of social vices very difficult and their continued propagation very easy.

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